SECOND DIVISION
|
NYK-FIL
Petitioners,
- versus - ALFONSO T. TALA Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 175894 Present: QUISUMBING, Acting CJ., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: November 14, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Alfonso T. Talavera (respondent)
entered into a nine-month contract of employment with petitioner NYK-Fil Ship
Management, Inc. (NYK-Fil) and/or Josephine J. Francisco, acting for and in
behalf of petitioner TMM Co., Ltd. –
After respondent started working in
June 2003, he, on several occasions, felt slight pains in his back and other
parts of his body. He thus had frequent
consultations with the ship medical officer who gave him analgesics. The pain persisted and became more severe as
it radiated to his feet, hence, he consulted a clinic in Oman on August 16,
2003 and was diagnosed to have ureteric colic with urinary tract infection.
The following day or on August 17,
2003, respondent was repatriated to the Philippines following which he
consulted the Sachly International Health Partners, Inc. (SHIP), a
company-designated clinic, which diagnosed him to have lumbar strain with
plantar fascitis and urinary tract infection.
Respondent thus went through daily
physical rehabilitation therapy. After
undergoing a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and other tests, he was finally
diagnosed to have “chronic bilateral L6 radiculopathies probably secondary to a
lumbar canal” and “motility-like dyspepsia.”
He was later deemed fit to resume sea duties by specialists of the SHIP.[1]
Respondent sought a second opinion
from an orthopedic expert who diagnosed him to have “lumbar spondylopathy,
lumbar disk protrusion, L5-S1” and declared him unfit for further sea duties.[2] The doctor recommended a partial permanent
disability with Grade 8 impediment based on the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA)
Contract.[3]
Respondent thereupon sought to
claim illness allowance and disability benefits from petitioners. His claim was denied in view of the
declaration by the company-designated physicians that he was fit to work,
drawing respondent to
file a complaint[4] against
petitioners, docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. (M) 04-05-01242-00, for disability
benefits, illness allowance, damages and attorney’s fees, invoking Sections
1 and 3 of Article XXI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between
the All Japan Seamen’s Union/Associated Marine Officers’ and Seamen’s Union of
the Philippines and Global Marine Co., Ltd. as well as Sections 20 (B) (3)
and 20 (B) (6) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract.[5]
By Decision[6] of
June 28, 2005, the Labor Arbiter, finding that respondent was “not yet fit to
perform his usual task as fitter” and noting that he had been declared unfit
for further sea duty, awarded him “100% compensation as disability benefit” in
the amount of $88,000 inclusive of attorney’s fees. It denied, however, his prayer for illness
allowance and damages, such allowance having already been paid and the claim
for damages not having been justified.[7]
Petitioners alleged to have received the Labor Arbiter’s
decision on July 13, 2005 and thus had until July 23, 2005 to file their
memorandum on appeal. July 23, 2005
being a Saturday and the following Monday, July 25, 2005, being a special
non-working holiday, petitioners filed their Memorandum on Appeal[8] on
July 26, 2005 before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The NLRC dismissed petitioners’ appeal for having been filed
out of time,[9] it
finding that “per Registry Receipt address[ed] to [petitioners’ counsel],” copy
of the Labor Arbiter’s decision was received by them on July 12, 2005, hence,
“the ten (10) day reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal was up
to July 22, 2005.”
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC
order, their counsel contending that:
x x x The aforementioned decision by the Labor Arbiter was
received by the Makati Central Post Office on 12 July 2005 but the same was not
delivered to the undersigned law office until 13 July 2005 by Letter Carrier
JACOB ZETA. Attached hereto as Annex “A”
is a certification issued by Ms. Emily A. Gianan, Chief, Administrative Unit of
the Makati Central Post Office stating that the records of their office
reflect the undersigned’s manifestation that the decision was received by J
As the Honorable Commission is well aware, 25 July 2005 was declared a special non-working holiday. Thus, the filing by the Respondents-Appellants of their Memorandum on Appeal on the next working day, 26 July 2005, was timely and indubitably within the reglementary period.[10] (Underscoring supplied)
The NLRC denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration by Resolution of
January 31, 2006, declaring that:
x x x [T]he appeal was filed out of time based on the Registry Return Receipt returned by the Post Office to this Commission, which forms part of the records of the case showing that a copy of the decision was received by respondents[’] counsel on July 12, 2005, and not on July 13, 2005 as alleged in respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration. The certification of Ms. Emily A. Gianan of the Makati Central Post office cannot invalidate the same official Registry Return Receipt that the very same post office sent back to this Commission showing the date of receipt by respondents[’] counsel as July 12, 2005 on the face thereof.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners thereupon filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals,[12] their
counsel alleging that:
x x x Upon being confronted with the registry return card after the denial of Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration by Public Respondent, Ms. Cantalopez [of the office of petitioners’ counsel] realized that she had inadvertently and mistakenly entered the date “12” and not “13”. She had actually received the decision of the Labor Arbiter on 13 July 2005 and had later that same day recorded that date accurately on the undersigned’s copy of the Decision and in an “incoming” logbook, along with other incoming correspondences addressed to the undersigned law firm, before routing these to the appropriate attorney’s, as is the Firm’s standard practice and internal operating procedure. This may be considered as akin to a mere typographical error and should not be given the extreme punishment of dismissal of Petitioner’s Appeal. x x x[13] (Underscoring supplied)
Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Cantalopez of the office of
petitioners’ counsel and a copy of the pertinent page of the logbook of the
same office[14]
reflecting the receipt on July 13, 2005 of the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for, inter alia, failure to show that Marcelo
R. Rañenes (Rañeses), Vice President of petitioner NYK-FIL Ship Management who
signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was authorized
to sign for and in behalf of the said company.[15] Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[16]
attaching a copy of the Board Resolution of NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc.
