THIRD
DIVISION
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SPS. GABRIEL LLANES and MARIA LLANES,
Petitioners, - versus
- REPUBLIC OF THE Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 177947 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ. Promulgated: November 27, 2008 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision[1]
dated
The
facts of this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
The
Spouses Llanes applied for registration of their title over a parcel of land
known as Lot No. 5812 of Plan AP-04-009967, Malvar Cadastre, with an area of
4,014 square meters, located in
The subject property had been in the possession
of Gabriel’s grandmother, Eugenia Valencia (Eugenia), since the 1930s. She
declared the said property for taxation purposes as evidenced by Tax Declarations
No. 3470[4]
(1948); No. 8942[5]
(1955); and No. 12338,[6]
No. 12365,[7]
and No. 12371[8]
(1963). It was classified as
agricultural land and was being cultivated by Eugenia’s son and Gabriel’s
father, Francisco Llanes (Francisco).
Francisco planted the subject property with rice.[9]
In
1965, Gabriel’s brother, Servillano Llanes (Servillano), purchased the subject
property from Eugenia. Servillano
personally cultivated the subject property by planting it with rice, and then
later with coconut.[10] Servillano, together with his wife, Rita
Valencia (Rita), declared the subject property for taxation purposes under Tax
Declarations No. 14051[11]
(1966), No. 1788[12] (1969),
No. 1341[13] (1974),
No. 0220[14] (1980),
No. 00645[15] (1982),
and No. 011-00310[16]
(1994).
On
In
1996, however, the Spouses Llanes conveyed the subject property to ICTSI
Warehousing, Inc. (ICTSI), by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.[22]
On
On
When
LRC Case No. T-349 was called for initial hearing, the Spouses Llanes presented
several documents[28]
to show compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of notice, posting, and
publication, which were admitted by the RTC.
The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed before the RTC its Notice of Appearance[29]
as counsel for the Republic and deputized the public prosecutor to assist it in
the proceedings in LRC Case No. T-349.
The Republic submitted to the RTC its
Opposition[30] to the
Spouses Llanes’ application, anchored on the grounds that (1) neither the
Spouses Llanes nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since
12 June 1945 or earlier; and (2) the muniments of title and/or tax
declaration(s) and tax payment receipt(s) of the Spouses Llanes appeared to be
of recent vintage and cannot constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
fide acquisition of the land or of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner.[31]
Considering that no private
opposition to the Spouses Llanes’ application was registered, an Order of
General Default was issued by the RTC against the whole world with the
exception of the Director of Lands (on behalf of the Republic), as represented
by the OSG.[32]
On
The Spouses Llanes filed their formal
offer of evidence before the MCTC. Among
the evidence they submitted were the Certifications issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) IV, Forest Management Bureau (FMB)[34]
dated 9 March 2000 and by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO), Batangas City[35]
dated 15 June 2000, both declaring the subject property as alienable and
disposable.
On
WHEREFORE, and confirming the [O]rder of [G]eneral [D]efault, this Court hereby adjudicates and decrees the parcel Lot No. 5812 subject matter of this application in the names of applicants, [Spouses Llanes], both of legal age, Filipinos, with residence and postal address at Brgy. Paligawan, Balete, Batangas as the true and absolute owners thereof.
Once this DECISION shall have become final let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.[36]
Unsatisfied
with the aforesaid Decision, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the MCTC erred in granting the Application for Registration of
Title of the Spouses Llanes because the latter failed to comply with the
statutory requirement of possession for 30 years, the subject property becoming
alienable and disposable only on 22 December 1997 per the CENRO
Certification. The appeal of the
Republic was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 80021.
It
was only at this point that the Spouses Llanes realized that the Certifications
issued to them by the government agencies concerned stated different dates when
the subject property became alienable and disposable. Based on the DENR-FMB Certification, the
subject property became alienable and disposable on
On
The
Spouses Llanes moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Court of Appeals
Decision but their motion was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution
dated
Hence,
the present Petition raising the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals
erred[38]
in reversing and setting aside the grant by the MCTC of the Spouses Llanes’
Application for Registration of Title based on its finding that the subject
property became alienable and disposable only on
The
Court rules in the affirmative and, thus, finds merit in the Petition at
bar.
