EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 &
183962 (The Province of North Cotabato, duly represented by Gov. Jesus Sacdalan and/or Vice-Gov. Emmanuel Piñol,
for and in his own behalf, petitioners, v. The Government of the Republic of
the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (
Promulgated:
October 14, 2008
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SEPARATE OPINION
REYES, R.T., J.:
Nemo dat
quod non habet. You cannot give what you do not have. Hindi mo maibibigay
ang hindi sa iyo.
This
maxim forcefully applies in these consolidated petitions and
petitions-in-intervention for mandamus and prohibition which in the main seek
the nullification of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) entered
into between the Government of the Republic of the
The
issues may be compressed as follows: (1) whether the petitions and
petitions-in-intervention have become moot due to supervening events; and (2)
whether the MOA-AD is constitutional.
I. The
petitions and petitions-in-intervention have become moot due to supervening
events. However,
they should be decided given the exceptional circumstances, following well
known precedents.
During the
Be that as it may, the
Court is not precluded from passing judgment on them. It is hornbook doctrine that courts will
decide cases, otherwise moot, when (1) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest involved demand; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[3]
Let me cite a few
examples.
In Javier v. Commission on Elections,[4] petitioner Evelio B.
Javier was assassinated on
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the
disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the private
respondent – both of whom have gone their separate ways – could be a convenient
justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must
be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities
here raised. The more important purpose
is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not
disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext
that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the
highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in the quest of law
but we must also give him justice. The
two are not always the same. There are
times we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and
decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as
in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for
the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for
the guidance of and as a restraint on the future.[5]
(Emphasis supplied)
In Salonga v. Cruz-Paño,[6] the Court had already deliberated on
the case, a consensus on the judgment of the Court had been reached, and a
draft ponencia
was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any. However, on
However, this
did not prevent the Court from deciding the merits of the petition. In doing so, the Court reasoned that “[t]he
setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions
of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual
as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of
Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court’s function.” It “also has the duty to formulate guiding
and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.”[7] Similarly, Dela Camara v. Enage,[8] Gonzales v.
Marcos,[9] and Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile[10] were decided under the same aegis.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[11] the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of
the consolidated petitions on the ground of mootness.
It was argued that because the President
had already lifted her declaration of state of national emergency, there was no
longer an actual case or controversy. The
Court was not convinced, saying that “[t]he “moot and academic” principle
is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case.”[12] It then proceeded to declare unconstitutional major
parts of the declaration of state of national emergency by the President.
Just recently, in Manalo v. Calderon,[13] “[n]otwithstanding
the mootness of the issues on restrictive custody and
monitoring of movements of petitioners,” the Court opted to resolve the
petition for habeas corpus, due to “(a)
the paramount public interest involved, (b) their susceptibility of recurring
yet evading review, and (c) the imperative need to educate the police community
on the matter.”
The
petitions and petitions-in-intervention call for a similar or analogous
treatment by the court, due to their transcendental importance and in the
national interest.
II. The
MOA-AD is unconstitutional.
The
The
1. The negotiations shall be conducted in
accordance with the Mandates of the Philippine Constitution, the Rule of Law,
and the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic
of the
2. The negotiation process shall be pursued
in line with the national Comprehensive Peace Process, and shall seek the
principled and peace resolution of the armed conflict, with neither blame
nor surrender, but with dignity for all concerned.
3. The objective of the GPNP is to attain a
peace settlement that shall:
a. Contribute to
the resolution of the root cause of the armed conflict, and to societal reform,
particularly in
b. Help attain a
lasting peace and comprehensive stability in Southern Philippines under a
meaningful program of autonomy for Filipino Muslims, consistent with the Peace
Agreement entered into by the
c. Contribute to
reconciliation and reconstruction in
4. The general approach to the negotiations
shall include the following:
a. Seeking a middle
ground between the aspirations of the MILF and the political, social and
economic objectives of the Philippine Government;
b. Coordinated
Third Party facilitation, where needed;
c. Consultation
with affected communities and sectors. (Emphasis supplied)
In an apparent compliance with the
Directive of the President, the MOA-AD mentions the following documents as
terms of reference, to wit:
1. The
Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities dated
2. The General Framework of Agreement of Intent Between the
3. The Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks
Between the
4. The Tripoli Agreement on Peace Between the
5. The Tripoli Agreement Between the
6. Republic Act No. 6734, as amended
by R.A. 9054, otherwise known as “An Act to
Strengthen and Expand the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)”;
7. ILO Convention No. 169, in correlation to the UN Declaration on the
Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and Republic Act No. 8371 otherwise known as
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, the UN Charter, the UN Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and
internationally recognized human rights instruments; and
8. Compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua’hada
(or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace
agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device. For the purpose of this Agreement, a “treaty”
is defined as any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understandings,
obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that
elaborates the principles declared in the Agreement.
