SECOND DIVISION
|
LEONOR
CAMCAM, JOSE, FORTUNATO, VIRGINIA, GLORIA, FLORENDO, DELFIN, RODRIGO,
LEUTERIO, NARCISO, ONOFRE, ZENAIDA, AURELIA, TEOFILA, FELICIDAD, MERCEDES,
LYDIA, ALFREDO, BIENVENIDO, EFREN, LILIA, ERLINDA, MELINDA, MARYLOU, MERIAM, all surnamed SALVADOR, Petitioners,
- versus -
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ARCADIO FRIAS, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 142977 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ.
Promulgated: September 30, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Leonor Camcam (Leonor) and
her husband Laureano Salvador (Laureano) were the registered owners of two
parcels of land, Lot Nos. 19554 and 18738 of the Cadastral Survey of San
Carlos, Pangasinan, located in the Barrio of Basista,
Laureano died intestate on
On
1.
P11,000 consideration signed by Leonor (Exhibit
“B”/“1”);[2]
2.
P45,000 consideration, signed by
Leonor (Exhibit “A”/“3”);[3]
and
3.
P3,000, signed by Leonor (Exhibit
“C”/“2”).[4]
Before the trial court, petitioners advanced
the following version of the case:
In November 1982, Frias offered to
purchase the two lots from Leonor.
Leonor, however, was only willing to enter into a sale with right of repurchase within five years. Frias agreed to Leonor’s condition but he deceived
her into signing the Deed of Adjudication-Exhibit “B”/“1,” after which he paid her
P9,000 out of the P11,000 consideration, he promising that he
would settle the balance of P2,000 before the end of the month.
In the latter part of November 1982, Frias,
instead of delivering the balance of P2,000, again deceived Leonor into
signing another document, the Deed of Absolute Sale-Exhibit “C”/“2,” he telling
her that since two lots were involved, she had to sign another instrument
pertaining to the other lot.
Upon verification with Rodolfo Acosta
(Acosta), the notary public who notarized Exhibits “B”/“1” and “C”/“2,” petitioners
discovered that the deeds Leonor signed transferred ownership of the entire
area covering the two lots. They also, upon
inquiry with the Register of Deeds at Lingayen, discovered that Original
Certificate of Title Nos. 11634[5]
and 12027[6] in
the name of Leonor and her husband covering the two lots were cancelled and
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
143752[7] and
143753[8]
were in their stead issued in Frias’ name.
Further, they discovered that Frias registered the document-Exhibit “A”/“3,”
which had the same date and notarial details as those of Exhibit “B”/“1.”
Petitioners alleged that assuming that the documents are valid, it is void with respect to the shares of Leonor’s co-heirs-co-petitioners as they were conveyed without their knowledge and participation.
They thus prayed for judgment
(1) Declaring null and void, the Deed of Adjudication with Sale dated November 4, 1982 [Exhibit “B”/“1”], and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 23, 1982 [Exhibit “C”/“2”] on the ground that the said documents did not reflect the true intention of the parties x x x, moreover, the shares of the plaintiffs, other than plaintiff Camcam, were included without their knowledge, participation and consent x x x;
(2)
Declaring null and void, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and
(3) That as a consequence of the nullity of [Exhibit “A”/“3”], TCT Nos. 143752 and 143753 be declared null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan to cancel said transfer certificates of titles issued in the name of defendant Frias and the annotations on OCT Nos. 11634 and 12027 relative to the cancellation be cancelled; or, in the alternative, the defendant Frias xxx be ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance over the parcels subject of this suit in favor of the plaintiffs, in the following proportion, to wit: one half (1/2) to plaintiff Camcam, and the other half shall pertain to the other plaintiffs, namely, Agapito, Jose, Fortunato and the heirs of the late Luis, all surnamed Salvador, in equal proportion;
(4) Declaring plaintiffs Agapito, Jose, Fortunato, and the late Luis, all surnamed Salvador, the latter being represented in this suit by his heirs, as the only legitimate heirs to inherit the estate of their deceased brother, Laureano Salvador who died on December 9, 1941, thereby excluding the widow from participating xxx;
(5) Declaring the defendant liable for actual, compensatory and moral damages to plaintiffs and litigation expenses, assessable in terms of money in such amount as will be proved in court, and to pay exemplary damages as may be assessed by the court;
(6)
Declaring the defendant liable for the
attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and to pay the costs.[9] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
They likewise prayed for other just
and equitable reliefs.[10]
Upon the other hand, Frias advanced
the following version:
Leonor inherited the two lots, to the
exclusion of her co-petitioners, under the old Civil Code[11] and
it was she who convinced him to buy them.