authorizing Rañeses to sign the required verification and certification “at any
stage of the subject case.” Their motion
was denied,[17] hence,
the present Petition[18]
raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER A TOTALLY NEW
Annexed to the petition is a Secretary’s Certificate
attesting to the conduct of a special meeting of the Board of Directors of
petitioner NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc. in which said petitioner “is now
ratifying the actions of its Vice President Rañeses and submit such
ratification to this Honorable Supreme Court.”[20]
The law allows a corporation to ratify the unauthorized acts of its
corporate officer.[21] With the ratification by petitioner NYK-Fil
of Rañeses’ accomplishing of the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping which accompanied petitioners’ petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, said petitioner had substantially complied with the
requirements of the law. Any defect in
the signing of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping is thus
deemed cured. If this Court had, in some
instances, allowed the belated filing of the certification against forum
shopping, or even excused the non-compliance therewith, this Court a fortiori
should allow the timely submission
of such requirements, albeit the proof of the authority of the signatory was
put forward only after.[22]
While the normal course of action would be to remand the case to the
appellate court for decision on the merits, it is well within the conscientious
exercise of this Court’s broad review powers to choose to render judgment on
the merits, all material facts having been duly laid before it as would
buttress its ultimate conclusion, in the public interest and for the
expeditious administration of justice.
Petitioners insist that they received notice of the Labor Arbiter’s
decision on July 13, 2005 and not on July 12, 2005 as indicated by their
counsel’s employee Cantalopez in the Registry Return Card. It is a generally accepted rule that when
service is made by registered mail, the service is deemed complete and
effective upon actual receipt by the addressee as shown by the Registry Return
Card.[23] Between the Registry Return Card on one hand,
and the Certification issued by Ms. Emily A. Gianan, Chief, Administrative Unit
of the Makati Central Post Office that copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision was
served on petitioners’ counsel on July 13, 2005 and the entry of petitioners’
counsel’s office logbook stating that copy of the decision was received on July
13, 2005, on the other, the Registry Return Card commands more weight.[24] The Registry Return Card is considered as
the official record of the NLRC. It is
presumed to be accurate, unless proven otherwise, unlike a written record or
note of a party which is often self-serving and easily fabricated.[25]
Nevertheless, this Court deems it proper to relax procedural rules in the
interest of substantial justice[26]
in view of the partial merit of petitioners’ appeal before the NLRC.
Before the NLRC petitioners raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER
THE COMPLAINANT-APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO DI
II
WHETHER
THE COMPLAINANT-APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO DI
III
WHETHER
THE COMPLAINANT-APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO DI
IV
WHETHER COMPLAINANT-APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES.[27]
Respecting petitioners’ argument that a company-designated physician
declared respondent fit to resume sea duties, the right of a seafarer to seek a
second opinion is recognized by the POEA Standard Employment Contract of 2000,
the CBA governing the relationship between petitioners and respondent, and
jurisprudence.
Section 20 (B) (3) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract of 2000
provides:
SECTION 20.
