SECOND DIVISION
BETTY GABIONZA and G.R. No. 161057
ISABELITA TAN,
Petitioners,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
COURT OF APPEALS, LUKE BRION, JJ.
ROXAS and EVELYN NOLASCO,
Respondents. Promulgated:
September 12, 2008
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
Tinga,
J.:
On
According
to petitioners, ASBHI was incorporated in 1996 with its declared primary
purpose to invest in any and all real and personal properties of every kind or
otherwise acquire the stocks, bonds, and other securities or evidence of
indebtedness of any other corporation, and to hold or own, use, sell, deal in,
dispose of, and turn to account any such stocks.[2] ASBHI
was organized with an authorized capital stock of P500,000.00, a fact
reflected in the corporation’s articles of incorporation, copies of which were
appended as annexes to the complaint.[3]
Both petitioners had previously placed monetary investment with the Bank of Southeast Asia (BSA). They alleged that between 1996 and 1997, they were convinced by the officers of ASBHI to lend or deposit money with the corporation. They and other investors were urged to lend, invest or deposit money with ASBHI, and in return they would receive checks from ASBHI for the amount so lent, invested or deposited. At first, they were issued receipts reflecting the name “ASB Realty Development” which they were told was the same entity as BSA or was connected therewith, but beginning in March 1998, the receipts were issued in the name of ASBHI. They claimed that they were told that ASBHI was exactly the same institution that they had previously dealt with.[4]
ASBHI would issue two (2) postdated checks to its lenders, one representing the principal amount and the other covering the interest thereon. The checks were drawn against DBS Bank and would mature in 30 to 45 days. On the maturity of the checks, the individual lenders would renew the loans, either collecting only the interest earnings or rolling over the same with the principal amounts.[5]
In the first quarter of 2000, DBS Bank started to refuse to pay for the checks purportedly by virtue of “stop payment” orders from ASBHI. In May of 2000, ASBHI filed a petition for rehabilitation and receivership with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and it was able to obtain an order enjoining it from paying its outstanding liabilities.[6] This series of events led to the filing of the complaints by petitioners, together with Christine Chua, Elizabeth Chan, Ando Sy and Antonio Villareal, against ASBHI.[7] The complaints were for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) and (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, estafa under Presidential Decree No. 1689, violation of the Revised Securities Act and violation of the General Banking Act.
A special task force, the Task Force
on Financial Fraud (Task Force), was created by the Department of Justice (DOJ)
to investigate the several complaints that were lodged in relation to ASBHI.[8]
The Task Force, dismissed the complaint on
Petitioners
then filed a joint petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. On 15
October 2001, then Secretary Hernando Perez issued a resolution which partially
reversed the Task Force and instead directed the filing of five (5) Informations
for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code on the complaints
of Chan and petitioners Gabionza and
Tan, and an Information for violation of Section 4 in relation to Section 56 of
the Revised Securities Act.[11] Motions
for reconsideration to this Resolution were denied by the Department of Justice
in a Resolution dated
Even as the Informations were filed
before the
The
Court of Appeals deviated from the general rule that accords respect to the
discretion of the DOJ in the determination of probable cause. This Court
consistently adheres to its policy of non-interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations, and to leave to the investigating prosecutor
sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause for the filing of an information against a supposed offender.[15]
At the outset, it is critical to set forth the key factual findings of the DOJ which led to the conclusion that probable cause existed against the respondents. The DOJ Resolution states, to wit:
The
transactions in question appear to be mere renewals of the loans the
complainant-petitioners earlier granted to BSA. However, just after they agreed
to renew the loans, the ASB agents who dealt with them issued to them receipts
indicating that the borrower was ASB Realty, with the representation that it
was “the same entity as BSA or connected therewith.” On the strength of this
representation, along with other claims relating to the status of ASB and its
supposed financial capacity to meet obligations, the complainant-petitioners
acceded to lend the funds to ASB Realty instead. As it turned out, however, ASB
had in fact no financial capacity to repay the loans as it had an authorized
capital stock of only P500,000.00 and paid up capital of only P125,000.00.
