NATIONAL MINES and ALLIED WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU),
Petitioner, -
versus - MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 174641
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, carpio MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: November 11, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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We
resolve in this Decision the petition for review on certiorari[1]
filed by petitioner National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU) to
annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
No. 70875[2]
and its subsequent order denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.[3] The CA decision nullified the resolution[4]
and the order[5] of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
denying the appeal filed by Marcopper Mining Corporation (MARCOPPER), and ordered the NLRC to give due course to MARCOPPER’s
appeal.
THE
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On
NAMAWU
was the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file workers of
MARCOPPER. On
MARCOPPER
denied liability, contending that NAMAWU had not been authorized by the
individual employees – the real parties-in-interest – to file the complaint; and
that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of certification of non-forum
shopping, for the pendency of another action between the same parties, and for
lack of factual and legal basis.[9]
Labor
Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos ruled in NAMAWU’s favor in a decision dated P44,622,871.02), while the attorney’s
fees amounted to four million four hundred sixty-two thousand two hundred
eighty-seven and 10/100 pesos (P4,462,287.10).
MARCOPPER
appealed the decision to the NLRC. In
this appeal, it also moved that it be allowed not to post an appeal bond for
615 NAMAWU members – former MARCOPPER employees who had been dismissed
effective
The NLRC dismissed MARCOPPER’s appeal in
a Resolution dated
The
NLRC subsequently denied MARCOPPER’s motion for reconsideration.[11] MARCOPPER
thus sought relief from the CA through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition imputed grave abuse of
discretion on the NLRC for disregarding an earlier CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
51059 (illegal strike case) involving
the same parties and the same reliefs; and for awarding wages and separation
pay to NAMAWU members who had earlier been dismissed and were no longer
MARCOPPER employees when MARCOPPER suspended its operations.
The
CA granted MARCOPPER’s petition in the currently assailed decision promulgated
on
The
CA noted in the assailed decision that it had previously confirmed the validity
of the termination of employment of NAMAWU members in its decision dated
The CA’s denial of NAMAWU’s motion for
the reconsideration of the CA’s
THE
PETITION
The
petition, which submits four issues for our resolution, boils down to the core
issues of whether the CA erred in ruling that there was no need for MARCOPPER
to post an appeal bond, and in ordering the NLRC to give due course to MARCOPPER’s
appeal.[17]
NAMAWU submits that:
First,
an appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege; parties
who wish to avail of the privilege must comply with the statutes or rules regulating
the appeal. It points out that, by law, an
appeal may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.[18] No exception is provided nor allowed as the
legal intent is to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection
of an appeal.
Second, the perfection of an
appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional
and non-compliance with the legal requirement renders the judgment final and
executory.[19] The bond serves as an assurance to the workers
that they would be paid if they finally prevail, as held in Coral Point Development Corp. v. NLRC.[20]
Third, the CA delved into the merits
of the company’s appeal despite the patent lack of a perfected appeal. This
happened, the petitioner submits, when the CA took cognizance of its decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 51059 (the illegal
strike case) where 615 company employees were adjudged to have been
terminated for cause effective
Fourth, outside of the 615
employees who were the focus of the assailed CA decision, there were other
employees similarly situated who are not covered by the previous illegal strike
case (CA-G.R. SP No. 51059) but are covered by the March 14, 2000 decision of
Labor Arbiter Ramos. The company’s
position implies that there were no employees working with the company from the
dismissal date of
Fifth, the CA ignored the fact
that the present case involves an issue pertaining to MARCOPPER’s violation of
safety and health rules which resulted in the loss of jobs of all its workers.
This was the reason why the Labor Arbiter ordered MARCOPPER to pay the workers
not only separation pay but also unpaid wages for the duration of the disaster.
The decision cited by the CA involved an illegal strike and entailed only
separation pay. Even granting that the previous strike case could bar the
safety and health case under consideration, still MARCOPPER was under legal
obligation to post a bond to perfect its appeal to the NLRC to guarantee the
payment of the money claims of workers who were not included in the illegal strike
case.
Sixth, in the guise of ruling
on the issue of the non-filing of an appeal bond, the CA already decided the
case in favor of MARCOPPER. When the CA ordered the NLRC to give due course to MARCOPPER’s
appeal without an appeal bond, there was nothing more left to be done by the
NLRC but to reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT
The respondent company and its
principal officers presented their case in a Comment[23]
filed on
1. The
CA correctly ruled that there is no necessity for the filing of an appeal bond
considering that the employment of petitioner NAMAWU’s members was terminated
even before the issuance by the DENR of its order on
2. There
is no pre-judgment of MARCOPPER’s appeal with the NLRC; the CA had to consider
the member-employees’ termination from employment in order to resolve the issue
of whether there was a need for the posting of an appeal bond in the present
case.
