EN BANC
G.R. No.
183591 - THE
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, ET AL. v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), ET AL.
G.R. No. 183752
- CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA,
ET AL. v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
G.R. No. 183893
- THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly
represented by CITY MAYOR LAURENCE LLUCH CRUZ v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE
G.R. No. 183951
- THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as represented by HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, ET AL. v. THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN
(GRP), ET AL.
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FRANKLIN
M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO,
Petitioners-in-Intervention.
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Petitioner-in-Intervention.
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THE
CITY OF
Petitioner-in-Intervention.
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THE
PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, represented by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDDATU, in his
capacity as Provincial Governor and a resident of the Province of Sultan Kudarat,
Petitioner-in-Intervention.
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RUY
ELIAS LOPEZ,
Petitioner-in-Intervention.
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CARLO
B. GOMEZ, ET AL.,
Petitioner-in-Intervention.
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The piece of writing being assailed
in these consolidated Petitions is a peace negotiation document, namely the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001
(MOA). The Solicitor General explained
that this document, prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached
between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.[1] Subsequently, the Solicitor General moved for
the dismissal of the consolidated cases at bar based on changed circumstances
as well as developments which have rendered them moot, particularly the
Executive Department’s statement that it would no longer sign the questioned
peace negotiation document.[2] Nonetheless, several parties to the case, as
well as other sectors, continue to push for what they call a “complete
determination” of the constitutional issues raised in the present Petitions.
I believe that in light of the pronouncement
of the Executive Department to already abandon the MOA, the issue of its
constitutionality has obviously become moot.
The rule is settled that no question
involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be
heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by
the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the
question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the
decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two
requisites.[3]
For a court to exercise its power of
adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy — one which involves
a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial resolution; the case must
not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations
not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale.[4] An action is considered “moot” when it no
longer presents a justiciable controversy because the
issues involved have become academic or
dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one
is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be
raised again between the parties. Simply
stated, there is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof
has been overtaken by subsequent events.[5]
Such is the case here.
The MOA has not even been signed, and
will never be. Its provisions will not
at all come into effect. The MOA will
forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper,
with no legal force or binding effect.
It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all
other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer
present an actual case or a justiciable controversy
for resolution by this Court.
An actual case or controversy exists
when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal
claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A
justiciable controversy is distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a
definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy
admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character,
whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts.[6]
For the Court to still rule upon the
supposed unconstitutionality of the MOA will merely be an academic exercise. It would, in effect, only be delivering an
opinion or advice on what are now hypothetical or abstract violations of
constitutional rights.
In Abbas v. Commission on Elections,[7]
the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and Republic Act No. 6734 (the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) were challenged for purported violations
of the provisions of the Constitution on freedom of religion. The Court held therein that it should not
inquire into the constitutionality of a peace agreement which was already
consummated (the 1976 Tripoli Agreement) and an Organic Act which was already
passed into law (R.A. No. 6734) just because of potential conflicts with the
Constitution. Then, with more reason
should this Court desist from ruling on the constitutionality of the MOA which
is unsigned, and now entirely abandoned, and as such, cannot even have any
potential conflict with the Constitution.
The Court should not feel constrained
to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public interest these
cases have generated. We are, after all,
a court of law, and not of public opinion.
The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and
existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public
clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by
other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is not
committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of
constitutional law.
The Executive Department has already
manifested to this Court, through the Solicitor General, that it will not sign the MOA in its present
form or in any other form. It has
declared the same intent to the public. For
this Court to insist that the issues raised in the instant Petitions cannot be
moot for they are still capable of repetition is to totally ignore the
assurance given by the Executive Department that it will not enter into any
other form of the MOA in the future. The
Court cannot doubt the sincerity of the Executive Department on this matter. The Court must accord a co-equal branch of
the government nothing less than trust and the presumption of good faith.
Moreover, I deem it beyond the power
of this Court to enjoin the Executive Department from entering into agreements similar
to the MOA in the future, as what petitioners and other opponents of the MOA
pray for. Such prayer once again requires this Court to make a definitive
ruling on what are mere hypothetical facts. A decree granting the same, without the Court
having seen or considered the actual agreement and its terms, would not only be
premature, but also too general to make at this point. It will perilously tie the hands of the
Executive Department and limit its options in negotiating peace for
Upon the Executive Department falls
the indisputably difficult responsibility of diffusing the highly volatile
situation in
Peace negotiations are never simple.
If neither party in such negotiations thinks outside the box, all they would
arrive at is a constant impasse. Thus, a counsel for one of the intervenors who assert the unconstitutionality of the MOA[8]
had no choice but to agree as follows:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: Well, we realize the constitutional constraints of sovereignty, integrity and the like, but isn’t there a time that surely will come and the life of our people when they have to transcend even these limitations?
DEAN AGABIN: Yes, we have seen it happen in several instances, Your Honor.
x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And in pursuit of that purpose, the Supreme Court cannot look beyond the horizon and look for more satisfying result?
DEAN AGABIN: Well, if you mean by looking beyond the horizon, it would mean a violation of the provisions of the Constitution, then it should not be, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
QUISUMBING: In some part, we have gone to
DEAN AGABIN: Yes,
Your Honor. But in all these, we have
always insisted on preserving the territorial integrity of the country.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And this dicta or [dogma] is unassailable forever. There cannot be an exception.
DEAN AGABIN: It is unassailable under the present Constitution, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: But, at least, you can also agree that the Constitution ought to be changed in order for a country to fulfill its internal obligation as a matter of necessity.
DEAN
AGABIN: Yes, if the people so will it, your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
QUISUMBING: You remember how the emperor of
DEAN AGABIN: Yes, it was enforced upon him by Mr. McArthur, and they have no choice.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: Isn’t that a very good example of
thinking outside the box? That one day even those who are underground may have
to think. But frankly now Dean, before I
end, may I ask, is it possible to meld or modify our Constitutional Order in
order to have some room for the newly developing international notions on
Associative Governance Regulation Movement and Human Rights?
DEAN AGABIN: Yes. It is possible, Your Honor, with the consent of the
people.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And, therefore, we vote it to a referendum or any consultation beforehand?
DEAN AGABIN: If there is such a proposal for or amendment or revision of the Constitution, yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: So, either initiative or CHA-CHA or CON-AS?
DEAN AGABIN: Yes, Your Honor.[9]
It must be noted that the
Constitution has been in force for three decades now, yet, peace in
[A]s long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by [the Convention], there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the Courts are devoid of jurisdiction. x x x.
At this point, there is far from a
concrete proposed amendment to the Constitution which the Court can take
cognizance of, much less render a pronouncement upon.
At most, the Court can only exhort
the Executive Department to keep in mind that it must negotiate and secure peace
in
As a final note, I find it necessary
to stress that the Court must not allow itself to be mired in controversies
affecting each step of the peace process in
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the GRANT of the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Solicitor General and, accordingly, for the DISMISSAL of the Petitions at bar for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
[1] Respondent’s Manifestation and
Motion,
[2]
[3]
Joya
v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541,
[4]
[5]
[6] Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 426 (1998).
[7] G.R. Nos. 89651 & 89965,
[8] Dean Pacifico Agabin is the counsel for Intervenor Manuel A. Roxas III.
[9] TSN, pp. 603-611.
[10] 150 Phil. 778, 785 (1972).