THIRD
DIVISION
HEIRS OF ARTURO REYES, represented by
Evelyn R. San Buenaventura,
Petitioners, - versus
- ELENA SOCCO-BELTRAN, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 176474 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: November 27, 2008 |
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D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1]
dated 31 January 2006 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87066,
which affirmed the Decision[2]
dated 30 June 2003 of the Office of the President, in O.P. Case No. 02-A-007, approving
the application of respondent Elena Socco-Beltran to
purchase the subject property.
The subject
property in this case is a parcel of land originally identified as Lot No. 6-B,
situated in
On
Petitioners
herein, the heirs of the late Arturo Reyes, filed their protest to respondent’s
petition before the DAR on the ground that the subject property was sold by
respondent’s brother, Miguel R. Socco, in favor of
their father, Arturo Reyes, as evidenced by the Contract to Sell, dated
That I am one of the co-heirs of the Estate of the deceased Constancia Socco; and that I am to inherit as such a portion of her lot consisting of Four Hundred Square Meters (400) more or less located on the (sic) Zamora St., Municipality of Dinalupihan, Province of Bataan, bounded as follows:
x x x x
That for or in consideration of the sum of FIVE PESOS (P5.00) per square meter, hereby sell, convey and transfer by way of this conditional sale the said 400 sq.m. more or less unto Atty. Arturo C. Reyes, his heirs, administrator and assigns x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners
averred that they took physical possession of the subject property in 1954 and
had been uninterrupted in their possession of the said property since then.
Legal Officer
Brigida Pinlac of the DAR Bataan Provincial Agrarian Reform Office conducted an
investigation, the results of which were contained in her Report/
Recommendation dated
Further investigation was conducted by the undersigned and based on the documentary evidence presented by both parties, the following facts were gathered: that the house of [the] Reyes family is adjacent to the landholding in question and portion of the subject property consisting of about 15 meters [were] occupied by the heirs of Arturo Reyes were a kitchen and bathroom [were] constructed therein; on the remaining portion a skeletal form made of hollow block[s] is erected and according to the heirs of late Arturo Reyes, this was constructed since the year (sic) 70’s at their expense; that construction of the said skeletal building was not continued and left unfinished which according to the affidavit of Patricia Hipolito the Reyes family where (sic) prevented by Elena Socco in their attempt of occupancy of the subject landholding; (affidavit of Patricia Hipolito is hereto attached as Annex “F”); that Elena Socco cannot physically and personally occupy the subject property because of the skeletal building made by the Reyes family who have been requesting that they be paid for the cost of the construction and the same be demolished at the expense of Elena Socco; that according to Elena Socco, [she] is willing to waive her right on the portion where [the] kitchen and bathroom is (sic) constructed but not the whole of Lot [No.] 6-B adjudicated to her; that the Reyes family included the subject property to the sworn statement of value of real properties filed before the municipality of Dinalupihan, Bataan, copies of the documents are hereto attached as Annexes “G” and “H”; that likewise Elena Socco has been continuously and religiously paying the realty tax due on the said property.
In the end,
Legal Officer Pinlac recommended the approval of
respondent’s petition for issuance of title over the subject property, ruling
that respondent was qualified to own the subject property pursuant to Article
1091 of the New Civil Code.[8] Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Raynor Taroy concurred in the
said recommendation in his Indorsement dated
In an Order
dated
1. DISMISSING the claims of Elena Socco-Beltran, duly represented by Myrna Socco for lack of merit;
2. ALLOCATING Lot No. 6-B under Psd-003-008565
with an area of 360 square meters, more or less, situated
3. ORDERING the complainant to refrain from any act tending to disturb the peaceful possession of herein respondents.
4. DIRECTING the MARO of Dinalupihan,
Respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, which was denied by
DAR Regional Director Acosta in another Order dated
Respondent then
appealed to the Office of the DAR Secretary.
In an Order, dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
September 15, 1999 Order is hereby SET ASIDE and a new Order is hereby issued
APPROVING the application to purchase
Petitioners
sought remedy from the Office of the President by appealing the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED and the instant appeal DISMISSED.[16]
Petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the Office of the President in
a Resolution dated
Consequently,
petitioners filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 87066. Pending the resolution of
this case, the DAR already issued on
Acting on
CA-G.R. SP No. 87066, the Court of Appeals subsequently promulgated its Decision,
dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant PETITION FOR REVIEW is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
The Court
of Appeals denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision in a
Resolution dated
Hence, the
present Petition, wherein petitioners raise the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT THAT THE SUBJECT
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONERS “CANNOT LEGALLY ACQUIRE THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS THEY ARE NOT CONSIDERED LANDLESS AS EVIDENCED BY A TAX DECLARATION.”
