Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO,
JR., and
BRION, JJ.
CARLOS DELA
CRUZ, Promulgated:
Accused-Appellant.
November
20, 2008
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D E C I S I
O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This
is an appeal from the November 29, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02286 entitled People
of the Philippines v. Carlos Dela Cruz which affirmed the September 16,
2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77 in
The Facts
On
Criminal Case No. 6517
That, on or about the 20th
day of October 2002, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then a private citizen, without any lawful authority,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly have in his possession
and under his custody and control One (1) Gauge Shotgun marked ARMSCOR with
Serial No. 1108533 loaded with four (4) live ammunition, which are high powered
firearm and ammunition respectively, without first securing the necessary
license to possess or permit to carry said firearm and ammunition from the
proper authorities.
Criminal Case No. 6518
That
on or about the 20th day of October 2002, in the Municipality of San
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct
custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag weighing 49.84
grams of white crystalline substance, which gave positive results for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[1]
Accused-appellant
entered a not guilty plea and trial ensued.
The
facts, according to the prosecution, showed that in the morning of
Accused-appellant
was subsequently arrested. The substance seized from the hideout was sent to
the Philippine National Police crime laboratory for examination and tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. He was thus
separately indicted for violation of RA 9165 and for illegal possession of
firearm.
According
to the defense, accused-appellant was at Boy Bicol’s house having been asked to
do a welding job for Boy Bicol’s motorcycle. While accused-appellant was there,
persons who identified themselves as police officers approached the place,
prompting accused-appellant to scamper away.
He lied face down when gunshots rang. The buy-bust team then helped him
get up. He saw the police officers searching the premises and finding shabu and
firearms, which were on top of a table or drawer.[2]
When he asked the reason for his apprehension, he was told that it was because
he was a companion of Boy Bicol. He denied under oath that the gun and drugs
seized were found in his possession and testified that he was only invited by
Boy Bicol to get the motorcycle from his house.[3]
The RTC acquitted accused-appellant
of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition but convicted him of possession
of dangerous drugs. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court based on insufficiency of evidence hereby ACQUITS accused CARLOS DELA CRUZ Y VICTORINO in Criminal Case No. 6517 for violation of P.D. 1866 as amended by RA 8294.
In Criminal Case No. 6518 for
Possession of Dangerous Drug under Section 11, 2nd paragraph of
Republic Act 9165, the Court finds said accused CARLOS DELA CRUZ Y VICTORINO,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to Life Imprisonment and
to Pay a Fine of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00).
SO ORDERED.[4]
On
In his appeal to the CA,
accused-appellant claimed that: (1) the version of the prosecution should not
have been given full credence; (2) the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that he was guilty of possession of an illegal drug; (3) his
arrest was patently illegal; and (4) the prosecution failed to establish the
chain of custody of the illegal drug allegedly in his possession.
The CA sustained accused-appellant’s
conviction.[5] It
pointed out that accused-appellant was positively identified by prosecution
witnesses, rendering his uncorroborated denial and allegation of frame-up weak.
As to accused-appellant’s alleged illegal arrest, the CA held that he is deemed
to have waived his objection when he entered his plea, applied for bail, and
actively participated in the trial without questioning such arrest.
On the supposedly broken chain of
custody of the illegal drug, the appellate court held that accused-appellant’s
claim is unpersuasive absent any evidence showing that the plastic sachet of shabu
had been tampered or meddled with.
On
On
Accused-appellant presents the
following issues before us:
I
THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
II
THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF SECTION
11, ARTICLE II, RA 9165 DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
III
THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
DESPITE THE PATENT ILLEGALITY OF HIS ARREST
IV
THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 11,
ARTICLE II, RA 9165 DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE
CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ILLEGAL DRUG ALLEGEDLY FOUND IN HIS POSSESSION
Accused-appellant claims that the
presence of all the elements of the offense of possession of dangerous drug was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt since both actual and constructive
possessions were not proved. He asserts that the shabu was not found in his actual possession, for which reason the
prosecution was required to establish that he had constructive possession over
the shabu. He maintains that as he
had no control and dominion over the drug or over the place where it was found,
the prosecution likewise failed to prove constructive possession.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal
has merit.