Clearly, the representations regarding its supposed financial capacity to meet
its obligations to the complainant-petitioners were simply false. Had they
known that ASB had in fact no such financial capacity, they would not have
invested millions of pesos. Indeed, no person in his proper frame of mind would
venture to lend millions of pesos to a business entity having such a meager
capitalization. The fact that the complainant-petitioners might have benefited
from its earlier dealings with ASB, through interest earnings on their previous
loans, is of no moment, it appearing that they were not aware of the fraud at
those times they renewed the loans.
The
false representations made by the ASB agents who dealt with the
complainant-petitioners and who inveigled them into investing their funds in
ASB are properly imputable to respondents Roxas and Nolasco, because they, as
ASB’s president and senior vice president/treasurer, respectively, in charge of
its operations, directed its agents to make the false representations to the
public, including the complainant-petitioners, in order to convince them to
invest their moneys in ASB. It is difficult to make a different conclusion,
judging from the fact that respondents Roxas and Nolasco authorized and
accepted for ASB the fraud-induced loans. This makes them liable for estafa
under Article 315 (paragraph 2 [a]) of the Revised Penal Code. They cannot
escape criminal liability on the ground that they did not personally deal with
the complainant-petitioners in regard to the transactions in question. Suffice
it to state that to commit a crime, inducement is as sufficient and effective
as direct participation.[16]
Notably, neither the Court of Appeals’ decision nor the dissent raises any serious disputation as to the occurrence of the facts as narrated in the above passage. They take issue instead with the proposition that such facts should result in a prima facie case against either Roxas or Nolasco, especially given that neither of them engaged in any face-to-face dealings with petitioners. Leaving aside for the moment whether this assumed remoteness of private respondents sufficiently insulates them from criminal liability, let us first discern whether the above-stated findings do establish a prima facie case that petitioners were indeed the victims of the crimes of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code and of violation of the Revised Securities Act.
Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code states:
ART. 315. Swindling
(estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
herein below shall be punished by:
xxx
xxx xxx
(2) By
means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By
using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions,
or by means of other similar deceits;
xxx
xxx xxx
The elements of estafa by means of deceit as defined under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[17]
Do the findings embodied in the DOJ Resolution align with the foregoing elements of estafa by means of deceit?
First. The DOJ Resolution explicitly
identified the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means perpetrated
upon the petitioners. It narrated that petitioners were made to believe that
ASBHI had the financial capacity to repay the loans it enticed petitioners to
extend, despite the fact that “it had an authorized capital stock of only P500,000.00
and paid up capital of only P125,000.00.”[18]
The deficient capitalization of ASBHI is evinced by its articles of incorporation,
the treasurer’s affidavit executed by Nolasco,
the audited financial statements of the corporation for 1998 and the general information
sheets for 1998 and 1999, all of which petitioners attached to their respective
affidavits.[19]
The Court of Appeals conceded the fact of insufficient capitalization, yet discounted its impact by noting that ASBHI was able to make good its loans or borrowings from 1998 until the first quarter of 2000.[20] The short-lived ability of ASBHI, to repay its loans does not negate the fraudulent misrepresentation or inducement it has undertaken to obtain the loans in the first place. The material question is not whether ASBHI inspired exculpatory confidence in its investors by making good on its loans for a while, but whether such investors would have extended the loans in the first place had they known its true financial setup. The DOJ reasonably noted that “no person in his proper frame of mind would venture to lend millions of pesos to a business entity having such a meager capitalization.” In estafa under Article 315(2)(a), it is essential that such false statement or false representation constitute the very cause or the only motive which induces the complainant to part with the thing.[21]
Private respondents argue before this Court that the true capitalization of ASBHI has always been a matter of public record, reflected as it is in several documents which could be obtained by the petitioners from the SEC.[22] We are not convinced. The material misrepresentations have been made by the agents or employees of ASBHI to petitioners, to the effect that the corporation was structurally sound and financially able to undertake the series of loan transactions that it induced petitioners to enter into. Even if ASBHI’s lack of financial and structural integrity is verifiable from the articles of incorporation or other publicly available SEC records, it does not follow that the crime of estafa through deceit would be beyond commission when precisely there are bending representations that the company would be able to meet its obligations. Moreover, respondents’ argument assumes that there is legal obligation on the part of petitioners to undertake an investigation of ASBHI before agreeing to provide the loans. There is no such obligation. It is unfair to expect a person to procure every available public record concerning an applicant for credit to satisfy himself of the latter’s financial standing. At least, that is not the way an average person takes care of his concerns.
