EN BANC
|
THE
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN
and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own behalf, Petitioners, - versus - THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA,
ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and
duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the
so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process,
Respondents. x--------------------------------------------x Petitioners,
- versus - THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL (GRP), as represented by RODOLFO C.
GARCIA, LEAH ARMAMENTO, SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and HERMOGENES
ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, Respondents. x--------------------------------------------x THE Petitioner, - versus – THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC.
RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN
SULLIVAN; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., in his capacity as the present and
duly appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process; and/or SEC. EDUARDO
ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary. Respondents. x--------------------------------------------x THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA
DEL NORTE, as represented by HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, in his capacity as
Provincial Governor, HON. FRANCIS H. OLVIS, in his capacity as Vice-Governor
and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Petitioners, - versus - THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL [GRP], as represented by HON. RODOLFO C.
GARCIA and HON. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential
Adviser of Peace Process,
Respondents. x--------------------------------------------x ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY,
and AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, Petitioners,
- versus - THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman RODOLFO C.
GARCIA, and the MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL,
represented by its Chairman MOHAGHER IQBAL,
Respondents. x--------------------------------------------x FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS
TAMANO,
Petitioners-in-Intervention. x--------------------------------------------x SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS,
Petitioners-in-Intervention. x--------------------------------------------x MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly
represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N. DEANO,
Petitioners-in-Intervention, x--------------------------------------------x THE
Petitioners-in-Intervention. x--------------------------------------------x THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep.
by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDADATU, in his capacity as Provincial Governor and a
resident of the Province of Sultan Kudarat, Petitioner-in-Intervention. x-------------------------------------------x RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own
behalf and on behalf of Indigenous Peoples in Mindanao Not Belonging to the
MILF,
Petitioner-in-Intervention. x--------------------------------------------x CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG,
NESARIO G.
Petitioners-in-Intervention. x--------------------------------------------x MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI,
Petitioners-in-Intervention. x--------------------------------------------x MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION,
INC (MUSLAF), Respondent-in-Intervention. x--------------------------------------------x MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR
PEACE & DEVELOPMENT (MMMPD), Respondent-in-Intervention. x--------------------------------------------x |
G.R. No. 183591
Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, & BRION,
JJ. Promulgated: October 14, 2008 G.R. No.
183752 G.R. No. 183893 G.R. No. 183951 G.R. No. 183962 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
D E C I S I
O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the
President in pursuing the peace process.
While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed
conflict in
I.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS
On
The
MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership
of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what
Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis
towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.[1]
The
signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize,
however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their
cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
The
MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of
several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the
GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On
The
Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating
that the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue
peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity
in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the
use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations
on the substantive agenda are on-going.[2]
Early
on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing
in the
When
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against
the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace
talks. The MILF, according to a leading
MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President
Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF
convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually,
decided to meet with the
The
parties met in
Formal
peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22,
2001, the outcome of which was the
A
second round of peace talks was held in
Meanwhile,
then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on
In
2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in
II. Statement
of the proceedings
Before
the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious “consensus” ever embodied in
an instrument – the MOA-AD which is assailed principally by the present petitions
bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962.
Commonly
impleaded as respondents are the
On
This
initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for Mandamus and Prohibition[11]
filed by the City of
By Resolution of
Meanwhile, the City of Iligan[16]
filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R.
No. 183893, praying that respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or,
if the same had already been signed, from implementing the same, and that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners
herein additionally implead Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent.
The
On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda,
Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition,[20] docketed
as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and
permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the
MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying
the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as
respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman
Mohagher Iqbal.
Various parties moved to intervene
and were granted leave of court to file their
petitions-/comments-in-intervention.
Petitioners-in-Intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former
Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of
By subsequent Resolutions, the Court
ordered the consolidation of the petitions.
Respondents filed Comments on the petitions, while some of petitioners
submitted their respective Replies.
Respondents, by Manifestation and
Motion of
The cases were heard on oral argument
on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the following principal issues:
1. Whether the
petitions have become moot and academic
(i)
insofar as the mandamus aspect is
concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of
the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and
(ii)
insofar as the prohibition aspect involving
the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation
has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;
2.
Whether the constitutionality and the legality
of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
3.
Whether respondent Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated
the MOA vis-à-vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;
4.
Whether there is a violation of the
people’s right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution,
Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28)
including public consultation under
Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]
If it is in the
affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;
5.
Whether by signing the MOA, the
Government of the Republic of the
a)
to
create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state,
or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b)
to
revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c)
to concede to or recognize the claim of
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
If in the
affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the
Government of the Republic of the
6.
Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the
Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality
of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected
Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and
7. Whether
desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the
Government of the Republic of the
The Court, thereafter, ordered the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda.
Most of the parties submitted their memoranda on time.
III. Overview
of the MOA-AD
As
a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject
five petitions and six petitions-in-intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as
the two comments-in-intervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an
overview of the MOA.
The
MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the
Under the heading “Terms of
Reference” (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier agreements between
the GRP and MILF, but also two agreements between the GRP and the MNLF: the
1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of
the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the
administration of President Fidel Ramos.
The
MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes – the organic act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)[25]
and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),[26] and
several international law instruments – the ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to the UN
Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among others.
The
MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of “compact rights
entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua’hada (or territory under
compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement)
that partakes the nature of a treaty device.”
During
the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world
through a simple dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam)
and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to those lands where
Islamic laws held sway, while the second denoted those lands where Muslims were
persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or ineffective.[27]
This way of viewing the world, however, became more complex through the
centuries as the Islamic world became part of the international community of
nations.
As
Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant
States and inter-governmental organizations, the classical division of the
world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually lost its
meaning. New terms were drawn up to
describe novel ways of perceiving non-Muslim territories. For
instance, areas like dar-ul-mua’hada (land of compact) and dar-ul-sulh
(land of treaty) referred to countries which, though under a secular
regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim States,
having been bound to each other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on
the other hand, referred to countries which, though not bound by treaty with
Muslim States, maintained freedom of religion for Muslims.[28]
It
thus appears that the “compact rights entrenchment” emanating from the regime
of dar-ul-mua’hada and dar-ul-sulh simply refers to all other
agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government – the Philippines
being the land of compact and peace agreement – that partake of the nature of a
treaty device, “treaty” being broadly defined as “any solemn agreement in
writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for both
parties which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared
in the [MOA-AD].”[29]
The
MOA-AD states that the Parties “HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS,”
and starts with its main body.
The main
body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and
Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance.
A. Concepts
and Principles
This
strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and
all Indigenous peoples of
Thus,
the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes
not only “Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims,[31]
but all indigenous peoples of
The
MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro
homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro
people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation.[32] Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the
public domain.[33]
The
Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance,
which right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised
originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a
Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates
were described as states or “karajaan/kadatuan”
resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-state in
the modern sense.[34]
The
MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on
the past suzerain authority of the sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as the
Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in the
case of the Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation
of independent principalities (pangampong)
each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme over the others.[35]
The
MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as “the ‘First Nation’ with defined territory and with a system of
government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign
nations.”
The
term “First Nation” is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples
of that territory, particularly those known as Indians. In
The
MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the “Bangsamoro Juridical Entity” (BJE) to which it grants the
authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
B. Territory
The
territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as
the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial
domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region.[38]
More
specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area
of the ARMM – thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and
Outside of this core, the BJE is to
cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped
into two categories, Category A and Category B.
Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on
different dates, years apart from each other.
