THIRD DIVISION
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ZAMBOANGA BARTER TRADERS KILUSANG BAYAN, INC. represented
by its President, ATTY. HASAN G. ALAM,
Petitioner, - versus - HON. JULIUS
RHETT J. PLAGATA, in his capacity as Executive Labor Arbiter of NLRC-RAB No.
IX, SHERIFF DANILO P. TEJADA of NLRC-RAB No. IX and TEOPISTO MENDOZA,
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 148433 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 20
November 2000 and its (2) Resolution[2]
dated 31 May 2001 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. It likewise asks that the second alias writ
of execution issued by Hon. Julius Rhett J. Plagata, Executive Labor Arbiter of
NLRC-RAB IX, be annulled and declared without any legal effect, as well as the
ensuing levy, sale on execution of the subject property and the writ of
possession all issued and conducted pursuant thereto.
The Court of Appeals dismissed
petitioner Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc.’s (ZBTKBI’s)[3] petition for certiorari, which assailed public respondent Hon. Julius Rhett J. Plagata’s
orders dated 5 May 2000 and 7 June 2000 and the 23 May 2000 writ of possession
he issued in NLRC Case No. RABIX-0133-81.
The order dated
The antecedents are as follows:
On
On 17 June 1981, ZBTKBI, thru its
President, Atty. Hassan G. Alam, and the Republic of the
1. That upon the effectivity or acceptance
hereof the DONEE shall, thru the authorized agency/ministry, construct a P5
Million Barter Trade market building at the afore-described parcel of land;
2. That the aforesaid Barter Trade Market building shall accommodate at least 1,000 stalls, the allocation of which shall be determined by the Executive Committee for Barter Trade in coordination with the Officers and Board of Directors the Zamboanga Barter Traders’ Kilusang Bayan, Inc., provided, however, that each member of the DONOR shall be given priority;
3. That the said Barter Trade Market
building to be constructed as above-stated, shall be to the strict exclusion of
any other building for barter trading in
4. That in the event barter trading shall be phased out, prohibited, or suspended for more than one (1) year in Zamboanga City, Philippines, the afore-described parcel of land shall revert back to the DONOR without need of any further formality or documentation, and the DONOR shall have the first option to purchase the building and improvements thereon.
5. That the DONEE hereby accepts this donation made in its favor by the DONOR, together with the conditions therein provided.[6]
With the acceptance of the donation,
TCT No. T-61,628[7] in the
name of ZBTKBI was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT. No. T-66,696[8]
covering the same property was issued in the name of the Republic of the
Pursuant to condition No. 1 of the
Deed of Donation, the Government and Regional Office No. IX of the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) constructed a P5,000,000.00 at the
said Lot No. 6. The building was
completed on
Prior to said donation, on
For this reason,
On
Wherefore,
in view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering
the respondent Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang
Bayan, Inc. thru its president or authorized representative to reinstate
complainant Teopisto Mendoza in his former position or any substantially
equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and
with backwages to be computed at the rate of P866.00 a month from April 2, 1981
up to the time he is reinstated.
On
On
It
appears on record that this case had been set for hearing several times but for
many occasions, the same had been postponed upon the instance of the
respondent. On
On
On
On
On
NOW THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Writ of Execution is hereby returned unsatisfied.[24] (Emphasis supplied.)
On
On
On
NOW,
THEREFORE, you are hereby ordered to go to the premises of the respondent Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. located at
Canelar, Zamboanga City to reinstate complainant Teopisto Mendoza in his former
position and to collect from said respondent through its president or any
authorized representative the amount of P90,930.00 representing complainant’s
backwages plus additional backwages to be computed at the rate of P866.00
per month from January 2, 1990 up to the time complainant is reinstated in his
former position and thereafter to turn over said amount to this Regional
Arbitration Branch for further disposition.
Should you fail to collect said amount in cash, you are hereby directed
to cause the satisfaction of the same on movable or immovable properties of the
respondent not other (sic) exempt from execution. You are further directed to return this writ
of execution within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof, together with your
report thereon. You may collect your
legal fee from the respondent in accordance with the Revised Rules of the NLRC.[30]
On
On
P96,443.53, with
Having
failed to take possession of the land in question, Mendoza filed a Petition
(for Issuance of Writ of Possession) on 14 February 2000,[35]
praying that the same be issued ordering that actual possession over the real property,
together with all the buildings and improvements thereon, covered by TCT No.