The elements in illegal possession of
dangerous drug are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which
is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[6] On
the third element, we have held that the possession must be with knowledge of
the accused or that animus possidendi existed with the possession or
control of said articles.[7]
Considering that as to this knowledge, a person’s mental
state of awareness of a fact is involved, we have ruled that:
Since courts cannot
penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with
certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as
a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into
consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the
surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from
the attendant events in each particular case.[8]
The prior or contemporaneous acts of
accused-appellant show that: he was inside the nipa hut at the time the
buy-bust operation was taking place; he was talking to Boy Bicol inside the
nipa hut; he was seen holding a shotgun; when PO1 Calanoga, Jr. pointed his
firearm at accused-appellant, the latter dropped his shotgun; and when apprehended,
he was in a room which had the seized shabu, digital weighing scale,
drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines. Accused-appellant later admitted
that he knew what the content of the seized plastic bag was.[9]
Given the circumstances, we find that
the prosecution failed to establish possession of the shabu, whether in its actual or constructive sense, on the part of
accused-appellant.
The two buy-bust team members
corroborated each other’s testimonies on how they saw Boy Bicol talking to
accused-appellant by a table inside the nipa hut. That table, they testified,
was the same table where they saw the shabu
once inside the nipa hut. This fact was
used by the prosecution to show that accused-appellant exercised dominion and
control over the shabu on the table.
We, however, find this too broad an application of the concept of constructive
possession.
In People v. Torres,[10] we
held there was constructive possession of prohibited drugs even when the accused
was not home when the prohibited drugs were found in the master’s bedroom of
his house.
In People v. Tira,[11] we
sustained the conviction of the accused husband and wife for illegal possession
of dangerous drugs. Their residence was searched and their bed was found to be
concealing illegal drugs underneath. We held that the wife cannot feign
ignorance of the drugs’ existence as she had full access to the room, including
the space under the bed.
In Abuan v. People,[12] we
affirmed the finding that the accused was in constructive possession of
prohibited drugs which had been found in the drawer located in her bedroom.
In all these cases, the accused was
held to be in constructive possession of illegal drugs since they were shown to
enjoy dominion and control over the premises where these drugs were found.
In the instant case, however, there
is no question that accused-appellant was not the owner of the nipa hut that
was subject of the buy-bust operation. He did not have dominion or control over
the nipa hut. Neither was accused-appellant a tenant or occupant of the nipa
hut, a fact not disputed by the prosecution. The target of the operation was
Boy Bicol. Accused-appellant was merely
a guest of Boy Bicol. But in spite of
the lack of evidence pinning accused-appellant to illegal possession of drugs,
the trial court declared the following:
It
cannot be denied that when the accused was talking with Boy Bicol he knew that
the shabu was on the table with other items that were confiscated by the police
operatives. The court [surmises] that the accused and boy Bicol were members of
a gang hiding in that nipa hut where they were caught red-handed with
prohibited items and dangerous [drugs].[13]
The trial court cannot assume, based on
the prosecution’s evidence, that accused-appellant was part of a gang dealing
in illegal activities. Apart from his presence in Boy Bicol’s nipa hut, the
prosecution was not able to show his participation in any drug-dealing. He was
not even in possession of drugs in his person. He was merely found inside a
room with shabu, not as the room’s
owner or occupant but as a guest. While he allegedly pointed a firearm at the
buy-bust team, the prosecution curiously failed to produce the firearm that
accused-appellant supposedly used.
The prosecution in this case clearly
failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a showing of either actual
or constructive possession by the accused-appellant.
Since accused-appellant was not in
possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicol’s nipa hut, his subsequent arrest
was also invalid. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.––A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The warrantless arrest of
accused-appellant was effected under Sec. 5(a), arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto.
For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[14]
Accused-appellant’s act of pointing a
firearm at the buy-bust team would have been sufficient basis for his arrest
in flagrante delicto; however, the prosecution was not able to adequately
prove that accused-appellant was committing an offense. Although
accused-appellant merely denied possessing the firearm, the prosecution’s
charge was weak absent the presentation of the alleged firearm. He was
eventually acquitted by the trial court because of this gaffe. His arrest,
independent of the buy-bust operation targeting Boy Bicol, was therefore not
lawful as he was not proved to be committing any offense.
In sum, we find that there is
insufficient evidence to show accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Having ruled on the lack of material or constructive possession by
accused-appellant of the seized shabu
and his succeeding illegal arrest, we deem it unnecessary to deal with the
other issue raised.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The CA Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISU
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[2]
[3] CA
rollo, p. 17.
[5] Rollo, p. 18. The Decision was penned by
Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Mario L. Guariña III and Japar B. Dimaampao.
[6] People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511,
[7] People v. Lagata, G.R. No. 135323, June 25, 2003, 404 SCRA 671, 676; citing People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 419.
[8] Lagata, supra; citing People v. Burton, 335 Phil. 1003, 1024-1025 (2000).
[9] Rollo, p. 50.
[10]
G.R. No. 170837,
[11]
G.R. No. 139615,
[12]
G.R. No. 168773,
[13]
CA rollo, p. 25.
[14] People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587,