Thus, Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later
than twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD.[40] Category B areas, also called “Special
Intervention Areas,” on the other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five
(25) years from the signing of a separate agreement – the Comprehensive
Compact.[41]
The
Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over
all natural resources within its “internal
waters,” defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of
the BJE area;[42] that the
BJE shall also have “territorial
waters,” which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines
of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland
Mindanao; and that within these territorial
waters, the BJE and the “Central Government” (used interchangeably with RP)
shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over
all natural resources.[43] Notably,
the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as
“joint.”
The
MOA-AD further provides for the sharing
of minerals on the territorial
waters between the Central Government and the BJE, in favor of the latter,
through production sharing and economic cooperation agreement.[44] The activities which the Parties are allowed
to conduct on the territorial waters
are enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of natural
resources, regulation of shipping and fishing activities, and the enforcement
of police and safety measures.[45] There
is no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with
respect to the internal waters of the BJE.
C. RESOURCES
The
MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and
trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish
trade missions in those countries. Such
relationships and understandings, however, are not to include aggression
against the GRP. The BJE may also
enter into environmental cooperation agreements.[46]
The
external defense of the BJE is to
remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The Central Government is also bound to “take
necessary steps to ensure the BJE’s participation in international meetings and
events” like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in
Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border
agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of
incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the
islands forming part of the ancestral domain.[47]
With
regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential
sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the
jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE “as the party
having control within its territorial jurisdiction.” This right carries the proviso that, “in times of national emergency, when public interest
so requires,” the Central Government may, for a fixed period and under
reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct the
operation of such resources.[48]
The
sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production
pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.[49]
The
MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising
from any unjust dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights,
customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible,
reparation is to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties.[50]
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or
agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements
(MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure
instruments granted by the Philippine Government, including those issued by
the present ARMM.[51]
D. Governance
The
MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and
monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive
Compact. This compact is to embody
the “details for the effective enforcement” and “the mechanisms and modalities
for the actual implementation” of the MOA-AD.
The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party
shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship between the Central
Government and the BJE.[52]
The “associative” relationship
between the Central Government
and the BJE
The MOA-AD describes the relationship
of the Central Government and the BJE as “associative,”
characterized by shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of
governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and
administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the
Comprehensive Compact.
The
MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to the existing
legal framework” shall take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and
within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. As
will be discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs on the legality
of this provision.
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and
maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial
and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal
security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, the details
of which shall be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.
As
stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on
Annexed to the MOA-AD are two
documents containing the respective lists cum
maps of the provinces, municipalities, and barangays under Categories A and
B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on TERRITORY.
IV. PROCEDURAL
ISSUES
A. Ripeness
The power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases or controversies.[54] Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or
to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions.[55] The limitation of the power of judicial
review to actual cases and controversies defines the
role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure
that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government.[56]
An actual case or controversy
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute. There
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on
the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.[57] The Court can decide the constitutionality of
an act or treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted
for judicial determination.[58]
Related to the requirement of an
actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it.[59] For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture,[60]
and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.[61]
He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.[62]
The Solicitor General argues that
there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the
present petitions, reasoning that
The
unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further
negotiations and legislative enactments as well as constitutional processes
aimed at attaining a final peaceful agreement.
Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does not
automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations until the
list of operative acts required have been duly complied with. x x x
x x
x x
In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon issues based on hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are no concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners’ and intervenors’ rights since the acts complained of are mere contemplated steps toward the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors’ perceived injury, if at all, is merely imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere conjectures. (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General cites[63]
the following provisions of the MOA-AD:
TERRITORY
x x x x
2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the
following stipulations:
x x x x
d. Without derogating from the requirements of
prior agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, using all
possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the
MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the list and depicted
in the map as Category A attached herein (the “Annex”). The Annex constitutes an integral part of
this framework agreement. Toward this
end, the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all
outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from
the signing of the MOA-AD.
x x
x x
GOVERNANCE
x x
x x
7.
The Parties agree that mechanisms and
modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in
the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur
effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.[64] (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General’s arguments
fail to persuade.
Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are
not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,[65]
this Court held:
x x
x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act.
Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty.
x x
x x
By
the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme
is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the
responsibility of the courts.[66]
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,[67] the
United States Supreme Court held that the challenge to the
constitutionality of the school’s policy allowing student-led prayers and
speeches before games was ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer had
yet been led under the policy, because the policy was being challenged as
unconstitutional on its face.[68]
That the law or act in question is
not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in New York v. United States,[69] decided in 1992, the United States
Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York challenging the
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe for
adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take effect until
January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New York had to take immediate
action to avoid the provision's consequences.[70]
The present petitions pray for Certiorari,[71] Prohibition,
and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition
are remedies granted by law when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, in
the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of prohibition, without
or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.[72] Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use
or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.[73]
Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts
of legislative and executive officials.[74]
The authority of the
The present petitions allege that
respondents
Furthermore, the petitions allege
that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of
the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into
force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the
Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This
stipulation, in effect, guaranteed
to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution.
Such act constitutes another
violation of its authority.
Again, these points will be discussed in more detail later.
As the petitions allege acts or
omissions on the part of respondent that
exceed their authority, by
violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and
statutes, the petitions make a prima
facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute.[77]
B. Locus
Standi
For
a party to have locus standi, one
must allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.”[78]
Because
constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is
likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to
this interest in the constitutional question raised.[79]
When suing as a citizen,
the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to
be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.[80] When the issue concerns a public
right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in
the execution of the laws.[81]
For
a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue
where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or
deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[82]
The Court retains discretion whether or not to allow a taxpayer’s suit.[83]
In
the case of a legislator or member of
Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned
by legislators. A member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.[84]
An
organization may be granted standing
to assert the rights of its members,[85]
but the mere invocation by the Integrated
Bar of the
As
regards a local government unit (LGU),
it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and
of the other LGUs.[87]
Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon
showing of facts that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention,[88]
such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties.
In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the
procedural technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has
exercised, highlighted in the case of David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[89] where technicalities of procedure were
brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.[90] The Court’s forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving
constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of fundamental
rights.
In
not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to
determine whether the other branches of government have kept themselves within
the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion
given them, has brushed aside technical rules of procedure.[91]
In the
petitions at bar, petitioners Province
of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province
of Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-intervention
Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of
Isabela and Municipality of Linamon
have locus standi in view of the
direct and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their
territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended
domain of the BJE. These petitioners
allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which would be
expanded to form the BJE territory.
Petitioners’ legal standing is thus beyond doubt.
In G.R.
No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda,
Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel
III would have no standing as
citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied
some right or privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a former Senator, an
incumbent mayor of
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing
as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct of
an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal
standing. Their allegation that the
issues involved in these petitions are of “undeniable transcendental
importance” clothes them with added basis for their personality to intervene in
these petitions.
With
regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his
standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate and a citizen to
enforce compliance by respondents of the public’s constitutional right to be
informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the requisite standing as
an intervenor.
With
respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as
a former congressman of the 3rd district of Davao City, a taxpayer
and a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo
B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and
taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as
taxpayer, resident and member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal
interest in the present petitions. Just
the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax
the procedural technicality on locus
standi given the paramount
public interest in the issues at hand.
Intervening
respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral
Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the
attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers, allege that
they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the resolution
of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial of the
petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices to clothe them
with standing.
B. Mootness
Respondents
insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction
of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement
of the Executive Secretary that “[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately
decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA.”[92]
In
lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that
the President had already disbanded the
In
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[94]
this Court held that the “moot and academic” principle not being a magical
formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave
violation of the Constitution;[95]
(b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is
involved;[96] (c) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public;[97]
and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[98]
Another
exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary
cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer
voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive
the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the
case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive
relief against the possible recurrence of the violation.[99]
The
present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into
the domain of judicial review. The grounds
cited above in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they
were, not only in David, but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo[100]
and Manalo v. Calderon[101]
where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events that
would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding.