66,696, be given/delivered to him; and that ZBTKBI be ordered to reimburse
and/or refund to him all rents, earnings and income from said properties from
13 June 1991 until he would be placed in actual possession thereof.[36]
In
an Order dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, complainant’s petition dated
Accordingly,
let a writ of possession be so issued to place the complainant in possession (of)
the rights, interests, shares, claims, and participations of Zamboanga Barter
Traders Kilusan Bayan, Inc. in that parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-66,696 of the Registry of Deeds for
Pursuant to said Order, a Writ of
Possession was issued by Executive Labor Arbiter Plagata on
A Notice dated
ZBTKBI filed on
Sheriff Tejada submitted a Sheriff’s
Service Report dated
On
1. PUBLIC RESPONDENT AND SHERIFF TEJADA GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY CAUSED THE LEVY ON THE PARCEL OF LAND BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC, WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND AFTER THE LAPSE OF FIVE YEARS FROM THE FINALITY OF JUDGMENT.
2.
PETITIONER RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS THAT THE PROCEEDINGS THAT FOLLOWED THE LEVY,
SUCH AS THE
3.
PETITIONER RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS THAT THERE EXISTS NO LEGAL GROUND TO ALLOW
RESPONDENT
4.
THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY TO MENDOZA BY THE NLRC-RAB 9 SHERIFF FOR P90,
930, BEING SO SCANDALOUSLY LOW AND SHOCKING TO THE CONSCIENCE, AMOUNTED TO
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.[46]
On
On P90,960.00 was scandalously low and
shocking. It explained that it was for
the benefit of the judgment debtor that the winning bid was low, for this gives
him the opportunity to easily redeem the property.
ZBTKBI filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[49] which
the Court of Appeals denied per resolution dated
Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari filed on
On
On P96,000 plus legal interest from 30 June
1990 to Mendoza[56] to
answer for the awards given him by the NLRC, and to order the Register of Deeds
of Zamboanga City to cancel TCT No. T-66,696 and re-title the same in their
names.
On
On
On
On
On
On 12 July 2002, the Office of the
Solicitor General, by way of Manifestation, declared that even assuming arguendo that the conditions for the
reversion of the parcel of land donated by ZBTKBI to the Republic may have
accrued at the time of the levy, the Republic had neither lost its title and
right to the buildings and improvements it constructed on the subject land
worth P5M, nor waived its right to exercise ownership over them.[64]
In a Manifestation dated
The OSG was required to file its comment
on the instant petition considering that government property was involved in
this case.[66] It filed
its Comment on
The instant petition raises the
following issues:
1.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPELAS ERRED IN NOT PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF THE
NULLITY OF THE LEVY, IT HAVING BEEN MADE WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO THE REPUBLIC.
2.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT ALL THE PROCEEDINGS
SUBSEQUENT TO THE INVALID LEVY, SUCH AS THE AUCTION, THE CERTIFICATE OF
3.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPELAS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE EXECUTION SALE OF THE
SUBJECT LOT AS VOID AB INITIO
CONSIDERING THAT THE SHERIFF COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CAUSING AN OVER-LEVY
ON A P100 MILLION PROPERTY FOR A JUDGMENT FOR SUM OF MONEY IN THE AMOUNT
OF P96,433.53.
4.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT PASSING UPON THE ISSUE THAT THE
JUDGMENT A QUO MAY NO LONGER BE EXECUTED
BY MERE MOTION UNDER SECTION 6, RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT (NOW 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE).
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DONATED PROPERTY HAS ALREADY REVERTED TO THE PETITIONER KILUSAN.[67]
In resolving this case, we first rule
on the issue of ownership over the 13,643 square meters of land located at Barrio
Canelar, City of
Petitioner argues that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the donated property was no longer owned by the
Republic of the
From the records, the subject
property was donated by petitioner (donor) to the Republic (donee) with the
following conditions already adverted heretofore but are being reiterated for
emphasis:
1.
That upon the effectivity or acceptance
hereof the DONEE shall, thru the authorized agency/ministry, construct a P5
Million Barter Trade market building at the afore-described parcel of land;
2.
