HRS.
OF THE LATE SPS. LUCIANO G.R. No. 173891
P. LIM and SALUD NAKPIL
BAUTISTA, namely: LUIS LIM, Present:
LEONARDO LIM, QUISUMBING, J.,
Petitioners, Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
- versus - VELASCO,
JR., and
BRION,
JJ.
THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE Promulgated:
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON
Successor of the late Judge
Marciano
Bacalla of the said Court;
AMPARO
CAÑOSA; and the REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF
Respondents.
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Tinga,
J.:
This
treats of the Petition for Review[1] on
certiorari of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 83013 dated
On
On
Petitioners claimed that when
respondent Cañosa filed a petition for the reconstitution
of TCT No. 169395, covering 33,914 sq m on
For
her part, respondent Cañosa alleged
that there was no fraud and that
the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication had been complied with;
thus, the trial court did not err when it ordered the reconstitution of TCT No.
169395. She also claimed that the title issued to petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest was spurious because it emanated from Psd-17268 which
covered a lot located in Nueva Ecija and not
The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its
Petitioners sought reconsideration of
the resolution, but their motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals on
Now,
petitioners, on the one hand, posit that the Court of Appeals erred when it made a finding of fact through a mere
physical comparison of the technical descriptions in the TCTs without first allowing the parties to
vindicate their respective claims, at least during the pre-trial or more
properly, in a trial held for the purpose.
They also question the Court of Appeals’ refusal to resolve the issue of ownership of the
subject lot, arguing that in a petition under Rule 47, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, the appellate
court is allowed to be a trier of facts.[13]
Petitioners reiterate that Judge Bacalla’s decision is null
and void for having been issued without jurisdiction and for having been secured
through extrinsic fraud. They argue that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the property subject of the
reconstitution proceedings because said property is already covered by other
existing titles in the name of other owners, many of which have been
administratively reconstituted after their original TCTs
were destroyed by fire. They point out
the finding of the former head of the EDP unit of the
records exist of Yu Chi Hua’s (predecessor
of respondent) ownership of 33,914 sq m of land in
Respondent Cañosa,
on the other hand, maintains that the Court of Appeals followed the correct
procedure when it dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment because
under Section 5, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, it may dismiss outright such a petition if it
finds no substantial merit in it. She
points out that petitioners did not allege nor present anything that would
contradict the technical description of the two titles and that the
certificates of title of the two lots are conclusive on all
matters contained therein, not only on ownership but also on its location and its
metes and bounds.[15]
Considering that her lot is not
inside, affected by or subsumed in respondent Cañosa’s
lot, petitioners allegedly have no personality and right to be notified of the
reconstitution proceedings nor do they have any right to file the petition for
annulment of judgment.[16] Respondent Cañosa also argues that a petition for
annulment of judgment is not the proper
remedy because what petitioners really wanted is the determination of ownership
which the Court of Appeals, however, has no jurisdiction to decide in the first instance.[17] She adds that the petition was already time-barred, it having been filed more than four (4) years
from
We dismiss the petition.
In a petition for annulment of
judgment, the court is tasked to look if there exists extrinsic fraud or lack of
jurisdiction.[20] However, in this case, a preliminary but critical question has to be
disposed of before a proper
determination can be arrived at—that is, whether petitioners are the real
parties-in-interest.
A real party-in-interest is defined as
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. “Interest” within the meaning
of the rule means “material
interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental
interest.”[21] To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest
in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present
real owner of the right sought to be enforced.[22]
The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioners’ and respondent Cañosa’s
properties are different, thus:
A
simple comparison of the transfer certificate of titles presented by the
parties reveal that the property claimed by petitioners is entirely different and does not even form
part of the land covered by TCT No. 169395 sought to be reconstituted by
private respondent.
The technical
description in petitioners’ title described their alleged property as Lot 10
Blk. 3 of the subdn plan. [P]sd-34194 being a portion of
We reviewed the titles presented by
both parties in
the proceedings below and arrived at the same conclusion as that of the Court of Appeals.[24] Indeed, per their TCT, petitioners’ lot was
derived from Lot-22-D-3, whereas respondent Cañosa’s covers
the entire
Petitioners are not real parties-in-interest
because the reconstitution of the original and duplicate copy of TCT No. 169395
will have no effect on their property, the latter being different from, and not
even a part of the property covered by
the reconstituted title. One having no
right or interest of his own to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as a party plaintiff in an action, thus petitioners’ petition for
annulment of judgment was rightfully dismissed.