Petitions not
mooted
Contrary
then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the
eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present
petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through
due to the Court’s issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
Contrary
too to respondents’ position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere “list of
consensus points,” especially given its nomenclature,
the need to have it signed or
initialed by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional implications
of these “consensus points,” foremost of which is the creation of the
BJE.
In
fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend and
effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain provisions
of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently,
the present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the
MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future negotiations and agreements
necessary for its realization. The
petitions have not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the
public disclosure of the MOA-AD,[102] the
manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP
Panel not withstanding.
Petitions
are imbued with paramount public interest
There
is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest,
involving a significant part of the country’s territory and the wide-ranging
political modifications of affected LGUs.
The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject
to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more
than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the
government and its negotiating entity.
Respondents
cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.[103]
where the Court did not “pontificat[e] on issues which no longer legitimately
constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good
to the nation as a whole.”
The
present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and
eventually cancelled was a stand-alone government procurement contract for a
national broadband network involving a one-time contractual relation
between two parties—the government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved specific
government procurement policies and standard principles on contracts, the
majority opinion in Suplico found
nothing exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to
the transactions and parties involved in the controversy.
The MOA-AD is
part of a series of agreements
In
the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out
the
Accordingly,
even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of
Need to
formulate principles-guidelines
Surely, the present MOA-AD can be
renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
Respondents
invite the Court’s attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Reyes[104] in which he stated that the doctrine of “capable of repetition
yet evading review” can override mootness, “provided the party raising it in a
proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct
result of their issuance.” They contend that
the Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter for the doctrine to be
invoked.
The present petitions all contain
prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City of
Indeed,
the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine
immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases.[106] There is a reasonable expectation
that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del
Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the
Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the
future as respondents’ actions are capable of repetition, in another or any
form.
It
is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become
moot, respondents having, by Compliance of
V. SUBSTANTIVE
ISSUES
As
culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically
two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one relating to the manner in which
the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its
provisions, viz:
1.
Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later
initialed the MOA-AD?
2.
Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?
On the first Substantive
issue
Petitioners invoke their
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as provided
in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.[107]
As
early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,[108]
the Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public
records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional status.
The
right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution
and the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory
constitutional right.[109]
In
the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,[110] the
Court ruled that access to public records is predicated on the right of the
people to acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly,
in a democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
political significance.
x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation’s problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: “Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.” x x x[111]
In the same way that free discussion
enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to
information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making
by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation[112] so that they may
be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a
responsible, reasonable and effective manner.
It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among
a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes
desired by the people.[113]
The MOA-AD
is a matter of public concern
That the subject of the information
sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern[114]
faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents
admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern.[115] In previous cases, the Court found that the
regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds,[116]
the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws,[117]
the civil service eligibility of a public employee,[118]
the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public
officials,[119]
the recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth,[120]
and the identity of party-list nominees,[121]
among others, are matters of public concern.
Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving
as it does the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at
large.
Matters
of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory
nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically
ruled:
x x x [T]he right to information “contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction.” Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed “policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.”[122] (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Intended
as a “splendid symmetry”[123]
to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution
reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.[124]
The
policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to
information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right
of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty
of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.[125]
The
policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the
conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people’s
right to know as the centerpiece. It is
a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy.[126] These provisions are vital to the exercise of
the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people.[127]
Whether
Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission so disclose:
MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will not be in force and effect until after Congress shall have provided it.
MR. O
The following discourse, after Commissioner
Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the issue, is enlightening.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the Gentleman correctly as having said that this is not a self-executing provision? It would require a legislation by Congress to implement?
MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment from Commissioner Regalado, so that the safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause “as may be provided by law”
MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and Congress may provide for reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national interest?
MR. O
Indubitably,
the effectivity of the policy of public
disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it
is merely directed to provide for “reasonable safeguards.” The complete and effective exercise of the
right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is
absurd to say that the broader[130]
right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while
the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public
interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the
absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such
policy.
An
essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will.[131] Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights
to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to participate? Will the government provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can participate and can react where the existing media facilities are not able to provide full feedback mechanisms to the government? I suppose this will be part of the government implementing operational mechanisms.
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses take place. There is a message and a feedback, both ways.
x x x x
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence?
I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public officials but also network of private business o[r] community-based organizations that will be reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more credence or credibility on the private network of volunteers and voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not think we are afraid that there will be another OMA in the making.[132] (Emphasis supplied)
The
imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information,
is evident in the “marching orders” to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose
information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and
process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3.[133] The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3
declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil
society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people’s
participation.
One of the three underlying
principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it “should be
community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to
all Filipinos” and “shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the
different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community.”[134] Included as a component of the comprehensive
peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes “continuing
consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace
agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people’s
participation in the peace process.”[135]
Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite
to effectuate “continuing” consultations, contrary to respondents’ position
that plebiscite is “more than sufficient consultation.”[136]
Further,
E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of
which is to “[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF)
and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments,
recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the
progress of the comprehensive peace process.”[137] E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the
NPF to be “the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek
advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of
society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the
comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue
and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives.”[138]
In fine, E.O. No. 3
establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a
corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure.
PAPP Esperon
committed grave abuse of discretion
The
PAPP committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to
carry out the pertinent consultation.
The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal
authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary
and despotic exercise thereof.
The
Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a
particular way or manner. It may,
however, require him to comply with the law and discharge the functions within the authority granted by the
President.[139]
Petitioners
are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents’
retort in justifying the denial of petitioners’ right to be consulted. Respondents’ stance manifests the manner by
which they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people’s
participation. Such disregard of the express
mandate of the President is not much different from superficial conduct toward
token provisos that border on classic lip service.[140] It illustrates a gross evasion of positive
duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
As
for respondents’ invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable
under the premises. The argument defies
sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3’s explicit provisions on
continuing consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels. The
executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public’s right even
before the GRP makes its official recommendations or before the government
proffers its definite propositions.[141] It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to
elicit relevant advice, information, comments and recommendations from the
people through dialogue.
AT
ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege
in view of their unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final
draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally
complying with the Court’s
Petitioners’
assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State
policy to “require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and
people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any
project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions”[142]
is well-taken. The LGC chapter on
intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy:
Prior Consultations Required. – No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.[143] (Italics and underscoring supplied)
In
Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Paño,[144] the
Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted provision of the LGU apply
only to national programs or projects which are to be implemented in a
particular local community. Among the
programs and projects covered are those that are critical to the environment
and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be
implemented.[145] The
MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,[146] which could pervasively and drastically
result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from
their total environment.
With
respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs),
whose interests are represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are adversely
affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to
participate fully at all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect
their rights, lives and destinies.[147] The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing
ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut
mechanisms ordained in said Act,[148]
which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior
informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.
Notably,
the IPRA does not grant the
Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is
the raison d’etre of the MOA-AD, without which all other stipulations or
“consensus points” necessarily must fail.
In proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain,
without complying with the IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the
MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended
the boundaries of their authority.
As it seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary
changes to the legal framework. While
paragraph 7 on Governance suspends the effectivity of all provisions requiring
changes to the legal framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be
discussed in the following section.
Indeed,
ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public
scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain
democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government
authority emanating from them.[149]
ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
With
regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they
cannot all be accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral
arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend
the existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its
provisions. Respondents, nonetheless,
counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity because any provisions therein
which are inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective
until the necessary changes to that framework are made. The validity of this argument will be
considered later. For now, the Court
shall pass upon how
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws as presently worded.