Second. The DOJ Resolution also made it clear that the false representations have been made to petitioners prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The assurance given to them by ASBHI that it is a worthy credit partner occurred before they parted with their money. Relevantly, ASBHI is not the entity with whom petitioners initially transacted with, and they averred that they had to be convinced with such representations that Roxas and the same group behind BSA were also involved with ASBHI.
Third. As earlier stated, there was an explicit and reasonable conclusion drawn by the DOJ that it was the representation of ASBHI to petitioners that it was creditworthy and financially capable to pay that induced petitioners to extend the loans. Petitioners, in their respective complaint-affidavits, alleged that they were enticed to extend the loans upon the following representations: that ASBHI was into the very same activities of ASB Realty Corp., ASB Development Corp. and ASB Land, Inc., or otherwise held controlling interest therein; that ASB could legitimately solicit funds from the public for investment/borrowing purposes; that ASB, by itself, or through the corporations aforestated, owned real and personal properties which would support and justify its borrowing program; that ASB was connected with and firmly backed by DBS Bank in which Roxas held a substantial stake; and ASB would, upon maturity of the checks it issued to its lenders, pay the same and that it had the necessary resources to do so.[23]
Fourth. The DOJ Resolution established
that petitioners sustained damage as a result of the acts perpetrated against
them. The damage is considerable as to petitioners.
Gabionza lost P12,160,583.32
whereas Tan lost 16,411,238.57.[24] In addition, the DOJ Resolution noted that
neither Roxas nor Nolasco disputed that ASBHI had borrowed funds from about 700
individual investors amounting to close to P4B.[25]
To the benefit of private respondents, the Court of Appeals ruled, citing Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals,[26] that the subject transactions “are akin to money market placements which partake the nature of a loan, the non-payment of which does not give rise to criminal liability for estafa.” The citation is woefully misplaced. Sesbreno affirmed that “a money market transaction partakes the nature of a loan and therefore ‘nonpayment thereof would not give rise to criminal liability for estafa through misappropriation or conversion.’”[27] Estafa through misappropriation or conversion is punishable under Article 315(1)(b), while the case at bar involves Article 315 (2)(a), a mode of estafa by means of deceit. Indeed, Sesbreno explains: “In money market placement, the investor is a lender who loans his money to a borrower through a middleman or dealer. Petitioner here loaned his money to a borrower through Philfinance. When the latter failed to deliver back petitioner's placement with the corresponding interest earned at the maturity date, the liability incurred by Philfinance was a civil one.”[28] That rationale is wholly irrelevant to the complaint at bar, which centers not on the inability of ASBHI to repay petitioners but on the fraud and misrepresentation committed by ASBHI to induce petitioners to part with their money.
To
be clear, it is possible to hold the borrower in a money market placement
liable for estafa if the creditor was induced to extend a loan upon the false
or fraudulent misrepresentations of the borrower. Such estafa is one by means
of deceit. The borrower would not be generally liable for estafa through
misappropriation if he or she fails to repay the loan, since the liability in
such instance is ordinarily civil in nature.
We can thus conclude that the DOJ Resolution clearly supports a prima facie finding that the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) has been committed against petitioners. Does it also establish a prima facie finding that there has been a violation of the then-Revised Securities Act, specifically Section 4 in relation to Section 56 thereof?
Section
4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 176, or the Revised Securities Act, generally requires
the registration of securities and prohibits the sale or distribution of
unregistered securities.[29]
The DOJ extensively concluded that private respondents are liable for violating
such prohibition against the sale of unregistered securities:
Respondents Roxas and Nolasco do not
dispute that in 1998, ASB borrowed funds about 700 individual investors
amounting to close to P4 billion, on recurring, short-term basis, usually 30 or
45 days, promising high interest yields, issuing therefore mere postdate
checks. Under the circumstances, the
checks assumed the character of “evidences
of indebtedness,” which are among the “securities” mentioned under the
Revised Securities Act. The term
“securities” embodies a flexible rather than static principle, one that is
capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by
those who seek to use the money of others on the promise of profits (69 Am Jur
2d, p. 604). Thus, it has been held that
checks of a debtor received and held by the lender also are evidences of
indebtedness and therefore “securities” under the Act, where the debtor agreed
to pay interest on a monthly basis so long as the principal checks remained
uncashed, it being said that such principal extent as would have promissory
notes payable on demand (Id., p. 606,
citing Untied States v. Attaway (DC La) 211 F Supp 682). In the instant case, the checks were issued
by ASB in lieu of the securities enumerated under the Revised Securities Act in
a clever attempt, or so they thought, to take the case out of the purview of
the law, which requires prior license to sell or deal in securities and
registration thereof. The scheme was to designed to circumvent the law. Checks constitute mere substitutes for cash
if so issued in payment of obligations in the ordinary course of business
transactions. But when they are issued
in exchange for a big number of individual non-personalized loans solicited
from the public, numbering about 700 in this case, the checks cease to be such.
