Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
ANONAS CONSTRUCTION AND
INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CORPORATION, and ELISEO F. LIBUNAO, Petitioners, - versus - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and LARRY NAFUAR, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 164052
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, AZCUNA,* CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: October
17, 2008 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before
the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated
The instant petition is an offshoot
of an illegal dismissal case filed by respondent Larry Nafuar (Nafuar) against
petitioners. On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the dismissal of the complainant from his employment to be illegal and concomitantly, Respondents are jointly and solidarily liable to pay Complainant the following:
P 101,848.76 –
representing backwages
26,061.36 – representing separation pay
2,505.90 – representing holiday pay
P
130,313.60 TOTAL
= = = = = = =
Other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed in
toto the decision of the LA in a Resolution[3]
dated
Hence, this petition.
The Facts
Anonas
Construction and Industrial Supply Corporation is a domestic juridical entity
engaged in the construction business and headed by Eliseo F. Libunao.[5]
In
April 1994, petitioner company engaged the services of respondent Nafuar who
started as delivery man until the company assigned him additional tasks in
collecting payments, selling, checking and dispatching industrial materials to
its clientele.[6]
On
On
On
On
Petitioners
appealed the ruling before the NLRC which sustained the LA. Thereafter, the petitioners went to the CA on
a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
As
mentioned above, on
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
resolution dated
In
the main, the CA said that certiorari
under Rule 65 is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion and does not include a correction or evaluation of the evidence,
particularly when there is no conflict in the factual findings of the labor
tribunals. It cited with approval the
NLRC’s pronouncement that there could have been no abandonment because by
filing a complaint for illegal dismissal, the employee could not be said to
have abandoned his work. Further, the
appellate court found no adequate proof of willful disobedience by the
employee, and noted that there was lack of compliance by the petitioners with
the requirements of due process.
Finally, the CA stressed that petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration from the NLRC decision which is a condition sine qua non for a petition for certiorari.
Aggrieved,
petitioners now come before this Court assigning the following errors:
I. THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
DESPITE CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE BASIS THEREOF IS HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND
CONJECTURAL.
II. THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE NLRC
INTRUDING ON THE LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY OF THE MANAGEMENT TO
DISCIPLINE ITS EMPLOYEES.[14]
The Issue
The
bottom line issue we are called upon to resolve is whether respondent Nafuar
was illegally dismissed from employment.
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioners
insist that the CA gravely erred when it relied on the NLRC findings which were
sourced from alleged misapprehension of facts.
Basically, petitioners’ argument rests on the proposition that
respondent Nafuar was not dismissed, but merely suspended, at the time he
instituted his complaint for illegal dismissal on
Corollarily,
petitioners maintain that the CA, by upholding the NLRC’s ruling, encroached on
the exercise of the company’s authority to discipline its employees.
The
argument does not persuade.
I
The
“Statement of Facts” in the very petition filed before this Court quotes the
factual narration made by the CA, as follows:
In a phone call to his employer, [respondent]
inquired whether he could still report for work but the company adamantly
imposed the two (2)-day suspension against him.
Petitioner company usually
suspends its employees due to insubordination and charge them with abandonment.[15]
By adopting the CA’s narrative as
their own account of the factual antecedents of the case, the petitioners
effectively admitted that the suspension of the respondent was simply a
precursor of an intended dismissal, ostensibly on the ground of abandonment. Furthermore, respondents were not able to
refute the factual finding of the LA, as affirmed by the CA, that petitioner
company refused Nafuar’s request to return to work after his suspension.
The
CA committed no reversible error in upholding the resolution of the NLRC which
affirmed in toto the decision of the
LA. Factual findings of labor administrative officials that are supported by
substantial evidence are accorded great respect and finality, absent a showing
that they arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence of such nature as
to compel a contrary conclusion if properly appreciated.[16]
The Supreme Court does not review supposed errors in the decisions of
quasi-judicial agencies which raise factual issues because this Court is
essentially not a trier of facts.[17]
As
correctly explained by the CA, judicial review of decisions of the NLRC via petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as a general rule, is confined only to
issues of lack or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC. The CA does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence
upon which the LA and the NLRC based their conclusions. The issue is limited to
the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the resolution,
except if the findings of the NLRC are not supported by substantial evidence.[18]
At
this point, it is proper to reiterate that for the dismissal of an employee to
be valid, it must be for a just cause[19]
or an authorized cause[20]
and the requirements of due process[21]
must necessarily be observed.[22]
The illegality of the act of dismissal constitutes discharge without just or
authorized cause, while the illegality in the manner of dismissal is dismissal
without due process.[23]
Petitioners
allege insubordination, grave misconduct and abandonment as bases for Nafuar’s
termination. However, as uniformly found by the LA, the NLRC and the CA, they
failed to substantiate their allegations with sufficient evidence. On top of
this, it appears that respondent Nafuar was terminated without the benefit of
due process.