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT “…WHATEVER RESERVATION WE HAVE OVER THE RIGHT OF MYRNA SOCCO TO SUCCEED WAS ALREADY SETTLED WHEN NO LESS THAN MIGUEL SOCCO (PREDECESSOR-IN INTEREST OF HEREIN PETITIONERS) EXECUTED HIS WAIVER OF RIGHT DATED APRIL 19, 2005 OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF MYRNA SOCCO.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL THEREBY
BRUSHING ASIDE THE FACT THAT MYRNA V. SOCCO-ARIZO GROSSLY MISREPRESENTED IN HER
INFORMATION SHEET OF BENEFICIARIES AND APPLICATION TO PURCHASE
The main issue in this case is
whether or not petitioners have a better right to the subject property over the
respondent. Petitioner’s claim over the
subject property is anchored on the Contract to Sell executed between Miguel Socco and Arturo Reyes on
The Court is unconvinced.
Petitioners
cannot derive title to the subject property by virtue of the Contract to Sell. It was unmistakably stated in the Contract
and made clear to both parties thereto that the vendor, Miguel R. Socco, was not yet the owner of the subject property and
was merely expecting to inherit the same as his share as a co-heir of Constancia’s estate.[24] It was also declared in the Contract itself that
Miguel R. Socco’s conveyance of the subject to the
buyer, Arturo Reyes, was a conditional sale. It is, therefore, apparent that the sale of
the subject property in favor of Arturo Reyes was conditioned upon the event
that Miguel Socco would actually inherit and become
the owner of the said property. Absent
such occurrence, Miguel R. Socco never acquired
ownership of the subject property which he could validly transfer to Arturo
Reyes.
Under
Article 1459 of the Civil Code on contracts of sale, “The thing must be licit
and the vendor must have a right to transfer ownership thereof at the time it
is delivered.” The law specifically
requires that the vendor must have ownership of the property at the time it is
delivered. Petitioners claim that the
property was constructively delivered to them in 1954 by virtue of the Contract
to Sell. However, as already pointed out
by this Court, it was explicit in the Contract itself that, at the time it was
executed, Miguel R. Socco was not yet the owner of
the property and was only expecting to inherit it. Hence, there was no valid sale from which
ownership of the subject property could have transferred from Miguel Socco to Arturo Reyes.
Without acquiring ownership of the subject property, Arturo Reyes also could
not have conveyed the same to his heirs, herein petitioners.
Petitioners,
nevertheless, insist that they physically occupied the subject lot for more
than 30 years and, thus, they gained ownership of the property through
acquisitive prescription, citing Sandoval
v. Insular Government [25]
and San Miguel Corporation v. Court of
Appeals. [26]
In Sandoval, petitioners therein sought the
enforcement of Section 54, paragraph 6 of Act No. 926, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act, which required -- for the issuance of a certificate of
title to agricultural public lands -- the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same in good faith and under claim
of ownership for more than ten years.
