THIRD
DIVISION
|
Office of the ombudsman, Petitioner, - versus
- ROLANDO L. MAGNO and the COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER FIFTH DIVISION), Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 178923 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: November 27, 2008 |
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D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision[1]
dated
The
following are the factual antecedents:
Lizabeth Carreon (Carreon) – alleging
to be the legal representative of Kejo Educational System, Merylvin Publishing
House, and Southern Christian Commercial which were distributors and suppliers
of textbooks to public schools in Metro Manila – filed a complaint-affidavit[5] on
10 February 2000 before the Ombudsman against Magno and other officials of
Parañaque City, particularly: Joey P. Marquez (Marquez), City Mayor and Chairman
of the PCSB; Silvestre A. de Leon (de Leon), City Treasurer; Flocerfida Babida
(Babida), City Budget Officer; Mar Jimenez (Jimenez), Executive Assistant to
the City Mayor; and Antonette Antonio (Antonio), Assistant to the City Mayor
(hereinafter collectively referred to as Magno, et al.). Carreon charged Magno, et al. with violation of Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, for allegedly having failed to pay the purchase price of books ordered and
delivered to the different public schools in Parañaque City.[6]
Carreon averred that sometime in the
first quarter of 1998, she was approached by a close family friend, Noli Aldip
(Aldip), who also happened to be a friend of Marquez. Aldip introduced her to
Jimenez and Antonio; the two, in turn, introduced her to Magno. Immediately after their meeting, Jimenez and
Antonio proposed to Carreon that if the companies she represented, i.e., Kejo Educational System, Merylvin
Publishing House, and Southern Christian Commercial, were willing to do
business with PCSB, they could facilitate, through the Office of the City
Mayor, book purchases for Parañaque City public schools. Magno, for his part, assured Carreon that he,
Jimenez, and Antonio, could arrange the passage of the required PCSB
Resolutions for said business transaction.
Carreon claimed that Jimenez and
Antonio informed her that they had the go-signal of the City Mayor for the book
purchases. Subsequently, she learned
through Magno, Jimenez, and Antonio that the PCSB had already passed the following
Resolutions in July 1998:
Resolution No. Purpose Amount
25 For 500 copies of
Diksyonaryong Pilipino P1,122,250.00
26 For 500 copies of Oxford
Dictionary 1,247,500.00
28 For DECS Basic Textbooks in
Grade II 2,021,250.00
29 For DECS Basic Textbooks 2,021,250.00
TOTAL
6,412,250.00
Four months after, in November 1998, Carreon
said that Magno, Jimenez, and Antonio notified her that the funding for the dictionary
and textbook purchases had been arranged and, in fact, some of the necessary documents
were already signed. Carreon was
provided by Magno, Jimenez, and Antonio with copies of Requests for Allocation
of Allotment (ROAs) and Disbursement Vouchers (DVs) signed by Magno; Purchase
Requests (PRs) No. 0001391, No. 0001387, No. 0001388 and No. 0001390, signed by
Marquez and Magno; as well as Purchase Orders (POs) for individual requests
signed by Marquez and the Parañaque Purchasing Officer. Magno, Jimenez, and Antonio then advised
Carreon to start making deliveries of the dictionaries and textbooks.
Allegedly relying on the
representations of Magno, Jimenez, and Antonio, Carreon caused the deliveries
of the dictionaries and textbooks, amounting to P6,412,201.91, to the PCSB,
evidenced by delivery receipts dated 14, 21, and
According to Carreon, she was assured
several times that payments for the said dictionaries and textbooks would be
released soon. On
Carreon asserted that the actions of Magno,
et al. before, during, and subsequent
to the delivery of the dictionaries and textbooks were done in evident bad
faith and manifest evil design; and that the non-payment of said books caused
her undue injury, in violation of Sections 3(e) and (f) of Republic Act No.
3019.
Carreon’s complaint-affidavit gave
rise to two separate proceedings before the Ombudsman: a criminal
investigation, docketed as OMB-0-00-0350;
and an administrative investigation, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-00-0148. The
administrative charges against Magno, et
al. were particularly for Misconduct and Oppression.
Apparently in negotiations for the
amicable settlement of her claims, Carreon filed a Manifestation in OMB-0-00-0350
dated September 2000 before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
of the Office of the Ombudsman withdrawing her complaint-affidavit, without
prejudice to its re-filing in case the parties fail to reach an agreement.[9]
On
In a letter[11] dated
28 March 2001 and addressed to the AIB Director, Magno, et al. (except Antonio), authorized Atty. Leo Luis Mendoza (Atty.