Curiously missing
in the enumeration,
however, is the Constitution. The
omission could only mean that the parties
intended the MOA-AD not to be bound by the fundamental law. The Constitution is supposed to be the one to
conform to the MOA-AD, and not the other way around.[15]
There can be no doubt as to the marching orders by the President. In negotiating with the MILF, the
The commitment of the
Under the present constitutional scheme, the President is a mere bystander
as far as the process of constitutional amendment or revision is
concerned. The President is deprived of
any participation because the Constitution[16]
only allows three political agents, namely: (1) the Congress, upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its members; (2) a constitutional convention;[17]
and (3) the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve (12) per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of its
registered voters.
Thus, since the President is bereft of any power in effecting
constitutional change, the
The
MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that appear unconstitutional.
Respondents claim that the contents of the MOA-AD are mere
concession points for further negotiations. The MILF, however, publicly announced that the
MOA-AD is already a “done deal” and its signing a mere formality.[18]
I find both claims of respondents
and the MILF difficult to swallow. Neither
position is acceptable. The
Having said that,
let me point out the defects of the MOA-AD.
First. The MOA-AD creates a new political
subdivision, the so-called Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity (BJE). This is not permitted by the Constitution, which limits the
political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Worse, the BJE also trenches on the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Notably, the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, while recognizing the rights
of indigenous peoples to self-determination, does not give them the right to
undermine the territorial integrity of a State.[28]
Second. The creation of the BJE is prohibited even
assuming that the MOA-AD only attempts to create the BJE as an autonomous
region. Only Congress is empowered to
create an autonomous region.[29]
In fact, RA Nos. 6734[30]
and 9054,[31] the
laws creating and expanding the ARMM, have already been passed
by Congress. As a result of these
Organic Acts, the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Sulu and Tawi-Tawi and the
City of
Third.
The MOA-AD creates the Bangsamoro Homeland as
an ancestral domain. However, there is
non-compliance with the procedure laid down under RA No. 8371, otherwise known
as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
True, Article II, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution recognizes the
rights of all indigenous peoples.[33] This, however, cannot be used in the MOA-AD as
a blanket authority to claim, without sufficient proof, a territory spanning an
entire geographical region, the entire Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region.[34]
Indeed, Chapter VIII of the IPRA
provides for stringent requirements and strict process of delineation for
recognition of ancestral domains, thus:
x x x x
(b)
Petition for Delineation. – The process of delineating a specific
perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP
concerned, or though a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a
majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs.
(c)
Delineation Proper. – The official delineation of ancestral domain
boundaries including census of all community members therein, shall be
immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the
application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with
the community concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and
participation by the members of the communities concerned.
(d)
Proof Required. – Proof of Ancestral
Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or community under oath,
and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or
occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs
in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic
documents:
1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs
customs and traditions;
2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;
3) Pictures showing long term occupation
such as those of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old
villages;
4) Historical accounts, including pacts
and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs
concerned with other ICCs/IPs;
5) Survey plans and sketch maps;
6) Anthropological data;
7) Genealogical surveys;
8) Pictures and descriptive histories of
traditional communal forests and hunting grounds;
9) Pictures and descriptive histories of
traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills,
terraces and the like; and
10) Write-ups of names and places derived
from the native dialect of the community.
(e)
Preparation of Maps. – On the basis
of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of
the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map,
complete with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features
and landmarks embraced therein.
(f)
Report of Investigation and Other Documents.
– A complete copy of the preliminary census and a report of investigation,
shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP.
(g)
Notice and Publication. – A copy of
each document, including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place
therein for at least fifteen (15) days.
A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and
regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants
to file opposition thereto within fifteen days (15) from date of such
publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exist, broadcasting
in a radio station will be a valid substitute; Provided, further, That
mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are
not available.
(h)
Endorsement to NCIP. – Within fifteen
(15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action
upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient,
the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional
evidence; Provided, That the
Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent
after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office
shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing
the grounds for denial. The denial shall
be appealable to the NCIP. Provided,
furthermore, That in cases where
there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the
boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause
the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary
resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication
according to the Section below.
The MOA-AD is problematic when read in conjunction
with the IPRA because it does not present any proof or specific reference that
all the territories it enumerates accurately represent the “ancestral domains”
of the Bangsamoro Homeland. The MOA-AD assumes that these territories are
included in the Bangsamoro Homeland as ancestral
domains, without proof or identification of native title or other claim of
ownership to all the
affected areas.
Section 3(g) of the IPRA[35]
also requires that there be a “free and informed prior consent” by the
indigenous peoples concerned to be exercised through consultations before any
decision relating to their ancestral domain is made. This rule not only
guarantees the right to information[36]
of the people in these areas, but also the right of the indigenous peoples to
“free and informed prior consent” as an element of due process.[37] Obviously, respondents did not conduct the
required consultation before negotiating the terms of the MOA-AD. Otherwise, no petitions and
petitions-in-intervention would have been filed in the first place.
Fourth. Under the MOA-AD, the BJE is vested with jurisdiction,
powers and authority over land use, development, utilization, disposition and
exploitation of natural resources within the Bangsamoro
Homeland.[38] In doing so, respondents in effect surrendered
to the BJE ownership and gave it full control and supervision over the
exploration, development, utilization over the natural resources which belong
to the State. This is in clear
contravention of the Regalian Doctrine now expressed under Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period
not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant.