Primarily, the Spouses Llanes’ Application
for Registration of Title was filed under Presidential Decree No. 1529
otherwise known as “Property Registration Decree.”
Section
14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration
proceedings, expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the aforequoted
provisions, the three requisites for the filing of an application for
registration of title are: (1) that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession
has been under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. Thus, Section 14(1) requires that
the property sought to be registered should already be alienable and disposable
at the time the application for registration of title is filed.[39]
To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, or an administrative action,
investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act
or statute. A certification by the CENRO
of the DENR stating that the land subject of an application is found to be
within the alienable and disposable site per a land classification project map
is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of the
application.[40]
In
the instant case, the Spouses Llanes submitted to the MCTC Certifications from
DENR Region IV and CENRO,
To
determine whether the Court of Appeals properly disregarded the corrected CENRO
Certification as evidence for the Spouses Llanes, the Court refers to the
relevant rules on evidence. Section 34,
Rule 132 the Rules of Court explicitly provides:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
If
the Court strictly applies the aforequoted provision of law, it would simply
pronounce that the Court of Appeals could not have admitted the corrected CENRO
Certification because it was not formally offered as evidence before the MCTC
during the trial stage. Nevertheless,
since the determination of the true date when the subject property became
alienable and disposable is material to the resolution of this case, it
behooves this Court, in the interest of substantial justice, fairness, and
equity, to consider the corrected CENRO Certification even though it was only
presented during the appeal to the Court of Appeals. Since rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that the Court is empowered to suspend its rules
or to exempt a particular case from the application of a general rule, when the
rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of
justice.[41]
Moreover,
the Spouses Llanes should not be made to suffer the grave consequences, which
include the possibility of losing their right to their property, arising from
the mistake of CENRO, a government agency.
CENRO itself admitted its blunder and willingly issued a corrected
Certification. Very conspicuously, no
other objection to the corrected CENRO Certification was raised except as to
its late presentation; its issuance and authenticity were not challenged or
placed in doubt.
Since both the DENR
Certification and the corrected CENRO Certification state that the subject
property became alienable and disposable on
Reviewing the evidence on record, the
Court finds that the subject property has been in the possession of the Spouses
Llanes and their predecessors-in-interest even prior to
In
addition, generations of Gabriel’s family have declared the subject property
under their names and paid real property taxes thereon. The earliest tax declaration was in the name
of Eugenia, issued as early as 1948.
While tax declarations and receipts are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes not only manifests
one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but also
announces an adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties
with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.[46] Tax declarations are good indicia of possession in the concept of
an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or constructive possession.[47] Moreover, while tax declarations and receipts
are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land,
nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of
great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.[48]
The
evidence submitted by the Spouses Llanes, taken as a whole, establishes that
the subject property became alienable and disposable as early as 26 March 1928;
and the Spouses Llanes and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject property, in the
concept of an owner, even prior to 12 June 1945. In contrast, the Republic did not present any
evidence to refute that of the Spouses Llanes.
To the Court, therefore, the Spouses Llanes were able to sufficiently
discharge the burden of proof that they have an imperfect title to the subject
property capable of judicial confirmation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring; rollo, pp. 39-45.
[2] Rollo, p. 46.
[3] Penned by Judge Fermin M. Chavez; rollo, pp. 36-38.
[4] Records, p. 128.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Testimony of Servillano Llanes,
TSN,
[10]
[11] Records, p. 123.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Testimony of Gabriel Llanes, TSN,
[19]
[20] Records, p. 117.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] In its Order dated
[28] Records, pp. 88-107.
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32] As evidenced by an Order dated
[33] Records, p. 144.
[34] Rollo, p. 77.
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39] Republic
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144057,
[40] Republic
v. Candy Maker, Inc., G.R. No. 163766,
[41] Thermphil, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 589, 595-596 (2001).
[42] TSN,
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46] Republic
v. Alconaba, G.R. No. 155012,
[47] Consolidated
Rural Bank (
[48] Heirs
of