Mendoza) to appear on their behalf in the preliminary conference on
OMB-ADM-0-00-0148 and to present and submit the necessary documents/affidavits
as may be required by law and/or the AIB.
On
In the meantime, separate Ex-Parte Manifestations[15]
were filed by Kejo Educational System,[16] Merylvin
Publishing House,[17]
and Southern Christian Commercial,[18] disclaiming
the authority of Carreon to file with the Ombudsman the complaint-affidavit against
Magno, et al. on their behalf.
After holding a preliminary
conference, the Ombudsman issued on
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered
its Decision in OMB-ADM-0-00-0148 on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office rules and so holds that:
1. Respondent ROLANDO L. MAGNO is hereby FOUND GUILTY of the offense of GRAVE MISCONDUCT, and for which he is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE WITH ALL ITS ACCESSORY PENALTIES, pursuant to Section 52(A-3), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
2. Respondent MARIO “MAR” L. JIMENEZ is hereby found guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and for which he is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE WITH ALL ITS ACCESSORY PENALTIES, pursuant to Section 52(A-3), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. In view, however, of recent developments which now preclude this Office from dismissing him from office, it is (sic) hereby ordered the forfeiture of his retirement benefits and his perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service;
3.
Respondents FLORCEFIDA M. BABIDA and
SILVESTRE
4.
For having been rendered moot and
academic, the instant case against respondents JOEY P. MARQUEZ and ANTONETTE
ANTONIO is hereby DISMISSED.[19]
Magno filed with the Ombudsman a
Motion for Reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision. He alleged in his Motion that he was not a
signatory to the Joint Counter-Affidavit submitted on 3 April 2000 in OMB-0-00-0350
and adopted in OMB-ADM-0-00-0148; consequently, he argued that he “can not be
adversely affected by whatever unfavorable allegations contained therein
regarding the refusal of [the other Parañaque City officials] to pay
Carreon due to lack of funds.”[20] The
The Ombudsman, in its Order issued on
Magno elevated his case to the Court
of Appeals via a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 91080. Magno grounded his appeal on the following
arguments: that Carreon had no legal standing to institute the administrative
case against him; that he signed the ROAs and PRs for the book purchases as
part of his official duties, and that, even then, the said documents had no
bearing unless approved by the appropriate officials of the Parañaque City
government; and that since he was administratively charged only with Misconduct
and Oppression for his supposed violation of Sections 3(e) and (f) of Republic Act
No. 3019, he could not be found guilty of Grave Misconduct without violating
his right to due process.
The Court of Appeals issued on
On
The Office of the Ombudsman erred in finding [Magno] guilty of grave misconduct. [Magno] was charged with violation of Section 3 (e) and (f), R.A. 3019. He was not charged with grave misconduct, as to put him on notice that he stands accused of misconduct coupled with any of the elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or established rules. Therefore, he was not afforded the opportunity to rebut the elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules in grave misconduct, in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him.[25]
On
Magno opposed the Omnibus Motion of
the Ombudsman, contending that the latter was not a real party-in-interest, and
its motion to intervene was already belatedly filed since such should have been
filed before the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91080.
In a Resolution[27]
dated
Hence, the Petition at bar, in which
the Ombudsman asserts that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the following manner:
THE RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE OMNIBUS MOTION FOR INTERVENTION AND RECONSIDERATION
FILED BY PETITIONER OMBUDSMAN, IT APPEARING THAT THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION AND
DECISION ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT UNDER THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES:
A.
PETITIONER OMBUDSMAN HAS SUFFICIENT LEGAL
INTEREST WARRANTING ITS INTERVENTION IN CA-GR SP NO. 91080, ENTITLED “ROLANDO
L. MAGNO VS. LIZABETH CARREON.”
B. PETITIONER OMBUDSMAN DID NOT VIOLATE PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGNO’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT DECLARED HIM ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT.
The Ombudsman prays that the Court
issue (1) a writ of certiorari setting
aside the 7 November 2006 Decision and 14 June 2007 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals and reinstating the 3 June 2005 Decision and 22 August 2005 Resolution of
the Ombudsman; and (2) a writ of prohibition perpetually restraining Magno and
the Court of Appeals from enforcing the assailed Decision and Resolution.
The present Petition is without merit
and is accordingly dismissed by this Court.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are special remedies governed by Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court, relevant provisions of which read:
SEC. 1.
Petition for Certiorari. –
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
x x x x
SEC. 2.