Leonor later changed her mind and was
willing to sell only the whole of the residential land, Lot No. 19554, and ½ of
the mango and coconut land, Lot No. 18739,[12]
as she was giving her brothers-in-law two weeks to buy the ½ remaining portion thereof,[13]
hence, he and Leonor forged Exhibit “B”/“1.”
Leonor later informed him that her brothers-in-law could not buy the
remaining ½ portion of Lot No. 18739, hence, he and Leonor forged Exhibit “C”/“2.”[14]
After the execution of the two documents
dated
During the pendency of the proceedings
before the trial court, Leonor’s brother-in-law Agapito died and was
substituted by his heirs, namely petitioners Teofila, Felicidad,
By Decision[17] of
x x x x
We cannot agree that Leonor Camcam signed [these] document[s] without reading them. She signed [them] and read [them] because she was one who had enough learning. x x x Besides that, Evangeline Pira, and Gertrudes Calpo signed it themselves as [witnesses according to] the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo Acosta.
x x x x
But this is true only with regards to ½ of the properties as [they are] conjugal in nature. As regards x x x the other half of the property the rights of inheritance by x x x brothers and sisters under the old law is provided thus:
Article 948. If there are brothers and sisters and nephews, who are children of brothers and sisters of the whole blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.
Article 953. In case there are brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters, the widow or widower shall have a right to receive, in concurrence with the former, the portion of the inheritance in usufruct granted him or her in Article 837.
Article 837. When the testator leaves no legitimate descendants or ascendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance also in usufruct[18] (The old civil code) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE the other half [of the two lots] should be divided among the brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces by the right of intestate succession; to brothers and sisters, per capita; and the nephews and nieces per stirpes; of one-half of the property. The remaining one-half belong[s] to defendant [herein-respondent Frias].
Ordering the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan to cancel TCT No. 143752 and 143753 and instead issue another title, one half of the property to the brothers and sisters, per capita; and to the nieces and nephews per stirpes; the other half to the defendants.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On appeal,[20]
the Court of Appeals, by Decision[21]
of
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the decision of the lower court dated
THE Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan is directed to cancel TCT Nos. 143752 and 143753 and issue the corresponding titles in accordance with the above pronouncement. The expenses of the survey should be borne equally by plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee. Costs against plaintiffs-appellants.[22] (Underscoring supplied)
Their Motion for Reconsideration[23] having
been denied,[24]
petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[25] faulting
the appellate court
1.
. . . IN NOT DE
2.
[IN NOT DECLARING THAT] THE SALES WERE IL
Petitioners
contend as follows:
x x x x
From
the appearance of these documents, particularly the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition and Sale (Annex “A” or Exh. “A”/“3”) and the Deed of
Adjudication with
x x x x
Aside
from the anomalous situation created by the irregularly executed deeds and
advantageously employed by the private respondent, in order to conceal the
apparent irregularities, the private respondent claimed that the Deed of
Partition and Sale (Annex “A” or Exh “A”/“3”) dated November 4, 1982, was a
consolidation deed of the Deed of Adjudication with Sale dated November 4, 1982
(Annex “B” or Exh. “B”/“1”) and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
x x x x
Assuming, without admitting, that petitioner Leonor Camcam regularly sold her one-half portion in the two parcels of land in favor of private respondent Arcadio Frias, however, considering the preferential right of the other petitioners, who are admittedly the owners of the other half portion in said parcels of land, and considering further the attendant circumstances of this case, as discussed above, the petitioners, with the exception of petitioner Leonor Camcam, should be allowed to jointly exercise their right of redemption, the consideration of which shall proportionately be based on that Deed (Annex “B” or Exh. “B”/“1”) which was published in the newspaper.[28] (Underscoring supplied)
The petition is bereft of merit.