That the aforesaid Barter Trade Market
building shall accommodate at least 1,000 stalls, the allocation of which shall
be determined by the Executive Committee for Barter Trade in coordination with
the Officers and Board of Directors the Zamboanga Barter Traders’ Kilusang
Bayan, Inc., provided, however, that each member of the DONOR shall be given
priority;
3.
That the said Barter Trade Market
building to be constructed as above-stated, shall be to the strict exclusion of
any other building for barter trading in
4.
That in the event barter trading shall
be phased out, prohibited, or suspended for more than one (1) year in Zamboanga
City, Philippines, the afore-described parcel of land shall revert back
to the DONOR without need of any further formality or documentation, and
the DONOR shall have the first option to purchase the building and improvements
thereon.
5.
That the DONEE hereby accepts this
donation made in its favor by the DONOR, together with the conditions therein
provided. (Underscoring supplied)
It is clear from condition number 4
that the property donated to the Republic, in the event that barter trading was
phased out, prohibited or suspended for more than one year in P5,000,000.00.
Petitioner further claims that the
Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was automatic reversion of the land,
because it put the Republic in a disadvantageous situation when it had a P5
million building on a land owned by another.
This claim is untenable. The Court of Appeals merely enforced or
applied the conditions contained in the deed of donation. The Republic accepted the donation subject to
conditions imposed by the donor. In
condition number 4, the Republic is given the right to sell the building it
constructed on the land and the improvements thereon. If ever such condition is disadvantageous to
the Republic, there is nothing that can be done about it, since it is one of
the conditions that are contained in the donation which it accepted. There being nothing ambiguous in the contents
of the document, there is no room for interpretation but only simple
application thereof.
We likewise find to be without basis petitioner’s
claim that the Republic should be reimbursed of the cost of the construction of
the barter trade building pursuant to condition number 4. There is nothing there that shows that the
Republic will be reimbursed. What is
stated there is that petitioner has the first option to purchase the buildings
and improvements thereon. In other
words, the Republic can sell the buildings and improvements that it made or
built.
Petitioner’s statement that neither
party to the donation has expressly rescinded the contract is flawed. As above ruled, the deed of donation contains
a stipulation that allows automatic reversion.
Such stipulation, not being contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy, is valid and binding on the parties to the
donation. As held in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort
North)
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
When a deed of donation, . . . expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, . . . not contrary to law, . . . public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
The automatic reversion of the
subject land to the donor upon phase out of barter trading in
Petitioner maintains that the Court
of Appeals erred in not passing upon the issue that the judgment a quo may no
longer be executed by mere motion under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
Looking over the decision of the
Court of Appeals, it appears that said issue was, indeed, skirted by the
appellate court. Be that as it may, we
shall rule on the same.
Petitioner contends that the decision
of the NLRC dated
Was public respondent Labor Arbiter
justified in issuing the second alias writ of execution when the motion asking
for the same was filed on
We believe so.
We find that private respondent
Mendoza need not file an independent action to enforce the NLRC decision. The motion he filed on 18 December 1989 to
execute the judgment is sufficient in light of his two prior motions[71]
filed within the five-year period and the non-satisfaction of the judgment for causes
beyond his control.
Section 6 of Rule 39[72]
of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
The purpose of the law (or rule) in
prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent
obligors from sleeping on their rights.[73]
It is clear from the above rule that
a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its
entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it
is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.[74] If the prevailing party fails to have the
decision enforced by a mere motion after the lapse of five years from the date
of its entry (or from the date it becomes final and executory), the said
judgment is reduced to a mere right of action in favor of the person whom it
favors and must be enforced, as are all ordinary actions, by the institution of
a complaint in a regular form.[75] However, there are instances in which this
Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years upon
meritorious grounds.[76] In Lancita v. Magbanua,[77]
the Court declared:
In computing the time limited for suing out an execution, although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[78]
we ruled:
To be sure, there had been many instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
In Gonzales v. Court of Appeals,[79]
we emphasized that if the delays were through no fault of the prevailing party,
the same should not be included in computing the 5-year period to execute a
judgment by motion.