Petition for prohibition. –
When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or
matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The rules are explicit that the
special remedies of certiorari and
prohibition may only be availed of when the tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person, exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions, acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
A petition for certiorari (as well as one for prohibition) will only prosper if grave
abuse of discretion is manifested.[28] The burden is on the part of the petitioner
to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing
the impugned order. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be
grave.[29] The term grave abuse of discretion has a
technical and set meaning. Grave abuse
of discretion is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.[30]
Judging from the foregoing standards,
there is no grave abuse of discretion in the case at bar. There is factual and legal justification for
the denial by the Court of Appeals of the Ombudsman’s Omnibus Motion.
The Court notes that only Carreon was
named a respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 91080; the Ombudsman was not impleaded
as a party in said case, even as a nominal party. The Ombudsman, despite receiving notices from
said case, failed to immediately move to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No.
91080. Instead, the Ombudsman waited
until the Court of Appeals rendered its judgment dismissing the charges against
Magno before filing its Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for
Reconsideration. The appellate court no
longer allowed the Ombudsman to intervene.
Intervention is not a matter of right
but may be permitted by the courts only when the statutory conditions for the
right to intervene are shown. Thus, the allowance or disallowance of a motion
to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[31]
To allow intervention, it must be
shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or
otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or
prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate
proceeding or not. Both requirements
must concur, as the first is not more important than the second.[32]
In the case at bar, the Court holds
that the Ombudsman failed to sufficiently establish its legal interest to
intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 91080.
Legal interest, which entitles a
person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment.[33]
The
Ombudsman invokes its disciplining authority over public officers and employees
in an attempt to justify its intervention in CA-G.R. SP No. 91080.
It was in the exercise of such disciplining authority that the Ombudsman
conducted the investigation in OMB-ADM-0-00-0148, the administrative case against Magno and the other
That it was
its decision, rendered as the disciplining authority over Magno, which was the
subject of the appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 91080, did not necessarily vest the
Ombudsman with legal interest to intervene in the said case. Every decision rendered by the Ombudsman in
an administrative case may be affirmed, but may also be modified or reversed on
appeal – this is the very essence of appeal.
In case of modification or reversal of the decision of the Ombudsman on
appeal, it is the parties who bear the consequences thereof, and the Ombudsman itself would only have
to face the error/s in fact or law that it may have committed which resulted in
the modification or reversal of its decision.
Moreover, the reason for disallowing
the disciplining authority from appealing the reversal of its decision, as decided in National Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v. Mamauag,[34]
citing Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[35]
is also true for precluding said disciplining authority from intervening in the
appeal of its decision, to wit:
RA
6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of
the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize
“either party” to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. One
party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the
penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party
is the government when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of
demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the service is the
proper penalty.
However,
the government party that can appeal is
not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and
imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The
government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative
case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or
tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an
active participant in prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided
after Dacoycoy, the Court declared:
To
be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought
before the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as
a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be
likened to a judge who should “detach himself from cases where his decision is
appealed to a higher court for review.”
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to “hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies,” not to litigate. (Emphasis ours.)
In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group,[36]
the Court further warned that:
The court or the
quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not only when hearing and
resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is brought on appeal
before a higher court. The judge of a court
or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency must keep in mind that he is an
adjudicator who must settle the controversies between parties in accordance
with the evidence and the applicable laws, regulations, and/or
jurisprudence. His judgment should
already clearly and completely state his findings of fact and law. There must be no more need for him to justify
further his judgment when it is appealed before appellate courts. When the court judge or the quasi-judicial
officer intervenes as a party in the appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his
detachment and impartiality, and his interest in the case becomes personal
since his objective now is no longer only to settle the controversy between the
original parties (which he had already accomplished by rendering his judgment),
but more significantly, to refute the appellant’s assignment of errors, defend
his judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on appeal.
Equally relevant herein is Section 2,
Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court, which states that the motion to
intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the court. The period within which a person may intervene
is thus restricted. After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted
anymore. This is because, basically,
intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to
an existing litigation.[37]
In the instant case, the Ombudsman
moved to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 91080 only after the Court of Appeals had
rendered its decision therein. It did
not offer any worthy explanation for its belated attempt at intervention, and
merely offered the feeble excuse that it was not ordered by the Court of
Appeals to file a Comment on Magno’s Petition. Even then, as the Court has already pointed
out, the records disclose that the Ombudsman was served with copies of the
petition and pleadings filed by Magno in CA-G.R. SP No. 91080, yet it chose not
to immediately act thereon.
While there may be cases in which the
Court admitted and granted a motion for intervention despite its late filing to
give way to substantive justice, the same is not applicable to the case at bar,
for here, not only did the Ombudsman belatedly move for intervention in CA-G.R.
SP No. 91080, but more importantly, it has no legal interest at all to
intervene. The absence of the latter is
insurmountable.
