EN
BANC
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NESTOR A.
JACOT,
Petitioner, - versus
- ROGEN T.
DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 179848 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, DE CASTRO,* and BRION,** JJ. Promulgated: November 27, 2008 |
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Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the
Resolution[1]
dated 28 September 2007 of the Commission on Elections (COM
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act. He filed a request for the
administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Six months after, on
On
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.—Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
x x x x
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In his Answer[9] dated
In the meantime, the
On
ACCORDINGLY, NESTOR ARES JACOT is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. If proclaimed, respondent cannot thus assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such disqualification.[14]
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on
Petitioner sought remedy from this Court via the present Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, where he
presented for the first time an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution of this Court:
I
WHETHER
OR NOT PUBLIC
II
WHETHER
OR NOT PUBLIC
III
WHETHER
OR NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT WOULD RESULT IN THE
FRUSTRATION OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF CATARMAN, CAMIGUIN.[19]
The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is
whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the
This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.—Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
“I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the
By the oath
dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the
The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one
contained in the Certificate of
Candidacy which must be executed by any
person who wishes to run for public
office in Philippine elections. Such
an oath reads:
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify that the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge.
Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.—Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
x x x x
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office,
who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or
before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.[20]
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a
foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship
(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225,
and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to
additionally execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized
public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of
the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to
accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied
with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines). This is made clear in the
discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of
House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors
of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon
and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to
Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of
allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship:
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. “Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.” I think it’s very good, ha? No problem?
REP. JAVIER. … I think it’s already covered by the oath.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. Ah… but he has taken his oath already.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. No…no, renouncing foreign citizenship.
x x x x
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. What’s your problem, Boy? Those
seeking elective office in the
REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking that ano…
CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?
CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.
REP. A.D. DEFE
There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was
not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if
they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine
elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine
citizenship.
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of
Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation
sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of
allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates
in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an
additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts,
considering their special circumstance of having more than one
citizenship.
Petitioner erroneously invokes the doctrine in Valles[21]
and Mercado,[22]
wherein the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of
candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, was already considered a
renunciation of foreign citizenship. The
ruling of this Court in Valles and Mercado
is not applicable to the present case, which is now specially governed by
Republic Act No. 9225, promulgated on
In Mercado, which was cited in Valles, the
disqualification of therein private respondent Manzano
was sought under another law, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, which
reads:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
x x x x
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
The Court in
the aforesaid cases sought to define the term “dual citizenship” vis-ŕ-vis the concept of “dual
allegiance.” At the time this Court decided the cases of Valles and Mercado on
Lopez v. Commission on Elections[24]
is the more fitting precedent for this case since they both share the
same factual milieu. In Lopez, therein petitioner Lopez was a
natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he became a
naturalized
Petitioner presents before this Court
for the first time, in the instant Petition for Certiorari, an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been
raised in the proceedings below. Points
of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the
lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need not be
considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at
that late stage. Basic considerations of
fairness and due process impel this rule.[26]
Courts have neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose
to go to trial haphazardly.[27]
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of
evidence.[28] Petitioner should have offered the Affidavit
dated
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that “In
the absence of any applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court in the
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC,
respondent had no opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to
due process. [29] Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of
evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.[30]
The Court further notes that petitioner had already presented before the
COMELEC an identical document, “Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship” executed on
27 June 2007, subsequent to his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy on 26
March 2007. Petitioner attached the said
Oath of
The justification offered by petitioner, that his counsel had advised him
against presenting this crucial piece of evidence, is lame and
unconvincing. If the Affidavit of
And even if it were true, petitioner’s excuse for the late presentation
of the Affidavit of
It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsel’s
conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case, and the client cannot
be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer
proceeded differently.[31] The only exceptions to the general rule --
that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel -- which this Court finds
acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright
deprivation of one’s property through a technicality.[32] These exceptions are not attendant in this
case.
The Court cannot sustain petitioner’s averment that his counsel was
grossly negligent in deciding against the presentation of the Affidavit of
Also belying petitioner’s claim that his former counsel was grossly
negligent was the fact that petitioner continuously used his former counsel’s
theory of the case. Even when the
COMELEC already rendered an adverse decision, he persistently argues even to
this Court that his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the
Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel was
inept, petitioner should have promptly taken action, such as discharging his
counsel earlier and/or insisting on the submission of his Affidavit of 7
February 2007 to the COMELEC, instead of waiting until a decision was rendered
disqualifying him and a resolution issued dismissing his motion for
reconsideration; and, thereupon, he could have heaped the blame on his former
counsel. Petitioner could not be so
easily allowed to escape the consequences of his former counsel’s acts,
because, otherwise, it would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative,
and subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing
counsel. [34]
Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[35]
where therein petitioner De Guzman was unable to present a piece of evidence because
his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his prior leave to do so. The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in
filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of any chance to
present documentary evidence in his defense.
