G.R. No. 176951 (League
of Cities of the Philippines [
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G.R. No.
177499 (League of Cities of the
Philippines [
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G.R. No.
178056 (League of Cities of the
Philippines [
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Table
of Contents
Page
The Facts - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4
Issues - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
9
Ruling - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10
Preliminaries - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10
1. On Locus
Standi - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10
2. On Prohibition as Remedy - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 16
Main Points of Petition - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - 20
I. Cityhood laws do not violate Section 10,
Article X of the
Constitution on
creation of cities - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 21
A. They are in accord with the intent of R.A.
No. 9009
amending
the Local Government Code to exempt respondent
municipalities from increased
income requirement - - - - - - - 22
1. Hindi
ang letra na pumapatay, kung hindi
ang
diwa na nagbibigay-buhay - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - 25
2. Senate President Franklin Drilon’s pertinent
interpellation
of Senator Aquilino Pimentel - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - 27
3. Intent of a statute is the Law - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 29
B. Petitioners are unable to overcome
presumption
of constitutionality
of cityhood laws - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 30
II. Cityhood laws do not violate the equal
protection clause
under Section
1, Article
A. Sponsorship speech of Senator Alfredo Lim
on
House Joint Resolution No. 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 33
B. The classification rests on substantial
distinctions - - - - - - - 37
C. The classification is germane to the
purpose
of the law - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 39
D. The classification is not limited to
existing
conditions only - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 39
E. The classification applies equally to all
members of
the
same class - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 44
Summing Up - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - 48
A Parting Word - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - 51
Disposition - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - 52
x - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
x
DISSENTING
OPINION
REYES, R.T., J.:
TODAY, the majority on a 6-5 voting has choked the
aspiration of the 16 respondent municipalities in becoming cities by declaring
their cityhood laws[1]
unconstitutional. For the first time, I
am compelled to submit a respectful dissent.
The Facts
Between July 1998 and June 2001,
during the Eleventh Congress, a total of fifty-seven (57) bills seeking the
conversion of numerous municipalities into component cities were filed before
the House of Representatives.[2] Out of the fifty-seven (57) bills, thirty-two
(32) became cityhood laws, and one (1) was rejected in a plebiscite. Twenty-four (24) other bills were not acted
upon.
On P20,000,000.00
annual income to P100,000,000.00 locally-generated income.
On P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 2000 constant prices.”
Immediately after the opening of the
Twelfth Congress in July 2001 and with R.A. No. 9009 already in full force and
effect, the House of Representatives adopted House Joint Resolution No. 29,[4]
entitled “Joint Resolution to Exempt
Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress Before P100,000,000.00 in R.A. No. 9009 the
twenty-four (24) municipalities[6]
whose conversions into cities were not acted upon during the Eleventh Congress. The reasons for exempting these municipalities
were the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigation into the jueteng scandal;
the impeachment against former President Joseph Estrada by the House of
Representatives; the aborted impeachment proceedings in the Senate; the
leadership reorganization in both Houses of Congress; the “EDSA Dos” and
“EDSA Tres” uprisings; the campaign period; and the May 2001 elections.[7]
The proponents of House Joint
Resolution No. 29 found success in the House all the way through the Senate. In the Senate, they found a staunch ally in
the person of Senator Robert Barbers, chair of the Committee on Local
Government. However, notwithstanding the
several public hearings, caucuses, dialogues, and informal discussions, the favorable
committee report did not translate into legislation.[8] The Twelfth Congress ended without favorable
action.
During the Thirteenth Congress
(2004-2007), the House of Representatives reinitiated the move, this time via
House Joint Resolution No. 1, and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.
On
Out of the sixteen (16) members of
the Committee who deliberated on House
Joint Resolution No. 1, seven (7) senators signed with either
“reservations”[10] or
“strong reservations,”[11]
while three (3) senators dissented.[12]
During the Senate session held on
The proponents of House Joint
Resolution No. 1 acceded to the suggestion of Senator Pimentel. Consequently, of the twenty-four (24)
municipalities enumerated in House Joint Resolution No. 1, sixteen (16)
municipalities filed their individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting the particular municipality from the income
requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009.
On
When the cityhood bills were
forwarded to the Office of the President, they were allowed to lapse into law
pursuant to Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution,[13]
after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo chose not to sign them.
Under the cityhood laws, respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is directed to conduct and supervise
plebiscites in respondent municipalities within thirty (30) days from the
approval of each of the cityhood laws. The expense for such plebiscites will be
shouldered by the respective respondent municipalities.
On
As a show of support to their mother association,
separate petitions-in-intervention were filed by various sympathetic cities who are members
of the League of Cities of the
Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention
collectively prayed for the issuance of lawful orders from this Court, enjoining
respondent COMELEC and respondent municipalities from implementing the
provisions of the challenged cityhood laws and conducting plebiscites in the
affected areas or, in the alternative, for the COMELEC not to proclaim the
plebiscite results. They likewise prayed
that the cityhood laws[21]
be struck down as unconstitutional.
On
On
As
no temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was issued by the
Court, the COMELEC proceeded to conduct
plebiscites in respondent municipalities, where all the cityhood laws were
ratified. Too, the DBM to date has been
releasing the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) to respondent municipalities
as cities.
Issues
Petitioners
in G.R. No. 176951,[24] G.R. No. 177499,[25] and G.R.
No. 178056[26] pose common
issues for Our consideration, to wit:
I
THE CITYHOOD
II
THE CITYHOOD
Petitioners-in-intervention
raise essentially similar issues.
There are, however, two (2) procedural
issues which must be resolved at the outset as they would determine whether the
petitions and the petitions-in-intervention should proceed: first, whether petitioners and
petitioners-in-intervention possess locus standi; and second,
whether a petition for prohibition is the correct remedy to question the
constitutionality of the cityhood laws.
Ruling
Preliminaries
Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention
possess locus standi.
In the leading case of Baker
v. Carr,[27]
the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice William J. Brennan,
held that “the gist of the question of standing” is whether the party “alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.”[28]
Thus, the rule in the United States
is that persons wishing to contest, on constitutional grounds, the validity of
the statute must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but also
that they have sustained, or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct
injury as the result of its enforcement. Suffering in some indefinite way in common
with people generally would not suffice.[29] In other words, one who is not prejudiced by
the enforcement of an act of Congress cannot question its constitutionality.[30] In the absence of showing of injury, actual,
or threatened, there can be no constitutional argument.[31]
The rule has been adopted in our
jurisdiction. In House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[32] Joya
v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[33] Integrated
Bar of the
Locus
standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
x x
x a party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and
personal interest. It must show not only
that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or
is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to
be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it
is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
or act complained of.
For
a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must
show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.[37]
Parties
can have locus standi depending on the personality they assume. Parties may come to the Court as (1) organizations
and groups representing their own interests; (2) organizations and groups
representing the interests of their members; (3) individuals championing a
class; (4) political
subdivisions; (5) public officials; (6) members of Congress; (7) taxpayers; (8) corporations and other
business entities; (9) citizens, residents, and aliens; (10) health
professionals; (11) voters; and (12) other miscellaneous classes.[38]
The League of Cities of the
Petitioners City of
The Local Government Code mandates
that each class of Local Government Unit should have a fixed share in the IRA. In the case of cities, they are entitled to
23%. In dividing this 23% share among
all the cities, the population of a particular city is considered.[46] But 25% of the 23% share is equally divided
among all the cities. Thus, an increase in the number of cities means that
the allotment to each city out of the fixed 23% IRA share of all will be
reduced. A fixed numerator divided by an increased denominator necessarily
results in a smaller quotient. The reduction would obviously affect the amounts
budgeted by existing cities for their programs and projects.
Jerry
P. Treñas, as taxpayer, has locus standi. A person
who pays taxes or is liable to pay taxes for the
support of a taxing unit, and who would
be injured by the unlawful expenditure of public funds by the illegal
disposition of the public property of such unit, or by any other illegal act
which would increase his or her burden of taxation, has locus standi to
institute and maintain a taxpayer’s suit. This is regardless of the amount or kind of
taxes being paid.[47]
In Velarde v. Social Justice
Society,[48] reiterating the doctrine in Del
Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[49]
the Court held that “parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove
that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation.”[50] A taxpayer’s suit “may be properly brought
only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.”[51] Here, there is no question that the conduct of
the plebiscites required under the cityhood laws and the consequent release of
the respective IRAs of respondent municipalities as cities, entails the
spending of funds sourced from the public coffers. Clearly, there is an exercise by Congress of
its taxing or spending power.
In any event, the Court in more than
one instance has taken a liberal stance as far as standing is concerned. This is especially true when important
constitutional issues are at stake. The
cases of Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez,[52] Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,[53] Guingona,
Jr. v. Carague,[54] Basco
v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR),[55] Osmeña
v. Commission on Elections,[56] Carpio
v. Executive Secretary,[57] Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,[58] Cruz
v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[59] and Agan
v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[60] bear witness to the liberal attitude
of the Court on locus standi.