In such a circumstance, the checks assume the character of evidences of
indebtedness. This is especially so where the individual loans were not
evidenced by appropriate debt instruments, such as promissory notes, loan
agreements, etc., as in this case. Purportedly, the postdated checks themselves
serve as the evidences of the indebtedness.
A different rule would open the floodgates for a similar scheme, whereby
companies without prior license or authority from the SEC. This cannot be countenanced. The subsequent
repeal of the Revised Securities Act does not spare respondents Roxas and
Nolasco from prosecution thereunder, since the repealing law, Republic Act No.
8799 known as the “Securities Regulation Code,” continues to punish the same
offense (see Section 8 in relation to Section 73, R.A. No. 8799).[30]
The Court of Appeals however ruled that the postdated checks issued by ASBHI did not constitute a security under the Revised Securities Act. To support this conclusion, it cited the general definition of a check as “a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand,” and took cognizance of the fact that “the issuance of checks for the purpose of securing a loan to finance the activities of the corporation is well within the ambit of a valid corporate act” to note that a corporation does not need prior registration with the SEC in order to be able to issue a check, which is a corporate prerogative.
This analysis is highly myopic and ignorant of the bigger picture. It is one thing for a corporation to issue checks to satisfy isolated individual obligations, and another for a corporation to execute an elaborate scheme where it would comport itself to the public as a pseudo-investment house and issue postdated checks instead of stocks or traditional securities to evidence the investments of its patrons. The Revised Securities Act was geared towards maintaining the stability of the national investment market against activities such as those apparently engaged in by ASBHI. As the DOJ Resolution noted, ASBHI adopted this scheme in an attempt to circumvent the Revised Securities Act, which requires a prior license to sell or deal in securities. After all, if ASBHI’s activities were actually regulated by the SEC, it is hardly likely that the design it chose to employ would have been permitted at all.
But was ASBHI able to successfully evade the requirements under the Revised Securities Act? As found by the DOJ, there is ultimately a prima facie case that can at the very least sustain prosecution of private respondents under that law. The DOJ Resolution is persuasive in citing American authorities which countenance a flexible definition of securities. Moreover, it bears pointing out that the definition of “securities” set forth in Section 2 of the Revised Securities Act includes “commercial papers evidencing indebtedness of any person, financial or non-financial entity, irrespective of maturity, issued, endorsed, sold, transferred or in any manner conveyed to another.”[31] A check is a commercial paper evidencing indebtedness of any person, financial or non-financial entity. Since the checks in this case were generally rolled over to augment the creditor’s existing investment with ASBHI, they most definitely take on the attributes of traditional stocks.
We should be clear that the question of whether the subject checks fall within the classification of securities under the Revised Securities Act may still be the subject of debate, but at the very least, the DOJ Resolution has established a prima facie case for prosecuting private respondents for such offense. The thorough determination of such issue is best left to a full-blown trial of the merits, where private respondents are free to dispute the theories set forth in the DOJ Resolution. It is clear error on the part of the Court of Appeals to dismiss such finding so perfunctorily and on such flimsy grounds that do not consider the grave consequences. After all, as the DOJ Resolution correctly pointed out: “[T]he postdated checks themselves serve as the evidences of the indebtedness. A different rule would open the floodgates for a similar scheme, whereby companies without prior license or authority from the SEC. This cannot be countenanced.”[32]
This
conclusion quells the stance of the Court of Appeals that the unfortunate
events befalling petitioners were ultimately benign, not malevolent, a
consequence of the economic crisis that beset the
Private respondents cannot make capital of the fact that when the DOJ Resolution was issued, the Revised Securities Act had already been repealed by the Securities Regulation Code of 2000.[34] As noted by the DOJ, the new Code does punish the same offense alleged of petitioners, particularly Section 8 in relation to Section 73 thereof. The complained acts occurred during the effectivity of the Revised Securities Act. Certainly, the enactment of the new Code in lieu of the Revised Securities Act could not have extinguished all criminal acts committed under the old law.