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY AND ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer
when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term
of his contract are as follows:
x x x x
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer
is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by
the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one
hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit
himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated
physician within three working days upon his return except when he is
physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the
agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer
to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his
forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If
a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly
between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be
final and binding on both parties.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This
provision substantially incorporates the 1996 POEA Standard Employment
Contract. Passing on the 1996 POEA
Standard Employment Contract, this Court held that “[w]hile it is the
company-designated physician who must declare that the seaman suffers a
permanent disability during employment, it does not deprive the seafarer of his
right to seek a second opinion,” hence, the Contract “recognizes the
prerogative of the seafarer to request a second opinion and, for this purpose,
to consult a physician of his choice.”[28]
The CBA governing the relationship between
petitioners and respondent contains provisions similar to the aforecited
provision of the POEA Standard Employment Contract of 2000, thus:
SECTION 2. The disability suffered by the Seafarer shall
be determined by a doctor appointed by the Company, and the Company shall
provide disability compensation to the Seafarer in accordance with the
percentage specified in the table below which is appropriate to this
disability.
x x x x
SECTION 5. If a doctor appointed by the Union disagrees
with the assessment of the Company doctor in SECTION 2, 3, or 4, a third doctor
shall be mutually agreed between the Company and the Union, and the decision of
this doctor shall be binding on both parties.[29]
From the following findings of respondent’s
physician, respondent is entitled to the benefits under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract of 2000:
IMPRESSION:
Lumbar
spondylopathy
Lumbar
disc protrusion, L5-S1
Mr. Talavera’s back pain has improved since
his physical therapy. However, he still
experiences pain and discomfort with exertion.
He also now has started to complain of numbness that radiates down his
thighs. His diagnostic tests are
significant for degenerative changes and disc protrusion which are conditions
due to wear and tear. That is, with
more exposure to activities producing back stress, more injuries, and
disability are to be expected. He
has lost his pre-injury capacity, and I now recommend a partial permanent disability with
Grade
8 Impediment based on the POEA contract. He is UNFIT for further sea duties.
x x x x
Degenerative disc disease is a wear and tear
condition and is associated with degenerative changes in the articular
cartilage. In the vertebral column, the
fact joints are involved. A single episode of trauma may not initially be
significant, but repeated trauma, such as excessive and strenuous physical
activities may play a role.
Through degeneration, wear and tear or
trauma, the annulus fibrosus containing the soft disc material (nucleus
pulposus) may tear. This results in
protrusion of the disc or even extrusion of disc material into the spinal canal
or neural foramen. In addition, the
nerve fibers of the affected root are also compressed and this situation leads
to radiculopathy in the appropriate muscles.
When the nerve roots become compressed, the herniated disc becomes
significant. The most common complaint
in patients with a herniated disc is that of severe low back pain developing
immediately or within a few hours after an injury.
The mainstay of therapy for a herniated
lumbar disc is conservative treatment, that is, nonsurgical. The mechanism of injury is often an episode
of trauma or a continued mechanical stress of postural or occupational
type. Therefore, torsional stresses on
the back, and activities such as lifting and repetitive bending should be
avoided. The more these patients do, the
more they hurt.
Prolonged relief is less likely if no
permanent modification in the patient’s activities is made. Over time, as the patient resumes his normal
work of increased loading, twisting, or bending and extension of the back, the
patient exposes himself to dangers of enhancing the herniated disc to a more
severe form.
Mr. Talavera should therefore refrain
from activities producing torsional stress on the back and those that require
repetitive bending and lifting. His
symptoms are also heightened by prolonged sitting and standing. His functional capacity has diminished
making it unsafe for him to work at his previous occupation. He is UNFIT to resume his sea
duties.[30]
(Emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners argue, however, that respondent’s
injury or illness is not work-related.[31] They rely on their designated physician’s
Reply to Medical Query, stating that respondent’s conditions could also be
attributed to age, genetics, weight, bone diseases, infections, and unknown
factors.[32] They also call attention to Article XXI, Section 1 of the CBA
which requires that disability be the result of an accident to be compensable.[33]
Indeed, under Section 1 of the CBA which
reads:
SECTION 1: A Seafarer who suffers permanent disability as a result of an accident, regardless of fault but excluding injuries caused by a Seafarer’s willful act, whilst in the employment of the Company, including accidents occurring while traveling to or from the Ship, and whose ability to work is reduced as a result thereof, shall in addition to sick pay, be entitled to compensation according to the provisions of the Agreement. The copy/ies of the medical certificate and other relevant medical reports shall be made available by the Company to the Seafarer,[34]
disability must be the result of an accident to be compensable.