MARCOPPER reiterated that petitioner
NAMAWU’s members were dismissed from employment on
Imputing bad faith on the part of
NAMAWU, MARCOPPER decries that despite the
pendency of the illegal strike case, NAMAWU filed on
MARCOPPER points out that it did not
deliberately fail to post the required appeal bond. It submits that it filed in
good faith a Motion to Dispense with the Filing of an Appeal Bond[30]
for the 615 employees, and at the same time posted a bond for three
complainants[31] – Apollo
V. Saet, Rogelio Regencia, and Jose Romasanta – who were not included in the
strike case. It claims that the motion is similar to a Motion to Reduce Bond
that the NLRC should have resolved first before it dismissed the appeal.
It expresses disappointment that it
was only after close to two years (or on
THE
RULING OF THE COURT
We
state at the outset that we do not agree with NAMAWU’s position that the illegal
strike case between it and MARCOPPER – CA-G.R. SP No. 51059; later, this
Court’s G.R. No. 143282, July 12, 2000) – is “an entirely separate and distinct
case not connected with the case under consideration.” In the first place, both the previous and the
present cases are between the same parties – NAMAWU and MARCOPPER. Both cases refer to termination of employment
and its consequences. In fact, the payment of separation pay that NAMAWU seeks
in the present case was considered by the NLRC in its decision in the illegal
strike case, although the award was stricken out by the CA when the illegal
strike case was brought to it for review. Thus, the two cases are intimately intertwined in the
consideration made by the tribunals a quo as well as in point of time as
our discussions below will show. If they differ at all, the difference lies only
in the grounds and circumstances of termination since the illegality of
NAMAWU’s strike of
The
employment of the NAMAWU officers and members had been declared terminated on
However, We take
judicial notice of the fact that due to the environmental incident involving
spillage of mine waste and tailings, the Deparment of Environment and Natural
Resources ordered the cessation of operation of the Company on April 1, 1996
rendering the workers out of work, which to this time, is already beyond the
allowable period of six (6) months temporary suspension of operation under
Article 286 of the Labor Code. This
being so, said
Let it be stressed that the grant of separation pay shall
include all the Union members, the grant of the same being based on their
termination of employment by operation of law. The 13 officers of the
x
x x
The
environmental incident referred to in this illegal strike ruling is the same
environmental incident that gave rise to the present complaint (In Re: Dispute in Marcopper Mining, NLRC Case
No. 106-95) that NAMAWU filed on
Similarly
interesting, as respondent MARCOPPER alleged in its submissions, is the fact
that MARCOPPER’s appeal to the NLRC was filed on
In
the context of the NLRC appeal bond that is directly at issue, MARCOPPER had
every reason to claim in its April 10, 2000 appeal to the NLRC that it should
be excused from filing an appeal bond with respect to the NAMAWU members who
were no longer company employees. The CA
decision decreeing the termination of employment of those involved in the illegal
strike case had already been issued at that time. We subsequently ruled on the same issue
during the time the environmental incident case was pending before the
NLRC. Thus, when the NLRC dismissed MARCOPPER’s
appeal for failure to file the requisite appeal bond corresponding to the 615
NAMAWU members, the termination of employment of these NAMAWU members was
already a settled matter that the NLRC was in no position to disregard. In
this light, the CA was correct in reversing the dismissal of MARCOPPER’s appeal
for failure to file an appeal bond.
Pursued to its logical end, the CA conclusions should lead to the
dismissal of NAMAWU’s complaint with respect to its 615 previously dismissed
members.
In
contrast with the above, the case of the three other employees – Apollo V.
Saet, Rogelio Regencia and Jose Romasanta – who were in MARCOPPER’s employ at
the time of the suspension of operations on
We
recognize, however, that their case has now dragged on for more than a decade since
its inception on
We
find from the pleadings filed that the environmental incident that gave rise to
NAMAWU’s April 1996 complaint to be undisputed; MARCOPPER caused the spillage
of mine waste and tailings into the
The
suspension of MARCOPPER’s operations was decreed in an Ex-Parte Order dated
April 1, 1996 issued by the Pollution Adjudication Board of the DENR pursuant
to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 984 and Section 36 of its Implementing Rules.[39] The dispositive portion of this order
provides:
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the Board on consultation hereby orders the respondent to cease
and desist from undertaking any activity and/or operating its
machines/equipment generating pollution until the respondent prevents or abates
its pollution within allowable standards.
This Order shall be
IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY and shall remain in force until modified or nullified by
the Board.
Separately
from this Order, the DENR Secretary ordered on
The
rule that NAMAWU cites in its claim for wages is Rule X, Book III, Section 3(b) of the Rules
and Regulations implementing the Labor Code.[41] This
rule, however, specifically relates to suspension
of operations due to health and safety concerns. It states:
Enforcement power on
health and safety of workers. – (a) The Regional Director may likewise order
stoppage of work or suspension of operation of any unit or department of an
establishment when non-compliance with the law, safety order or implementing
rules and regulations poses grave and imminent danger to the health and safety
of workers in the workplace. (b) x x x In case the violation is attributable to
the fault of the employer, he shall pay the employees concerned their salaries
or wages during the period of such stoppage of work or suspension of
operation.