Without passing on the merits of
Frias’ claim that Leonor originally sold to him ½ of Lot No. 18739 as reflected
in the first November 4, 1982 document but later conveyed the remaining ½
thereof, hence, the execution of the second document bearing the same date, an irregular
notarization merely reduces the evidentiary
value of a document to that of a private document, which requires proof of its
due execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence.[29]
The irregular notarization – or, for that matter, the lack of notarization –
does not thus necessarily affect the validity of the contract reflected in the
document. Tigno v. Aquino[30] enlightens:
x x x [F]rom a civil law perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights over immovable property should be in a public document, yet it is also an accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper form does not render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form required in Article 1358 is not essential to the validity or enforceability of the transaction, but required merely for convenience. We have even affirmed that a sale of real property though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces effects between the parties.[31] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners alleged fraud on Frias’
part, hence, they had the burden of establishing the same by clear and
convincing evidence.[32] This they failed to discharge.
By Leonor’s account, she signed the
three documents relying on Frias’ word that they were deeds of “mortgage,” and
she did not read them because she “[did] not know how to read,”[33] When asked, however, on cross-examination about
her educational attainment, Leonor answered that she finished the third year of
a nursing course at San Juan de Dios Hospital.[34]
Clarifying her statement that she did
not know how to read, Leonor explained that
she knew how to read but her eyesight was blurred.[35] Leonor’s granddaughter-witness Gertrudes Calpo
(Gertrudes) who signed as witness in Exhibit “B”/“1” declared, however, that
she read the contents of Exhibit “B”/“1” to Leonor,[36]
thus belying petitioners’ claim that Leonor signed the same without knowing its
true contents.
As for Exhibit “A”/“3” which
petitioners maintain is spurious, Leonor’s signature therein being allegedly forged,[37] Leonor
herself admitted having signed the same,[38]
and this was corroborated by Gertrudes.[39]
As for Leonor’s co-petitioners’ invocation
of their right of redemption of the share of Leonor in the lots sold to Frias, points
of law, theories, issues of fact, and arguments not brought to the attention of
the trial court ordinarily are not considered by a reviewing court as they
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[40] Besides, given that petitioners already knew
of the sale as early as 1983, they are guilty of laches, having raised their
right of redemption for the first time in 2000 when they filed the present petition.[41]
At all
events, even assuming
that the invocation by Leonor’s co-petitioners of their right of redemption was
timely made, it cannot be considered a valid exercise thereof as it was not accompanied
by a reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price.[42]
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the
foregoing disquisition, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-9.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Exhibit “4.”
[6] Exhibit “5.”
[7] Exhibit “6.”
[8] Exhibit “7.”
[9]
[10] Ibid.
[11]
[12] TSN,
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Records, pp. 202-205.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Jainal D. Rasul, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Santiago M. Kapunan
and Oscar M. Herrera. CA rollo,
pp. 49-unnumbered page before p. 50.
[22] Pp. 5-6 of CA decision.
[23] CA rollo, pp. 50-56.
[24] Resolution of
[25] Rollo, pp. 3-13.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] Rules
of Court, Rule 132, Section 20; Vide Soriano v. Basco,
A.C. No. 6648,
[30] G.R. No. 129416,
[31]
[32] Vide
Republic v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424,
438; Sps.
Morandarte v. Court of Appeals,
479 Phil. 870, 882-883 (2004).
[33] TSN,
[34] TSN,
[35]
[36] TSN,
[37] Records, p. 6.
[38] TSN,
[39] TSN,
[40] Vide
[41] Vide
Aguilar v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 141613,
[42] Vide
Villegas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 111495 and 122404,