CARLOS C. DE CASTRO,
Petitioner, -
versus - LIBERTY BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. and EDGARDO QUIOGUE, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 165153
Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
carpio MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: September 23, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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Before
us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed
by petitioner Carlos C. de Castro (petitioner)
to annul, reverse and/or set aside the Decision[2]
dated May 25, 2004 and the Resolution[3]
dated August 30, 2004 of the Former Special Third Division of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79207 entitled “Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. and Edgardo B. Quiogue v. National
Labor Relations Commission and Carlos C. de Castro.”
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
The facts of the case as gathered from the records are
briefly summarized below.
The petitioner commenced his employment with respondent
Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. (respondent company) as Building
Administrator on
In his answer, the petitioner denied the allegations
against him contained in the affidavits of respondents’ witnesses, Vicente Niguidula
(Niguidula) and Gil Balais (Balais).[5] The
petitioner labeled all of the respondents’ accusations as completely baseless
and sham, designed to protect Niguidula and Balais who were the favorite boys
of respondent Edgardo Quiogue (Quiogue), the Executive Vice President of
the respondent company. At the petitioner’s request, the respondent company scheduled
a formal hearing at
On
1. Soliciting
and/or receiving money for his own benefit from suppliers/dealers/traders Aying
and Samarita, representing “commissions” for job contracts involving the
repair, reconditioning and replacement of parts of the airconditioning units at
the company’s Antipolo Station, as well as the installation of fire exits at
the Technology Centre;
2. Diversion
of company funds by soliciting and receiving on different occasions a total of P14,000.00
in “commissions” from Aying for a job contract in the company’s Antipolo
Station;
3. Theft
of company property involving the unauthorized removal of one gallon of Delo oil
from the company storage room;
4. Disrespect/discourtesy
towards a co-employee, for using offensive language against Niguidula;
5. Disorderly
behavior, for challenging Niguidula to a fight during working hours within
company premises, thereby creating a disturbance that interrupted the normal
flow of activities in the company;
6. Threat
and coercion, for threatening to inflict bodily harm on the person of Niguidula
and for coercing Balais, a subordinate, into soliciting money in his (the
petitioner’s) behalf from suppliers/contractors;
7. Abuse
of authority, for instructing Balais to collect commissions from Aying and
Samarita, and for requiring Raul Pacaldo (Pacaldo) to exact 2%-5% of the
price of the contracts awarded to suppliers; and
8. Slander,
for uttering libelous statements against Niguidula.
The petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against the respondents with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Arbitration Branch in the National Capital Region. At the arbitration, he denied
committing the offenses charged. He maintained that: he could not encourage
solicitation of commissions from suppliers considering that he was quite new in
the company; the accusations are belated because the imputed acts happened in
1995; the one gallon of Delo oil he allegedly carted away was at the room of Balais
at the time, which circumstance he immediately relayed to Mandap; the
affidavits of Niguidula and Balais are not reliable because he had altercations
with them; in the first week of May 1996, he reprimanded Balais for incurring
unnecessary overtime work, which Balais resented; on May 9, 1996, Niguidula
verbally assaulted and challenged him to a fight, which he reported to
respondent Quiogue and to the Makati Police. Attached to the petitioner’s
position paper were the affidavits[8] of
Aying and Ronalisa O. Rosana, a telephone operator of the company.
On
On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and adopted the findings of Labor Arbiter
Tamayo who had reviewed the appeal on the NLRC’s instructions.[10] It ruled that Arbiter Pati erred in
disregarding the affidavits of the respondents’ witnesses.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the
NLRC granted in a Resolution promulgated on
The NLRC turned down the motion for reconsideration that
the respondent company subsequently filed.[12] The
respondent company thus elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The CA granted the petition in its Decision promulgated on
The petitioner moved but failed to secure a reconsideration
of the CA Decision; hence, he came to us through the present petition.
THE
PETITION
The
petitioner submits that the CA erred when it acted as a trial court and interfered
without sufficient basis with the NLRC’s findings. Citing our ruling in Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. NLRC, et al.,[14]
he points out that factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when they
coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, are accorded respect and finality and
should not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence.
The petitioner points out, too, that Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court finds full application only when an administrative tribunal has acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction, or when such finding is not supported by the evidence. He argues
that the respondent company failed to raise any jurisdictional question of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion before the CA. What the respondent company
effectively sought from the CA, citing our ruling in Flores v. NLRC,[15]
was a judicial re-evaluation of the adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence on
record – an improper exercise of power outside the scope of the extraordinary
writ of certiorari.
The petitioner further argues that the CA erred when it substituted
its judgment for that of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who were the “triers of
facts” who had the opportunity to review the evidence extensively.
