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MAGSAYSAY
MARITIME CORP. and/or CONRADO N. DELA CRUZ and ODF JELL ASA,
Petitioners, -versus- JAIME M.
VELASQUEZ and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 179802 Present: pUNO, C.J.,* CARPIO,** AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*** CARPIO MORALES,*** and LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, JJ. Promulgated: November
14, 2008 |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review
of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97098, which reversed and set aside the
The facts, as culled from the record,
are as follows.
Respondent Jaime M. Velasquez was
hired by petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation as second cook for its
foreign principal, co-petitioner ODF Jell ASA.
The parties had a considerably long employment history covered by about
ten (10) employment contracts wherein petitioners engaged respondent’s services
on board vessels owned by ODF Jell ASA.
On
It is from this point onwards that
the allegations of the parties differ.
In his pleadings, respondent alleged
that upon his repatriation, he was not confined to St. Luke’s
Petitioners, on the other hand,
maintained that upon respondent’s repatriation on October 13, 2003, he was
immediately referred to a company designated physician for further medical care
and treatment; that the initial impression was Systemic Staphylococcal Infections; Resolving; that he was under
the care of said physician for three (3) months during which he underwent
extensive medications and treatment; that he was admitted and confined at St.
Luke’s Medical Center from October 13,
2003 to November 11, 2003; that progress reports on his recovery have been
issued; that by January 5, 2004, respondent was declared as “cleared to work
resumption as seafarer”; and that petitioners were the ones who shouldered
respondent’s hospitalization expenses.
On
WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the respondents Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Conrado N. Dela
Cruz and ODF Jell ASA to pay complainant Jaime M. Velasquez the amount of SIXTY
TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY US DOLLARS (US$62,260.00) or its equivalent in
Philippine Peso at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment
representing his disability benefits and sickness allowance and 10% of the
total monetary award by way of attorney’s fees.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
From the foregoing decision,
petitioners filed an appeal with the NLRC, alleging serious errors in the
factual findings of the Labor Arbiter.
Upon review of the records, the NLRC
made the following findings:
A careful review of the records shows that, in not one instance did
complainant, by way of a contrary medical finding, assail the diagnosis arrived
at by the company designated physician, Dr. Natalio G. Alegre II. As noted, the findings of Dr. Efren Vicaldo,
complainant’s private physician, and those of Dr. Alegre, bear consistency with
each other save for his hypertensive condition.
Above all these, complainant’s credibility suffered a serious setback
when he declared that he was seen by Dr. Alegre only twice and that there was
no treatment given to him since repatriation (Records, pp. 88-89). Records belie such assertion. Copies of the medical reports accomplished by
the company accredited physician would show that he was examined and treated by
the latter for no less than eight (8) times (Records, pp. 128-135). As gleaned therefrom, complainant was placed
under the care and supervision of Dr. Alegre for about ninety (90) days, his
admission at St. Luke’s
“His infection has already subsided and
resolved.
He has been off his anti-hypertensive
medication for 1 week and his blood pressure is still acceptable at 140/90.
Regular intake of anti-hypertensive
medications is advised for strict compliance so that hypertension is controlled
to prevent complications.”
Given the earlier adverted consideration on
such want of credence on complainant’s part as gleaned from his assertions
which were easily controverted by evidence on record, such notable conjectural
tenor on the part of complainant’s private physician as to the possible effects
of his alleged hypertensive condition cannot be taken as sufficient basis to
overcome the correctness of the medical findings arrived at by Dr. Alegre, not
to mention that complainant was examined by his chosen physician only
once. Aside from his alleged
hypertensive condition which could be addressed to by oral medication, there
exists no evidence that there is a direct causal connection between said
alleged hypertensive condition and a condition of permanent and total
disability being claimed by the complainant.
Accordingly, the claim must be denied.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under
review is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another entered, DISMISSING the complaint for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
In arriving at such a disposition,
the NLRC held:
Weighty considerations anchored on principles
governing contracts and jurisprudence in support thereof find the complainant
to observe its commitments under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (Article
1159, Civil Code of the
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the
matter to the CA via petition for
certiorari.