It
is also worth mentioning that suspension is not the same as termination. Suspension is a disciplinary measure that is
imposed for violation by the employee of a reasonable rule of conduct
prescribed by the employer and made known to the employee. However, just like termination, suspension
must be based on a valid or just cause, and the employee must be apprised of
his alleged violation and given an opportunity to explain his side. And where the employee denies the charge, the burden of proving that there is a valid
ground for suspension, as in termination, rests on the employer.[24]
On
this point, the Court notes with approval the ratiocination made by the LA, as
follows:
While
it is true that on record, there are memos dated
[Petitioners]
should have presented proof by submitting an affidavit executed by Ramiro
Luntayao stating that he gave the memos to [Nafuar] and the latter refused to
sign the same. Sad to say, no such
evidence was presented by the [petitioners].
[Petitioners]
further emphasize that [Nafuar] committed several infractions, to say the
least, his being absent, his refusal to submit his written explanations and insubordination
to the alleged [charges] against the latter.
However, this (sic) infractions were denied by [Nafuar] that he
committed them. In which case, the burden
of proof is momentarily shifted to the employer/[petitioners] until they have
shown sufficient facts and evidence establishing the infractions committed by
[Nafuar].
In
the case at bench, [petitioners] failed to convince this Arbitration Branch that
[Nafuar] indeed committed the violations alleged by the [petitioners].[25]
Likewise ---
[Petitioners]
failed to serve [Nafuar] the required notice on abandonment of work that a
written notice be sent to [Nafuar] at his last known address informing him of
his absences and abandonment of work (Section 2, Rule 14, Book V of the Omnibus
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, as amended).[26]
II
As
to petitioners’ second contention, the CA adequately responded to the same, in
this wise:
We do not question the prerogative of
management to issue regulations and impose the corresponding sanctions for the
violation to ensure discipline among its employees. In the instant case, petitioners however
failed to duly apprise private respondent of his infractions --- unjustified absences
and disrespect to superiors.[27]
Thus,
even if we accept petitioners’ submission that its initial disciplinary action
was merely to suspend – not to dismiss – respondent Nafuar, it is obvious that
the suspension would inevitably lead to the dismissal of Nafuar. Noteworthy is the fact that, in either case,
petitioner failed to show ample proof of respondent’s alleged infraction before
the labor tribunals.
In
light of these disquisitions, there appears no justifiable reason to disturb the
assailed ruling of the CA.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76139 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZC Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
*
Additional member replacing
Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes per Special Order No. 521 dated
[1] Penned
by Labor Arbiter Ermita T. Abrasaldo-Cuyuca.
[2] Rollo, p. 23.
[3] Penned by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino, with Commissioners Victoriano R. Calaycay and Angelita A. Gacutan, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-47.
[4] Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring; rollo, pp. 23-31.
[5] Rollo, p. 24.
[6] Records, p. 69.
[7] Rollo, p. 24.
[8]
[9]
[10] Records, p. 70.
[11]
[12] Supra note 4.
[13] Rollo,
p. 31.
[14]
[15]
[16] Fabela v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 150658, February 9, 2007, 515 SCRA 288; Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Soriano, G.R. No. 166039, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 704.
[17] Aurora
Land Projects Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114733,
[18]
[19] ART. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER
An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee
of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against
the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
[20] ART. 283. CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND REDUCTION OF
PERSONNEL
The employer may also terminate the employment of any
employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this Title x x x.
ART. 284. DISEASE
AS GROUND FOR TERMINATION
An employer may terminate the
services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and
whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health
as well as to the health of his co-employees x x x.
ART. 287. RETIREMENT
Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
[21]
ART.
277. MISCELLANEOUS
PROVISIONS
x x x x
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.
[22] Siemens Philippines, Inc. v. Enrico A. Domingo, G.R. No. 150488, July 28, 2008; Gregorio S. Saberola v. Ronald Suarez and Raymundo Lirasan, Jr., G.R. No. 151227, July 14, 2008.
[23] Petron
Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 154532,
[24] Labor Code, Art. 277.
[25] Rollo,
pp. 34-35.
[26]
[27]