The petitioner theorizes that his termination from
employment was a hatchet job maliciously concocted by the respondents, with
Quiogue at the helm. He had offended Quiogue when he questioned the latter’s
award of the fire exit contract to Samarita; as a result, Quiogue fabricated
charges against him, using his underlings Niguidula and Balais. He particularly questions the charge that he
conspired with his fellow managers (such as Niguidula, Pacaldo and even
Personnel Manager Mandap) in December 1995, and asks why his investigation and
the supporting evidence came only in May 1996.
The petitioner likewise cites Aying’s change of statement
as evidence that the respondents’ charges have been concoctions. He belies that he slandered and challenged Niguidula
to a fight; it was in fact Niguidula who had defamed him. He stresses that he
complained in writing to respondent Quiogue about the incident immediately
after it happened, copy furnished B. P. Mandap, F. A. Domingo and R. M. Moreno,
the Personnel Manager, Head of Human Relations and President of the company, respectively. He likewise reported the matter to the police
and to the barangay covering the workplace, and lodged a complaint for grave
oral defamation against Niguidula before the Makati Prosecutor’s Office. His co-employee, Ronalisa Rosana,
corroborated all these allegations. He points out that Niguidula never reported
the incident to Quiogue or to anyone for that matter, thus, proving the falsity
of his (Niguidula’s) complaint.
Finally, the petitioner draws attention to Quiogue’s
failure to act on his complaint against Niguidula, only to resurrect it under
the Notice of Violation served on him on
THE
CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS
The respondents submit that the CA correctly ruled as the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it flip-flopped in its factual
findings. They further stress that the positive testimonies of Balais, Pacaldo, and Samarita should be given credence over
the negative testimony of the petitioner. Even granting that the testimony of
Niguidula was tainted with malice and bad faith, the affidavit of Balais should
stand because no evidence supports the petitioner’s claim that Balais also had
altercations with him before he (Balais) executed his two affidavits.
With respect to the testimony of Samarita, the respondents
point out that Samarita stated in no uncertain terms that he was forced to increase
his quotation for the construction of the company fire exits from P70,091.00
to P87,000.00 because the petitioner had asked for commissions. The petitioner failed to rebut this. They brush aside the insinuation that Samarita
and Pacaldo suffer from bias as the petitioner failed to show by evidence that
their personal interests led them to favor the company.
The respondents lastly maintain that petitioner’s claim – that
Quiogue orchestrated the petitioner’s dismissal after he (the petitioner) questioned
Quiogue’s award of a contract to Samarita Enterprises for a questionable price
– is not supported by evidence. They
reiterate the gravity of the charges the petitioner faces; they constitute
serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach of trust reposed in him by his
employer and are just causes for termination of employment under Article 282 of
the Labor Code, as well as serious breaches of company rules and the trust
reposed in him by the respondent company.
OUR RULING
As
a rule, and as recently held in Rudy A.
Palecpec, Jr. v. Hon. Corazon C. Davis, et al.[17]
(a 2007 case), this Court is not a trier
of facts and can review a Rule 45 petition only on questions of law. We wade, however, into questions of facts when
there are substantial conflicts in the factual findings of the CA, on the one
hand, and the trial court or government agency concerned, on the other. This is precisely the situation that we have before
us since the NLRC and the CA have diametrically opposed factual findings
leading to differing conclusions. Hence,
we are left with no option but to undertake a review of the facts in this Rule
45 case.
We find the petition
meritorious. To
our mind, the CA erred in the appreciation of the evidence surrounding
petitioner’s termination from employment. The cited grounds are at best
doubtful under the proven surrounding circumstances, and should have been
interpreted in the petitioner’s favor pursuant to Article 4 of the Labor Code.
1. The petitioner had not stayed long in
the company and had not even passed his probationary period when the acts
charged allegedly took place.[18] This
fact carries several significant implications.
First, being new, his natural
motivation was to make an early positive impression on his employer. Thus, it is believable that as building
administrator, he diligently, zealously, and faithfully performed his tasks,
working in excess of eight hours per day to maintain the company buildings and
facilities in excellent shape; he even lent the company his personal tools and
equipment to facilitate urgent repairs and maintenance work on company
properties.[19] Second, because of his natural
motivation as a new employee and his lack of awareness of the dynamics of
relationships within the company, he must have been telling the truth when he
said that he objected to the way the contract for the installation of fire
escapes was awarded to Samarita. Third, his being new somehow rendered
doubtful the charge that he had already encouraged solicitation of commission
from suppliers, especially if considered with the timing of the charges against
him and the turnaround of witness Aying’s testimony.
2. The relationships within the company at the
time the charges were filed showed that he was a stranger who might not have
known the dynamics of company inter-relationships and might have stepped on the
wrong toes in the course of performing his duties.
