Republic
of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
LOLITA ANDRADA, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1720
Complainant, (Formerly
A.M.
No.
02-1267-MTJ)
Present:
-
versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Presiding
Judge, Municipal Trial Promulgated:
Court,
Mariveles, Bataan,
Respondent. November 25, 2008
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R E S O L U T I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
Lolita
Andrada filed an administrative complaint charging respondent Hon. Emmanuel G.
Banzon, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Mariveles,
On
The first writ of execution dated
Judge Banzon issued an Order dated
In his comment, respondent Judge admitted that he issued
the assailed
Findings
and Conclusion of the Investigating Justice
This investigating Officer finds that the complainant failed to adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to substantiate the charge that respondent Judge Emmanuel G. Banzon committed grave abuse of authority, oppression and gross ignorance of the law.
In charging
respondent judge, complainant primarily based her claim on the alleged refusal
of respondent judge to accept her notice of appeal of the Order dated
To be liable for grave abuse of authority and oppressive conduct, it must be sufficiently shown that the judge deals with lawyers and litigants in a cavalier and arrogant attitude. It should likewise be shown that the judge used intemperate, harsh and disparaging language indicative of his lack of courtesy and civility, and not a desire to instill proper decorum and discipline.
In this case, respondent judge denied the allegation that he refused to accept complainant’s notice of appeal. Yet, he admitted that he informed complainant that she could not appeal from an interlocutory order but she refused to believe relying on the erroneous advice of her counsel. The actuation of respondent judge in merely “informing” complainant that a notice of appeal is not the proper remedy can in no way be indicative of grave abuse of authority nor oppressive conduct on the part of respondent judge. Moreover, the record is bereft of evidence that respondent judge informed or instructed complainant of the erroneous notice of appeal in a discourteous manner with the intemperate use of cruel language.
x x x x
Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law, the same should likewise fail. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, more importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. For to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, would be intolerable.
In the instant case,
there is nothing to show that respondent judge was prompted by malice or
corrupt motive in refusing to accept the
notice of appeal nor is there clear evidence that respondent judge is ignorant
of the law, as a notice of appeal is indeed not the proper remedy to question
the Order of
x x x x
Since the assailed Order is merely interlocutory, this order cannot be the subject of appeal. The respondent judge did not err in this respect. An interlocutory order determines incidental matters that do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. The proper remedy to question an improvident interlocutory order is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. To avail of the special civil action for certiorari, it must be clearly shown that the court issued said order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
The reliance of complainant on Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is therefore misplaced. Said provision speaks that a judgment or final order of the court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases. There is no judgment or final order of indirect contempt to speak of in this case. The appeal allowed under Section 11, Rule 71 is with respect to final orders declaring a person guilty of indirect contempt and imposing punitive sanctions provided under Section 7 thereof.
x x x x
RECOMMENDATION:
On the basis of the foregoing findings/conclusion, there being no evidence adduced by the complainant to support her claim that respondent Judge Emmanuel Banzon committed grave abuse of authority, oppression and gross ignorance of the law, the undersigned hereby recommends that the instant administrative case be DISMISSED for lack of merit.[1]
We
agree with the findings of the investigating Justice.
It
is an established rule in administrative cases that complainant bears the onus of establishing or proving the
averments in his complaint by substantial evidence.[2] In the instant case, complainant failed to
adduce evidence to support the charges against respondent Judge Emmanuel G.
Banzon.
Well-settled
is the rule that unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an
injustice, respondent judge may not be held administratively
liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts
in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the
adjudication of cases.
Further,
to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous rule or
decision he renders would be nothing short of harassment and would make his
position doubly unbearable. To hold
otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon
to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of the administration of justice can be infallible in
his judgment.[3]
In Ong v. Rosete,[4] the
High Court eloquently stated that, “[t]he Court will not shirk from its
responsibility of imposing discipline upon erring members of the bench. At the same time, however, the Court should
not hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt
rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. This Court could not be the instrument that
would destroy the reputation of any member of the bench, by pronouncing guilt
on mere speculation.”[5]
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative charges are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice