SECOND DIVISION
|
MACTAN- Petitioner, - versus - BENJAMIN
TUDTUD, BIENVENIDO TUDTUD, DAVID TUDTUD, JUSTINIANO BORGA, JOSE BORGA, and FE
DEL ROSARIO, represented by LYDIA ADLAWAN, Attorney-in-fact, Respondents. |
G.R. No.
174012 Present:
QUISUMBING, Acting CJ., and Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: November
14, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The predecessors-in-interest of respondents Benjamin
Tudtud et al. were the owners of a parcel of land in Cebu City, identified as
Lot No. 988 of the Banilad Estate and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 27692.
In 1949, the National Airports Corporation (NAC), a
public corporation of the Republic of the
By virtue of a judgment rendered by the third branch
of the Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. R-1881, the NAC acquired Lot
No. 988, among other lots. TCT No. 26792
covering Lot No. 988 was thus cancelled and TCT No. 27919 was issued in its
stead in the name of the Republic of the
Lot No. 988 was later transferred to the Air
Transport Office (ATO), and still later to petitioner Mactan Cebu International
Airport Authority (MCIAA) in 1990 via Republic Act No. 6958.
When the
By letter of October 7, 1996 to the general manager
of the MCIAA, Lydia Adlawan, acting as attorney-in-fact of the original owners
of Lot No. 988, demanded to repurchase the lot at the same price paid at the time
of the taking, without interest, no structures or improvements having been erected
thereon and the Cebu Lahug Airport having been closed and abandoned, hence, the
purpose for which the lot was acquired no longer existed.[1]
As the demand remained unheeded, respondents,
represented by their attorney-in-fact Lydia Adlawan, filed a Complaint[2]
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Respondents anchored their complaint on the assurance
they claimed was made by the NAC that the original owners and/or their
successors-in-interest would be entitled to repurchase the lot when and in the
event that it was no longer used for airport purposes.[3]
In its Answer with Counterclaim,[4]
the MCIAA countered that, inter alia,
the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 did not lay any condition that the lots subject
of expropriation would revert to their owners in case the expansion of the
To prove their claim, respondents presented
witnesses who testified that the NAC promised their predecessors-in-interest-original
owners of Lot No. 988 that it would be returned to them should the expansion of
the
The MCIAA disputed the applicability to the present
case of the immediately-cited MCIAA ruling, the NAC having acquired
Lot No. 988 not by a deed of sale but by virtue of a final judicial
decree of expropriation which cannot be modified by parole evidence.[9]
After trial, Branch 20 of the Cebu City RTC rendered
judgment in favor of respondents, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs as against defendant ordering the
latter to reconvey the entire subject real property covered by T.C.T.
No. 27919 within 15 days from receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.[10] (Underscoring supplied)
On appeal,[11]
the Court of Appeals, by Decision of
I.
THE JUDGMENT OF EXPROPRIATION IN CIVIL CASE
NO. R-1881 WAS ABSOLUTE AND UNCONDITIONAL.
II.
RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM OF ALLEGED VERBAL
ASSURANCES FROM THE GOVERNMENT VIOLATES THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
III.
THE BEST EVIDENCE SHOWING THE UNCONDITIONAL
ACQUISITION OF
In insisting that the judgment in Civil Case No.
R-1881 was absolute and unconditional, the MCIAA cites Fery v. Municipality
of Cabanatuan[17] which held that:
x x x If x x x the decree of expropriation
gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute
property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or
municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of
defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings.
When land has been acquired for public use in
fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent
domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and
the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use,
without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the
former owner.[18] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
MCIAA in fact offers the text of the trial court’s decision
in R-1881, inviting attention to the dispositive portion thereof, to prove that
the judgment of expropriation entered in favor of the government is absolute
and unconditional, and that there is nothing in the decision that would show
that the government made any assurance or stipulation whatsoever to reconvey
the subject lot in case the expansion of the Lahug airport would not
materialize.[19]
But also in Fery,
this Court, passing on the question of whether a private land which is expropriated
for a particular public use, but which particular public use is abandoned, may be
returned to its former owner, held:
The answer to that question depends upon
the character of the title acquired by the expropriator x x x. If, for example, land is expropriated for a
particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended
or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course,
when the purpose is terminated or abandoned, the former owner reacquires the
property so expropriated. If, for
example, land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is
granted upon conditions that the city can only use it for a
public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public
street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory
provision to the contrary.[20] (Underscoring supplied)
That nothing in the trial court’s decision in Civil
Case No. R-1881 indicates a condition attached to the expropriation of the
subject lot, this Court, in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno v. MCIAA[21] involving the
rights of another former owner of lots also involved in Civil Case No.
R-1881, noting the following portion of the body of the said trial court’s
decision:
As for the public purpose of the expropriation
proceeding, it cannot now be doubted.
Although the
held:
While the trial court in Civil Case No.