Indeed, public interest demands that the
Court take a more liberal view in determining whether petitioners and
petitioners-in-intervention possess locus standi. The issues hoisted are of paramount
importance. The petitions and
petitions-in-intervention raise serious constitutional issues on the
requirements for conversion of a municipality to a city. This, in turn, would affect not only the
conversion of respondent municipalities but also all future conversions of
municipalities to cities. To dismiss the
petitions and petitions-in-intervention on mere technicality is not in line
with the function of this Court as the final interpreter of what the law is and
should mean.
There is no merit to the contention
of respondent COMELEC and respondent municipalities that the petitions and
petitions-in-intervention are based on mere “speculative injury” that
supposedly render them devoid of any actual controversy. This is belied by the allegations in the
petitions and the petitions-in-intervention. There actually exist diametrically opposed
views among the contending parties as regards the validity of the cityhood laws.
Too, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention have sufficiently averred
economic injury to their city budgets and their plans and projects as a
consequence of the conversion of respondent municipalities into component
cities. Economic injury is a valid basis
for acquiring locus standi and judicial review.[61]
Prohibition is the correct remedy to
question the constitutionality of the cityhood laws.
The Constitution[62]
grants to the Court original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition. Although this original jurisdiction over
petitions for prohibition (together with petitions for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus) is concurrent with that of
the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, the established policy is that this Court
allows the direct invocation of its original jurisdiction “if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant,”[63]
or “in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to
promptly put an end to the present controversy.”[64] This policy has been applied by the Court in
exceptional cases, among them, People v. Cuaresma,[65] Santiago
v. Vasquez,[66] Manalo v. Gloria,[67] Philippine
National Bank v. Sayo, Jr.,[68] Cruz
v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[69] Buklod
ng Kawaning EIIB v.
The Court should take cognizance of
the petitions and petitions-in-intervention because the issues raised are
exceptional and of paramount importance.
They involve substantial public interest that warrant no less than the
intervention of this Court so that said issues may be settled.
In Tan
v. Commission on Elections,[72]
this Court granted the petition for prohibition and struck down as
unconstitutional Batas Pambansa Blg.
885, which created the
In Miranda
v. Aguirre,[74]
this Court granted the petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528
converting the city of
In Agan v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc.,[75] petitioners and
petitioners-in-intervention were allowed to avail themselves of the remedy of
prohibition to stop the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) and the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary from
implementing several agreements executed by the Philippine Government through
the DOTC and the MIAA and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
In La
Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,[76]
the remedies of prohibition and mandamus were used to assail the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995, along with its Implementing Rules and Regulations, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order 96-40, and the Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement entered into on
In Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company, Inc. v. National Wages and Productivity Commission,[77] the Court synthesized the
requirements for a petition for prohibition, thus: (1) it must be directed
against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person exercising functions, judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial; (2) the tribunal, corporation, board, or person
has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[78]
The petitions and
petitions-in-intervention comply with the above criteria.
First, the petitions and
petitions-in-intervention seek to prohibit the COMELEC from complying with its
ministerial function to conduct the plebiscites as required by the cityhood
laws. The DBM is also sought to be
enjoined from performing its ministerial function of releasing the IRA of
respondent municipalities as cities. In Ruperto
v. Torres[79]
and Municipal Council of Lemery v.
Provincial Board of Batangas,[80]
among others, ministerial function was described as one by which an officer or a
tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed
manner, and without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the
propriety of the act done. The
respective functions of the COMELEC and DBM as far as the cityhood laws are concerned
fit this parameter.
The conduct
sought to be prohibited in the petitions and petitions-in-intervention is a ministerial function. The COMELEC does not have the discretion
whether or not to conduct the plebiscites. The same may be said of the DBM. It has no choice save to release the respective
IRAs of respondent municipalities as cities.
Second, the
petitions and petitions-in-intervention have sufficiently alleged that the
COMELEC and the DBM acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing
the cityhood laws – on the part of the COMELEC, in conducting the plebiscites;
while on the part of the DBM, in releasing the respective IRAs of respondent
municipalities as cities.
Third,
petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention have no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. To recall, the cityhood laws have a common
provision that the COMELEC is supposed to conduct plebiscites in different
parts of the country for the ratification of the cityhood laws. Thus, filing different petitions for
prohibition in the various Regional Trial Courts where the plebiscites were to
be conducted was not a speedy and adequate remedy.
I cannot
subscribe to the fait accompli defense of respondent municipalities,
which they claim should be a ground for outright dismissal of the petitions and
petitions-in-intervention. They are not
mooted by the fact that plebiscites were already conducted, respondent
municipalities acknowledged as cities, and their officials correspondingly
appointed. The petitions and
petitions-in-intervention raise constitutional issues which necessitate the
intervention of the Court. No amount of
intervening events can legitimize the conversions of respondent municipalities
into component cities if, indeed, the requirements of the Constitution and the Local Government Code have not been
met. As the Court earlier held:
x x
x the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and
its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already
moot and academic. Continuation of the
existence of this newly proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess
to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired by this Tribunal so that,
if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error
should not provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this
Court to yield to the respondents’ urging that, as there have been fait
accompli, then this Court should passively accept and accede to the
prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as
respondents so propose is a proposition
fraught with mischief. Respondents’ submission will create a dangerous
precedent. Should this Court decline now
to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should
be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to
recklessly and without ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the
boundaries of political subdivisions either brazenly or stealthily, confident
that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts
if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.[81]
It is true
that the usual function of the writ of prohibition is to prevent the execution
of an act which is about to be done. It
is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.[82]
The office of prohibition is to arrest
proceedings rather than to undo them.[83]
A preventive remedy, as a rule, does not
lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.[84]
However, courts
may take exceptions. In the performance
of their duties, courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which would
result in manifest injustice. Rules of
procedure are only tools crafted to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, if they
result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be eschewed. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a
rigid and technical application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed with public interest,
a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order.[85]
Time and again, this Court has suspended
its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
higher interests of justice so require.[86]
The issues
in the petitions and petitions-in-intervention are exceptional. They are of paramount importance and involve
substantial public interest. They
warrant no less than the intervention of this Court.
Now to the main points of the
petition.
I
The
cityhood laws do not violate Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution states:
No
province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. (Emphasis supplied)
What the
provision means is that once the Local Government Code is enacted, the creation,
modification, or dissolution of local government units must conform with the
criteria thus laid down.[87]
The use of
the word “shall” in a constitutional provision is generally considered as a
mandatory command,[88]
though the word “shall” may receive a permissive interpretation when necessary
to carry out the true intent of the provision where the word is found.[89]
Thus, it is not always the case that the
use of the word “shall” is conclusive.[90]
However, a reading of Section 10,
Article X cannot be construed as anything else but mandatory.
That said Section
10 is mandatory is all the more bolstered by the use of the negative and
prohibitory words “[n]o province, city x x x may be created x x x
except in accordance with x x x.” In Varney v. Justice[91]
and Hunt v. State,[92]
it was held that if the language used in the Constitution is prohibitory, it
should be construed to mean a positive and unequivocal negation.
Section 10,
Article X is clear: (a) the creation, division, merger or abolition or
alteration of boundaries of local government units must be in accordance with
the criteria set forth in the Local Government Code; and (b) such act must be approved by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit
directly affected. On one hand, it
should be in accordance with the criteria set forth in the Local Government Code because
the creation, division, merger, or abolition of political units is part of the
larger power to enact laws which the Constitution vests in Congress.[93]
It is also to ensure uniformity in
criteria. On the other hand, the
plebiscite is required as a check against the pernicious political practice of
gerrymandering. No better control exists
against this excess than through the exercise of direct people power, which
promotes local autonomy. After all,
local autonomy is guaranteed by the Constitution.[94]
A. The intent of R.A. No. 9009, which amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, is to exempt respondent
municipalities from the income requirement of P100,000,000.00. Thus, the cityhood laws, which merely carry
out the intent of R.A. No. 9009, are in accordance with the “criteria
established in the Local Government Code,” pursuant to Section 10, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution.
The cityhood
laws contain a uniformly worded exemption clause, which states: “Exemption
from Republic Act No. 9009. The city of [___] shall be exempt from the
income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.”[95]
Petitioners
and petitioners-in-intervention contend that since Section 10, Article X is
mandatory and prohibitive, it follows that there is no other way of compliance
but to refrain from enacting cityhood laws unless these are in accordance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code.[96]
Section 10 contains no exceptions and
should admit of no exceptions. Any
exceptions to the rule, to be valid, must necessarily be enacted by Congress by
first converting itself into a constituent assembly to amend the provision.[97]
Since the income requirements prescribed under R.A. No. 9009 are among the
criteria in the Local Government
Code within the contemplation of Section 10, it follows that the exemption clauses
in the cityhood laws are in direct violation of Section 10.[98]
In other words, Congress cannot provide
a wholesale exemption from R.A. No. 9009 without repealing the law itself.
Petitioners
and petitioners-in-intervention would be correct if it were not the intent of
R.A. No. 9009, which amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, to
exempt respondent municipalities from the income requirement of P100,000,000.00.
I will elaborate.
The
“criteria established in the local government code” that Section 10, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution speaks of, are spread in at least four sections of the
Local Government Code, namely, Section
6 entitled “Authority to Create Local Government Units”;[99]
Section 7 entitled “Creation and Conversion,”[100]
Section 449 entitled “Manner of
Creation,”[101]
and most importantly, Section 450 entitled “Requisites for Creation.”
During the
deliberations on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,[102]
Commissioner De Castro remarked that when P20,000,000.00)
for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, x x x.” R.A. No. 9009, amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, further
increased the income requirement to P100,000,000.00, thus:
Section
450. Requisites
for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred
Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
A
contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as
certified by the Land Management Bureau; or
A
population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office.
The
creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b)
The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created
is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands.
(c)
The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Underscoring supplied)
What Congress had in mind is not at
all times accurately reflected in the language of the statute. Thus, the literal interpretation of a statute may
render it meaningless; and lead to absurdity, injustice,
or contradiction.[105]
When this happens, and following the
rule that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,[106]
resort should be had to the principle that the spirit of the law controls its
letter.[107] Not to the letter that killeth, but to the
spirit that vivifieth. Hindi
ang letra na pumapatay, kung hindi ang diwa na nagbibigay buhay.
It is in this respect that the intent
of Congress in enacting Senate Bill No. 2157, which eventually became R.A. No.
9009, finds relevance.
The purpose
of the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can be seen in the sponsorship speech of
Senator Pimentel on Senate Bill No. 2157. Noteworthy
is his statement that the basis for the
proposed increase from P20,000,000.00 to P100,000,000.00 in the income requirement for
municipalities and cluster of barangays wanting to be converted into
cities is the “mad rush of
municipalities wanting to be converted into cities,” and in order that the
country “will not be a nation of all cities and no municipalities,” viz.:
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have
wanted this bill to be included in the whole set of proposed amendments that we
have introduced to precisely amend the Local Government Code. However, it is a fact that there is a mad rush of municipalities wanting to be
converted into cities. Whereas in
1991, when the Local Government was approved, there were only 60 cities, today
the number has increased to 85 cities, with 41 more municipalities applying for conversion
to the same status. At the rate we are going, I am apprehensive
that before long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no municipalities.
It is for that reason, Mr.
President, that we are proposing among other things, that the financial
requirement, which, under the Local Government Code, is fixed at P20
million, be raised to P100 million to enable a municipality to have the
right to be converted into a city, and the P100 million should be sourced
from locally generated funds.
What has been happening, Mr.
President, is, the municipalities aspiring to become cities say that they
qualify in terms of financial requirements by incorporating the Internal
Revenue share of the taxes of the nation added on to their regularly generated
revenue. Under that requirement, it looks clear to me that practically all
municipalities in this country would qualify to become cities.
It is precisely for that reason,
therefore, that we are seeking the approval of this Chamber to amend,
particularly Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, the requisite for the
average annual income of a municipality to be converted into a city or cluster
of barangays which seek to be converted into a city, raising that revenue
requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the last two
consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices.[108] (Emphasis supplied)
What
follows is revealing. At the time that
R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was also well aware that
several municipalities wanting to become cities and which qualified under the
income threshold of P20,000,000.00
under the old Local Government
Code had pending cityhood bills. These
included respondent municipalities. Thus, equally noteworthy is the
interpellation by Senate President Franklin Drilon of Senator Pimentel in which
the latter stated that municipalities that had pending cityhood bills “would
not be affected” by the income threshold of P100,000,000.00 being
proposed by Senate Bill No. 2157, thus:
THE
PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask
for some clarificatory point.
SENATOR
PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President.
THE
PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of
the pending bills in the Senate which propose the conversion of a number of
municipalities into cities and which qualify under the present standard.
We would like to know the view of
the sponsor: Assuming that this bill
becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the standard as proposed in this bill to
those bills which are pending for consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL, Mr. President, it might not be
fair to make this bill, on the assumption that it is approved, retroact to the
bills that are pending in the Senate for conversion from municipalities to cities.
THE
PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate
language crafted to reflect that view?
Or does it not become a policy of the Chamber, assuming that this bill
becomes a law tomorrow, that it will apply to those bills which are already approved
by the House under the old version of the Local Government Code and are now
pending in the Senate? The Chair does
not know if we can craft a language which will limit the application to those
which are not yet in the Senate. Or is
that a policy that the Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to put that
provision because what we are saying here will form part of the interpretation
of this bill. Besides, if there is no
retroactivity clause, I do not think that the bill would have any retroactive
effect.
THE
PRESIDENT. So the understanding is
that those bills which are already pending in the Chamber will not be affected.
SENATOR
PIMENTEL. These will not be affected,
Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. Thank you Mr. Chairman.[109] (Underscoring supplied)
The deliberations of Congress are
necessary to ferret out the intent of the legislature in enacting
R.A. No. 9009. It is very clear that Congress
intended that the then pending cityhood bills would not be covered by the income requirement of P100,000,000.00
imposed by R.A. No. 9009. It was made
clear by the Legislature that R.A. No. 9009 would not have any retroactive
effect.
Thus, the interpellations by Senator
Drilon of Senator Pimentel are consistent with the rule that laws should be
applied prospectively in the spirit of justice and fair play. Be that as it may, the Civil Code is explicit
that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided.[110]
This is expressed in the familiar legal
maxim, lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward,
never backward. Ang batas ay tumitingin sa
hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan. The reason behind the rule is not
difficult to perceive. The retroactive
application of the law usually divests rights that have already become vested
or impairs the obligations of contracts, thus, is unconstitutional.[111]
It then
becomes clear that the basis for the inclusion of the exemption clause of the cityhood
laws is the clear-cut intent of the
Legislature of not giving retroactive effect to R.A. No. 9009. In fact, not only do the legislative records
bear the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood laws from the income
requirement of P100,000,000.00
imposed by R.A. No. 9009. Congress has
now made its intent express in the cityhood
laws.
Legislative
intent or spirit is the controlling factor, the leading star and guiding light
in the application and interpretation of a statute.[112] If a statute needs construction, the
influence most dominant in that process is the intent or spirit of the act.[113]
The spirit, rather than the letter, of a
statute, determines its construction.[114] Thus, a statute must be read according to its
spirit or intent.[115] For what is within the spirit is within the
statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the
letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.[116] Stated otherwise, a thing which is within the
intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter;
and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute
unless within the intent of the lawmakers.[117] Legislative intent is part and parcel of the
law. It is the controlling factor in
interpreting a statute. In fact, any
interpretation that runs counter with the legislative intent is unacceptable
and invalid.[118] Torres v. Limjap[119]
could not have been more precise, to wit:
The intent of a Statute is the Law.
– If a statute is valid, it is to have
effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence
of the law and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect
to that intent. The intention of the
legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the
statute. Courts will not follow the
letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the
legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the
act. Intent is the spirit which gives
life to a legislative enactment. In
construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true
intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with
the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects
of the legislature x x x.[120] (Emphasis supplied)
Verba
intentioni, non e contra debent inservire.
Words ought to be more subservient to the intent than intent to the
words. Ang mga salita ng batas ay dapat
higit na sumunod sa layunin kaysa ang layunin ang sumunod sa mga salita nito.
B. Petitioners and petitioners-intervention
were not able to discharge their onus probandi of overcoming the presumption of
constitutionality accorded to the cityhood laws.
On the side
of every law lies the presumption of constitutionality.[121]
Consequently, before a law is nullified,
it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. Laws will only be declared
invalid if the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt.[122]
A declaration of the unconstitutionality
of a statute is only done (a) as a last
resort;[123] (b)
when absolutely necessary;[124]
(c) when the statute is in palpable conflict with a plain provision of the Constitution;[125]
and (d) when the invalidity is
beyond reasonable doubt.[126]
x x x there is a strong presumption that all
regularly enacted statutes are constitutional. In other words, statutes are not presumed to
be irrational. Thus, where possible, congressional enactments are to be
interpreted so as to avoid raising serious doubts on constitutional questions.
x x
x x
The general principle that there is
a strong presumption that all regularly enacted statutes are constitutional has
been expressed in a variety of ways. Thus, it has been said that all statutes
are of constitutional validity unless they are shown to be invalid; that
legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally in passing a statute;
that the courts must start out with the presumption that a statute is
constitutional and valid; that every intendment is in favor of the validity of
a statute; that every act of the legislature is presumed to be in harmony with
the constitution unless the contrary clearly appears; that every act of the
legislature and every law found on the statute books is presumptively valid, at
least if the statute is not patently unconstitutional on its face; that the courts
will indulge in every presumption of constitutionality of which the statute is
susceptible; that every rational and reasonable presumption must be indulged in
favor of the validity of an act; and that the presumption of constitutionality
is the postulate of judicial adjudication. The presumption should be the
foremost thought in the court’s mind as its proceeds to determine the
constitutionality of a statute.[127] (Citations omitted)
The
presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes produces a grave
consequence – anyone who wants a statute to be declared unconstitutional bears
the onus probandi, thus:
A
party who alleges the unconstitutionality of a statute normally has the burden
of substantiating his or her claim. The
burden is a heavy and difficult one, and it is well settled that to sustain it,
the assailant must negate every reasonable, conceivable basis which might
support the statute attacked; must be able to point out the particular
provision that has been violated and the ground on which it has been infringed;
with regard to facial attacks alleging invalidity, must establish that no set
of circumstances exists under which the act may be held valid; and must
overcome the strong presumption in favor of its validity, which continues until
the contrary is proved. He or she must
show how, as to him or her, the legislation in question is unconstitutional. x x
x[128] (Citations omitted)
Sadly for
petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention, they failed to discharge their heavy
burden. Because they failed to do so, the Court has no
choice but to uphold the presumption of constitutionality accorded to the cityhood
laws.
II
The cityhood
laws do not violate the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article
Article
The
essence of the command of the equal protection clause is a direction that all
persons similarly situated should be treated alike.[132] The primary objective of the equal protection
clause was to secure for the black persons, who were then recently emancipated,
the full enjoyment of their freedom.[133] As presently understood, however, equal
protection extends to all persons without regard for race, color, or class. It prohibits any state legislation which
denies to any race, class, or individual the equal protection of the laws.[134] And
as “persons” include corporations,[135]
political subdivisions of a state, which
are public corporations, are covered by the guarantee of the equal protection
clause.
Not all classifications are prohibited,
however. The equal protection guarantee
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take away from Congress the power of
classification.[136] Thus, it is hornbook doctrine that the
guaranty of the equal protection of the law is not violated by a legislation
based on reasonable classification.[137]
However, the classification, to be
reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.[138] Using the foregoing as parameters, We rule
that the cityhood laws do not violate the equal protection clause.
A. Sponsorship speech of
Senator Alfredo Lim on House Joint Resolution No. 1
But first, let the convincing sponsorship
speech of then Senator Alfredo Lim on House Joint Resolution No. 1 shed light
on the ensuing discussion:
I thank the Senate President and my
colleagues in this Chamber for their kind indulgence in allowing this
Representation to take the floor on behalf of the people of 12 municipalities
in their collective aspiration for sustained growth and progress. Over a million people spread in eight regions
have long been awaiting the realization of their dreams for cityhood.
Between July 1998 to June 2001, during the Eleventh Congress, fifty-seven (57)
municipalities applied for city status, confident that each
has met the requisites for conversion under Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, particularly the income threshold of P20 million. Of the 57 that filed, thirty-two (32) were
enacted into law; one was rejected in a plebiscite; while the rest –
twenty-four (24) in all – failed to pass through Congress. Shortly before the long recess of Congress in
February 2001, to give way to the May elections of that year, Senate Bill No.
2157, which eventually became Republic Act No. 9009, was passed into law,
effectively raising the income requirement for creation of cities to a whooping
P100 million, exclusive of IRA. Much
as the proponents of the 24 cityhood bills then pending struggled to beat the
effectivity of the law on
Some of these intervening events were the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee investigation into the jueteng scandal, the impeachment
of President Estrada by the House of Representatives, the aborted
impeachment proceedings in the Senate, the leadership reorganization in
both Houses of Congress, the ”EDSA Dos” and “EDSA Tres”
uprisings, the campaign period and the May 2001 elections.
The imposition of a much higher income
requirement for the creation of a city virtually delivered a lethal blow to the
aspirations of the 24 municipalities to attain economic growth and
progress. To them, it was unfair; like
any sport – changing the rules in the middle of the game.
Undaunted, they came back during the Twelfth
Congress (from June 2001 to June 2004)
appealing for fairness and justice. They
filed House Joint Resolution No. 29 seeking exemption from the higher income
requirement of RA 9009. They were
successful in the House all the way through the Senate. Here, they found a staunch ally in the person
of my dear friend and colleague Sen. Bobby Barbers as chair of the Committee on
Local Government. Several public
hearings, caucuses, dialogues and informal discussions notwithstanding, the
committee report was only good up to plenary debates. For the second time, time ran out from
them.
For many of the municipalities whose
Cityhood Bills are now under consideration, this year, at the closing days of
the Thirteenth Congress, marks their ninth year appealing for fairness and
justice. House Joint Resolution No. 1
which was sent by the House to the Senate for concurrence embodies their
unfailing hope that their lawmakers would give them their rightful due.
I, for one, share their view that fairness
dictates that they should be given a legal remedy by which they could be
allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city
status using the criteria set forth under the Local Government Code prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Hence, when House Joint Resolution. No. 1 reached the Senate and was referred to
the Committee on Local Government in March 2005, I immediately set the public
hearing the following month. On
session day since then, it was only last October 12 that the Senate agreed to
proceed with the committee and individual amendments. On the same day, the Senate approved the
measure on Second Reading, without prejudice to a motion for reconsideration by
any member who was not on the floor that day.
After a month-long break, on November 7, the
approval was reconsidered to give way to further questions from Senators
Pimentel and Biazon. By November 14, the
measure had reverted to the period of individual amendments. This was when the then acting majority
leader, Senator Compañera Pia Cayetano, informed the Body that Senator Pimentel
and the proponents of House Joint Resolution No. 1 have agreed to the proposal
of the Minority Leader for the House to first approve the individual Cityhood
Bills of the qualified municipalities, along
with the provision exempting each of them from the higher income requirement of
RA 9009. Prior to that, on the
initiative of the Senate President, and in his presence, this Representation
and Senator Pimentel had come up with an agreement with the proponents to
pre-qualify the municipalities. This led
to the certification issued by the proponents short-listing fourteen (14)
municipalities deemed to be qualified for city-status.
Acting on the suggestion of Senator
Pimentel, the proponents lost no time in working for the approval by the House
of Representatives of their individual Cityhood Bills, each containing a
provision of exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. On the last session day of last year,
December 21, the House transmitted to the Senate the Cityhood Bills of twelve
out of the 14 pre-qualified municipalities.
Your Committee immediately conducted the public hearing last January 10,
and the committee reports were filed on January 25.
The whole process I enumerated spanning three
Congresses brings us to where we are today.
I sincerely hope that time would not run out for them the third time
around.
In essence, the Cityhood Bills now under
consideration will have the same effect as that of House Joint Resolution No. 1
because each of the 12 bills seeks exemption from the higher income requirement
of RA 9009. The proponents are invoking
the exemption on the basis of justice and fairness.
Each of the 12 municipalities has all the
requisites for conversion into a component city based on the old requirements
set forth under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, prior to its
amendment by RA 9009, namely:
1. An average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of at least P20 million for the
last two consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either
of the following requisites:
1.1 A contiguous territory of at
least 100 square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
1.2 A population of not less than 150,000
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Allow me now to place on record the
qualification of each of the 12 municipalities based on these
requirements. The average regular income
for the years 2000 and 2001 (prior to the effectivity of RA 9009) based on 1991
constant prices was duly certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance,
the land area by the Lands Management Bureau, and the population (based on the
2000 Census) by the National Statistics Office:
Municipalities (House Bill- Income Land
Area Population
Committee Report)
1. Baybay, P29.8 M 459.34 km² 86,179
2. Tayabas, Quezon
(H. No. 5930-CR 219) P24.7
M 230.95 km² 64,449
3. Catbalogan, P28.3 M 274.22 km² 76,324
4. Lamitan, Basilan
(H. No. 6601-CR 221) P22.1
M 354.95 km² 54,433
5. Tandag, Surigao (H. No. 5999-CR 222) P21.7 M 291.73 km² 39,222
del Sur
6. Tabuk, Kalinga
(H. No. 6005-CR 223) P29.9
M 700.25 km² 63,507
7. Batac, Ilocos Norte (H. No.
6004-CR 224) P28.3 M 161.06 km² 45,534
8. Carcar, P25.7 M 116.78 km² 78,726
9. Bayugan, Agusan (H.
No. 5991-CR 226) P32.5
M 668.77 km² 89,999
del Sur
10. Cabadbaran, Agusan (H. No. 5992-CR
227) P21.9 M 311.02 km² 51,905
Del Norte
11. Borongan, Eastern (H. No.
5990-CR 228) P25.4 M 475.00 km²
48,638
12. Bogo, P22.0 M 103.52km² 57,509
Based on these data, it is clear that all
the 12 municipalities under consideration are qualified to become cities prior
to RA 9009. All of them satisfy the
mandatory requirement on income and one of the two optional requirements of
territory.
It must also be noted that except for Tandag
and Lamitan, which are both second-class municipalities in terms of income, all the rest are categorized by the Department
of Finance as first-class municipalities with gross income of at least P70
million as per Commission on Audit Report for 2005. Moreover, Tandag and Lamitan, together
with Borongan, Catbalogan, and Tabuk, are all provincial
capitals.
The more recent income figures of the 12
municipalities, which would have increased further by this time, indicate their
readiness to take on the responsibilities of cityhood.
Moreover, the municipalities under
consideration are leading localities in their respective provinces. Borongan, Catbalogan, Tandag, Batac and Tabuk
are ranked number one in terms of income among all the municipalities in their
respective provinces; Baybay and Bayugan are number two; Bogo and Lamitan are number three; Carcar,
number four; and Tayabas, number seven. Not only are they pacesetters in their
respective provinces, they are also among the frontrunners in their regions –
Baybay, Bayugan and Tabuk are number two income earners in Regions VIII, XII,
and
It is for these reasons that I once again
appeal to my distinguished colleagues for their kind consideration and approval
of the Cityhood Bills of the 12 municipalities whose application for city
status was overtaken by events beyond their control. They have longed for so long a time now, ever
hoping that their elected representatives in this Chamber would see the
reasonableness of their appeal. I
believe they have already bent over backwards in recognition of the valid
sentiments of their colleagues in the League of Cities. You will note that out of the original 24
municipalities, we only have before us nearly as half.
Our people from these 12 municipalities
deserve a straightforward response from us on this matter they deem important.
Even those who oppose the exemption expect that the Senate would once and for
all put a closure to the issue. There is
ample time if we choose to measure up to our mandate as representatives of the
people. I am confident that we will not
fail them the third time.[139] (Underscoring supplied)
B. The
classification rests on substantial distinctions. What distinguishes respondent
municipalities from other municipalities is that the latter had pending cityhood bills before
the passage of R.A.
No. 9009. In the words of Senator Lim,
the peculiar conditions of respondent municipalities, which led to their exemption from the
increased P100,000,000.00 income requirement of
R.A. No. 9009, is that the imposition of a much higher income requirement on
those that were qualified to become cities before the enactment of R.A. No.
9009 was “unfair; like any sport – changing the rules in the middle of the
game.” Thus, “fairness dictates that
they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that
they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria
set forth under the Local Government Code prior to its amendment by R.A. No.
9009.” Truly, the peculiar conditions of
respondent municipalities, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient
grounds for legislative classification.
It is not the province of the Court
to delve into the wisdom of legislative enactments. The only function of courts is the
interpretation of laws. The principle of
separation of powers prevents them from reinventing laws.[140] By the very nature of the function of the Legislature,
it is that branch of government that is vested with being the judge of the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of any law.[141] Courts are bereft of any power to take away the
prerogatives of the legislature in the guise of construing or interpreting the
law.[142] In making choices, Congress has consulted its
own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less
reverse. Courts do not sit to resolve
the merits of conflicting theories. That
is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the
wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes, are not addressed to the
judiciary. They may be addressed only by
the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our
scheme of government. That function is
exclusive, to which courts have no business of prying into. Whichever way the legislative and executive
branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and their
constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not the courts of
justice.[143]
Courts cannot question the wisdom of
the classification made by Congress. This
is the prerogative of the Legislature. The
power of the Legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons
is neither curtailed nor denied by the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Legislative power admits
of a wide scope of discretion. A law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.
Courts
do not sit to determine the wisdom of statutes, or fashion remedies that
Congress has specifically chosen not to extend. With questions of wisdom,
propriety, appropriateness, necessity, policy, fairness, or expediency of
legislation or regulations, the courts simply have no concern.
x x
x x
The courts should similarly be unconcerned with questions of legislative motivation. Indeed, the factfinding process and motivation of legislative bodies is generally entitled to a presumption of regularity and deferential review by the judiciary x x x.[144]
True, courts are given that awesome
power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.[145] There is none here.
C. The
classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of respondent municipalities from the P100,000,000.00 income requirement of R.A. No. 9009 was unquestionably
designed to insure that fairness and justice were accorded to respondent
municipalities, as their cityhood bills were not enacted by Congress in view of
intervening events and for reasons beyond their control. The
equal protection clause does not merely prohibit Congress from passing
discriminatory laws. The equal
protection clause also commands Congress to pass laws which would positively
promote equality or reduce existing inequalities. This was what Congress actually did in
enacting the cityhood laws. These laws positively
promote equality and reduce the existing inequality between respondent
municipalities and the “other thirty-two (32) municipalities” whose cityhood
bills were enacted during the 11th
Congress.
D. The
classification is not limited to existing conditions only. The non-retroactive effect of R.A. No. 9009 is
not limited in application to
conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all time as long
as the conditions set there exist. It is
applicable as long as the concerned municipalities
have filed their
respective cityhood bills before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9009,
and qualify for conversion into city under the original version of
Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
The common exemption clause in the cityhood
laws is an application of the non-retroactive effect of R.A. No. 9009. It is not a declaration of certain rights
but a mere declaration of prior qualification and/or compliance with the non-retroactive
effect of R.A. No. 9009.
Curiously, petitioners and
petitioners-in-intervention do not question the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9009. In fact, they use R.A. No. 9009 to
argue for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws. This is absurd, considering that the cityhood laws only expressed the intent of R.A. No. 9009 to exempt respondent
municipalities from the income requirement of P100,000,000.00.
Petitioners
and petitioners-in-intervention, however, invite the attention of the Court to Mayflower
Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck.[146] In that
case, the Milk
Control Act of 1933 authorized a board to fix minimum prices for sales of fluid
milk by dealers to stores in cities where there are more than one million
inhabitants with a differential of 1% quart in favor of dealers “not having a
well-advertised trade name.” The Act was
good for one year. An amended act, effective
It shall not be unlawful for any milk dealer who since
April tenth, nineteen hundred thirty-three has been engaged continuously in the
business of purchasing and handling milk not having a well advertised
trade name in a city of more than one million inhabitants to sell fluid milk in
bottles to stores in such city at a price not more than one cent per quart
below the price of such milk sold to stores under a well advertised trade name,
and such lower price shall also apply on sales from stores to consumers;
provided that in no event shall the price of such milk not having a well
advertised trade name, be more than one cent per quart below the minimum price
fixed (by the board) for such sales to stores in such a city.[147]
Appellant Mayflower
did not have a well-advertised
trade name. However, its application for
license was denied because although it had not been continuously in the
business of dealing in milk since
In support of the argument
that the questioned act did not violate the equal protection clause, appellees
referred to the Court “a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be
prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those presently engaged
in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutes licensing physicians and
dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession subsequent to the
passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which
exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding slaughter houses within certain
areas, but excepting existing establishments.”[149]
The
cases cited by appellees, however, were held to be inapplicable to the
questioned Act. This was so because the
questioned Act, “on its face, x
x x is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for
the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to
those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who
enter the industry after that date.”[150]
In
finally ruling that the questioned Act violated the equal protection clause,
the United States Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Owen Roberts, held that “appellees
do not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the public health
or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it
was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business.”[151] Thus, “[i]n the absence of any such showing,
we have no right to conjure up possible situations which might justify the
discrimination. The classification is
arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection of the
law.”[152]
Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention
claim that like the Milk Control Act of 1933, the cityhood laws should also be
declared unconstitutional because “there is no compelling or countervailing
State policy, constitutional provision or even statutory or public policy that
underlies the exemption clause in the cityhood laws.”[153]
The argument is untenable. The Milk Control Act of 1933 was declared
unconstitutional because the time was based on an arbitrary date. It did not have any relation to the public
welfare generally. There was no causal
connection between time and the purpose of the law.
What we have here is
different. There is a causal connection
between time, i.e., the Eleventh Congress when the cityhood bills of respondent
municipalities were filed, and the purpose of the law, which is justice and
fairness.
Respondent municipalities and
the other thirty-two (32) municipalities, which had already been elevated to
city status, were all found to be qualified under the old Section 450 of the Local Government Code and had pending
cityhood bills during the Eleventh Congress. As such, both respondent
municipalities and the other thirty-two (32) municipalities are under like
circumstances and conditions. There is
thus no cogent reason why an exemption from the P100,000,000.00 cannot
be given to respondent municipalities.
Otherwise, unfairness and injustice will be committed against them.
The equal protection of the
law clause proscribes undue favor and individual favor and individual or class
privilege as well as hostile discrimination or the possession of
inequality. The equal protection clause
is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. Neither does equal protection demand absolute
equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced.[154]
An analogy may be found in the
Constitution. Citizenship may be granted
to those born before
the P100,000,000.00 income requirement imposed by R.A.
No. 9009 if their cityhood laws were pending when R.A. No. 9009 was passed, and
were compliant with the income threshold requirement of P20,000,000.00
imposed by then Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Even if the classification of
the cityhood laws is limited to existing conditions only, this does not
automatically mean that they are unconstitutional. The general rule is that a classification must not be based on
existing conditions only. It must also
be made for future acquisitions of the class as other subjects acquire the
characteristics which form the basis of the classification. The exception
is when the statute is curative or remedial, and thus temporary.[156]
Here, the cityhood laws are
curative or remedial statutes. They seek
to prevent the great injustice which would be committed to respondent
municipalities. Again, the cityhood laws
are not contrary to the spirit and intent of R.A. No. 9009 because Congress
intended said law to be prospective, not retroactive, in application. Indeed, to deny respondent municipalities the
same rights and privileges accorded to the other thirty-two (32) municipalities
when they are under the same circumstances, is tantamount to denying respondent
municipalities the protective mantle of the equal protection clause. In effect, petitioners and
petitioners-in-intervention are creating an absurd situation in which an
alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution is
remedied by another violation of the equal protection clause. That the Court cannot sustain.
E. The
classification applies equally to all members of the same class. The cityhood laws, in carrying out the clear
intent of R.A. No. 9009, apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills
before the passage of R.A. No. 9009 and were compliant with then Section 450 of
the Local Government Code that prescribed an income requirement of P20,000,000.00.