In 1909-1910, the Philippine and United States Supreme Courts affirmed the principle that when the repealing act reenacts substantially the former law, and does not increase the punishment of the accused, “the right still exists to punish the accused for an offense of which they were
convicted and
sentenced before the passage of the later act.”[35]
This doctrine was reaffirmed as recently as 2001, where the Court, through
Justice Quisumbing, held in Benedicto v.
Court of Appeals[36]
that an exception to the rule that the absolute repeal of a penal law deprives
the court of authority to punish a person charged with violating the old law
prior to its repeal is “where the repealing act reenacts the former statute and
punishes the act previously penalized under the old law.”[37] It
is worth noting that both the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulation Code of 2000 provide for exactly the same penalty: “a fine of not
less than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos nor more than five hundred
thousand (P500,000.00) pesos or imprisonment of not less than seven (7)
years nor more than twenty one (21) years, or both, in the discretion of the
court.”[38]
It is ineluctable that the DOJ Resolution established a prima facie case for violation of Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code and Sections 4 in relation to 56 of the Revised Securities Act. We now turn to the critical question of whether the same charges can be pinned against Roxas and Nolasco likewise.
The DOJ Resolution did not consider it exculpatory that Roxas and Nolasco had not themselves dealt directly with petitioners, observing that “to commit a crime, inducement is as sufficient and effective as direct participation.”[39] This conclusion finds textual support in Article 17[40] of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals was unable to point to any definitive evidence that Roxas or Nolasco did not instruct or induce the agents of ASBHI to make the false or misleading representations to the investors, including petitioners. Instead, it sought to acquit Roxas and Nolasco of any liability on the ground that the traders or employees of ASBHI who directly made the dubious representations to petitioners were never identified or impleaded as respondents.
It appears that the Court of Appeals was, without saying so, applying the rule in civil cases that all indispensable parties must be impleaded in a civil action.[41] There is no equivalent rule in criminal procedure, and certainly the Court of Appeals’ decision failed to cite any statute, procedural rule or jurisprudence to support its position that the failure to implead the traders who directly dealt with petitioners is indeed fatal to the complaint.[42]
Assuming that the traders could be tagged as principals by direct participation in tandem with Roxas and Nolasco – the principals by inducement – does it make sense to compel that they be jointly charged in the same complaint to the extent that the exclusion of one leads to the dismissal of the complaint? It does not. Unlike in civil cases, where indispensable parties are required to be impleaded in order to allow for complete relief once the case is adjudicated, the determination of criminal liability is individual to each of the defendants. Even if the criminal court fails to acquire jurisdiction over one or some participants to a crime, it still is able to try those accused over whom it acquired jurisdiction. The criminal court will still be able to ascertain the individual liability of those accused whom it could try, and hand down penalties based on the degree of their participation in the crime. The absence of one or some of the accused may bear impact on the available evidence for the prosecution or defense, but it does not deprive the trial court to accordingly try the case based on the evidence that is actually available.
At bar, if it is established after trial that Roxas and Nolasco instructed all the employees, agents and traders of ASBHI to represent the corporation as financially able to engage in the challenged transactions and repay its investors, despite their knowledge that ASBHI was not established to be in a position to do so, and that representatives of ASBHI accordingly made such representations to petitioners, then private respondents could be held liable for estafa. The failure to implead or try the employees, agents or traders will not negate such potential criminal liability of Roxas and Nolasco. It is possible that the non-participation of such traders or agents in the trial will affect the ability of both petitioners and private respondents to adduce evidence during the trial, but it cannot quell the existence of the crime even before trial is had. At the very least, the non-identification or non-impleading of such traders or agents cannot negatively impact the finding of probable cause.