This was certainly not the case in the Petition at bar.
Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively defended his suit by
attending the hearings, filing the pleadings, and presenting evidence on
petitioner’s behalf. Moreover,
petitioner’s cause was not defeated by a mere technicality, but because of a
mistaken reliance on a doctrine which is not applicable to his case. A case lost due to an untenable legal
position does not justify a deviation from the rule that clients are bound by
the acts and mistakes of their counsel.[36]
Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest
number of votes for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman
during the 2007 local elections. The fact
that a candidate, who must comply with the election requirements applicable to
dual citizens and failed to do so, received the highest number of votes for an
elective position does not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, such
requirement.[37] The will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed that the candidate was qualified.
The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly
applied. If a person seeks to serve the
Republic of the
WHEREFORE,
the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISU
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice |
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
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RENATO C.
CORONA
Associate Justice |
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
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ADOLFO S.
AZC
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DANTE O.
TINGA
Associate Justice
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PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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ON
OFFICIAL LEAVE |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
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TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ON LEAVE
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court.
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REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice
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** On leave.
[1] Per Curiam, with Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo A. Brawner, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer. Rollo, pp. 36-39.
[2] Penned by Presiding Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr with Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Nicodemo T. Ferrer, concurring; Rollo, pp. 31-35.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] 392 Phil. 327 (2000).
[13] 367 Phil. 132 (1999).
[14] Rollo, p. 35.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Lopez
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 182701,
[21] Supra note 12 at 340.
[22] Supra note 13 at 152-153.
[23] Even
if Republic Act No. 9225 had not been enacted, petitioner would still not be
able to rely on Valles
and Mercado. The ruling in those cases was that when a
person who was merely a dual citizen, not a person with dual allegiance, files
a certificate of candidacy, this already constitutes as a renunciation of
foreign citizenship. In these cases,
this Court made an important distinction between “dual citizenship” and “dual
allegiance.” Dual citizenship is the
result of the application of the different laws of two states, whereby a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, arises
when a person simultaneously owes her loyalty to two or more states by
undertaking a positive act. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s
volition. Thus, Article IV, Section 5 of
the Constitution provides that: “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
national interest and shall be dealt with by law.” In both Valles and Mercado, the candidates whose qualifications are being challenged
were dual citizens: They became citizens of another state without performing
another act—both candidates, who have Filipino parents, became citizens of the
foreign state where they were born under the principal of jus soli and had not taken an oath of
allegiance to said foreign state. In
contrast, herein petitioner has dual allegiance since he acquired his
Other factual
considerations need to be pointed out. It is significant to note that in Valles, therein
private respondent Lopez executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship which, consequently, led to the cancellation of her Australian passport,
even before she filed her Certificate of Candidacy. The issue in that case was Lopez’s
reacquisition of her citizenship, not her failure to renounce her foreign
citizenship. (Valles v. Commission on Elections, supra note
12 at 340-341.)
In Mercado, the Court took special notice
of the fact that “private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part
in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.” (Mercado v. Manzano,
supra note 13 at 153.)
Herein
petitioner’s situation is markedly different since he actively elected to
acquire a foreign citizenship and re-acquired his Filipino citizenship only a
year before he filed his candidacy for a local elective position.
[24] Supra note 20.
[25] Rollo, p. 96.
[26] Tan and Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 166143-47 and 166891, 20 November 2006, 507 SCRA 352, 373-374; Vda de Gualberto v. Go, G.R. No. 139843, 21 July 2005, 463 SCRA 671, 678; Del Rosario v. Bonga, 402 Phil. 949, 957-958 (2001).
[27] Villanueva
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, 14 April 2004, 427
[28] Filipinas Systems, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 463 Phil. 813, 819 (2003)
[29] Manongsong v. Estimo, 452 Phil. 862, 879-880 (2003).
[30] Cansino v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 686, 693 (2003).
[31] People v. Kawasa, 327 Phil. 928, 933 (1996).
[32] R Transport Corporation v. Philippine Hawk Transport Corporation, G.R. No. 155737, 19 October 2005, 473 SCRA 342, 347-348; Trust International Paper Corporation v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 164871, 22 August 2006, 499 SCRA 552, 563.
[33] Andrada v. People, G.R. No. 135222, 4 March 2005, 452 SCRA 685, 693-694; Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 96027-28, 8 March 2005, 453 SCRA 24, 45; People v. Mercado, 445 Phil. 813, 829 (2003); Tesoro v. Court of Appeals, 153 Phil. 580, 588-589 (1973); United States v. Umali, 15 Phil. 33, 35 (1910).
[34] People v. Kawasa, supra note 31 at 934-935.
[35] 326 Phil. 184 (1996).
[36] Espinosa
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.128686, 28 May 2004, 430 S
[37] Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 105111 and 105384, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 297, 308.
[38] Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989, 174 SCRA 245, 255.
[39] Lopez v. Commission on Elections, supra note 20.