In sum, a statutory discrimination
will not be set aside on the ground of denial of equal protection of the laws
if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.[157] Class legislation which discriminates against
some and favors others is prohibited. But
a classification on a reasonable basis, which is not made arbitrarily or capriciously,
is permissible.[158] Thus, in Lopez v. Commission on Elections,[159] the Court rejected the claim that there was
denial of the equal protection provision of the Constitution, unless
Presidential Decree No. 824, which created Metropolitan Manila, was to be
construed in such a way that, along with the rest of other cities and
municipalities, there would be an election for Sangguniang Bayan. The Court reasoned, thus:
x x x There is no need to set anew the compelling reasons that
called for the creation of Metropolitan Manila. It is quite obvious that under
the conditions then existing – still present and, with the continued growth of
population, attended with more complexity – what was done was a response to a
great public need. The government was called
upon to act. Presidential Decree No. 824 was the result. It is not a condition for the validity of the
Sangguniang Bayans provided for in the four cities and thirteen municipalities
that the membership be identical with those of other cities or municipalities.
There is ample justification for such a distinction. It does not by any means come under the
category of what Professor Gunther calls suspect classification. There is thus no warrant for the view that the
equal protection guarantee was violated.[160]
As
a last ditch effort, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention allege that
respondents are not yet ready to become cities. This contention, however, is belied by the
sponsorship speech by Senator Lim of Senate Bill
No. 1[161] and that
by the respective Congressmen[162]
who introduced what
eventually became the cityhood laws.[163] Contra
factum non valet argumentum. There
is no argument against facts. Walang
pakikipagtalo laban sa totoo.
It
should not also be forgotten that petitioning cities and petitioners-in-intervention
became cities under the old income requirement of either P10,000,000.00
by virtue of B.P. Blg. 337 or P20,000,000.00
by virtue of then Section 450 of the Local Government Code. And yet nobody doubted their capacity to
become cities.
Summing Up
The majority holds that the cityhood
laws are unconstitutional on seven grounds, namely: (1) applying R.A. No. 9009
to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because
R.A. No. 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became laws more
than five (5) years later; (2) the Constitution requires that Congress shall
prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law; (3) the cityhood laws violate Section 6, Article
X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the
national taxes to local government units; (4) the intent of members of Congress
to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009 remained an
intent and was never written into law; (5) the criteria prescribed in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, for converting a
municipality into a city are clear, plain, and unambiguous, needing no resort
to any statutory construction; (6) the deliberations of the 11th or 12th
Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in
interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress because it is not a continuing
body; and (7) even if the exemption in the cityhood laws were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause because the
exemption is based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood
bills pending in the 11th Congress when R.A. No. 9009 was enacted.
Anent the first ground, it must be
pointed out that the cityhood bills were pending before the passage of R.A. No. 9009. Congress was well aware of
such fact. Thus, Congress intended the
hiked income requirement in R.A. No. 9009 not to apply to the cityhood bills
which became the subject cityhood laws.
This is the context of the reference to the prospective application of
the said R.A. Congress intended the
cityhood laws in question to be exempted from the income requirement of P100,000,000.00
imposed by R.A. No. 9009.
The second point is specious. It overlooks that R.A. No. 9009 is now Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. The cityhood laws also
merely carry out the intent of R.A. No. 9009 to exempt respondent
municipalities from the income requirement of P100,000,000.00.
The
third needs clarification. Article X,
Section 6 of the Constitution speaks for itself. While it is true that local government units
shall have a “just share” in the
national taxes, it is qualified by the phrase “as determined by law.”
As to the fourth point, Congress meant
not to incorporate its intent in what eventually became R.A. No. 9009. To recall, Senate President Franklin Drilon
asked if there would be an appropriate language to be crafted which would
reflect the intent of Congress. Senator
Aquilino Pimentel gave a categorical answer: “I do not think it is necessary
to put that provision because what we are saying here will form part of the
interpretation of this bill.”[164]
Neither is the fifth item
persuasive. The dissent admits that courts
may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history
of the law if the
literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or
injustice.[165]
The sixth reason misses the point. It is immaterial if Congress is not a
continuing body. The hearings and
deliberations conducted during the 11th or 12th Congress may still be used as
extrinsic aids or reference because the same cityhood bills which were filed
before the passage of R.A. No. 9009 were being considered during the 13th
Congress.
It does not matter if the officers of
each Congress or the authors of the bills are different. In the end, the rationale for exempting the
cityhood bills from the P100,000,000.00 income requirement imposed by
R.A. No. 9009 remains the same: (1) the cityhood bills were pending before
the passage of R.A. No. 9009, and (2) respondent municipalities were compliant
with the P20,000,000.00 income requirement imposed by the old Section 450
of the Local Government Code, which was eventually amended by R.A. No. 9009.
What should not be overlooked is that
the cityhood laws enjoy
the presumption of constitutionality. Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention
bear the heavy burden of overcoming such presumption. However, the majority does exactly the
opposite. It shifts the onus probandi to respondent municipalities to
prove that their cityhood laws are constitutional. That is violative of the basic rule of evidence.[166]
On the last ground, the majority
misreads the dissent. The exemption on
the 16 municipalities is not only based on the fact that they had
pending cityhood bills when R.A. No. 9009 was enacted. Aside from complying with the territory and
population requirements of the Local Government Code, these municipalities also
met the P20,000,000.00 income threshold of the old Section 450 of the
Local Government Code.
A Parting Word
The decade-long quest of respondent municipalities
for cityhood merits an approval, not rejection.
Section
10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution requires, aside from a plebiscite, that
the criteria established in the Local Government
Code should be followed
in the creation of a city.
R.A. No. 9009, which became Section 450 of the Local Government Code, prescribes an
income threshold of P100,000,000.00.
But the intent of R.A. No.
9009 is clear. Congress intended to
exempt municipalities (1) that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of
R.A. No. 9009; and (2) that were
compliant with the income threshold of P20,000,000.00 under the old
Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Respondent municipalities are covered by the twin criteria.
Thus, petitioners and
petitioners-in-intervention cannot hardly claim the cityhood laws are
unconstitutional on the ground they violate the criteria established in the Local
Government Code. Neither may they claim
that the
cityhood laws violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Congress is given the widest latitude in
making classifications and in laying down the criteria. Separation of powers prevents the Court from
prying into the wisdom or judgment of Congress. Even if
the Court did,
there is no unreasonable classification here, much less grave abuse of discretion.
Admittedly,
R.A. No. 9009 is geared towards making it very difficult for municipalities and
cluster of barangays to convert into
cities. The dissent is not contrary to
that goal. The intent of Congress – to
avert the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities and to
prevent this nation from becoming a nation of all cities and no municipalities –
is preserved. A cluster of barangays or municipalities that had (1)
no pending cityhood bills before the passage of R.A. No. 9009; and (2) that were not compliant with
the income threshold of P20,000,000.00 imposed by the old Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, cannot find refuge in the cityhood laws in their bid
to become component cities. They now
have to comply with the P100,000,000.00 income requirement imposed by
R.A. No. 9009. In the alternative, they
should seek the amendment of R.A. No. 9009 if they wish to lower the income
requirement.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, I vote to
DISMISS the petitions and
petitions-in-intervention and to declare the cityhood laws CONSTITUTIONAL.
RUBEN
T. REYES
Associate Justice
[1] The Sixteen
(16) Cityhood Laws are the following:
1. Republic Act No. 9389, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality of
Baybay in the Province of Leyte into a component city to be known as City of
Baybay.” Lapsed into law on
2. Republic Act No. 9390, otherwise known as “An Act converting the municipality of Bogo
in the Province of Cebu into a component city to be known as City of Bogo.” Lapsed into law on
3. Republic Act No. 9391, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality of
Catbalogan in the Province of Western Samar into a component city to be known
as the City of Catbalogan.” Lapsed into
law on
4. Republic Act No. 9392, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality of
Tandag in the Province of Surigao del Sur into a component city to be known as
City of Tandag.” Lapsed into law on
5. Republic Act No. 9394, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality of
Borongan in the Province of Eastern Samar into a component city to be known as
City of Borongan.” Lapsed into law on
6. Republic Act No. 9398, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality of
Tayabas in the Province
of Quezon into a component city to be
known as City of Tayabas.” Lapsed into
law on
7. Republic Act No. 9393, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality of
Lamitan in the Province of Basilan into a component city to be known as City of Lamitan.” Lapsed into law on
8. Republic Act No. 9404, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality of Tabuk
in the Province of Kalinga into a component city to be known as City of Tabuk.” Lapsed into law on
9. Republic Act No. 9405, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality of
Bayugan in the Province of Agusan del Sur into a component city to be known as
City of Bayugan.” Lapsed into law on
10. Republic Act No. 9407, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality of Batac
in the Province of Ilocos Norte into a component city to be known as City of
Batac.” Lapsed into law on
11. Republic Act No. 9408, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality of Mati
in the Province of Davao Oriental into a component city to be known as City of
Mati.” Lapsed into law on
12. Republic Act No. 9409, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality of
Guihulngan in the Province of Negros Oriental into a component city to be known
as City of Guihulngan.” Lapsed into law
on
13. Republic Act No. 9434, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality of
Cabadbaran in the Province of Agusan del Norte
into a component city to be known as City of Cabadbaran.” Lapsed into law on
14. Republic Act No. 9436, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality of
Carcar in the Province of Cebu into a component city to be known as City of
Carcar.” Lapsed into law on
15. Republic Act No. 9435, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality of El
Salvador in the Province of Misamis Oriental into a component city to be known
as City of El Salvador.” Lapsed
into law on
16.