In
general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers
conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners
assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local
government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers
that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn
first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different
provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes
to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions
with it in mind.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY,
paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however,
that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The nature of the “associative”
relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely
in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of
“association” in international law, and the MOA-AD – by its inclusion of
international law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an international
legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in
understanding the use of the term “associative”
in the MOA-AD.
Keitner
and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. x x x[150] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall
Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (
According
to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the
In
the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the
It
bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free
association is understood as an international association between
sovereigns. The Compact of Free
Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation’s
national constitution, and each party may terminate the association consistent
with the right of independence. It has been said that, with the
admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN
in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is
actually based on an underlying status of independence.[152]
In
international practice, the “associated
state” arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to
full independence. Examples of
states that have passed through the status of associated states as a
transitional phase are
Back
to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the
international legal concept of association,
specifically the following: the BJE’s capacity to enter into economic and trade
relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to
ensure the BJE’s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central
Government over external defense.
Moreover, the BJE’s right to participate in Philippine official
missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection,
and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or
between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the
right of the governments of
These
provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of
an associated state or, at any rate,
a status closely approximating it.
The concept
of association is not
recognized under the present
Constitution
No province, city, or municipality,
not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the
national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any
local or regional government. It also
implies the recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution,
however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims
to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Even
the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD’s provisions, therefore, already
requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions,
specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of
the Republic of the
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the
The BJE is a far more powerful
entity than
the autonomous region
recognized
in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version
of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM.
Indeed, BJE is a state in all but
name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,[154]
namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government,
and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that
the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has
betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter
to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is
not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the
formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the
laws.
Article
X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he creation of the
autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces,
cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.”
(Emphasis supplied)
As
reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the
term “autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the
MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the
present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of
Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001
plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan,
Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically part of the BJE without
need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B
mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and
the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001,
however, does not render another
plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these
areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
The MOA-AD,
moreover, would not
comply with
Article X, Section 20 of
the
Constitution
since that provision defines the
powers of autonomous regions as follows:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied)
Again
on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD
would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant
to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice,
since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD
must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass
legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate
paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: “The BJE is free to enter
into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries:
provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include
aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x.” Under our constitutional system, it is only
the President who has that power. Pimentel
v. Executive Secretary[155]
instructs:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution
must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: “The
State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities
within the framework of national unity and development.” (Underscoring supplied) An associative
arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity
because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the
act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in
international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national
unity.
Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution,
the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing
statutory law, among which are R.A. No. 9054[156]
or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.[157]
Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of
the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of “Bangsamoro people”
used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states:
1. It is the birthright of all
Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that
found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than
lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples
living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes
between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows:
“As used in this Organic Act, the phrase “indigenous cultural community” refers to Filipino citizens residing in the autonomous region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions.”
Respecting
the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition
of ancestral domains. The MOA-AD’s
manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear
departure from that procedure. By
paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties
simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, “[t]he
Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as
the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain,
the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic
region.”
Chapter
VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as
illustrated in the following provisions thereof:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. — The identification and
delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the following
procedures:
x x x x
b) Petition for Delineation. — The process of delineating a
specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP
concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a
majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;
c) Delineation Proper. — The official delineation of ancestral
domain boundaries including census of all community members therein, shall be
immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the
application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination
with the community concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement
and participation by the members of the communities concerned;
d) Proof Required. — Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include
the testimony of elders or community under oath, and other documents directly
or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the area since time
immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1)
of the following authentic documents:
1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and
traditions;
2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political
structure and institution;
3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as
those of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old villages;
4) Historical accounts, including pacts and
agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with
other ICCs/IPs;
5) Survey plans and sketch maps;
6) Anthropological data;
7) Genealogical surveys;
8) Pictures and descriptive histories of
traditional communal forests and hunting grounds;
9) Pictures and descriptive histories of
traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills,
terraces and the like; and
10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the
native dialect of the community.
e) Preparation of Maps. — On the basis of such investigation
and the findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the
NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions, and a
description of the natural features and landmarks embraced therein;
f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. — A complete
copy of the preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall be prepared
by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;
g) Notice and Publication. — A copy of each document, including
a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted
in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the
document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and regional offices of
the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a
week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition
thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication: Provided, That
in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will
be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed
sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available;
h) Endorsement to NCIP. — Within fifteen (15) days from
publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall
prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is
deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient,
the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional
evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim
that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification:
Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office
shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing
the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided,
furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on
the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall
cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a
preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full
adjudication according to the section below.
x x x x
To remove all doubts about the
irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system, a discussion of not
only the Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international law is
in order, for
Article II,
Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines “adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.”
Applying this provision of the
Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,[158] held
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part of the law of the land
on account of which it ordered the release on bail of a detained alien of
Russian descent whose deportation order had not been executed even after two
years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin
v. Edu[159]
applied the aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signals.
International
law has long recognized the right to self-determination of “peoples,”
understood not merely as the entire population of a State but also a portion
thereof. In considering the question of
whether the people of Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from Canada,
the Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC[160]
had occasion to acknowledge that “the right of a people to self-determination
is now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has
acquired a status beyond ‘convention’ and is considered a general principle of
international law.”
Among the conventions referred to are
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[161]
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights[162]
which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the
right of self-determination, “freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.”
The
people’s right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as
extending to a unilateral right of secession.
A distinction should be made between the right of internal and external
self-determination. REFERENCE RE
SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:
“(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination
126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination – a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x
External self-determination
can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, supra, as
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people. (Emphasis added)
127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various international documents that support the existence of a people’s right to self-determination also contain parallel statements supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing state’s territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states.
x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The
Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external self-determination can arise,
namely, where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination
or exploitation outside a colonial context, and – less definitely but asserted
by a number of commentators – is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its
right to internal self-determination. The Court ultimately held that the population
of Quebec had no right to secession, as the same is not under colonial rule or
foreign domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom to make political
choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development, citing that
Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and judicial
institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent positions therein.
The
exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the
REPORT OF THE IN
x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is definitively constituted. A dispute between two States concerning such a question, under normal conditions therefore, bears upon a question which International Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned. Any other solution would amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack of stability which would not only be contrary to the very idea embodied in term “State,” but would also endanger the interests of the international community. If this right is not possessed by a large or small section of a nation, neither can it be held by the State to which the national group wishes to be attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Committee held that the dispute
concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question which is left by international
law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception
rather than the rule elucidated above.
Its ground for departing from the general rule, however, was a very
narrow one, namely, the
Turning
now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has
been used, in scholarship as well as international, regional, and state
practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and
connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly
incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as
“indigenous” since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants
of lands now dominated by others.
Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are
culturally distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler
societies born of the forces of empire and conquest.[164] Examples of groups who have been regarded as
indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of
As
with the broader category of “peoples,” indigenous peoples situated within
states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those
states under international law,[165]
but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal
self-determination.
In
a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP)
through General Assembly
Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143
to 4, the
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.
Self-government,
as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has
been understood as equivalent to “internal self-determination.”[166] The extent of self-determination provided for
in the UN DRIP is more particularly defined in its subsequent articles, some of
which are quoted hereunder:
Article 8
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of,
and redress for:
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of
depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural
values or ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has
the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or
resources;
(c) Any form of forced
population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any
of their rights;
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;
(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.
Article 21
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities.
Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied
or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own,
use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess
by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as
well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.
Article 30
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned.
2. States shall undertake effective
consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate
procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, prior
to using their lands or territories for military activities.
Article 32
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good
faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative
institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.