Respondent
Quiogue was the Executive Vice-President of the company,[20] a
very powerful official with a lot of say in company operations. Since Samarita was doing the fabrication of
steel balusters for Quiogue’s home in New Manila,
Mandap,
as Personnel Manager, is a subordinate of Quiogue. The proposal to secure commissions from
company suppliers reportedly took place in a very public gathering – a drinking
session – in his house. Why Mandap did
not take immediate action when he knew of the alleged plan as early as December
1995 was never explained although the petitioner raised the issue squarely.[22] The time gap – from December 1995 to May 1996
– is an incredibly long time under the evidence available and can be accounted
for only by the fact that there was no intention to terminate the services of
the petitioner in December; the motivation and the scheme to do this came only sometime
in April - May 1996 as the discussions below will show.
Niguidula,
as Purchasing Manager, occupies a position that deals with supplies and
suppliers. He, not the petitioner, is
one who might be expected to be in the middle of all the actions regarding supply
deals. He would not welcome a new and
over-zealous building administrator since the building facilities generate the
need for supplies and the building administrator is the end-user who can see
how supplies are procured and used. It
is significant that Niguidula and the petitioner had a dispute regarding the
accounting of company items and had a near-fight that “interrupted the normal
flow of activities in the company.”[23]
Pacaldo,
a Purchasing Officer and a subordinate of Niguidula, under usual conditions
would side with Niguidula. He and
Niguidula, not the petitioner, occupy the positions critical in the purchase of
supplies for the company and were the people who could exact commissions from
suppliers.
Balais
is an air-con maintenance man whom petitioner reprimanded for unauthorized
overtime work on an air-conditioning unit; for failure to monitor a newly
overhauled compressor unit contrary to standard practice; and for over-pricing
his purchases; and thus, Balais had every reason to testify against the
petitioner.[24]
As
already mentioned, Aying – the contractor who had earlier testified against the
petitioner – recanted his earlier statement that petitioner asked for
commissions from him.[25] Aying, in his second statement, exonerated the
petitioner.[26] This turnaround by itself is significant,
more so if considered with other circumstances,[27]
particularly the possibility that the charges might have been orchestrated owing
to the confluence of the people who were allied against the petitioner, their
respective motivations and the timing of events.
3. The timing of the
filing of charges was, as the petitioner pointed out, unusual. Indeed, if the proposal to solicit
commissions had transpired in December, the charges were quite late when they
came in May. Interestingly, it was in April
1996 that the petitioner questioned the soundness of respondent Quiogue’s
decision to award the fabrication and installation of six (6) units of fire
escape to Samarita Enterprises without observing company procedure of requiring
at least three quotations from suppliers and contractors.[28] The petitioner reprimanded air-con maintenance
man Balais sometime in the first week of May 1996 for unnecessary overtime work
and the two had a verbal altercation, an incident that the petitioner reported
to Quiogue.[29] On
All
these considerations, to our mind, render the cited causes for the petitioner’s
dismissal tenuous as the evidence supporting these grounds come from highly suspect
sources: they come either from people who harbor resentment against the petitioner; those whose
positions have inherent conflict points with that of the petitioner; or from
people with business dealings with the company. Thus, it was not surprising for the NLRC to
observe:
From the above, the
Commission believes that the Motion for Reconsideration should be granted.
Respondents’ charges against complainant were never substantiated by any evidence
other than the barefaced allegations in the affidavits of respondents’
witnesses who are employees of the company and who had an altercation with
complainant prior to the execution of their affidavits and charges. The other
witnesses are contractors having business deals with respondent company and in
fact, Jose Aying has made a turn around and denied the complainant has been
asking commission from him.
Under
the circumstances, we join the NLRC in concluding that the employer failed to
prove a just cause for the termination of the petitioner’s employment – a
burden the company, as employer, carries under the Labor
Code[31] –
and the CA erred when it saw grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC’s ruling. The evidentiary situation, at the very least,
brings to the fore the dictum we stated in Prangan
v. NLRC[32]
and in Nicario v. NLRC[33] that
“if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the
employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a
time-honored rule in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts
reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements
and writing should be resolved in the former’s favor.”
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
hereby GRANT the petition. Accordingly,
we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision and Resolution of the CA promulgated on
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Chairperson |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Filed under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III and
Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, concurring; rollo, pp. 190-199.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Supra note 2.
[14] G.R. No. 146397,
[15] G.R. No. 116419,
[16] Supra note 4.
[17] G.R. No.171048,
[18] Rollo, p. 16.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Id, p. 154.
[27] Ibid.
[28]
[29] Supra note 21.
[30] Ibid.
[31] THE LABOR CODE, Article 277(a):
“x x x The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or just cause shall rest on the employer x x x.”
[32] G.R. No. 126529,
[33] G.R. No. 125340,