There is no proof that respondent incurred disability as a result of an
accident. Neither is there proof,
however, that, following Section 3 of Article XXI of the CBA which reads:
x x x x
SECTION 3: Permanent Medical Unfitness – A Seafarer whose disability, in accordance with SECTION 1, is assessed at 50% or more under the attached APPENDIX B shall, for the purpose of this section be regarded as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity and entitled to 100% compensation, i.e. US$80,000 for officers and ratings above AB and US$60,000 for ratings, AB and below. Furthermore, any Seafarer assessed at less than 50% disability under the Contract but certified as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity by the Company doctor, shall also be entitled to 100% compensation[35] (Underscoring supplied),
respondent
had a rating above AB and that his disability was assessed at 50% or more under
Appendix “B” of the CBA to merit the award of 100% compensation or $80,000 disability benefit and
10% thereof or $8,000 attorney’s fees.
For disability to be compensable under Section 20
(B) of the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract, it must be the result of a work-related
injury or illness,[36]
unlike the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract in which it was sufficient
that the seafarer suffered injury or illness during the term of his employment.[37] The 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract
defines “work-related injury” as “injury(ies) resulting in disability or death
arising out of and in the course of employment” and “work-related illness” as
“any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set
therein satisfied.”
In More
Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC,[38] this Court, noting that the therein private
respondent’s job required him to enter a manhole accessible only in a crouching
position and carry a 20-liter canister to collect carbon, mud, and oil
deposited inside the cylinders of the ship’s air trunk,[39]
found that his chronic low back pain, which indicated a slipped disc, was
work-related. This Court, addressing the
therein petitioner’s argument that the therein respondent’s chronic low back
pain was due to a pre-existing condition, expounded on the nature of a
work-related injury or illness:
x x x Compensability of an
ailment does not depend on whether the injury or disease was pre-existing at
the time of the employment but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or aggravated his condition.
It is indeed safe to presume that, at the very least, the
arduous nature of Hormicillada’s employment had contributed to the
aggravation of his injury, if indeed it was pre-existing at the time of his
employment. Therefore, it is but just
that he be duly compensated for it. It
is not necessary, in order for an employee to recover compensation, that he
must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he received the
injury, or that he be free from disease.
Every workman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and
while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes
them as he finds them, and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition
aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal,
healthy person.[40] (Underscoring, emphasis, and italics
supplied)
In the case at bar, a reasonable connection between
the respondent’s injuries and the nature of his job has been established. Thus, as in the above cited case, it is safe
to presume that the arduous nature
of the respondent’s job caused the respondent’s illness or at least aggravated
any pre-existing condition he might have had, and is thus work-related.
The earlier-quoted findings of respondent’s
physician indicate that “repeated trauma such as excessive and strenuous physical
activities may play a role” in producing back stress, more injuries and
disability, hence, his advice for respondent to “refrain from activities
producing torsional stress on the back and those that require repetitive
bending and lifting” as he is “UNFIT to resume his sea duties.”
Petitioners’ physician herself stated that among
the causes of respondent’s conditions are trauma, biomechanical stress, and
repeated motion on a joint.[41] Her observation that “there was no overt and
direct assault or physical injury that may have contributed to the MRI findings
of Mr. Talavera’s lumbar spine”[42]
and petitioners’ argument that no record of an accident was presented[43]
do not persuade. As respondent’s
physician explained, “A single episode of trauma may not initially be
significant, but repeated trauma, such as excessive and strenuous physical
activities may play a role.”[44]
In their Reply[45]
to respondent’s Position Paper, petitioners did not contest or disprove respondent’s
claim that prior to June 2003, he had concluded three contracts with them and
that every time he was scheduled for deployment, he was subjected to medical
examination by petitioners’ designated physician and had always been declared
“fit to work.”[46] Petitioners failed too to refute,
respondent’s following claims:
Complainant Talavera as Fitter
performed repair and maintenance works, like hydraulic line return and other
supply lines of the vessel; he did all the welding works and assist[ed] the
First and Second Engineer during overhauling works of generators, engines and
others [sic] engineering works as
directed by lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling and moving heavy equipment
and materials and constantly performed overtime works because the ship was
old and always repair jobs are almost anywhere inside the vessel. He found himself with very few hours rest
period.
On several occasions due to
his excessive arduous and stressful, both physical and mental works, he felt
slight pains in his back and other parts of his body, [b]ut ignored the same due to the demands
of his works and because his superiors are very strict with regards to [the]
time table in a given task.[47] (Underscoring supplied)
Undoubtedly then, respondent is, under the 2000 POEA Standard Employment
Contract, entitled to compensation.
