EN BANC
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 176951
by LCP National President
JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
MAYOR JERRY P.
TREÑAS,
CITY OF
represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,
and JERRY P.
TREÑAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners,
-
versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
and
Respondents.
CITY OF
CITY OF
CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF
CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF
CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF
CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF
CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF
CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
BATANGAS, CITY OF
CITY OF
CITY OF
Petitioners-In-Intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - x
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 177499
by LCP National President
JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
MAYOR JERRY P.
TREÑAS,
CITY OF
represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,
and JERRY P.
TREÑAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL
SUR;
and
Respondents.
CITY OF
CITY OF
CITY OF
CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF
CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF
CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF
CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF
CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
BATANGAS, CITY OF
CITY OF
CITY OF
Petitioners-In-Intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
--x
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 178056
by LCP National President Present:
JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
MAYOR JERRY P.
TREÑAS, QUISUMBING,
CITY OF
represented by MAYOR CARPIO,
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
and JERRY P.
TREÑAS in his
personal capacity as
taxpayer, CARPIO MORALES,
Petitioners, AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; BRION, JJ.
DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY
OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF
ORIENTAL,
Respondents.
CITY OF
CITY OF
CITY OF
CITY OF
CITY OF
CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF
CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF
CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF
CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
BATANGAS, CITY OF
CITY OF
CITY OF
Petitioners-In-Intervention. November 18, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I
S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These
are consolidated petitions for prohibition[1]
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of
Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas[2]
assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting
plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
The Facts
During the 11th
Congress,[3]
Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on
bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During
the 12th Congress,[4]
Congress enacted into law Republic
Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),[5]
which took effect on P20 million to P100 million.
The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities
solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the
fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.[6]
After
the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress[7]
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,[8]
which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA
9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th
Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During
the 13th Congress,[9]
the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to
the Senate for approval. However,
the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice
of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The
16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100
million income requirement in RA 9009.
On
The
Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters
in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality
into a city.
Petitioners
filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for
violation of the equal protection clause.[12] Petitioners also lament that the wholesale
conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing
cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the
same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of
the Local Government Code.[13]
The Issues
The
petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate
Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution; and
2. Whether the
Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions.
The
Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are
thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the
present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009
took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years
later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the
criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any
other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to
local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain
and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never
written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on
unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law
passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450
of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.
Preliminary Matters
Prohibition
is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by
the COMELEC,[14] like the Cityhood Laws, which direct the
COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner League of Cities of the
Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective
Application of the Law
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001
during the 11th Congress.
This law specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
which now provides:
Section 450. Requisites
for Creation. — (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least
One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of
the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement.
Prior
to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills
pending in Congress. Thirty-three
cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress
did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.
During
the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income requirement of P100
million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities
whose cityhood bills were not acted upon during the 11th
Congress. This Resolution reached the
Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16
of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29
filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective
sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common
provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. — The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
This common provision exempted
each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100
million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by
RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into law on
various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
failed to sign them.
Indisputably,
Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA
9009 became effective on
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local
Government Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear.
The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law.
There is only one Local Government Code.[18] The Constitution requires Congress to
stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the
creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a
city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The
criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the
creation of a city. No other law, not
even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the
Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units
must follow the same uniform,
non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria
prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
RA
9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income
requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of
a city. This took effect on P100
million income requirement. Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.
In
enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent
municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when
Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood
Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
Such exemption clearly violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently
unconstitutional. To be valid, such
exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Cityhood Laws Violate
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
Uniform
and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are
essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to
all local government units. Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)
If the criteria in
creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can
be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government
units.
A
city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being
equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an
annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area,
population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are
material in determining the “just share” of local government units in national
taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not
follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they
prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in
violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code
is Clear,
Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids — like
deliberations of Congress — if the language of the law is plain, clear and
unambiguous. Courts determine the intent
of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law’s four corners.[19] If the language of the law is plain, clear
and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its express
terms. If a literal application of the
law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to
extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the
law.[20]
Congress,
in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not
provide any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to
respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress
passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous
that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased
income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in
applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
The 11th Congress’ Intent
was not Written into the Local Government Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent
municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the
matter during the 11th Congress.
However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into law.
Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did
not. This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities because such
exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion
of a municipality into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must
all be written in the Local Government Code.
Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria
in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not
comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code.
Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article
XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations
except by a general law. Section 16 of
Article XII provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress must prescribe all the
criteria for the “formation, organization, or regulation” of private
corporations in a general law applicable to all without discrimination.[21] Congress cannot create a private corporation
through a special law or charter.
Deliberations of the 11th
Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable
Congress
is not a continuing body.[22] The unapproved
cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere scraps
of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted
during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless
upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These
hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law
in the 13th or subsequent Congresses.
The
members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed
in one Congress become functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress
and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress. When their
respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th
Congress, the bills had to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills
taken up for the first time, from the filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the
Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly,
Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished
Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following:
a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of its last adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the end of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of the next session as if no adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus,
the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved
cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th
Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain
municipalities, have no legal significance.
They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by
subsequent Congresses.
Applicability of Equal
Protection Clause
If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by
RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income
requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible
violation of the equal protection clause.
Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government
Code, could be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid
classification. However, Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption. The exemption is contained
in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such exemption must be
prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution.
Even
if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, “Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.” This one sentence exemption provision
contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted
municipalities from those that are not exempted.
Even
if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that
municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100
million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy
the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16
municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when
RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a
valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption
from the P100 million income requirement.
To be
valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial
distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is
the purpose of the law,[23]
not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly
situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply
equally to all members of the same class.[24]
There
is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood
bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have
pending bills. The mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to
distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income
requirement. The pendency of a cityhood
bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of
income of a municipality. Municipalities
with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have
lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood
bills. In short, the classification
criterion −
mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the
purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from
converting into cities.
Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were
not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would
be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income
requirement. Had they been informed,
many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood
bills. These municipalities, even if
they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot
now convert into cities if their income is less than P100 million.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of
passage of RA 9009. That specific
condition will never happen again. This
violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to
existing conditions only. This
requirement is illustrated in Mayflower
Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,[25]
where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a
fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same
business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
We are referred to
a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in
operation and may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling
or activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutes licensing physicians
and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession subsequent to
the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which
exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain
areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is
not a regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the
protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to
those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who
enter the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the
classification bears any relation to the public health or welfare generally;
that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse,
cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we
have no right to conjure up possible situations which might justify the
discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the
appellant the equal protection of the law.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the
same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date −
the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th
Congress – as
against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the
effectivity of RA 9009.
Furthermore,
limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement
that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities
with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into
cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the
exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT
the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL
the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393,
9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
(On leave)
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
Chief Justice
[1] Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] As National President of the League
of Cities of the
[3] June
1998 to June 2001.
[4] June 2001 to June 2004.
[5] Entitled AN ACT AMENDING SECTION 450 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, BY INCREASING THE AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME REQUIREMENT FOR A MUNICIPALITY OR CLUSTER OF BARANGAYS TO BE CONVERTED INTO A COMPONENT CITY.
[6] Sponsorship Speech of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
[7] June 2004 to June 2007.
[8] Entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills
Filed in Congress before
[9] June 2007 to June 2010.
[10] The sixteen (16) Cityhood Laws are the
following:
Republic
Act No. 9389, entitled “An Act converting the
Republic
Act No. 9390, entitled “An Act converting the
Republic
Act No. 9391, entitled “An Act converting the
Republic
Act No. 9392, entitled “An Act converting the
Republic
Act No. 9394, entitled “An Act
converting the
Republic
Act No. 9398, entitled “An Act converting the
Republic
Act No. 9393, entitled “An Act converting the
Republic
Act No. 9404, entitled “An Act converting the
Republic
Act No. 9405, entitled “An Act converting the
Republic
Act No. 9407, entitled “An Act converting the
Republic
Act No. 9408, entitled “An Act converting the
Republic
Act No. 9409, entitled “An Act converting the
Republic
Act No. 9434, entitled “An Act converting the
Republic
Act No. 9436, entitled “An Act converting the
Republic
Act No. 9435, entitled “An Act converting the
Republic
Act No. 9491, entitled “An Act converting the
[11] Section 27 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.
