Republic of the
Supreme Court
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SHARICA MARI L.
GO-TAN |
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G.R. No. 168852 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., |
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Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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REYES, JJ. |
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SPOUSES PERFECTO
C. TAN |
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and JUANITA L.
TAN, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents.* |
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September 30, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Resolution[1]
dated
The factual background of the case:
On
On
On
On February 28, 2005, petitioner
filed a Comment on Opposition[11]
to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A.
No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the
protection and safety of victims of violence.
On
On
On
On
Verified
Motion for Reconsideration. The
RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262
would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a
pure question of law, to wit:
WHETHER
OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA,
MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “ANTI-VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004”.[17]
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262
must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262
which explicitly provides for the suppletory
application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on
“conspiracy” under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily
applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design
and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support;
harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that
respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for
complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents
submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof
explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by
marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that
allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination
which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents
cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their
presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal,
considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the
petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines
''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as
“any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual
or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm
or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.”
While the said provision provides
that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262
expressly provides for the suppletory application of
the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47.
Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised
Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis
supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of
the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses
not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions
of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the
latter should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed
from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes
punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special
law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,[18] the Court applied suppletorily
the provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of
violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the “Revised Motor Vehicle Law,”
noting that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant could
be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai
Cheung,[19] the Court applied suppletorily the rules on
the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the
accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise
known as the “Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972,” considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury,[20] the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17,
18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words “principal,” “accomplices” and
“accessories” under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the “Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,” because said words were not defined therein,
although the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons
liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v.
People,[21]
the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg.
22, otherwise known as the “Bouncing Checks
Law,” noting the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in
said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,[22]
the Court applied suppletorily the principle of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg.
22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the
principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express
provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by
their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy
may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For
once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the
act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals.[23]
It must be
further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the
acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an
offender through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of
Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of
the following acts:
x
x x
(h)
Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman
or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:
(1)
Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2)
Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her
child;
(3)
Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her
child against her/his will;
(4)
Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals
or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5)
Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order
that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of
violence against the woman or her
child may include
individuals other than the
offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. –
x x x The
protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or
all of the following reliefs:
(a)
Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing,
personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of
this Act;
(b)
Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting
or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262
calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This
Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of
the statute is the law[24]
and that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of
R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction
as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its
true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio
unios est exclusio alterius” finds no
application here. It must be remembered
that this maxim is only an “ancillary rule of statutory construction.” It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of
discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not
be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.[25]
The Court notes
that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of
circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents
to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary
matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on
the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is
not a trier of facts.[26]
It is thus premature for petitioner to
argue evidentiary matters since this
controversy is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be
included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence
or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that the
principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily
to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be
considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* The present petition impleaded the Court of Appeals as respondent. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, the name of the Court of Appeals is deleted from the title.
[1] Penned by Judge Romeo F. Zamora, records, p. 209.
[2]
[3] Records,
p. 21.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] SEC. 5. Acts of
Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of
the following acts:
x x
x x
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman
or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the
right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her
child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed
against the woman or her child. This
shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the
purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or child's movement
or conduct:
x x
x x
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the
woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the
woman or her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, or controlling the
victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common
money, or properties;
x x
x x
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her
child. This shall include, but not be
limited to, the following acts:
x x
x x
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or
violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public
ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited
to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.
[8] Entitled “AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN
PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”.
[9] Records,
p. 26.
[10] Records,
p. 36.
[11]
[12]
[13] Latin maxim meaning “The expression of one thing is the exclusion
of another.” (San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-Phil. Transport
and General Workers Org. v. San Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union-Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino,
G.R. No. 171153, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 125, 152).
[14] Records,
p. 316.
[15]
[16]
[17] Rollo, p. 8.
[18] 60 Phil. 712 (1934).
[19] G.R.
Nos. 90440-42,
[20] G.R.
Nos. 129577-80,
[21] G.R.
No. 134172,
[22] G.R.
No. 141066,
[23] Ladonga v.
People, supra note 22; People
v. Felipe, G.R. No. 142505, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 146, 176; People
v. Julianda, Jr., G.R. No. 128886,
November 23, 2001, 370 SCRA 448, 469; People v. Quinicio,
G.R. No. 142430, September 13, 2001, 365 SCRA 252, 266.
[24] Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 160528, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 90,
101; Eugenio v. Drilon,
322 Phil. 112 (1996); Philippine National
Bank v. Office of the President, 322 Phil. 6, 14 (1996); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86
Phil. 50, 57 (1950); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, 145-146 (1931).
[25] Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,
G.R. No.
132527, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA
47, 78; Dimaporo v. Mitra,
Jr., G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 779, 792; Primero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
48468-69, November 22, 1989, 179 SCRA 542, 548-549.
[26] Superlines Transportation
Company, Inc. v. Philippine National Construction Company, G.R. No. 169596, March 28, 2007,
519 SCRA 432, 441; Insular Life
Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28,
2004, 428 SCRA 79, 85.