Article 37
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the
recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other
constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have
States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive
arrangements.
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.
Article 38
States in
consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the
appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of
this Declaration.
Assuming
that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be
regarded as embodying customary international law – a question which the Court
need not definitively resolve here – the obligations enumerated therein do not
strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the
instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in
the MOA-AD. Even the more specific
provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its
application by the different States.
There is, for instance, no
requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples their
own police and internal security force.
Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection
for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of their
lands – a function that is normally performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to
indigenous people’s identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the
State, then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such
peoples would also be the duty of States.
Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of
indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is
the right of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources which
they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
Moreover,
the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does
not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of
an associated state. All the rights
recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
1.
Nothing in this Declaration may be
interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to
engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the
United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.
Even
if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the
validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws
unnecessary.
It is, therefore, clear
that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the
Constitution and the laws as presently worded. Respondents
proffer, however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed
any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely
because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws
shall not take effect until these laws are amended. They cite
paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is
reproduced below for convenience:
7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
Indeed, the foregoing stipulation
keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into force until
the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected. While
the word “Constitution” is not mentioned in the provision now under
consideration or anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term “legal framework” is
certainly broad enough to include the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the suspensive
clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD
the provisions thereof regarding the associative relationship between the BJE
and the Central Government, have already violated the Memorandum of
Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the
“negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Republic of the Philippines.” (Emphasis supplied) Establishing an associative relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already
discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment
of an independent status already prevailing.
Even apart from the above-mentioned
Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective because the suspensive clause is invalid,
as discussed below.
The
authority of the
It bears noting that the
SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. – The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as the “Paths to Peace”. These component processes are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited to, the following:
a.
PURSUIT OF SO
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably
be perceived as an attempt of respondents to address, pursuant to this
provision of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in
The
inquiry on the legality of the “suspensive clause,” however, cannot stop here,
because it must be asked
whether the
President herself may exercise the power delegated to the
The President cannot delegate a power
that she herself does not possess. May
the President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue reforms
that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the
reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the present laws
allow? The answer to this question
requires a discussion of
the extent
of the President’s power to conduct peace negotiations.
That the authority of the President to conduct
peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary,[168] in
issue was the authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion – an
authority which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The Court held thus:
“In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the President's
. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, the President’s power
to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the
general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she
has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
violence.[169]
As
the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed
conflict will show, however, peace is rarely attained by simply pursuing a
military solution. Oftentimes, changes
as far-reaching as a fundamental reconfiguration of the nation’s constitutional
structure is required. The observations
of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit:
x
x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must
form the core of any post-conflict peace-building mission. As we have observed
in
The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in the political and governance transition. Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy will operate.[170]
In
the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal
status of peace agreements, observed that the typical way that peace agreements
establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization and demobilization is by
linking them to new constitutional structures addressing governance,
elections, and legal and human rights institutions.[171]
In the Philippine experience, the
link between peace agreements and constitution-making has been recognized by no
less than the framers of the Constitution.
Behind the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions[172]
is the framers’ intention to implement a particular peace agreement, namely,
the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the
MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I will reserve my right to ask them if they are not covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions.
I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists in the Muslim region; it is working very well; it has, in fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my question is: since that already exists, why do we have to go into something new?
MR. OPLE. May I
answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo.
Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right that certain definite steps have
been taken to implement the provisions of the
The
constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them
have, to the credit of their drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still
faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and the
MILF. If the President is to be expected
to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace
in
The President may not, of course, unilaterally
implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be prevented
from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is
minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional
amendment and revision. In particular,
Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of
the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or revision to the
people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question
of calling such a convention.
While
the President does not possess constituent powers – as those powers may be
exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through
initiative and referendum – she may submit proposals for constitutional
change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of
constituent powers.
In
Sanidad v. COMELEC,[174] in
issue was the legality of then President Marcos’ act of directly submitting
proposals for constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing the interim National
Assembly which was the body vested by the 1973 Constitution with the power to
propose such amendments. President
Marcos, it will be recalled, never convened the interim National Assembly. The majority upheld the President’s act,
holding that “the urges of absolute necessity” compelled the President as the
agent of the people to act as he did, there being no interim National Assembly
to propose constitutional amendments.
Against this ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma vigorously
dissented. The Court’s concern at
present, however, is not with regard to the point on which it was then divided
in that controversial case, but on that which was not disputed by either side.
Justice Teehankee’s dissent,[175] in
particular, bears noting. While he
disagreed that the President may directly submit proposed constitutional
amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition that he
would have upheld the President’s action along with the majority had the
President convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his proposals
through it. Thus Justice Teehankee
opined:
“Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government, defines and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and the constituent power has not been granted to but has been withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it follows that the President’s questioned decrees proposing and submitting constitutional amendments directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom the power is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis.”[176] (Emphasis supplied)
From the
foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President – in the
course of conducting peace negotiations – may validly consider implementing
even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not
unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or
act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.
Since,
under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly
propose amendments through initiative and referendum, the President may also submit
her recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted on in a
plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for
their independent consideration of whether these recommendations merit being
formally proposed through initiative.
These
recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President’s
suggestions to the people, for any further involvement in the process of
initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine “people’s
initiative.” The only initiative
recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the
people. As the Court stated in Lambino
v. COMELEC:[177]
“The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the ‘people's voice.’ However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that ‘ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms.’ The Lambino Group thus admits that their ‘people's’ initiative is an ‘unqualified support to the agenda’ of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of ‘people's voice’ or ‘sovereign will’ in the present initiative.”
It will be observed that the
President has authority, as stated in her oath of office,[178]
only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however,
extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend
proposed amendments or revision. As long
as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation
need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The foregoing discussion focused on
the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, since
her authority to propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for
Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the more prominent instances the
practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation Address of the
President to Congress. Moreover, the
annual general appropriations bill has always been based on the budget prepared
by the President, which – for all intents and purposes – is a proposal for new
legislation coming from the President.[179]
The “suspensive
clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards
Given the limited nature of the
President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third
party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most
she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or
the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
Paragraph 7 on Governance of the
MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled
with the present Constitution and laws “shall come into force upon signing of a
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework.” This stipulation does not
bear the marks of a suspensive condition – defined in civil law as a future and
uncertain event – but of a term.
It is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the
legal framework will be effected, but when. That there is no uncertainty being
contemplated is plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state
that the contemplated changes shall be “with due regard to non derogation of
prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained
in the Comprehensive Compact.”
Pursuant to this stipulation,
therefore, it is mandatory for the
By the time
these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted among the
“prior agreements” from which there could be no derogation.
What remains for discussion in the
Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing details for these “consensus
points” and, notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated
changes to the legal framework.
Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on
GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the
limits of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments,
it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the “consensus
points” found in the MOA-AD. Hence,
it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
A comparison between the “suspensive
clause” of the MOA-AD with a similar provision appearing in the 1996 final
peace agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most instructive.
As a backdrop, the parties to the
1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in two phases. Phase I covered a three-year
transitional period involving the putting up of new administrative structures through
Executive Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD)
and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), while Phase
II covered the establishment of the new regional autonomous government through
amendment or repeal of R.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of the
ARMM.
The stipulations on Phase II
consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the expanded autonomous
region envisioned by the parties. To
that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a crucial difference
between the two agreements. While the
MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the
“necessary changes to the legal framework” will be put in place, the
GRP-MNLF final peace agreement states thus: “Accordingly, these provisions [on
Phase II] shall be recommended by the GRP to Congress for
incorporation in the amendatory or repealing law.”
Concerns
have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding
international law obligation on the part of the Philippines to change its
Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be considered either as a binding
agreement under international law, or a unilateral declaration of the
Philippine government to the international community that it would grant to the
Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in
international law, however.