The
State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The
Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well
as cooperative fish farming,
with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.
The
President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote
the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The
President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
Fifth. The MOA-AD also
grants to the BJE powers to enter into any economic cooperation and trade
relations with foreign countries. It
compels the Republic of the
Sixth. Article 1, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The national territory
comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty
or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains,
including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves,
and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form
part of the internal waters of the
Without the benefit of
any factual determination, the MOA-AD dismembers parts of
Seventh. The MOA-AD grants to the BJE plenary
power to undo executive acts and delegate to the BJE the authority to revoke existing
proclamations, issuances, policies, rules and guidelines, forest concessions,
timber licenses, contracts or agreements in the utilization of natural
resources, mining concessions, land tenure instruments.[45] This constitutes an undue delegation of
executive power. The President may
delegate its executive power only to local government units or an
administrative body attached to the executive department.[46] The
delegation of power to the BJE, on the other hand, is delegation of executive
power to an entirely different juridical entity that is not under its
supervision or control. That is impermissible.
Eighth. The MOA-AD empowers the BJE to
build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. This includes civil service, electoral,
financial and banking institutions, education, legislation, legal, economic,
police, internal security force, and judicial system.[47] This is anathema to several provisions of the
Constitution, namely: (1) the authority of the Commission on Elections to
administer all election laws in the Philippines;[48] (2)
that there shall only be one police force, national in scope to be administered
and controlled by the National Police Commission;[49] (3)
that the defense of the Republic shall belong exclusively to the Armed Forces
of the Philippines;[50] (4)
that judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such other inferior
courts as may be established by law;[51] (5)
that there shall only be one independent
central monetary authority, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas;[52]
and (6) that there shall be one independent economic planning agency.[53]
All told, respondents appear to have
committed grave abuse
abuse of discretion
in negotiating and initialing the MOA-AD.
Grave abuse of discretion
has been traditionally understood as
implying such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent
to lack of
jurisdiction, or, in
other words where
the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner.[54]
The definition has been expanded because
now, grave abuse of discretion exists when there is a contravention of the
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence.[55]
Negotiate
within the Constitutional bounds
During the American Civil War, the
The aborted MOA-AD is a setback to the government. But the setback is only temporary, not a
permanent one. The path to peace is
long. But it can be travelled.
On one hand, the government should be commended in its effort to bring lasting peace
to the South. On the other hand, it needs
to be reminded that any negotiation it enters into, even in the name of peace,
should be within the parameters of the Constitution.
WHERFORE, I vote to
GRANT the petitions and petitions-in-intervention
and to strike down the MOA-AD as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
RUBEN T.
REYES
Associate Justice
[1]
[2] Annex “A”;
Compliance of the Office of the Solicitor General
“The
MOA that was originally presented was a step in crafting a final peace
agreement. By design, any MOA as part of
a final peace agreement undergo a thorough review as part of our constitutional
processes since the MOAs will be part
of the enabling
law by Congress and a plebiscite to implement the entire agreement. The action by the Supreme Court is consistent
with that process. Moving forward, we are committed to securing
an agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because that is the only
way that long lasting peace can be assured.
“No matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides the government
will not sign the MOA. In light of
the recent violent incidents committed by MILF Lawless Goups, the President has
refocused all peace talks from one that is centered on dialogues with rebels to
one authentic dialogues with the communities, with
[3] Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780,
[4] G.R. Nos. L-68379-81,
[5] Javier v. Commission on Elections, id.
at 197-198.
[6] G.R.
No. L-59524,
[7] Salonga v. Cruz-Paño, id. at 463. (Emphasis
supplied.)
[8] G.R.
No. L-32951-2,
[9] G.R.
No. L-31685,
[10] G.R. No. L-35546,
[11] G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489
& 171424,
[12] David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo, id. at 214. (Emphasis
supplied.)
[13] G.R. No. 178920,
[14] Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum of Instructions from the
President dated
[15] Noteworthy is the statement of Al Haj
Murad Ebrahim, the Chairman
of the MILF, thus: “It may be beyond the Constitution but the Constitution can
be amended and revised to accommodate the agreement. What is important is
during the amendment, it will not derogate or water
down the agreement because we have worked this out for more than 10 years now. <http://222.abs-cbnnews.com/topofthehour.aspx?
StoryId=128834> (visited
[16] Constitution
(1987), Art. XVII, Sec. 1.
Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
may be proposed by:
1.
The Congress, upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its Members; or
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following
the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right.
Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of
all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all
its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
convention.
Sec. 4.
Any amendment
to, or revision
of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than
sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or
revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections
of the sufficiency of the petition.
[17] Constitution
(1987), Art. XVII, Sec. 3. “The
Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate
the question of calling such a convention.”
(1) Administrative
organization;
(2) Creation of
sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral
domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal,
family and property relations;
(5) Regional,
urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic,
social, and tourism development;
(8) Preservation
and development of the cultural heritage;
(b) National
defense and security;
(d) Coinage, and
fiscal and monetary policies;
(e) Administration
of justice;
(i) Naturalization, immigration and deportation;
(j) General
auditing, civil service and elections;