The assailed ruling unfortunately creates a wide loophole, especially in this age of call centers, that would create a nearly fool-proof scheme whereby well-organized criminally-minded enterprises can evade prosecution for criminal fraud. Behind the veil of the anonymous call center agent, such enterprises could induce the investing public to invest in fictional or incapacitated corporations with fraudulent impossible promises of definite returns on investment. The rule, as set forth by the Court of Appeals’ ruling, will allow the masterminds and profiteers from the scheme to take the money and run without fear of the law simply because the defrauded investor would be hard-pressed to identify the anonymous call center agents who, reading aloud the script prepared for them in mellifluous tones, directly enticed the investor to part with his or her money.
Is there sufficient basis then to establish probable cause against Roxas and Nolasco? Taking into account the relative remoteness of private respondents to petitioners, the DOJ still concluded that there was. To repeat:
The false representations made by the ASB agents who dealt with the complainant-petitioners and who inveigled them into investing their funds in ASB are properly imputable to respondents Roxas and Nolasco, because they, as ASB’s president and senior vice president/treasurer, respectively, respectively, in charge of its operations, directed its agents to make the false representations to the public, including the complainant-petitioners, in order to convince them to invest their moneys in ASB. It is difficult to make a different conclusion, judging from the fact that respondents Roxas and Nolasco authorized and accepted for ASB the fraud-induced loans.[43]
Indeed,
the facts as thus established cannot lead to a definite, exculpatory conclusion
that Roxas and Nolasco did not instruct, much less forbid, their agents from
making the misrepresentations to petitioners. They could of course pose that
defense, but such claim can only be established following a trial on the merits
considering that nothing in the record proves without doubt such law-abiding
prudence on their part. There
is also the
fact that ABSHI,
their corporation, actually received the alleged
amounts of money from petitioners. It is especially curious that according to
the ASBHI balance sheets dated 31 December 1999, which petitioners attached to
their affidavit-complaints,[44]
over five billion pesos were booked as “advances to stockholder” when, according to the general information sheet
for 1999, Roxas owned 124,996 of the 125,000 subscribed shares of ASBHI.[45]
Considering that ASBHI had an
authorized capital stock of only P500,000 and a subscribed capital of P125,000,
it can be reasonably deduced that such large amounts booked as “advances to
stockholder” could have only come from the loans extended by over 700 investors
to ASBHI.
It is true that there are exceptions that may warrant departure from the general rule of non-interference with the determination of probable cause by the DOJ, yet such exceptions do not lie in this case, and the justifications actually cited in the Court of Appeals’ decision are exceptionally weak and ultimately erroneous. Worse, it too hastily condoned the apparent evasion of liability by persons who seemingly profited at the expense of investors who lost millions of pesos. The Court’s conclusion is that the DOJ’S decision to prosecute private respondents is founded on sufficient probable cause, and the ultimate determination of guilt or acquittal is best made through a full trial on the merits. Indeed, many of the points raised by private respondents before this Court, related as they are to the factual context surrounding the subject transactions, deserve the full assessment and verification only a trial on the merits can accord.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated
DANTE
O. TINGA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[12]
[13]
[17]Aricheta v. People, G.R. No. 172500,
[20]
[21]L. Reyes, II The Revised Criminal Code
(2001 ed.) at 767; citing People v.
Gines, et al.
[29]The provision reads in full:
SECTION 4. Requirement of registration of securities. — (a) No securities, except of a class exempt under any of the provisions of Section five hereof or unless sold in any transaction exempt under any of the provisions of Section six hereof, shall be sold or offered for sale or distribution to the public within the Philippine unless such securities shall have been registered and permitted to be sold as hereinafter provided.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this
Section and the succeeding Sections regarding exemptions, no commercial paper
as defined in Section two hereof shall be issued, endorsed, sold, transferred
or in any other manner conveyed to the public, unless registered in accordance
with the rules and regulations that shall be promulgated in the public interest
and for the protection of investors by the Commission. The Commission, however,
with due regard to the public interest and the protection of investors, may, by
rules and regulations, exempt from registration any commercial paper that may
otherwise be covered by this paragraph. In either case, the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission shall be subject to the approval of the Monetary
Board of the Central Bank of the
(c) A record of the registration of securities shall be kept
in a Register of Securities in which shall be recorded orders entered by the
Commission with respect to such securities. Such register and all documents or
information with respect to the securities registered therein shall be open to
the public inspection at reasonable hours on business days.
[34]Dissenting Opinion, infra.
[40]Principals. – The following are considered principals:
1. those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.