The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in
the overview thereof, would have included foreign dignitaries as
signatories. In addition,
representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in
The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty[180]
(the Lomé Accord case) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone is enlightening. The Lomé Accord was a peace agreement signed on
July 7, 1999 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government had
been in armed conflict for around eight years at the time of signing. There were non-contracting signatories to the
agreement, among which were the Government of the Togolese Republic, the Economic Community of West African States, and the UN.
On January 16, 2002, after a
successful negotiation between the UN Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone
Government, another agreement was entered into by the UN and that Government
whereby the Special Court of Sierra Leone was established. The sole purpose of the Special Court, an
international court, was to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility
for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law
committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.
Among the stipulations of the Lomé
Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the members of the RUF with
respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of
that organization since the conflict began.
In the Lomé Accord case, the Defence
argued that the Accord created an internationally binding obligation not
to prosecute the beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing,
among other things, the participation of foreign dignitaries and international
organizations in the finalization of that agreement. The
“37.
In regard to the nature of a negotiated
settlement of an internal armed conflict it is easy to assume and to
argue with some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the defendants
seem to have done, that the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the
conflict, the document formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of
state or their representatives and representatives of international
organizations, means the agreement of the parties is internationalized so as to
create obligations in international law.
x x x x
40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict and the mediator or facilitator of the settlement, or persons or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took place but who are not at all parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties and who do not claim any obligation from the contracting parties or incur any obligation from the settlement.
41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State and the RUF which has no status of statehood and is to all intents and purposes a faction within the state. The non-contracting signatories of the Lomé Agreement were moral guarantors of the principle that, in the terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, “this peace agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties”. The moral guarantors assumed no legal obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its representative appended, presumably for avoidance of doubt, an understanding of the extent of the agreement to be implemented as not including certain international crimes.
42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations regulated by international law so that a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international law which will also provide principle means of enforcement. The Lomé Agreement created neither rights nor obligations capable of being regulated by international law. An agreement such as the Lomé Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates a factual situation of restoration of peace that the international community acting through the Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not convert it to an international agreement which creates an obligation enforceable in international, as distinguished from municipal, law. A breach of the terms of such a peace agreement resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a threat to peace in the determination of the Security Council may indicate a reversal of the factual situation of peace to be visited with possible legal consequences arising from the new situation of conflict created. Such consequences such as action by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII arise from the situation and not from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it. Such action cannot be regarded as a remedy for the breach. A peace agreement which settles an internal armed conflict cannot be ascribed the same status as one which settles an international armed conflict which, essentially, must be between two or more warring States. The Lomé Agreement cannot be characterised as an international instrument. x x x” (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Similarly,
that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and
international organizations not parties to the Agreement would not have
sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law.
In another vein, concern has been
raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral declaration of the
Philippine State, binding under international law, that it would comply with
all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it would have to
amend its Constitution accordingly regardless of the true will of the
people. Cited as authority for this view
is Australia v. France,[181]
also known as the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International Court
of Justice (ICJ).
In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia
challenged before the ICJ the legality of France’s nuclear tests in the South
Pacific.
Essential to
the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be
bound to the international community in issuing its public statements, viz:
43. It is well
recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning
legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations.
Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is
the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound
according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the
character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally
required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An
undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound,
even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is
binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor
any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction
from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a
requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the
juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made.
44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being bound–the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.
x x x x
51. In announcing
that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French
Government conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its
intention effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that
other States might take note of these statements and rely on their being
effective. The validity of these statements and their legal consequences
must be considered within the general framework of the security of
international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so
essential in the relations among States. It is from the actual substance
of these statements, and from the circumstances attending their making, that
the legal implications of the unilateral act must be deduced. The
objects of these statements are clear and they were addressed to the
international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they
constitute an undertaking possessing legal effect. The Court considers *270 that
the President of the Republic, in deciding upon the effective cessation of
atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to the international community to which
his words were addressed. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As gathered from
the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative
may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following
conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the
international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by
its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be
detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only
in peculiar circumstances.
The limited
applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case
decided by the ICJ entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali,[183]
also known as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration subject of that case
was a statement made by the President of Mali, in an interview by a foreign
press agency, that
Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the
ICJ held that the statement of Mali’s President was not a unilateral act with
legal implications. It clarified that
its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances
surrounding the French declaration subject thereof, to wit:
40. In order to
assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken
of all the factual circumstances in which the act occurred. For example, in
the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court took the view that since the applicant
States were not the only ones concerned at the possible continuance of
atmospheric testing by the French Government, that Government's unilateral
declarations had ‘conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its
intention effectively to terminate these tests‘ (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p.
269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the particular circumstances of those
cases, the French Government could not express an intention to be bound
otherwise than by unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it could
have accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each of the applicants
without thereby jeopardizing its contention that its conduct was lawful. The
circumstances of the present case are radically different. Here, there was
nothing to hinder the Parties from manifesting an intention to accept the
binding character of the conclusions of the Organization of African Unity
Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal agreement on the basis of
reciprocity. Since no agreement of this kind was concluded between the
Parties, the Chamber finds that there are no grounds to interpret the
declaration made by
Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the
above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on the
part of the Philippine State to the international community.
The Philippine panel did not draft the same with the clear intention of
being bound thereby to the international community as a whole or to any State,
but only to the MILF. While there were
States and international organizations involved, one way or another, in the
negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as
witnesses or, in the case of
Since the commitments in the MOA-AD
were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such commitments
would not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse – to the
trust and confidence essential in the relations among States.
In one important respect, the circumstances
surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as
already discussed, the Mali President’s statement was not held to be a binding
unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As
in that case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine panel, had it
really been its intention to be bound to other States, to manifest that
intention by formal agreement. Here,
that formal agreement would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a
clear commitment to be legally bound to the international community, not just
the MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the signatures of the
participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of that
commitment. Entering into such a formal
agreement would not have resulted in a loss of face for the Philippine
government before the international community, which was one of the
difficulties that prevented the French Government from entering into a formal
agreement with other countries. That the
Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it
had no intention to be bound to the international community. On that ground, the MOA-AD may not be considered a unilateral
declaration under international law.
The
MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international
law notwithstanding, respondents’ almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal
framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that
they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state
within a state, but in their brazen willingness
to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give
their imprimatur to their solution.
Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the
people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.
The sovereign people may, if it so desired,
go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to the Moros for
the sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so long
as the change is not inconsistent with what, in international law, is known as Jus Cogens.[184] Respondents, however, may not preempt it in
that decision.
SUMMARY
The petitions are ripe for
adjudication. The failure of respondents
to consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority
by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by
any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As
the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners,
petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal
stance adopted in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo.
Contrary
to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the
eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court
finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the “moot and
academic” principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution
involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The
MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out
the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF
back in June 2001. Hence, the present
MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar
or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
The
Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in
view of the respondents’ action in providing the Court and the petitioners with
the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.
The
people’s right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7,
Article III of the Constitution is in splendid
symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the
Constitution. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. The complete and effective
exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary
provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject
only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The
contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public
interest in the highest order. In
declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations
leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction
as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
An essential element of these twin
freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between
the government and the people. Corollary
to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was
envisioned to be a species of these public rights.
At
least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify
the exercise of the people’s right to be consulted on relevant matters relating
to the peace agenda.
One,
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on
both national and local levels and for a principal forum for
consensus-building. In fact, it is the
duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular
dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations
from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
Two,
Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all
national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program
critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for
the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one
peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically
result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from
their total environment.
Three,
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for
clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain,
which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior
informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain
claim by mere agreement or compromise.