On
That the company-designated physician did declare that petitioner is
fit to sea duty should not prejudice petitioner’s claim for disability
benefits. In the first instance, it is
well to note that there is doubt and question as to the accuracy of the
declaration of the Dr. Alegre’s “cleared to work resumption as seafarer.” Such certification should not be taken as the
only primary consideration, especially when there is contra finding by another
doctor giving doubt to the findings of the company-designated physician. As held in the case of Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, “opinions of petitioner’s
doctor to this effect should not be given evidentiary weight as they are palpably
self-serving and biased in favor of petitioners, and certainly could not be
considered independent.” The medical
findings of Dr. Alegre, unsubstantiated by any other evidence, are suspect for
being biased in favor of the private respondent. In the present case, petitioner has been rendered
incapable of further pursuing his usual work because of his weakened bodily
condition due to illness contracted during his employment. It is undisputed that petitioner had been
under the employ of respondents since 1992 and had finished ten (10) contracts
with them on board as second cook. While
considering this long stint with the respondent, his non-redeployment more so
puts in doubt the claim of respondent that petitioner was indeed fit to work. Moreover, it is well settled that strict
rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability
benefits. Petitioner having
substantially established that he could not able to perform the same work as he
used to before his repatriation, and was found both by his independent physician
and Gleneagles Hospital in Singapore suffering from severe hypertension as well
as other diagnosed illnesses which were contracted as a result of his exposure
to the risks involved in the performance of his job, we find the NLRC to have
acted in grave abuse of discretion in reversing and setting aside the decision
of the Labor Arbiter awarding disability claims to petitioner.
Petitioners are now before the Court
principally contending that the CA committed reversible error when it upheld
the findings of respondent’s private physician rather than the findings of the
company-designated physician.
We grant the petition.
The standard employment contract for
seafarers was formulated by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA)
pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 247 to "secure the best
terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure
compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of
Filipino workers overseas."[4] Section
29 of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA Contract) itself
provides that "[a]ll rights and obligations of the parties to [the]
Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants
where the Philippines is a signatory."
Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with
public interest that the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to "the
special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,
closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar
subjects."[5]
The POEA Contract is clear in its
provisions when it provided who should determine the disability grading or
fitness to work of seafarers. The POEA
contract recognizes only the disability grading provided by the
company-designated physicians. Section
20 B.3 of the POEA contract provides:
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is
entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by
the company-designated physician but in no case shall exceed one hundred twenty
(120) days.
xxx
For this purpose the seafarer shall submit
himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company designated
physician within three working days upon his return except when he is
physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the
agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall resort in his forfeiture of the right to
claim the above benefits.
Moreover, Section 20 (B), no. 2,
paragraph 2 of the POEA Contract provides:
However, if after the repatriation the
seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness,
he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared
fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the
company-designated physician.
These provisions clearly illustrate
that respondent’s disability can only be assessed by the company-designated
physician. If the company-designated
physician declares him fit to work, then the seaman is bound by such
declaration.
Further, it should be noted that the
claim for sickness and permanent disability benefits arose from the
stipulations in the standard format contract of employment pursuant to a
circular of the POEA. Such circular was
intended for all parties involved in the employment of Filipino seamen on board
any ocean-going vessel.[6] The POEA Contract, of which the parties are
both signatories, is the law between them and as such, its provisions bind both
of them.[7] Thus, the parties are both bound by the
provisions of the POEA Contract which declares that the degree of disability or
fitness to work of a seafarer should be assessed by the company-designated
physician.
In German Marine Agencies v. NLRC, [8] the
Court explicitly laid that it is the company-designated physician who should
determine the degree of disability of the seaman or his fitness to work, thus:
x x x
In order to claim disability benefits under the Standard Employment Contract,
it is the “company-designated” physician who must proclaim that the seaman
suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury
or illness, during the term of the latter’s employment. x x x It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation
of contracts that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall control. There is no
ambiguity in the wording of the Standard Employment Contract – the only
qualification prescribed for the physician entrusted with the task of assessing
the seaman’s disability is that he be “company-designated.
Again, in Benjamin L. Sarocam v. Interorient Maritime Ent., Inc., and Demaco
United Ltd, [9]
the Court ruled that the opinion of the company-designated physician should
be upheld over that of the doctors appointed by the seafarer considering that
the basis of the findings of the seafarer’s doctor are the medical findings of
the company physician.
Undoubtedly, jurisprudence is replete
with pronouncements that it is the company-designated physician’s findings
which should form the basis of any disability claim of the seafarer. In this particular case, respondent refused
to accept the assessment made by the company-designated physician that he is fit
to work.