Since the Court of Appeals denied the
intervention of the Ombudsman in CA-G.R. SP No. 91080, then the Court of
Appeals could not admit, much less, take into account the Ombudsman’s Motion
for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 7 November 2006. In the absence of any validly filed Motion
for Reconsideration of the said Decision or any appeal thereof taken to this
Court within the prescribed period, then the same has become final and
executory, and beyond the power of this Court to review even if the Decision
should contain any errors.
The Ombudsman, however, insists that
this Court delve into the merits of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 7
November 2006, on certiorari instead
of appeal, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate
court in promulgating the same.
Firstly, this Petition for Certiorari of the
According to Section 4, Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari
may be filed not later than 60 days from receipt of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court. The Ombudsman received a copy of the Court of
Appeals Decision dated
The results would have been different
had the Ombudsman been successful in the instant Petition to have the
Resolution dated 14 June 2007 of the Court of Appeals, denying its motion to
intervene, reversed; because, then, its motion for reconsideration of the
Decision dated 7 November 2006 of the appellate court would have also been
deemed admitted and would have suspended the running of the 60-day reglementary
period for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Regrettably for the Ombudsman, it failed in this regard.
Secondly, even if this Court
disregards the lapse of the reglementary period for the filing of a petition
for certiorari assailing the 7
November 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals, it will still not issue the
writ prayed for by the Ombudsman since it is not persuaded that the assailed
Decision had been rendered by the appellate court in grave abuse of discretion.
The administrative charges against
Magno, arising from his alleged violation of Sections 3(e) and (f) of Republic
Act No. 3019, were Misconduct and Oppression. Magno, in his pleadings filed
before the Ombudsman, argued and presented evidence based on such charges. However, the Ombudsman finally adjudged him
to be guilty of Grave Misconduct for which he was ordered dismissed from
service.
Misconduct has been defined as
improper or wrongful conduct. It is the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act,
a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and
not mere error in judgment. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful
conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The
term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. To
constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public
officer. On the other hand, when the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are manifest, the
public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct.[38]
Simple Misconduct is distinct and
separate from Grave Misconduct. The
Court clarified in Landrito v. Civil
Service Commission[39]
that “in grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law
or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest.”
In point is the Court’s ruling in Civil Service Commission v. Lucas,[40]
where:
The issues are (a) whether respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct, and (b) whether the act complained of constitutes grave misconduct.
Petitioner anchors its position on the view that “the formal charge against a respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, and not the designation of the offense.”
We deny the petition.
As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an existing guideline of the CSC distinguishing simple and grave misconduct. In the case of Landrito vs. Civil Service Commission, we held that “in grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest,” which is obviously lacking in respondent’s case. Respondent maintains that as he was charged with simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his right to due process by convicting him of grave misconduct.
We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him and that (b) a person can not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged.
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.
The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in administrative proceedings.
The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[41] As found by the Court of Appeals, Magno was
clearly deprived of his right to due process when he was convicted of a much
serious offense, carrying a more severe penalty, without him being properly
informed thereof or being provided with the opportunity to be heard thereon.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DISMISSED,
without prejudice to the outcome of the criminal cases still pending against
private respondent Rolando L. Magno for the same acts.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada with Associate Justices Roberto A.
Barrios and Mario L. Guariña III concurring; Rollo, pp. 22-32.
[2]
[3] Although
the Decision was dated 30 August 2004, it was signed and approved by Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo only on 3 June 2005;
Records, pp. 228-259.
[4] Although
the Order was dated 23 June 2005, it was signed and approved by Ombudsman
Simeon V. Marcelo only on 22 August
2005; CA rollo, pp. 82-92.
[5] Records,
pp. 1-5.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] CA rollo, pp. 64-65.
[20]
[21] Annex
1 to the Motion for Reconsideration before the Ombudsman; id. at 273.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Rollo, pp. 30-31.
[26] CA rollo, pp. 224-241.
[27]
[28] Microsoft Corporation v. Best Deal Computer
Center Corporation, 438 Phil. 408, 414 (2002).
[29] See Suliguin
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166046,
[30] Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
440 Phil. 1, 20-21 (2002).
[31] Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil.
215, 233 (2001).
[32]
[33] Nordic Asia, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 111159, 13 July 2004, 434 SCRA 195, 199.
[34] G.R.
No. 149999,
[35] 378
Phil. 466, 483-484 (1999).
[36] G.R.
No. 169982,
[37] Manalo v. Court of Appeals, supra note
31.
[38] Estarija v. Ranada, G.R. No. 159314,
[39] G.R.
Nos. 104304-05,
[40] 361
Phil. 486, 490-491 (1999).
[41] Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the
Philippine v. Lariosa, G.R. No. L-70479,