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REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIGUEL TOLENTINO, SR., ZOILA DE CHAVEZ, DEOGRACIAS
MERCADO, MARIANO PONTOJA, GUILLERMO MERCADO, AGAPITO REYES, ISIDRO BESAS,
LEONA LACHICA, ELENO MACALINDONG, DIONISIO MACALINDONG, DOROTEO SARA, JOAQUIN
CAUANCERAN, VIRGILIO AGUILAR, FELIX DUMAN, PIO BACULI, ANTERO APOLINAR,
FLAVIANO CURZADO, ROSENDO IBAÑEZ, ARCADIO GONZALES, FELIX BORJA, and BLAS
BASCO, Petitioners, - versus - HON. JAIME DELOS ANGELES,
Judge of the Court of First Instance, Branch III, Balayan, Batangas, AYALA Y
CIA and/or HACIENDA CALATAGAN, and ALFONSO ZOBEL, Respondents. x
-------------------------------------------- x REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, as Lessor, ZOILA DE CHAVEZ, assisted by her husband Col. Isaac
de Chavez, DEOGRACIAS MERCADO, ROSENDO IBAÑEZ and GUILLERMO MERCADO, as
permitees and/or lessees of public fishponds,
Petitioners, - versus
- HON. JUDGE JAIME DE LOS
ANGELES of the Court of First Instance, Branch III, Balayan, Batangas [later
replaced by JUDGE JESUS ARLEGUI], SHERIFF OF BATANGAS, ENRIQUE ZOBEL, and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BALAYAN, BATANGAS,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. L-26112
G.R. No. L-30240 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, *CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 6, 2008 |
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R E S O L U T I O N
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BRION, J.:
We resolve yet
another motion for reconsideration in the execution of this 46-year-old
decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Batangas in Civil Case No. 373. In
our Resolution of
The
Antecedents
This case
is an annulment of titles proceeding commenced by the Republic of the
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) Declaring as null
and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9550 (or Exhibit “24”) of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Batangas and other subdivision titles
issued in favor of Ayala y Cia and/or Hacienda de Catalagan over the areas
outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722, which, including the lots in
T-9550 (lots 360, 362, 363 and 182), are hereby reverted to public dominion.
We affirmed the CFI decision with modification
in Republic of the Philippines v. Ayala y Cia (G.R. No. L-20950).[1] (Our
modification has no bearing at all on the issues of the annulment of the
certificates of title and the reversion of illegally registered lands to the
public domain).
A month
prior to our decision in G.R. No. L-20950, we decided a closely related case – Dizon
v. Rodriguez (G.R. No. L-20300-01)[2]
– in which we found that the land subdivided and registered by
Ayala and its successors-in-interest (for instance, the Dizons) included
inalienable lands of the public domain – foreshore lands and territorial waters
– belonging to the State. This
conclusion was fully supported by the finding that subdivision plan
Psd-27941 (the approved plan for the subdivision of TCT No. 722, on
whose basis derivative titles of TCT No. 722 were issued) was prepared
not in accordance with the technical descriptions in TCT No. 722 but in
disregard of it. This case actually discussed and outlined how
the illegal inclusion of inalienable lands of the public domain in the land
originally covered by TCT No. 722 came about.
In due
course, our decision in G.R. No. L-20950 became final and executory.
Thereafter, the Republic and the intervenors moved for the issuance of a writ
of execution to enforce the decision.
Judge Jaime de
We granted the petition and ordered
Judge de
Twenty-three
years after we rendered our ruling in G.R. No. L-20950 and at least fifteen
(15) years from our last Resolution in G.R. No. L-26112, the execution of the
annulment and reversion portions of the CFI decision still did not see the
light of day. We sought to write finis
in Republic v. Delos Angeles (G.R. No. L-30420)[4]
to any uncertainty, issue or question on the propriety of executing the annulment and reversion portions of the
CFI decision. Frustrated with the
virtual non-execution of the CFI decision due to Ayala's dilatory pleadings,
motions and maneuverings, we took a direct hand at executing the CFI decision
by directing the Clerk of this Court to issue the writ. We reiterated our stand on the decision in
Civil Case No. 373, and said:
Contrary to respondent Zobel's assertion, the 1965 final judgment in favor of the Republic declared as null and void, not only TCT No. 9550, but also "other subdivision titles" issued over the expanded areas outside the private land of Hacienda Calatagan covered by TCT No. 722. As shown at the outset, after respondents ordered subdivision of the Hacienda Calatagan which enabled them to acquire titles to and "illegally absorb" the subdivided lots which were outside the hacienda's perimeter, they converted the same into fishponds and sold them to third parties. But as the Court stressed in the 1965 judgment and time and again in other cases, "it is an elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant." This is crystal clear from the dispositive portion or judgment. . . [of Civil Case No. 373].
x x x
This final 1965 judgment reverting to
public dominion all public lands unlawfully titled by respondent Zobel and
Ayala and/or Hacienda Calatagan is now beyond question, review or reversal by
any court, although as sadly shown hereinabove, respondents' tactics and
technical maneuvers have all these 23 long years thwarted its execution and the
Republic's recovery of the lands and waters of the public domain.[5] [Emphasis supplied.]
Despite these clear terms and their repetition, Ayala
has since persisted in frustrating the execution of the final and executory
decision.
The current problem traces its immediate
roots to the Orders that Judge Roberto Makalintal (Makalintal Orders), the predecessor of Judge Austria, issued on
August 1, 2000 and November 22, 2000 denying the alias writ of execution of
Deogracias Mercado and Guillerma Mercado (intervenors in the annulment of
titles case, herein called the Heirs).