Under the Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going
Vessel or the POEA Contract issued pursuant to DOLE Department Order No. 4 and
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 9, both Series of 2000, respondent could not
disregard the findings of the company-designated physician. Section 20-B, paragraph 3 of the POEA Contract
provides:
3. xxx
xxx
If a doctor appointed by the
seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly
between the employer and the seafarer.
The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
It is beyond cavil that it is the
company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the
seaman’s disability. But under the
aforecited provision, when the seaman’s private physician disagrees with the
assessment of the company-designated physician, as here, a third doctor’s
opinion may be availed of in determining his disability. This however was not resorted to by the parties. As such, the credibility of the findings of
their respective doctors was properly evaluated by the NLRC.
The Court has applied the Labor Code
concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. In a catena of cases,[10]
the Court declared that disability should not be understood more on its medical
significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement
of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar
nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work
which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. In addition, the Court in GSIS v.
Cadiz[11] and Ijares v. CA[12]
held that permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job
for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any
part of his body.
Here,
petitioner suffered from Staphylococcal
bacteremia, a type of bacteria which usually infects the skin entering the
bloodstream. Staphylococci normally grow in the nose and on the skin of 20% to
30% of healthy adults (and less commonly in the mouth; mammary glands; and
urinary, intestinal, and upper respiratory tracts). These bacteria do not harm most of the
time. However, a break in the skin,
burn, or other injury may allow the bacteria to penetrate the body’s defenses
and cause infection. Commonly,
staphylococcal infections produce collections of pus (abscesses), which can
appear not only on the skin but also in internal organs. If properly treated
with antibiotics, most healthy people who develop staphylococcal infections
recover fully within a short time.[13]
The company-designated physician
cleared respondent for work resumption upon finding that his infection has
subsided after successful medication. We
agree with the NLRC that the doctor more qualified to assess the disability
grade of the respondent seaman is the doctor who regularly monitored and
treated him. The company-designated
physician possessed personal knowledge of the actual condition of respondent. Since the company-designated physician in
this case deemed the respondent as fit to work, then such declaration should be
given credence, considering the amount of time and effort the company doctor
gave to monitoring and treating respondent’s condition. It is undisputed that the recommendation of
Dr. Vicaldo was based on a single medical report which outlined the alleged
findings and medical history of respondent despite the fact that Dr. Vicaldo
treated or examined respondent only once.
On the other hand, the company-designated physician outlined the
progress of respondent’s successful treatment over a period of several months
in several reports, as can be gleaned from the record. As between the findings of the
company-designated physician (Dr. Alegre) and the physician appointed by respondent
(Dr. Vicaldo), the former deserves to be given greater evidentiary weight.
All told, the Court finds and so
rules that the CA committed reversible error in ignoring the medical assessment
of the company-designated physician that respondent was cleared for work
resumption as a seafarer and granting respondent’s claim for disability on the
basis of a single medical examination report of respondent’s appointed
physician contrary to the clear, unambiguous provisions regarding disability
benefit claims contained in the POEA Contract between the parties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97098 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the NLRC, 2nd Division, is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Acting Chairperson |
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C.
CORONA Associate Justice |
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Acting Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISU
Acting Chief Justice
* On Official Leave.
** Acting Chairperson of the First Division as per Special Order No. 534.
*** Additional Member as per Special Order No. 535.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Arturo
G. Tayag, with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama Jr. and Arcangelita
Romilla-Lontok, concurring, rollo,
pp.11-23.
[2]
[3]
[4] E.O. No. 247, Sec. 3(i) and (j).
[5] Art. 1700, New Civil Code. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
[6] Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123619,
[7] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Wong, G.R. No. 120859,
[8] 403 Phil. 572, 588 (2001).
[9] G.R. No. 167813,
[10] ECC
v. Sanico, G.R. No. 134028, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 268, 270-271; GSIS v. CA, G.R. No. 117572, January 29,
1998, 285 SCRA 430, 436; GSIS v. CA, G.R.
No. 116015, July 31, 1996, 260 SCRA 133, 138; Bejerano v. ECC, G.R. No. 84777, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 598,
602.
[11] G.R. No. 154093,
[12] G.R. No. 105854,
[13] http://www.answers.com/topic/staphylococcal_infection_3,
citing Bennett, J. Claude, and Fred Plum, eds. Cecil Textbook of Medicine.