R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the presence of public purpose for the
exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of
On the Heirs of
The MCIAA goes on, however, to cite MCIAA
v. Court of Appeals and Chiongbian[26]
wherein this Court rejected testimonial evidence of an assurance of a right to
repurchase property acquired by the NAC under the judgment in still the same Civil
Case No. R-1881. The MCIAA’s reliance on
this case is misplaced. As this Court
noted in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno v. MCIAA,[27]
the respondent Chiongbian put forth inadmissible and inconclusive
evidence, Chiongbian’s testimony as
well as that of her witness as to the existence of the agreement being hearsay.[28]
In contrast,
in the case at bar, respondents’ witness respondent Justiniano Borga himself,
who represented his mother-one of the original owners of subject lot during the
negotiations between the NAC and the landowners, declared that the original
owners did not oppose the expropriation of the lot upon the assurance of the
NAC that they would reacquire it if it is no longer needed by the airport.[29]
Another
witness for respondent, Eugenio Amores, an employee of the NAC, declared that in
the course of some meetings with the landowners when he accompanied the NAC
legal team and was requested to jot down what transpired thereat, he personally
heard the NAC officials give the assurance claimed by respondents.[30]
The
MCIAA nevertheless urges this Court to reject respondents’ testimonial evidence,
citing Article 1403 (2)(e) of the Civil Code which places agreements for the
sale of real property or an interest
therein within the coverage of the Statute of Frauds.
The
Statute of Frauds applies, however, only to executory contracts.[31] It does not apply to contracts which have
been completely or partially performed,[32]
the rationale thereof being as follows:
x x x In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because unless they be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. The statute has precisely been enacted to prevent fraud. However, if a contract has been totally or partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith, for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already delivered by him from the transaction in litigation, and, at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him thereby.[33] (Underscoring supplied)
A word
on MCIAA’s argument that MCIAA v. Court
of Appeals, supra, does not apply to the present case. As reflected in the earlier-quoted ruling in Fery, the mode of acquisition for public
purpose of a land – whether by expropriation or by contract – is not
material in determining whether the acquisition is with or without
condition.
In fine,
the decision in favor of respondents must be affirmed. The rights and duties between the MCIAA and
respondents are governed by Article 1190 of the Civil Code[34]
which provides:
When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they have received.
In case of the loss, deterioration, or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article [Article 1189] shall be applied to the party who is bound to return.
x x x x
While
the MCIAA is obliged to reconvey Lot No. 988 to respondents, respondents must
return to the MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the
expropriation of Lot No. 988, plus legal interest to be computed from default,[35] which
in this case runs from the time the MCIAA complies with its obligation to the
respondents.[36]
Respondents
must likewise pay the MCIAA the necessary expenses it may have incurred in
sustaining Lot No. 988 and the monetary value of its services in managing it to
the extent that respondents were benefited thereby.
Following
Article 1187[37] of the
Civil Code, the MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained
from Lot No. 988, and respondents need not account for the interests that the
amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime.
In accordance
with the earlier-quoted Article 1190 of the Civil Code vis-à-vis Article 1189 which provides that “[i]f a thing is
improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit
of the creditor x x x,” respondents, as creditors, do not have to settle as
part of the process of restitution the appreciation in value of Lot 988 which
is a natural consequence of nature and time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the
foregoing disquisition, DENIED. The
1.
Respondents are ORDERED to return to the MCIAA the just
compensation they received for the expropriation of Lot No. 988 plus legal
interest in the case of default, to be computed from the time the MCIAA
complies with its obligation to reconvey Lot No. 988 to them;
2.
Respondents are ORDERED to pay the MCIAA the necessary
expenses it incurred in sustaining Lot No. 988 and the monetary value of its
services to the extent that respondents were benefited thereby;
3.
The MCIAA is ENTITLED to keep whatever fruits and income it
may have obtained from Lot No. 988; and
4.
Respondents are also ENTITLED to keep whatever interests the
amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime, as
well as the appreciation in value of Lot No. 988 which is a natural consequence
of nature and time;
In light
of the foregoing modifications, the case is REMANDED to Branch 20 the
SO
ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISU
Acting Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Exhibit “D,” records, p. 11.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] G.R. No. 121506,
[8] MCIAA v. Court of Appeals, id. at
741-744.
[9] Records, pp. 183-185.
[10]
[11]
[12] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Vicente L. Yap, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale
and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. CA rollo,
pp. 169-180.
[13]
[14]
[15] Rollo, pp. 25-44.
[16]
[17] 42 Phil. 28 (1921).
[18]
[19] Exhibit “1,” records, pp. 101-127; Exhibit “1-A,” records, pp. 125-127; records, p. 169.
[20] Supra note 17 at 29-30.
[21] 459 Phil. 948 (2003).
[22] Exhibit “C,” records, p. 109.
[23] Heirs of
[24] Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea
v. MCIAA, G.R. No. 156273, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 285, 305.
[25] Ibid.
[26] 399 Phil. 695 (2000).
[27] Supra note 21.
[28] MCIAA v. Court of Appeals, supra note
26 at 708-710.
[29] Vide
[30]
[31] Vide
Asia Production Co., Inc. v. Paño, G.R. No. 51058,
[32]
[33] Ibid. Citation omitted.
[34] Heirs
of
[35] Vide
Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea v. MCIAA, G.R. No. 156273,
August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 288, 306; Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994,
234 SCRA 78, 95.
[36] Civil Code, Article 1169:
x x x x
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills is obligation, delay by the other begins.
[37] Civil Code, Article 1187:
The effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation. Nevertheless, when the obligation imposes prestations upon the parties, the fruits and interests during the pendency of the condition shall be deemed to have been mutually compensated.
Vide Heirs of