After evaluating the evidence presented, consisting of the testimonies
of several witnesses and proof that fences were constructed around the
property, the Court in the afore-stated case denied the petition on the ground
that petitioners failed to prove that they exercised acts of ownership or were
in open, continuous, and peaceful possession of the whole land, and had caused
it to be enclosed to the exclusion of other persons. It further decreed that whoever claims such
possession shall exercise acts of dominion and ownership which cannot be
mistaken for the momentary and accidental enjoyment of the property. [27]
In San
Miguel Corporation, the Court reiterated the rule that the open, exclusive,
and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by
law creates the legal fiction whereby land ceases to be public land and is,
therefore, private property. It
stressed, however, that the occupation of the land for 30 years must be conclusively established. Thus, the evidence offered by petitioner
therein – tax declarations, receipts, and the sole testimony of the applicant
for registration, petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest who claimed to have occupied the land before selling it
to the petitioner – were considered insufficient to satisfy the quantum
of proof required to establish the claim of possession required for acquiring
alienable public land.[28]
As in the
two aforecited cases, petitioners herein were unable
to prove actual possession of the subject property for the period required by
law. It was underscored in San Miguel Corporation that the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious occupation of property for more than 30
years must be no less than conclusive,
such quantum of proof being necessary to avoid the erroneous validation of
actual fictitious claims of possession over the property that is being claimed.[29]
In the
present case, the evidence presented by the petitioners falls short of being
conclusive. Apart from their
self-serving statement that they took possession of the subject property, the
only proof offered to support their claim was a general statement made in the
letter[30]
dated
Moreover,
the certification given by Barangay Captain Gapero that
Arturo Reyes occupied the premises for an unspecified period of time, i.e., since peace time until the present,
cannot prevail over Legal Officer Pinlac’s more
particular findings in her Report/Recommendation. Legal Officer Pinlac
reported that petitioners admitted that it was only in the 1970s that they
built the skeletal structure found on the subject property. She also referred to the averments made by
Patricia Hipolito in an Affidavit,[31]
dated
In contrast,
respondent’s claim over the subject property is backed by sufficient
evidence. Her predecessors-in-interest, the
spouses Laquian, have been identified as the original
allocatees who have fully paid for the subject
property. The
subject property was allocated to respondent in the extrajudicial settlement by
the heirs of Constancia’s estate. The document entitled “Extra-judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Constancia Socco” was not notarized and, as a private document, can
only bind the parties thereto. However,
its authenticity was never put into question, nor was its legality impugned. Moreover, executed in 1965 by the heirs of Constancia Socco, or more than 30
years ago, it is an ancient document which appears to be genuine on its face
and therefore its authenticity must be upheld.[33] Respondent has continuously paid for
the realty tax due on the subject property, a fact which, though not
conclusive, served to strengthen her claim over the property.[34]
From the
foregoing, it is only proper that respondent’s claim over the subject property
be upheld. This Court must, however, note
that the Order of the DAR Secretary, dated
Moreover,
the Court notes that the records have not clearly established the right of
respondent’s representative, Myrna Socco-Arizo, over
the subject property. Thus, it is not
clear to this Court why the DAR issued on
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87066, promulgated on
SO ORDERED.
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice Acting Chairperson |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate
Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L.
Reyes with Associate Justices Arturo D. Brion (now an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Mariflor Punzalan Castillo, concurring. Rollo, pp. 32-40.
[2] Penned
by Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Waldo Q. Flores. Rollo, pp. 81-82.
[3] Records, p. 113.
[4] Rollo, pp. 55-58.
[5] Records,
p. 26.
[6] Rollo, p. 54.
[7] Records,
pp. 112-113.
[8]
Art.
1091. A partition legally made confers
upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him.
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 59-61.
[11]
[12]
[13] CA rollo, pp. 42-46.
[14]
[15] Rollo, pp. 81-82.
[16]
[17]
[18] CA rollo, pp. 153,
160-161.
[19]
[20] Rollo, pp. 36-38.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] In
the Contract To Sell, Miguel R. Socco states that,
“That I am one of the co-heirs of
the Estate of the deceased Constancia Socco; and that I am
to inherit as such a portion of her lot consisting of Four Hundred Square
Meters (400) more or less located on the (sic) Zamora St., Municipality of Dinalupihan, Province of Bataan.”
(Rollo, p.
54.)
[25] 12 Phil. 648 (1909).
[26] G.R.
No. 57667,
[27] Sandoval v. Insular Government, supra note 25 at 654-656.
[28] San Miguel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 26 at 724-726.
[29]
[30] Rollo, p. 117.
[31] Records, p. 105.
[32] Spouses Calvo v.
Spouses Vergara, 423 Phil. 939, 947 (2001); Dulos Realty and Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, 422 Phil. 292, 304
(2001); Advincula v. Dicen,
G.R. No. 162403, 16 May 2005, 458 SCRA 696, 712; Balbastro v. Junio, G.R. No. 154678, 17 July 2007,
527 SCRA 680, 693.
[33] Sec.
22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court states that:
SEC. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Manongsong v. Estimio, 452 Phil. 862, 878 [2003].)
[34] Records, p. 112.
[35] Spouses Tuazon v.
Hon. Garilao, 415 Phil. 62, 69 and 72 (2001).
[36] CA rollo, pp.
160-161.
[37] Records, p. 100.