In the case under consideration, the
decision of the NLRC was promulgated on
It cannot be disputed that
Under the circumstances obtaining, we
hold that the five-year period allowed for enforcement of a judgment by motion
was deemed to have been interrupted by petitioner. The prevention of the satisfaction of the
judgment on the first two writs of execution cannot be blamed on
Petitioner argues that the levy made by
Sheriff Anthony B. Gaviola on
We are not persuaded. The arguments advanced by petitioner, which
are all premised on the assumption that the Republic was still the owner of the
land when the levy was made, have no leg to stand on. As ruled above, the land reverted to
petitioner without need of any further formality or documentation when barter
trading was phased out in
Petitioner claims that the
execution/auction sale of the subject land was void ab initio,
considering that the sheriff made an over-levy when he levied the subject
property allegedly worth P100 million pesos for a judgment claim worth P96,
433.53. It added that the price for
which the subject land was sold at the auction sale was so scandalously low and
shocking to the conscience. Moreover, it
said that it should not be faulted for not redeeming the property within the
allowable period.
The relevant section as to what a
sheriff should levy upon in the enforcement of an execution of a money judgment
is Section 15,[80] Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Sec.
15. Execution of money judgments. –
The officer must enforce an execution of a money judgment by levying on all the
property, real and personal of every name and nature whatsoever, and which may
be disposed of for value, of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution, or
on a sufficient amount of such property, if there be sufficient, and selling
the same, and paying to the judgment creditor, or his attorney, so much of the
proceeds as will satisfy the judgment.
Any excess in the proceeds over the judgment and accruing costs must be
delivered to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise directed by the judgment or
order of the court. When there is more
property of the judgment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and
accruing costs, within the view of the officer, he must levy only on such part
of the property as is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property may be levied on in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.
From said section, it is clear that a
sheriff must levy upon and sell only such property, personal or real, as is
amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs. Petitioner faults the sheriff for levying on the
subject property, the value of which is so much more than the money judgment.
Can the sheriff be faulted for
levying on the subject land?
The answer is no. It must be remembered that the sheriff tried
to satisfy the money judgment when he went to Atty. Alam, President of ZBTKBI. Instead of cooperating and satisfying the
judgment, Atty. Alam did not comply with the money judgment. Instead, he threatened the sheriff, saying that
if the latter insisted on enforcing the writ of execution, he should wear an
iron dress. The actuation of Atty. Alam
was clear defiance of the executory judgment.
Petitioner had no intention of satisfying the judgment. Two writs of execution were issued, but they
were not satisfied. If petitioner were
truly willing to cooperate in the satisfaction of the judgment, the levy of the
subject property could have been prevented if only petitioner handed over to,
or informed, the sheriff any of its properties sufficient to satisfy the
judgment. It did not. Knowing the risk and difficulty of levying on
any of the properties of petitioner, the sheriff thus levied upon any property
that he could get hold of – the subject property.
Petitioner insists that the auction
sale of the subject property should be voided, because the winning bid was so
scandalously low and shocking to the conscience.
We do not agree. It is settled that when there is a right to
redeem, inadequacy of price is of no moment, for the reason that the judgment
debtor always has the chance to redeem and reacquire the property. In fact, the property may be sold for less
than its fair market value, precisely because the lesser the price, the easier
for the owner to effect a redemption.[81] In Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., [82] the Court ruled:
[G]ross inadequacy of price does not nullify an execution sale. In an ordinary sale, for reason of equity, a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy shocks one’s conscience as to justify the courts to interfere; such does not follow when the law gives the owner the right to redeem as when a sale is made at public auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price, the easier it is for the owner to effect redemption. When there is a right to redeem, inadequacy of price should not be material because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution sale. Thus, respondent stood to gain rather than be harmed by the low sale value of the auctioned properties because it possesses the right of redemption. x x x.
In the instant case, as stated in the
Sheriff’s Final Certificate of Sale, petitioner had the right to redeem, but it
failed to exercise such right. In ruling
on this matter, the Court of Appeals explained:
It
works naturally for the benefit of the judgment debtor that the winning bid was
low, for this gives him the opportunity to easily redeem his property through
means easily within his grasp, provided he exercises a minimum of effort. When he foregoes such opportunity to redeem,
he runs the risk of totally losing his property to the judgment creditor. He cannot later be heard in objection to the
sale, claiming that the winning bid was too low. x x x
Furthermore, it appears that petitioner was never deprived of its
opportunity to recover the property it claims to have been unlawfully
sold. It cannot claim that it is the
Republic that is the real owner and was deprived of due process, it appearing
that such is not the case, as previously explained.[83]
To show that it should not be faulted
for its failure to exercise its right to redeem, petitioner explains as
follows:
5.1. True, petitioner may have failed to redeem the property sold on execution within the allowable period, on the assumption that the prior levy and the auction sale were valid. The failure of the petitioner to do so, however, is not deliberate and made without any compelling reason. It appears that from the 2nd quarter of 1989 up to December 1995, the administration and operation of the petitioner-cooperative were entrusted by its President, Atty. Hasan G. Alam, to Treasurer, Mr. Hadji Muhaimin Alshibli, for reasons apparently personal to the president. It likewise appears that during the period when Mr. Alshibli was the caretaker of the petitioner-cooperative, he never convened or called the board to any meeting.