Petitioners impute error to the Court
of Appeals when it dismissed their petition after it concluded, on the basis of its
simple comparison of petitioners’ and
respondent’s TCTs, that the properties covered by the
two titles are entirely different.
Petitioners argue
that the Court of Appeals should have conducted a trial and
received evidence; and having failed to do so, its conclusion was allegedly not
only flawed but was also arrived at with grave abuse of discretion and without
due process.[25] We do not agree.
The Court of Appeals did not dismiss
the petition for annulment of judgment outright. In fact, it required respondent Cañosa to file her answer, and even allowed the filing of an amended answer─proof that it
was predisposed to consider the
arguments of both parties before it even decided to finally dismiss the
petition. Mere filing of a petition for
annulment of judgment does not guarantee the holding of trial or reception of
evidence. A petition for annulment of judgment may in fact be dismissed outright if it has no
prima facie merit.[26] With more reason that the Court of Appeals may dismiss a petition even without a hearing if it finds that based on the averments in the petition and
the responsive pleading, the annulment of the assailed judgment is not
warranted.
Petitioners also maintain that the
Court of Appeals should have taken cognizance of the questions of fact which
they raised in the petition for annulment of judgment, empowered as it were by
Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, which provides that:
Sec.6. Procedure. – The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be
observed. Should a trial be necessary,
the reception of the evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a
judge of a Regional Trial Court.
Petitioners
utterly miss the point. To repeat, with
the finding that the property described
in their title is different from that of respondent Cañosa,
the petition for annulment of judgment must necessarily fail. And that should put a stop on the
matter. However, the Court of Appeals
noted that both parties raised issues of ownership and spuriousness of their
respective titles — with petitioners claiming that no records exist in the Quezon City
Assessor’s Office nor in the Taxation (Real Estate Division) of the ownership
of respondent Cañosa’s predecessor-in-interest over
a 33,914 sq m land in Quezon City, and with respondent Cañosa
asserting that the title issued to petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest is a
spurious, having emanated from a spurious private subdivision survey (Psd) plan.
Obviously, the validity of the parties’ respective titles is being
attacked, in a proceeding which was brought merely to seek the nullification of
an order of reconstitution. This cannot be allowed. It is a well-settled doctrine that a
certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered,
modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.[27] This is the very same reason why the Court of
Appeals could not, and did not deign to, resolve the matter of ownership. The
Court of Appeals’ declaration that it is not a trier of facts must be taken
within this context.
There is no more need to dwell on the
issues of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction considering that petitioners are not real
parties-in-interest. In any case, a perusal of the decision of the trial court
shows that the jurisdictional requirements have been complied with.[28] The trial court also found that respondent Cañosa is the equitable owner of the property, having
purchased the same from Yu Chi Hua, as evidenced by a
deed of absolute sale.[29] By virtue of such sale, she came into possession
of the owner’s duplicate copy of the title, [30]
and may thus file the petition for reconstitution as she in fact did.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED,
and the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[3]
[4]
[24]The
technical description of petitioners’ title, TCT NO. RT-97223 (27997) reads:
A parcel of land (
while TCT No. RT-120722 (169395) of respondent Cañosa reads:
A parcel of land (Lot 22-A of the
subdn, plan (LRC) Psd-74624, being a portion of Lot 22 described on plan
Psu-32606, LRC (CLRO) Rec. No. 1037), situated in the Mun. of Montalban, Prov.
Of Rizal, Is. of
[26]Rules of
Court, Rule 47, Sec. 5,
Rule 47 provides:
SEC. 5. Action by the court. — Should the court find no substantial
merit in the petition, the same may be dismissed outright with specific reasons
for such dismissal.
Should
prima facie merit be found in the
petition, the same shall be given due course, and summons shall be served on
the respondent.
[30]Id. Respondent
Cañoza was
also authorized by Yu Chi Hua, the registered title
holder and owner, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney, to file the
petition for reconstitution. It appears
that respondent was unable to register the deed of absolute sale in her favor
because the fire destroyed the original
copy of the title.