His disability benefit, on account of the priorly stated partial
permanent disability with Grade 8 Impediment based on the 2000
POEA Standard Employment Contract, computed in accordance with Section 20 (B)
(6)[48] vis a vis Section 32[49]
of the 2000 Standard Employment Contract, thus:
US$50,000 x 33.59%
amounts to
US$16,795. The attorney’s fees awarded by the labor arbiter “equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the judgment award”[50] is
thus reduced to US$1,679.50.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated May 19, 2006 and December 4, 2006 are SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated June 28, 2005 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The disability benefit
awarded to the respondent Alfonso T. Talavera is reduced to US$16,795 in
accordance with Section 20 (B) (6) vis a
vis Section 32 of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Seafarers on Board
Ocean Going Vessels, as amended by Department Order No. 4 and Memorandum
Circular No. 9, both series of 2000. The
award of attorney’s fees is correspondingly reduced to US$1,679.50.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISU
Acting
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[1] NLRC records, p. 42.
[2] Id. at 63-65.
[3] Id. at 64.
[4] Id. at 2.
[5] Id. at 54-55.
[6] Id. at 128-132.
[7] Id. at 132.
[8] Id. at 136-147.
[9] Id. at 322-324.
[10] Id. at 330.
[11] Id. at 338 (erroneously numbered p. 343). Vide p. 135.
[12] CA rollo, pp. 2-16.
[13] Id. at 8-9.
[14] Id. at 59-60.
[15] Id. at 72.
[16] Id. at 73-88.
[17] Id. at 472-473.
[18] Rollo, pp. 3-26.
[19] Id. at 12.
[20] Id. at 19, 26.
[21] Civil Code Article 1910 (“x x x As for any obligation wherein the agent has exceeded his power, the principal is not bound except when he ratifies it expressly or tacitly.”); vide Yasuma v. Heirs of Cecilio S. De Villa, G.R. No. 150350, August 22, 2006, 499 SCRA 466, 471-472.
[22] Vide Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, G.R. No. 160455, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 325, 337; Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 404 Phil. 981, 996 (2001).
[23] Dela
Cruz v. Ramiscal, G.R. No. 137882, February 4, 2005, 450 SCRA 449, 456.
[24] Vide ibid.; Baltazar v. Commission on Elections, 403 Phil. 444, 450 (2001).
[25] Vide ibid.
[26] Vide Remulla v. Manlongat, 484 Phil. 832, 838-839 (2004).
[27] NLRC records, pp. 139-140.
[28] Seagull Maritime Corp. v. Dee, G.R. No. 165156, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 109, 117-119.
[29] NLRC records, pp. 30-31.
[30] Id. at 64-65.
[31] Id. at 141-143.
[32] Id. at 97-99.
[33] Id. at 143-144.
[34] Id. at 30.
[35] Id. at 31.
[36] 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract, Section 20(B) (6):
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENE
x x x x
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS.
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
x x x x
(6) In case of permanent or total disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and rules of compensation applicable at the time the disease or illness was contracted.
[37] 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract, Section 20 (B).
[38] 366 Phil. 646 (1999).
[39] Id. at 649.
[40] Id. at 654-655.
[41] Vide NLRC records, pp. 97-99.
[42] Id. at 99.
[43] Id. at 144.
[44] Id. at 64.
[45] Id. at 81-87.
[46] Id. at 49.
[47] Id. at 49-50.
[48] Vide note 36.
[49] Section 32,
POEA 2000 Standard Employment Contract:
SECTION 32.
SCHEDULE OF DISABILITY OR IMPEDIMENT FOR INJURIES SUFFERED
AND DISEASES
INCLUDING OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES OR ILLNESS CONTRACTED.
x x x x
CHEST-TRUNK-SPINE
x x x x
5. Moderate rigidity or two
thirds (2/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk. Gr. 8
x x x x
SCHEDULE OF DISAB
|
Impediment Grade |
|
Impediment |
|
|
1 |
US$50,000 |
x |
120.00% |
|
2 |
“ |
x |
88.81% |
|
3 |
“ |
x |
78.36% |
|
4 |
“ |
x |
68.66% |
|
5 |
“ |
x |
58.96% |
|
6 |
“ |
x |
50.00% |
|
7 |
“ |
x |
41.80% |
|
8 |
“ |
x |
33.59% |
|
9 |
“ |
x |
26.12% |
|
10 |
“ |
x |
14.93% |
|
11 |
“ |
x |
10.45% |
|
12 |
“ |
x |
6.72% |
|
13 |
“ |
x |
6.72% |
|
14 |
“ |
x |
3.74% |
To be paid in
Philippine currency equivalent at the exchange rate prevailing during the time
of payment. (Underscoring supplied)
[50] NLRC records, p. 132.