The
invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general
right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in
the face of executive secrecy. In any
event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally
disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial
compliance and public scrutiny.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out
the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No.
7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to
and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.
It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined.
The
MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but
the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional,
for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies
that the same is on its way to independence.
While
there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof
inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that
framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD
establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The
President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it
virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the
laws will eventually be put in place.
Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to
make such a guarantee. Upholding such an
act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested
only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through
the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the
outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference
with that process.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to
an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines
under international law, respondents’ act of guaranteeing amendments is, by
itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally
defective.
WHEREFORE, respondents’
motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN
DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISU Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES- Associate Justice MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN
T. REYES
Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Eric Gutierrez and Abdulwahab Guialal, The Unfinished Jihad: The Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Peace in Mindanao in Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines 275 (1999).
[2] Memorandum of Respondents dated September 24, 2008, p. 10.
[3] Memorandum of Respondents dated September 24, 2008, pp. 10-11.
[4] Vide Salah Jubair, The Long Road to Peace: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process 35-36 (2007).
[5] Memorandum of Respondents dated September 24, 2008, p. 12.
[6] Vide Salah Jubair, The Long Road to Peace: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process 40-41 (2007).
[7] Composed of its Chairperson, Sec. Rodolfo Garcia, and members, Atty. Leah Armamento, Atty. Sedfrey Candelaria, with Mark Ryan Sullivan as Secretariat head.
[8] Represented by Governor Jesus Sacdalan and/or Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol.
[9] Rollo (G.R. No. 183591), pp. 3-33.
[10] Supplement to Petition (with motion for leave) of August 11, 2008, rollo (G.R. No. 183591), pp. 143-162.
[11] Rollo (G.R. No. 183752), pp. 3-28.
[12] Represented by Mayor Celso L. Lobregat.
[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 183591), pp. 132-135; rollo (G.R. No. 183752), pp. 68-71.
[14] Rollo (G.R. No. 183591), pp. 130-131; rollo (G.R. No. 183752), pp. 66-67.
[15] Rollo (G.R. No. 183752), pp. 173-246.
[16] Represented by Mayor Lawrence Lluch Cruz.
[17] Represented by Governor Rolando Yebes.
[18] Namely, Seth Frederick Jaloslos, Fernando Cabigon, Jr., Uldarico Mejorada II, Edionar Zamoras, Edgar Baguio, Cedric Adriatico, Felixberto Bolando, Joseph Brendo Ajero, Norbideiri Edding, Anecito Darunday, Angelica Carreon, and Luzviminda Torrino.
[19] Rollo
(G.R. No. 183951), pp. 3-33.
[20] Rollo (G.R. No. 183962), pp. 3- 20.
[21] Represented by Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar.
[22] Represented by Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu.
[23] Represented by Mayor Noel Deano.
[24] Rollo (G.R. No. 183591), pp. 451-453.
[25] R.A. No.
6734, as amended by R.A. 9054 entitled An
Act to Strengthen and Expand the
[26] R.A. No. 8371, An act to re
[27] Cesar Adib Majul, The General Nature of Islamic Law and its Application in the Philippines, lecture delivered as part of the Ricardo Paras Lectures, a series jointly sponsored by the Commission on Bar Integration of the Supreme Court, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the U.P. Law Center, September 24, 1977.
[28] Ibid., vide
M.A. Muqtedar Khan Ph.D., immigrant
American Muslims and the Moral Dilemmas of Citizenship, http://www.islamfortoday.com/khan04.htm,
visited on September 18, 2008, and Syed Shahabuddin, Muslim
World and the contemporary Ijma' on rules of governance - ii, http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/2004/01-15May04-Print-Edition/0105200471.htm,
visited on September 18, 2008.
[29] MOA-AD Terms of Reference.
[30] MOA-AD, Concepts and Principles, par. 1.
[31] A traditional Muslim historical account of the acts of Shariff Kabungsuwan is quoted by historian Cesar Adib Majul in his book, Muslims in the Philippines (1973):
After a time it came to pass that Mamalu, who was the chief man next to Kabungsuwan, journeyed to Cotabato. He found there that many of the people had ceased to regard the teachings of the Koran and had fallen into evil ways. Mamamlu sent to Kabungsuwan word of these things.
Kabungsuwan with a portion of his warriors went from Malabang to Cotabato and found that the word sent to him by Mamamlu was true. Then he assembled together all the people. Those of them, who had done evilly and disregarded the teachings of the Koran thenceforth, he drove out of the town into the hills, with their wives and children.
Those wicked one who were thus cast out were the beginnings of the tribes of the Tirurais and Manobos, who live to the east of Cotabato in the country into which their evil forefathers were driven. And even to this day they worship not God; neither do they obey the teachings of the Koran . . . But the people of Kabungsuwan, who regarded the teachings of the Koran and lived in fear of God, prospered and increased, and we Moros of today are their descendants. (Citation omitted, emphasis supplied).
[32] Id., par. 2.
[33] Id., par. 3.
[34] Id., par. 4.
[35] Francisco L. Gonzales, Sultans of a Violent Land, in Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines 99, 103 (1999).
[36] The Charter of the Assembly of First
Nations, the leading advocacy group for the indigenous peoples of
“WE THE
CHI
THAT our peoples are the original peoples of this land having been put
here by the Creator; x x x.”
[37] Id., par. 6.
[38] MOA-AD, Territory, par. 1.
[39] Id., par. 2(c).
[40] Id., par. 2(d).
[41] Id., par. 2(e).
[42] Id., par. 2(f).
[43] Id., par, 2(g)(1).
[44] Id., par. 2(h).
[45] Id., par. 2(i).
[46] MOA-AD, Resources, par. 4.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Id., par. 5.
[49] Id., par. 6.
[50] Id., par. 7.
[51] Id., par. 9.
[52] MOA-AD, Governance, par. 3.
[53] “IN W
[54] Vide 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.
[55] Vide
Muskrat v. US, 219 US 346 (1911).
[56] Flast
v. Cohen, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1950 (1968).
[57] Didipio
Earth Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated (DESAMA) v. Gozun,
G.R. No. 157882, March 30, 2006, 485 SCRA 286.
[58] Vide
U.S. v. Muskrat, 219
[59] Guingona,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 427-428 (1998).
[60] Francisco,
Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 901-902 (2003) (citation
omitted).
[61] Vide
Warth v. Seldin, 422 US 490, 511
(1975).
[62] Vide
id. at 526.
[63] Solicitor General’s Comment to G.R. No. 183752, pp. 9-11.
[64] MOA-AD, pp. 3-7, 10.
[65] 391 Phil. 43 (2000).
[66] Id. at 107-108.
[67] 530 US 290 (2000).
[68] Id. at 292.
[69] 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
[70] Id. at 175.
[71] Although only one petition is denominated a petition for certiorari, most petitions pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional/null and void.
[72] Vide
Rules of Court, Rule 65, Secs. 1
and 2.
[73] Vide
Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 3.
[74] Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 575 (1997).
[75] Entitled Defining Policy and Administrative Structure for Government’s Peace Efforts which reaffirms and reiterates Executive Order No. 125 of September 15, 1993.
[76] E.O. No. 3, (2001), Sec. 1.
[77] Vide Tañada v. Angara, supra note 74.
[78] Baker v. Carr, 369
[79] Vicente V. Mendoza , Judicial Review of Constitutional Questions
137 (2004).
[80] Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 896 (2003).
[81] David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 S
[82] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 320 Phil. 171 (1995).
[83] Macasiano v. NHA, G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993, 224 SCRA 236.
[84] Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 400 Phil. 307, 328-329 (2000) citing Phil. Constitution Ass’n., Inc. v. Mathay, et al., 124 Phil. 890 (1966).