Republic Act No. 9491, otherwise known as “An Act converting the Municipality
of Naga in the Province of Cebu into a component city to be known as City of
Naga.” Lapsed into law on
[2] Journal, Senate 13th Congress 59th Session 1238
(
[3]
Entitled “An Act Amending Section 450
of Republic Act No. 7160, Otherwise Known as The Local Government Code of 1991,
by Increasing the Average Annual Income Requirement for a Municipality or
Cluster of Barangay to be Converted into a
[4] House Joint
Resolution No. 29 was actually a consolidation of House Joint Resolution No. 6
and a proposed bill of then Congressman Victor Sumulong seeking to amend
Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
[5] Annex “A,” Memorandum of Petitioners.
[6] The sixteen
(16) respondent municipalities are among those included in the list of
twenty-four (24).
[7] Supra note 2.
[8]
[9] Annex “B,” Memorandum of Petitioners.
[10]
Senator Manuel B. Villar, Jr., Senator Ramon Bong Revilla, Jr., Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile, Senator Manuel “Lito” M. Lapid, and Senator Jinggoy Ejercito
Estrada.
[11]
Senator Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr. and Senator Compañera Pia
[12]
Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, Senator Richard J. Gordon, and Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr.
[13] Sec.
27. (1) Every bill passed by the
Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it;
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the
House where it originated, which shall enter its objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. x x x The President shall communicate his veto of any bill
to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
[14] Rollo (G.R. No. 176951), Vol. 1, pp.
3-65.
[15] Rollo (G.R. No. 177499), Vol. 1, pp.
3-65.
[16] Rollo (G.R. No. 178056), Vol. 1, pp.
3-69.
[17]
Represented by its National President, Jerry P. Treñas.
[18]
Represented by its City Mayor, Jerry P. Treñas.
[19]
Represented by its City Mayor, Mel Senen S. Sarmiento.
[20]
[21] See
note 1.
[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 176951), Vol. 3, pp.
1628-1665.
[23]
[24]
[25] Rollo (G.R. No. 177499), Vol. 1, p. 26.
[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 178056), Vol. 1, p. 27.
[27]
369
[28] Baker v. Carr, id. at 204.
[29]
16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 143, citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 US 899, 116
[30]
[31]
[32]
G.R. No. L-75287,
[33]
G.R. No. 96541,
[34]
G.R. No. 141284,
[35]
460 Phil. 830 (2003).
[36]
G.R. No. 166052,
[37] Anak
Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary, id. at 591-592.
[38]
See 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 148-160. Am. Jur. also says that “The United States has
standing to challenge state laws or rules that contradict or contravene federal
laws or practices.” This is clearly not
applicable in our jurisdiction because we do not have a federal government.
[39]
As alleged in the Memorandum of Petitioners, the League of Cities of the
[40] Sec.
13. Local government unites may group
themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources
for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with law.
[41] Sec.
499. Purpose
of Organization. – There shall be an organization of all cities, to be known
as the League of Cities, for the primary purpose of ventilation, articulating
and crystallizing issues affecting city government administration and securing,
through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.
The League may form chapters at the provincial level for the component cities
of a province. The National League shall
be composed of the presidents of the league of highly urbanized cities and the
presidents of the provincial chapters of the league of component cities.
[42] Rules of Court (1997), Rule 3, Sec. 1.
[43] Civil Code, Art. 44.
[44] Id., Art. 46; Corporation Code, Art. 36.
[45]
Local Government Code, Sec. 15 provides: “Every local government created or
recognized under this Code is a body politic and corporate endowed with powers
to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise powers as a
political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory.”
[46]
(a) Provinces – Twenty-three
percent (23%)
(b) Cities – Twenty-three
percent (23%)
(c)
Municipalities – Thirty-four percent (34%)
(d) Barangays – Twenty
percent (20%)
Provided, however, That the share
of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined on the basis of
the following formula:
(a) Population –
Fifty percent (50%)
(b) Land Area – Twenty-five
percent (25%); and
(c) Equal
Sharing – Twenty-five percent (25%):
Provided, further, That
the share of each barangay with a
population of not less than one hundred (100) inhabitants shall not be less
than Eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) per annum chargeable against the twenty percent (20%) share of
the barangay from the internal
revenue allotment, and the balance to be allocated on the basis of the
following formula:
(a) On the first
year of the effectivity of this Code:
(1) Population –
Forty percent (40%); and
(2) Equal Sharing
– Sixty percent (60%)
(b) On the
second year:
(1) Population –
Fifty percent (50%); and
(2) Equal
Sharing – Fifty percent (50%)
(c) On the third
year and thereafter:
(1) Population –
Sixty percent (60%); and
(2) Equal
Sharing – Forty percent (40%):
Provided, finally, That the
financial requirements of barangays
created by local government units after the effectivity of this Code shall be
the responsibility of the local government unit concerned.
[47]
16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 155.
[48]
G.R. No. 159357,
[49]
G.R. Nos. 138298 & 138982,
[50] Velarde v. Social Justice Society, supra
at 296.
[51]
Id., citing Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 132922,
[52]
G.R. No. L-23326,
[53]
G.R. No. 83896,
[54]
G.R. No. 94571,
[55]
G.R. No. 91649,
[56]
G.R. Nos. 100318, 100308, 100417 & 100420,
[57]
G.R. No. 96409,
[58]
G.R. No. 113375,
[59]
G.R. No. 135385,
[60]
G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547 & 155661,
[61] Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316
[62] Constitution (1987), Art. VIII, Sec. 5.
[63] Fortich v.
[64]
[65]
G.R. No. 67787,
[66]
G.R. Nos. 99289-90,
[67] G.R. No. 106692,
[68]
G.R. No. 129918,
[69] Supra
note 59.
[70]
G.R. Nos. 142801-802,
[71]
G.R. No. 148571,
[72]
G.R. No. L-73155,
[73] Tan v. Commission on Elections, id. at
753. Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee,
concurring.
[74]
G.R. No. 133064,
[75] Supra
note 60.
[76]
G.R. No. 127882,
[77]
G.R. No. 144322,
[78] Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. National Wages and Productivity Commission,
id. at 356-357.
[79] 100
Phil. 1098 (1957).
[80]
56 Phil. 260, 268 (1931).
[81] Tan
v. Commission on Elections, supra note 72, at 741-742.
[82] Heirs of Eugenia V. Roxas, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 67195, 78618 & 78619-20,
[83]
Ferris, The Law of Extraordinary Remedies, 418.
[84] Montes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
143797,
[85] Tomawis v. Tabao-Caudang, G.R. No. 166547,
[86] Piczon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
76378-81,
[87] Torralba v.
[88]
16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 97, citing Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141
[89]
[90]
Id., citing Canyon Public Service Dist. v.
Tasa Coal Co., 156 W. Va. 606, 195 SE 2d 647 (1973).
[91]
86
[92]
22
[93]
See Mendenilla v. Onandia, 115 Phil.
534 (1962).
[94] Constitution (1987), Art. X, Sec. 2.
[95] 1.
Republic Act No. 9389, Sec. 62 (respondent
2. Republic Act No. 9390, Sec. 60
(respondent
3. Republic Act No. 9391, Sec. 61
(respondent
4. Republic Act No. 9392, Sec. 63 (respondent
5. Republic Act No. 9393, Sec. 62 (respondent
6. Republic Act No. 9394, Sec. 60 (respondent
7. Republic Act No. 9398, Sec. 62 (respondent
8. Republic Act No. 9404, Sec. 56 (respondent
9. Republic Act No. 9405, Sec. 61
(respondent
10. Republic Act No. 9407, Sec. 62
(respondent
11. Republic Act No. 9408, Sec. 61 (respondent
12. Republic Act No. 9409, Sec. 61 (respondent
13. Republic Act No. 9434, Sec. 60 (respondent
14. Republic Act No. 9435, Sec. 63 (respondent
15. Republic Act No. 9436, Sec. 62 (respondent
16. In the case of respondent
[96]
Memorandum of Petitioners, p. 25.
[97]
[98]
[99] Sec.
6. Authority
to Create Local Government Units. – A local government unit may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by
law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any
other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang
panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay
located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and
requirements prescribed in this Code.
[100] Sec.
7. Creation
and Conversion. – As a general rule, the creation of a local government
unit or its conversion from one level to another is based on verifiable
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide for services to wit:
(a) Income. – It must be
sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential
government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the
size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned; (b)
Population. – It shall
be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial
jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and (c) Land Area. – It must be contiguous, unless it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a local government unit
independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with
technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators
shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National
Statistics Office (
[101] Sec.
449. Manner
of Creation. – A city may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, only by an Act of Congress, and Subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the
COMELEC in the local government unit or units directly affected. Except as may
otherwise be provided in such Act, the plebiscite shall be held within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of its effectivity.