While
the mine tailing leakage and pollution of the Boac River cannot but affect the
health and safety of those in the MARCOPPER vicinity, particularly its
employees, we find that the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional
Director – at whose initiative a suspension of operation must originate for the
above-quoted provision to apply – did not act as envisioned by the above rule. Specifically, there was no ruling or
directive from the DOLE that the environmental incident was a workplace health
and safety concern that required a suspension of operation. There is likewise nothing in the laws
applicable to pollution, specifically, P.D. No. 984 and P.D. No. 1586 and their
implementing rules, that speak of the consequences of a DENR-ordered suspension
of operations on employment relationships.
Neither does the CBA between MARCOPPER and NAMAWU provide for the
consequences of a suspension of operation due to environmental causes. Under
the circumstances, we can only conclude that the general “no work, no pay” rule
should prevail with respect to employees’ wages during the suspension period,
subject to existing CBA terms on leave credits and similar benefits of
employees.
Because
the initial suspension of operations that the DENR imposed eventually turned
into an involuntary closure as discussed above, Article 283 of the Labor Code
comes into play entitling the three remaining employees the payment of separation
pay computed under the terms of that Article.
The termination of employment date, for separation pay purposes, should
be computed from June 21, 1996 and not from October 12, 1996 (or six months
from the April 12, 1996 suspension of operation date); June 21, 1996 must be
the closure date as it is from this date that MARCOPPER, by law, ceased to have
any authority to conduct its mining operations.
In
the absence of any showing that NAMAWU could represent “other similarly
situated employees” who are not its members, we cannot consider these other
employees (whose circumstances have never been discussed and who all remain
unnamed) to be covered by the terms of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
hereby PARTIALLY GRANT NAMAWU’s petition
with respect to the payment of separation pay to Apollo V. Saet, Rogelio
Regencia and Jose Romasanta. MARCOPPER
is hereby ORDERED to PAY them separation pay
pursuant to Article 283 of the Labor
Code. The claim under the petition for
the payment of wages during the suspension of operation period is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
We
hereby DISMISS the petition with
respect to the remaining 615 NAMAWU members who were no longer MARCOPPER employees
at the time MARCOPPER suspended its operations in April 1996.
No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 3-15.
[2] Promulgated
on
[3] Promulgated
on
[4] Dated
[5] Dated
[6]
[7] NLRC Case No. RAB IV-4-8018-96-M.
[8] x x x
Within 24 hours from the issuance of the order of stoppage or suspension, a hearing shall be conducted to determine whether the order for the stoppage of work or suspension of operation shall be lifted or not. The proceedings shall be terminated within seventy-two (72) hours and a copy of such order or resolution shall be immediately furnished the Secretary of Labor. In case the violation is attributable to the fault of the employer, he shall pay the employees concerned their salaries and wages during the period of such stoppage of work or suspension of operations.
[9] NLRC Case No. 106-95.
[10] Annex “M,” Petition; rollo, pp. 198-211.
[11] Under NLRC Order dated
[12] Supra note 2, p. 1.
[13]
[14] Annex “A,” Respondent’s Comment; rollo, pp. 264-284.
[15] G.R. No. 143282.
[16] Rollo, pp. 71-72; see also Annex “D,” MARCOPPERS’s Comment, id.,
pp. 288-289.
[17] Resolution of the Court granting NAMAWU’s Motion to adopt petition as
Memorandum; id., p. 307.
[18] LABOR CODE, Article 223.
[19] Cabalan Pastulan Nogrito Labor Ass.
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 106108,
[20] G.R. No. 129761,
[21] Supra note 15, p. 4.
[22] Supra
note 16, p. 4.
[23] Rollo,
pp. 237-263.
[24]
[25] Supra note 2, p. 1.
[26] NLRC Case No. 106-95.
[27] Rollo, pp. 264-283; Decision promulgated on
[28] Supra note 7, p. 2.
[29] MARCOPPERS’s Memorandum, pars. 13 & 14, pp. 15-16; rollo, pp. 322-323.
[30] MARCOPPER’s Comment, par. 9, p. 5; id., p. 241.
[31]
[32] Cited in CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 70875; id., p. 27.
[33] Supra note 16, p. 4.
[34] Supra note 7, p. 2.
[35] See: Ong
v. Mazo,
G.R. No. 145542,
[36] Supra note 6,
p. 2.
[37]
[38] Supra note 32, p. 9.
[39] Supra note 6, p. 2.
[40] In Re: Cancellation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate of Marcopper Mining Corporation.
[41] Supra note 8, p. 2.