SECOND DIVISION
|
NOEL E. MORA, Petitioner,
- versus - AVESCO MARKETING CORPORATION,
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 177414
Present: QUISUMBING, Acting
C.J. and Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: November
14, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On petition
for review on certiorari is the
In
March 1996, petitioner was hired as a “sales engineer” at Avesco Marketing
Corporation (respondent) to supervise and install sound and communications
systems for its clientele.[2] On
FOR : EDWIN
L. TANG
Vice – President Mktg.
CC : FRANTOR B. FERNANDEZ
Personnel
Manager
BENNIE
B. GUIAMOY
PMK- Manager
DATE :
Dear Sir:
It is with much reluctance and regret that I must
ask to be released from my position of Sales Engineer at Avesco
Marketing. For the past seven
years, I cannot forget how much this company has meant to me.
With this regard,
I’m tendering my resignation effective
on
It appears that petitioner’s filing
of a resignation letter came about after he was confronted for “selling
competitors’ products” to the prejudice and detriment of respondent and was
given the option of either immediately resigning or face administrative
charges.[4]
It further appears that petitioner
changed his mind and withdrew his letter of resignation on the same day,
The following day or on
A report by your Superiors has reached our office just recently some days ago [sic] that you again have committed another breach of trust [sic] against our Company in violation of our [sic] Company Rules and Regulations. This time instead of attending to the products you have to sell, you have surreptitiously undertaken sales transaction [sic], which is patently inimical to the interest of the Company that results to sales loss for the company. x x x x.
As you know very well, earlier[,] you have been disciplined for breach of trust against the Company . . . where you served a penalty of six days suspension . . . with a stern warning that commission of similar offense will eventually lead to your dismissal from the service of the company. The report that reached us now is a repetition of similar breach of trust reported upon you as Jr. Sales Engineer and for this, Management is constrained to dismiss you from the service for loss of trust and confident [sic] in gross violation of our Company Rules & Regulations on Dishonesty and Fraud.
On account of the
foregoing, you are hereby directed to submit to the undersigned not later than
48 hours upon receipt of this memo why
dismissal penalty should not be effected against you for the cited violation. Should you fail to comply with our
requirement, the company may have no other recourse except to initiate
dismissal proceedings. Meantime, you are placed under preventive
suspension effective today,
In his
In
response to your memo with reference no. PD-C003-095 dated
The report of my superior that I am surreptitiously selling other products instead of our products is just speculation and his mere tactics [sic] for our unfavorable sales output for the month. I sell products only from Avesco and never transact/deal other products. I know the consequences of that move and never cross to my mind doing that kind of accusation [sic].
I have been accused for a thing [sic] that I did not know what particular transactions [sic], I was not being talked by my superior [sic] about this or even asked me [sic], this is just a one[-]sided accusation and I am willing to know what it is all about. Your office did not explain to me what this accusation is all about[,] instead offering me an immediate resignation and your notice is a step for my termination [sic].
x x x x [7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner had not heard from
respondent thereafter. He was later to
learn from third party sources that his employment had been terminated as of
Petitioner thereupon filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
which the labor arbiter[8]
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction[9]
since the dispute falls within the province of the grievance procedure provided
for by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between respondent and the workers’
union.
The case was thus referred to the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board for voluntary arbitration. Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) Barriatos, by Decision
of
His motion for reconsideration having
been denied,[13]
petitioner filed the present petition for review.
Petitioner argues that he was only
inveigled to file a resignation letter on
Respondent at once raises procedural
infirmities in the petition, foremost of which is its attribution of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court, instead of raising
errors of law, apart from a lack of verified statement of material dates.[14]
On the merits, respondent maintains
that petitioner resigned.[15]
The Court notes that the appellate
court erred in giving due course to petitioner’s petition for certiorari, for his proper mode of
appeal was for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent had pointed this out in its
Comment[16]
before the appellate court. The
appellate court, however, misappreciated this Court’s ruling in Luzon
Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees[17] which, together with Circular 1-95,[18]
was subsequently used as basis of the Rules of Court Revision Committee for the
inclusion of the decisions of the VA as
appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.[19]
Section 1 of Rule 43 reading:
SECTION
1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to
appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals* and from awards, judgments final orders
or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions. Among
these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission,**
Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory
Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform
under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine
Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
vis-á-vis Section 4[20] thereof requires that the petition for review
to be taken to the Court of Appeals should be filed within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the award, judgment or final order or resolution of the VA.
While
Sec. 2[21]
of the same Rule 43 provides that said Rule shall not apply to judgments or
final orders issued under the Labor Code, the same refers only to cases decided
by labor arbiters which are appealable to the National Labor Relations
Commission.
As
earlier noted, petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition for certiorari on
An
independent action for certiorari may
of course be availed of when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,[22] if the decision of the voluntary arbitrator involves a question of jurisdiction. What petitioner is contesting, however, is
the finding that he voluntarily resigned.
Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is
a mistake of judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal.[23] The appellate court should thus have
dismissed outright the petition for certiorari,
as the decision of the VA had already become final and executory.
The Court, however, resolves to set aside procedural infirmity and rule on the
merits of the present petition in the interest of substantial justice to arrive
at the proper conclusion that is conformable to the evidentiary facts.[24]
In Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad,[25]
the Court held that should an employer interpose the defense of resignation, as
in the present case, it is still incumbent upon the employer, respondent herein,
to prove that the employee voluntarily resigned.
Voluntary
resignations being unconditional in nature, both the intent and the overt
act of relinquishment should concur. If the employer introduces evidence
purportedly executed by an employee as proof of voluntary resignation yet the
employee specifically denies such evidence, as in petitioner’s case, the
employer is burdened to prove the due execution and genuineness of such evidence.[26]
Respondent in this case failed to
discharge such burden. The notice of disciplinary action-“show cause” letter indefinitely
suspending petitioner, even after petitioner had submitted on March 25, 2003
his letter of resignation, albeit alleged
to have withdrawn on even date, negates respondent’s assertion of voluntary
separation. If respondent considered
petitioner resigned on account of his March 25, 2003 letter, to be effective on
April 25, 2003, there would have been no more need to preventively suspend him effective
March 26, 2003 “until further notice pending investigation” of his alleged
transgressions.
It is significant to note
that in his response to the
For a resignation tendered by an
employee to take effect, it should first be accepted or approved by the
employer.[27] Petitioner’s receipt by respondent’s personnel
department of his resignation letter is not equivalent to approval. Since petitioner requested that his
resignation was to be effective a month later or on
That respondent issued the “show
cause” letter a day after petitioner filed the controversial letter of
resignation could only mean that it did not accept the same.
Petitioner’s “resignation”
being premised on a qualification ─ that it be effective
This brings the Court to the issue of
whether petitioner was illegally dismissed.
The Court finds in the affirmative.
While selling of respondent’s competitors’
products is a valid ground for termination of employment, an employer cannot just
hurl generalized accusations but should at least cite specific instances and proof
in support thereof. Respondent relied on a “report by
[petitioner’s] superiors” in faulting petitioner. What this alleged “report” was and what it contained,
no testimonial or documentary proof thereof was proffered. And while respondent gave the impression that
it conducted or was going to conduct an investigation on the basis of the
“report,” there is no showing that one such was conducted and, if there was,
what the result was.
The tenor of respondent’s “show cause” letter sent
to petitioner ─ it was “constrained to dismiss” petitioner ─ shows
that it was terminating his services, the incongruent directive for him to
explain notwithstanding.
While the appellate court’s ratio that “preventive suspension is a
disciplinary measure for the protection of the company’s property pending
investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the
employee,”[28] is well-taken,
it overlooked that the preventive suspension of petitioner effective on March
26, 2003 “until further notice” lapsed into dismissal six days later without
petitioner substantiating the basis therefor.
Petitioner’s questioned filing of the
illegal dismissal case three months and 20 days after he withdrew his letter of
resignation does not dent his case. Under
the law,[29] he has
four years to file his complaint.
In fine, petitioner’s dismissal was
illegal. His claim for damages and
attorney’s fees must, however, be denied in light of his failure to prove the
bases therefor. Moral
damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused.[30] Broad allegations, bereft of proof, cannot sustain the award
of moral damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent is ordered to reinstate petitioner
with full backwages without loss of seniority rights and privileges from the
time of his dismissal until his actual reinstatement or, if reinstatement is no
longer feasible, to give him separation pay equivalent to at least one month
salary for every year of service.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal with Justices Jose L. Sabio Jr. and Jose C. Reyes Jr. concurring, rollo, pp. 37-49..
[2] Rollo, p. 15.
[3] CA
rollo, p. 63; Annex “A.”
[4] Rollo, p.16.
[5]
[6] CA rollo, p. 54.
[7]
[8] Labor Arbiter Fe Superiaso-Cellan.
[9] CA rollo, pp. 79-82.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo, p. 49.
[14]
[15]
[16] CA rollo, pp. 141-154.
[17] G.R. No. 120319,
[18] Issued
[19]
Vide:
* As amended.
** As amended.
[20] Section 4, Rule 43: Period of appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
[21] Section 2 of Rule 43: Cases
not covered. – This Rule shall
not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the
[22] Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[23] Madrigal
Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067,
[24] Progressive Development Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 138820, October 30, 2000; 344 SCRA 512; Samson v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121035, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 460; PAL v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126805, March 16, 2000; 328 SCRA 273 (2000); Aklan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121439, January 25, 2000, 323 SCRA 258.
[25] G.R. No.
159195,
[26] Ibid.
[27] Rase v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 110637,
[28] Rollo, p. 46.
[29] Article 1146 of the Civil Code states: The following actions must be instituted within four years: (1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2)
Upon a quasi-delict.
[30] Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that: Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.