Aggrieved
by the Makalintal Orders, Conrado Mercado (Mercado,
heir of intervenor Deogracias Mercado) filed with us on
In a
Resolution dated
Judge
The Issues
Ayala’s
motion hews closely to the supporting reasons of the Makalintal Orders and
posits that: (1) the judgment has been declared satisfied under the Makalintal
Orders; these orders are now final and the CFI decision can no longer be the
subject of further execution; (2) after judgment, a trial to determine the
subject of the judgment is not allowed and the annulment of the affected
Torrens titles cannot be effected except in a direct proceeding under the law,
citing Section 48 of P.D. 1529; and (3) Judge Austria's order directing
another relocation survey of the subject property to find the property or
properties against which the judgment is to be enforced violates due process.
Our Ruling
After due consideration, we
reiterate our directive of
First, the Makalintal Orders are post-judgment orders, i.e., orders issued after the adjudicative task of the court has
ended, the court having declared the parties’ rights and obligations with
respect to the matter under litigation. They draw their life from the final
and executory judgment they are implementing and thus cannot limit, vary,
interpret, or re-adjudicate the dispositions made by this judgment.
Second, they do not have the effect of res adjudicata in the same manner that pre-judgment
interlocutory orders do not.[6]
They do not involve any final “ruling on
the merits” as they only implement the court’s judgment strictly according to
the terms of that judgment. No “finality”
is involved since, subject to the time limits
prescribed by the Rules,[7]
the matter of execution is always open for as long as the implementation of the
judgment remains incomplete. For this
reason, there is no provision in the Revised Rules of Court for the entry of
judgment of supposedly final
interlocutory orders and execution stage orders, and no such orders are
accepted by any court for entry under Section 2, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules
of Court – the provision on Entry of Judgments and Final Orders – which provides:
SEC. 2. Entry of judgments and final orders. – If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final order shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date of finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final order has become final and executory. (2a, 10, R51).
Third, the
determination of whether there has been full satisfaction of judgment cannot
rest solely on the lower court because the decision on the merits has
effectively been our decision;
we cannot be denied a say on whether our
decision has been fully satisfied. In
blunter terms, the Makalintal Orders cannot effectively bar our ruling on any
of the execution and other issues Judge Makalintal took the liberty of
disposing in the course of issuing a post-judgment order.
Fourth,
the lower court has no jurisdiction to
interpret, much less reverse, this Court’s final and executory judgment. We enunciated this principle as early as 1922
in Shioji v.
Following these established rules, the Makalintal Orders cannot vary the terms of the CFI
decision that we consistently affirmed, among them: (1) the nullification
of all subdivision titles that were issued in favor of Ayala y Cia and/or
Hacienda Calatagan (and/or its successors-in-interest) over the areas outside
its private land covered by TCT No. 722; and (2) the declaration that all lands
or areas covered by these nullified titles are reverted to the public domain. These Orders are likewise wrong in concluding that, with the
nullification and/or cancellation of TCT No. T-9550, nothing more is needed to be
done to execute the CFI decision. TCT No.T-9550 was merely cited as one of the
derivative titles. The cancellation of all the affected derivative titles, all
of them sufficiently described, and their reversion to the State remain to be
completed.
With his
orders, Judge Makalintal committed the gravest abuse of discretion and even
patently acted without jurisdiction.
These are acts that in the recent past merited, not only the
nullification of the ultra vires orders,
but administrative sanctions as well for the issuer, as we did in the case of a Labor Arbiter and a retired Commissioner of
the National Labor Relations Commission who were suspended in Quijano v. Bartolabac[11]
for taking the liberty of deviating from this Court’s final and executory
judgment.
As our last point, Ayala has no
basis to complain about the terms of the decision as its fallo is sufficiently complete for purposes of execution and has
all the data required for its implementation; the titles to be cancelled and
the properties they cover – all sufficiently described in the decision - are
matters of official record. One only
needs to: look, with meticulous
care, at the official records with the concerned Register of Deeds to find out
the various derivative titles of TCT No. 722; examine, also with
meticulous care, the records at the Director of the Lands (or its successor
offices, the Land Management Bureau and/or Surveys Division of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources Regional Office) to compare the approved
plan for TCT No. 722 and the approved subdivision plan for the derivative
titles – Psd-27941; and finally, consolidate the findings
into an integral whole, to arrive at the derivative titles that should be
nullified for reversion to the State.
The relocation survey we previously ordered, now directed by Judge
We need not discuss Ayala’s other
points as they relate to the merits of the decision under execution and are
matters that have long been laid to rest.
In sum, the
CFI decision in Civil Case No. 373 is the judgment that we consistently
affirmed and this decision has long become final and executory. Under the doctrine of finality of judgment
and by operation of law, it has become immutable and should now be respected. Under the doctrine of res adjudicata, the decision effectively bars a re-litigation
of the issues settled with finality, particularly, the titles subject to
nullification and reversion. Under the doctrine
of the law of the case, the CFI decision, as affirmed, is the controlling
ruling that should guide further or future action on Civil Case No. 373,
specifically, the execution process.
This ruling shuts all doors to any objection to the execution of the
affirmed CFI decision that a recalcitrant losing party may still conceive.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the private respondents’ motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit.
We reiterate our directives in our Resolutions of
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief
Justice
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
(On official leave) RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA MARTINEZ Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice
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TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO
* On official leave.
[1] 14 SCRA 259,
[2] 13 SCRA 704,
[3] 20
SCRA 608,
[4]
[5]
[6] Perez
v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 107737. October 1, 1999, 316 SCRA 43, 56-57.
[7] Revised Rules of Court , Rule 39, Section 6, provides:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
[8] G.R. No. 18940,
[9] From the early
[10] Torres
v. Sison, GR No. 119811, August 30, 2001, 364 SCRA 37, 43.
[11] A.C. No. 5649,