[85] Vide
NAACP v.
[86] Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra note 80.
[87]
[88] Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 401 (1999) citing Gibson v. Judge Revilla, 180 Phil. 645 (1979).
[89] Supra note 81.
[90] Integrated
Bar of the Phils. v. Hon.
[91] Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, 346 Phil. 321 (1997).
[92] Vide
Compliance of September 1,
2008 of respondents.
[93] Vide
Manifestation of September
4, 2008 of respondents.
[94] Supra note 81.
[95] Id. citing Province of Batangas v.
Romulo, supra note 87.
[96] Id. citing Lacson v. Perez,
410 Phil. 78 (2001).
[97] Id. citing
[98] Id. citing Albaña v. Comelec, 478
Phil. 941 (2004); Chief Supt. Acop v. Guingona Jr., 433
Phil. 62 (2002); SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482 (2004).
[99] US v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629
(1953); US v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn,
166 U.S. 290, 308-310 (1897); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc.,
323 U.S. 37, 43 (1944); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376
(1963); Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312 (1974).
[100] Supra note 87.
[101] G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 290.
[102] Chavez v. PCGG, 366 Phil. 863, 871 (1999).
[103] G.R. No. 178830, July 14, 2008.
[104] Supra note 98.
[105] Ortega
v. Quezon City Government, G.R. No. 161400, September 2, 2005, 469
[106] Alunan III v. Mirasol, 342 Phil. 476
(1997); Viola v. Alunan III, 343 Phil. 184 (1997); Chief
Superintendent Acop v. Guingona, Jr., supra note 98; Roble
Arrastre, Inc. v. Villaflor, G.R. No. 128509, August 22, 2006, 499 SCRA
434, 447.
[107] Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7.
[108] 80 Phil. 383 (1948).
[109] Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. L-72119,
[110] 162 Phil. 868 (1976).
[111] Baldoza v. Dimaano, supra at 876.
[112] Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission, supra note 109.
[113] Chavez v. PCGG, 360 Phil 133, 164 (1998).
[114] In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra note 109 at 541, it was held that:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. `Public concern' like `public interest' is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
[115] Respondents’ Comment of August 4, 2008, p. 9.
[116] Subido v. Ozaeta, supra note 108.
[117] Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, et al., 220 Phil. 422 (1985); Tañada, v. Hon. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528 (1986).
[118] Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra note 109.
[119] Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., G.R.
No. 74930,
[120] Chavez v. PCGG, supra note 113; Chavez v. PCGG, supra note 102.
[121]
[122] Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 532-533 (2002).
[123] Vide V Record, Constitutional Commission 26-28 (September 24, 1986) which is replete with such descriptive phrase used by Commissioner Blas Ople.
[124] Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28.
[125] Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 100 (2003).
[126] Vide Bernas, Joaquin, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers 155 (1995).
[127] Vide Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note 122.
[128] V Record, Constitutional Commission 25 (September 24, 1986).
[129] V Record,
C
[130] In Chavez v. National Housing Authority,
G.R. No. 164527,
x x x The duty to disclose covers only transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of information which embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained in official communications and public documents of the government agency. (Underscoring supplied)
[131] Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra note 119.
[132] V Record, Constitutional Commission 28, 30 (September 24, 1986).
[133] Supra note 55.
[134] Executive Order No. 3 (2001), Sec. 3 (a).
[135] Executive Order No. 3 (2001), Sec. 4 (b).
[136] Respondents’ Memorandum of September 24, 2008, p. 44.
[137] Executive Order No. 3 (2001), Sec. 5 (b), par. 6.
[138] Executive Order No. 3 (2001), Sec. 8, see also Sec. 10.
[139] Cf. Garcia v. Board of Investments, G.R. No. 88637, September 7, 1989, 177 SCRA 374, 382-384 where it was held that the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 mandates the holding of consultations with affected communities, whenever necessary, on the acceptability of locating the registered enterprise within the community.
[140] In their Memorandum, respondents made
allegations purporting to show that consultations were conducted on
[141] Cf. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note 120.
[142] Republic Act No. 7160, Sec. 2(c).
[143] Republic Act No. 7160, Sec. 27.
[144] 416 Phil. 438 (2001).
[145] Id.; vide Alvarez v. PICOP
Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 162243,
[146] Vide MOA-AD “Concepts and Principles,” pars. 2 & 7 in relation to “Resources,” par. 9 where vested property rights are made subject to the cancellation, modification and review by the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity.
[147] Republic Act No. 8371 or “The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997,” Sec. 16.
[148]
[149] Tañada v. Tuvera, No. L-63915,
[150] C.I. Keitner and W.M. Reisman, Free Asso
[151] “The former
[152] H. Hills, Free
Asso
[153] Henkin, et al., International Law: Cases and Materials, 2nd ed., 274 (1987).
[154] Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
[155] G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005, 462 SCRA 622,
632.
[156] An Act to Strengthen and Expand the
[157] An Act To Re
[158] 90 Phil. 70, 73-74 (1951).
[159] 177 Phil. 160, 178-179 (1979).
[160] 2 S.C.R. 217 (1998).
[161] 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (March 23, 1976).
[162] 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (January 3, 1976).
[163]
[164] Lorie M. Graham, Resolving Indigenous Claims To Self-Determination, 10 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 385 (2004). Vide S. James Anaya, Superpower Attitudes Toward Indigenous Peoples And Group Rights, 93 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 251 (1999): “In general, the term indigenous is used in association with groups that maintain a continuity of cultural identity with historical communities that suffered some form of colonial invasion, and that by virtue of that continuity of cultural identity continue to distinguish themselves from others.”
[165] Catherine J. Iorns, In
[166] Federico
Lenzerini, “Sovereignty Revisited:
International Law And Parallel Sovereignty Of Indigenous Peoples,” 42 Tex. Int'l L.J. 155 (2006). Vide Christopher J. Fromherz, Indigenous Peoples' Courts: Egalitarian
Juridical Pluralism, Self-Determination, And The United Nations Declaration On The Rights
Of Indigenous Peoples, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1341 (2008): “While Australia and
the United States made much of the distinction between ‘self-government’ and
‘self-determination’ on September 13, 2007, the U.S. statement to the UN on May
17, 2004, seems to use these two concepts interchangeably. And, indeed, under
the DRIP [Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples], all three terms
should be considered virtually synonymous. Self-determination under the DRIP
means ‘internal self-determination’ when read in conjunction with Article 46,
and ‘self-government,’ articulated in Article 4, is the core of the
‘self-determination.’”
[167] Defining
The Approach And Administrative Structure For Government’s Comprehensive Peace
Efforts,
[168] 466 Phil. 482, 519-520 (2004).
[169] Constitution,
Article
[170] Kirsti Samuels, Post-Conflict Peace-Building And Constitution-Making, 6 Chi. J. Int'l L. 663 (2006).
[171] Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature And Legal Status, 100 Am. J. Int'l L. 373 (2006).
[172] Constitution, Article X, Sections 15-21.
[173] III Record, Constitutional Commission, 180 (August 11, 1986).
[174] 165 Phil. 303 (1976).
[175] Id. at 412.
[176] Id. at 413.
[177] G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160, 264-265.
[178] Constitution,
Art.
[179] Article VI, Section
25 (1) of the Constitution states as follows: “The Congress may not increase
the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation
of the budget shall be prescribed by law.”
[180] Prosecutor v. Kallon and Kamara [Case
No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E),
[181] 1974 I.C.J. 253, 1974 WL 3 (I.C.J.).
[182] M. Janis and J. Noyes, Inter
[183] 1986 I.C.J. 554, 1986 WL 15621 (I.C.J.), December 22, 1986.
[184] Planas
v. COMELEC, 151 Phil. 217, 249 (1973).