[102] Sec.
5. x x x (3) Each legislative district
shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.
[103] II Record, Constitutional Commission, p. 137.
[104] Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, Sec. 164.
[105] Casela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-26754,
[106] Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 100 Phil. 501 (1956); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141 (1931); Tamayo v. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953 (1916);
[107]
[108] II
Record, Senate, 13th Congress, p. 164 (
[109]
“REMARKS OF SENATOR PIMENTEL”
“Expressing his support for the sentiment of Senator Lim, Senator
Pimentel stated that the local government units applying for cityhood are requesting to
be exempted from the income requirement because when this was raised by RA
9009, the bills on conversion to cityhood were already pending in the House of
Representatives. He recalled that during the deliberation on said law, when
Senate President Drilon asked him if there were pending bills on the creation
of cities, he replied that there were three, only to find out later on that
there were, in fact, a number of cityhood bills pending in the House of Representatives.
He asked Senator Lim to be more patient
and to allow Senators Roxas and Recto to interpellate on the bills the
following day.”
[110]
Civil Code, Art. 4.
[111] Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon,
G.R. No. 143275,
[112] Yellow Taxi & Pasay Transp. Workers’
[113] De Jesus v. City of
[114]
[115] Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil.
315 (1912).
[116] People v. Purisima, G.R. Nos. L-42050-66,
L-46229-32, L-46313-16 & L-46997,
[117] Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
L-72873,
[118] National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr.,
G.R. No. 106724,
[119] Supra
note 106.
[120] Torres v. Limjap, id. at 145-146, citing
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. II, pp. 693-695.
[121] Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509
[122] Peralta v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
Nos. L-47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-47791 & L-47827,
[123]
16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 115, citing Tulkisarmute Native Community Council v. Heinze, 898 P. 2d 935 (
[124]
[125]
[126]
[127]
[128]
[129]
Ratified on
[130] Sec. 1.
[131]
See Smith, Bell & Co. v. Natividad,
40 Phil. 136 (1919).
[132]
16B Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 777.
[133]
[134]
[135]
See 18A Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, § 64.
[136]
16B Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 808, citing Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of
California, 451 US 648, 101 S. Ct. 2070, 68 L. Ed. 2d 514 (1981); Personnel Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeney,
442 US 256, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 60. L. Ed. 2d 870, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1377,
19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (
[137] People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (1939).
[138]
[139] Supra note 2, at 1238-1240.
It may be observed that Baybay,
In fact, House Joint Resolution No. 1
expressly includes the four (4) omitted municipalities in the list of municipalities
that had pending bills before R.A. No. 9009 was passed and were compliant with
the P20,000,000.00 income requirement prescribed by the old Section 450
of the Local Government Code.
To recall also, upon the prodding of
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. during the Senate session on
[140] Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives
Association, Inc. (PHILRECA) v. The Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, G.R. No. 143076,
[141] Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
(1957).
[142] Republic v. Go Bon Lee, 111 Phil. 805
(1961); Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil.
1051 (1957); De los
[143] Magtajas
v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., G.R. No. 111097,
[144]
16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 271.
[145] Constitution (1987), Art. VIII, Sec. 1
[146]
297
[147] Mayflower
Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, id. at 271-272.
[148]
[149]
[150]
[151]
[152]
[153]
Memorandum of Petitioners, p. 62.
[154] Ichong v. Hernandez, supra note 141,
citing 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.
[155] Constitution (1987), Art. IV, Sec. 1(3)
provides that “[t]hose born before
[156]
16B Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 846.
[157] Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell,
294
[158] People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
[159]
G.R. Nos. L-56022 & L-56124,
[160] Lopez v. Commission on Elections, id. at
644-645.
[161] See
note 139.
[162] Memorandum
of COMELEC through the Office of the Solicitor General, p. 37.
Batac,
Ilocos Norte – It is the biggest municipality of the 2nd District of Ilocos
Norte, 2nd largest and most progressive town in the
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte –
It is the largest of the eleven (11) municipalities in the
Borongan,
Lamitan, Basilan – Before
Catbalogan,
Bogo, Cebu – Bogo is very
qualified for a city in
terms of income,
population and area among others. It has
been elevated to the Hall of Fame being a five-time winner nationwide in the
clean and green program. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3042, introduced
by Rep. Clavel A. Martinez.]
Tandag, Surigao del Sur – This over 350 year
old capital town the province has long sought its conversion into a city that
will pave the way not only for its own growth and advancement but also help in
the development of its neighboring municipalities and the province as a
whole. Furthermore, it can enhance its
role as the province’s trade, financial and government center. [Explanatory
Note of House Bill No. 5940, introduced by Rep. Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.]
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur – It
is a first class municipality and the biggest in terms of population in the
entire province. It has the most
progressive and thickly populated area among the 14 municipalities that
comprise the province. Thus, it has
become the center for trade and commerce in Agusan del Sur. It has a more developed infrastructure and
facilities than other municipalities in the province. [Explanatory Note of House
Bill No. 1899, introduced by Rep. Rodolfo “Ompong” G. Plaza.]
Carcar, Cebu – Through the
years, Carcar metamorphosed from rural to urban and can now boast of its
manufacturing industry, agricultural farming, fishing and prawn industry and
its thousands of large and small commercial establishments contributing to the
bulk of economic activities in the municipality. Based on consultation with multi-sectoral
groups, political and non-government agencies, residents and common folk in
Carcar, they expressed their desire for the conversion of the municipality into
a component city. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3990, introduced by Rep.
Eduardo R. Gullas.]
Guihulngan,
Tayabas,
Quezon – It flourished and expanded into an important politico-cultural
center in Tagalog region. For 131 years
(1179-1910), it served as the cabecera
of the province which originally carried the cabecera’s own name, Tayabas.
The locality is rich in culture, heritage and trade. It was at the outset one of the more active
centers of coordination and delivery of basic, regular and diverse goods and
services within the first district of Quezon Province. [Explanatory Note of House
Bill No. 3348, introduced by Rep. Rafael P. Nantes.]
Tabuk, Kalinga – It not only serves as the main hub of commerce and trade, but also the cultural center of the rich customs and traditions of the different municipalities in the province. For the past several years, the income of Tabuk has been steadily increasing, which is an indication that its economy is likewise progressively growing. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3068, introduced by Rep. Laurence P. Wacnang.]
[163] Available information on Baybay, Leyte;
Mati, Davao Oriental; and Naga, Cebu shows their economic viability,
thus:
Covering an area of 46,050 hectares, Baybay
[Leyte] is composed of 92 barangays,
23 of which are in the poblacion. The remaining 69 are rural barangays. Baybay City is classified as a first class
city. It is situated on the western
coast of the province of Leyte. It has a
Type 4 climate, which is generally wet. Its topography is generally mountainous in the
eastern portion as it slopes down west towards the shore line. Generally an agricultural city, the common
means of livelihood are farming and fishing. Some are engaged in hunting and in forestal
activities. The most common crops grown
are rice, corn, root crops, fruits, and vegetables. Industries operating
include the Specialty Products Manufacturing, Inc. and the Visayan Oil Mill. Various cottage industries can also be found
in the city such as bamboo and rattan craft, ceramics, dress-making, fiber
craft, food preservation, mat weaving, metal craft, fine Philippine furniture
manufacturing and other related activities. Baybay has great potential as a tourist
destination, especially for tennis players. It is not
only rich in biodiversity and history,
but it also houses the campus of the Visayas State University (formerly the Leyte
State University/Visayas State College of Agriculture/Visayas Agricultural
College/Baybay National Agricultural School/Baybay Agricultural High School and
the Jungle Valley Park). Likewise, it
has river systems fit for river cruising, numerous caves for spelunking,
forests, beaches, and marine treasures. This richness, coupled with the friendly
Baybayanos, will be an element of a successful tourism program. Considering the role of tourism in
development, Baybay City intends to harness its tourism potential. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baybay
City> (visited
Mati [
Mati is
abundant with nickel, chromite, and copper. Louie Rabat, Chamber President of the Davao
Oriental Eastern Chamber of Commerce and Industry, emphasized the big potential
of the mining industry in the
Naga [Cebu]: Historical Background – In the early times, the place
now known as Naga was full of huge trees locally called as “Narra.” The first settlers referred to this place as Narra,
derived from the hudge trees, which later simply became Naga. Considered as one of the oldest settlements
in the Province of Cebu, Naga became a municipality on
Class of Municipality 1st class
Province Cebu
Distance from Cebu
City 22 kms.
Number of Barangays 28
No. of Registered Voters 44,643 as of
Total No. of Precincts 237 (as of
Ann. Income (as of
Main Product Agricultural, Indust.
Agro-Industrial,
Mining Product
<http://www.nagacebu.com/index.php?option=com.content&view=article&id=53:naga-facts-and-figures&catid=51:naga-facts-and-figures&Itemid=75>
(visited
[164] See note 109.
[165] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corporation, 462 Phil. 96 (2003); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 530 (1998).
[166] The burdens of pleading and proof with regard to most facts have been and should be assigned to the plaintiff who generally seeks to change the present state of affairs and who therefore naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion. (McCormick on Evidence, Vol. II, p. 949.)