[12] Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
[13] Section 285 of the Local Government Code provides: “Allocation to Local Government Units. — The share of local government units in the internal revenue allotment shall be allocated in the following manner:
(a) Provinces — Twenty-three percent (23%);
(b) Cities — Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities — Thirty-four percent (34%); and
(d) Barangays — Twenty percent (20%)
Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined on the basis of the following formula:
(a) Population — Fifty percent (50%);
(b) Land Area — Twenty-five percent (25%); and
(c) Equal sharing — Twenty-five percent (25%)
Provided, further,
That the share of each barangay with a population of not less than one hundred
(100) inhabitants shall not be less than Eighty thousand (P80,000.00)
per annum chargeable against the twenty percent (20%) share of the barangay
from the internal revenue allotment, and the balance to be allocated on the
basis of the following formula:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code:
(1) Population — Forty percent (40%); and
(2) Equal Sharing — Sixty percent (60%)
(b) On the second year:
(1) Population — Fifty percent (50%); and
(2) Equal Sharing — Fifty percent (50%)
(c) On the third year and thereafter:
(1) Population — Sixty percent (60%); and
(2) Equal sharing — Forty percent (40%).
Provided, finally, That the financial requirements of barangays created by local government units after the effectivity of this Code shall be the responsibility of the local government unit concerned.”
[14] Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008; Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC, 409 Phil. 571, 592 (2001); Mutuc v. COMELEC, 146 Phil. 798 (1970).
[15] Section 499 of the Local Government Code provides: “Purpose of Organization. — There shall be an organization of all cities to be known as the League of Cities for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government administration, and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.
The league may form chapters at the provincial level for the component cities of a province. Highly-urbanized cities may also form a chapter of the League. The National League shall be composed of the presidents of the league of highly-urbanized cities and the presidents of the provincial chapters of the league of component cities.”
[16] The Court granted the interventions of the following cities: Santiago City, Iriga City, Ligao City, Legazpi City, Tagaytay City, Surigao City, Bayawan City, Silay City, General Santos City, Zamboanga City, Gingoog City, Cauayan City, Pagadian City, San Carlos City, San Fernando City, Tacurong City, Tangub City, Oroquieta City, Urdaneta City, Victorias City, Calapan City, Himamaylan City, Batangas City, Bais City, Tarlac City, Cadiz City, and Tagum City.
[17] Article 4 of the Civil Code provides: “Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.”
[18] Republic Act No. 7160, as amended.
[19] Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, 28 September 1995, 248 SCRA 590, 596; Security Bank and Trust Company v. RTC of Makati, Br. 61, G.R. No. 113926, 23 October 1996, 263 SCRA 483, 488.
[20] Republic v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 530, 559 (1998); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corp., 462 Phil. 96, 129-131 (2003).
[21] The Corporation Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68) is the general law providing for the formation, organization and regulation of private corporations.
[22] See Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135-136.
[23] The rational basis test is the minimum level of scrutiny that all government actions challenged under the equal protection clause must meet. The strict scrutiny test is used in discriminations based on race or those which result in violations of fundamental rights. Under the strict scrutiny test, to be valid the classification must promote a compelling state interest. The intermediate scrutiny test is used in discriminations based on gender or illegitimacy of children. Under the intermediate scrutiny test, the classification must be substantially related to an important government objective. Laws not subject to the strict or intermediate scrutiny test are evaluated under the rational basis test, which is the easiest test to satisfy since the classification must only show a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies, 2nd Edition, pp. 645-646.
[24] De Guzman, Jr. v. COMELEC, 391 Phil. 70, 79 (2000); Tiu v. Court of Tax Appeals, 361 Phil. 229, 242 (1999).
[25] 297 U.S. 266 (1936).