5.2. For reasons personal to him, he opted to administer and operate the cooperative in his own way. Admittedly, no member of the cooperative ever questioned the manner with which Mr. Alshibli was running the petitioner-cooperative. This being the case, neither the president nor any member of the board was aware that the land used by the cooperative had been accordingly sold on execution and that the period to redeem it had already lapsed. Viewed in the light of this factual consideration, it would be highly prejudicial to the majority of the cooperative members if they are deemed to have permanently lost their own property just because of the failure of Mr. Alshibli to redeem the property for reasons purely personal to him.[84]
The foregoing explanation will not
help petitioner escape the predicament it is in. It cannot pass the blame to others for having
failed to exercise its right of redemption.
Petitioner has no one to blame but its officers who failed to look after
its interests and members. It could have
redeemed the property but it failed to do so.
It is now too late in the day for petitioner, considering that the ownership
of the subject property was validly and legally transferred to Teopisto Mendoza
when he bought said land at the auction sale without petitioner redeeming the
same at the proper time.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing
considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
|
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZAssociate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Bienvenido L. Reyes, concurring. CA rollo, pp. 193-201.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 266-267.
[3] ZBTKBI is a cooperative duly
registered with the Cooperative Development Authority on
[4] Establishing Guidelines for Liberalizing Traditional Trade for the Sulu Archipelago and Adjacent Areas.
[5] CA rollo, pp. 48-50.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Rollo, p. 445.
[10] Records, p. 12.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] At that time, there was no appellate
review from decisions of the NLRC except by Special Civil Action of Certiorari
under Rule65. In order to avail of such
remedy, a motion for reconsideration was a precondition for any further or
subsequent remedy. (
[19] Records, p. 107.
[20]
[21] ART. 224. Execution of decisions, orders or awards. – (a) The Secretary of Labor, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter or med-arbiter may, upon his own initiative or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution requiring the sheriff or a proper officer to execute final decisions, orders or awards of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter, or compulsory arbitrators or voluntary arbitrator. (Labor Code of the Phils..)
[22] NLRC Sheriff Omar S. Alibasa.
[23] Records, p. 114.
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] CA rollo, p. 112.
[28] Records, p. 137-138.
[29]
[30]
[31] Notice of Levy dated
[32] Records, p.145.
[33] Ibid.; See also CA rollo, p. 52.
[34] Records, pp. 145-146.
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45] CA rollo, pp. 2-25.
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51] Rollo, p. 194.
[52]
[53]
[54] 99 individuals who are members and incorporators of ZBTKBI and are the present occupants and stall holders of the fromer Barter Trade site, which is now called and used as the “Canelar Trading Center.
[55] Rollo, pp. 395-421.
[56]
[57]
[58]
[59]
[60]
[61]
[62]
[63]
[64]
[65]
[66]
[67]
[68] CA rollo, pp. 70, 113-114.
[69] G.R. No. 152663,
[70] G.R. Nos. 77425 and 77450, 19 June 1991,198 SCRA 300, 308-309.
[71] One was filed on
[72] Prior to 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[73] Francisco Motors Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 117622-23,
[74] Camacho v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 108, 113.
[75] Macias v. Lim, G.R. No. 139284,
[76] Yau v. Silverio, Sr., G.R. Nos.
158848 and 171994,
[77] 117 Phil. 39, 44-45 (1963).
[78] 329 Phil. 115, 121-122 (1996).
[79] G.R. No. 62556,
[80] Prior to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[81] Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 616, 627 (1999).
[82] G.R. No. 156364,
[83] CA rollo, p. 201.
[84] Rollo, pp. 41-42.