Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
SPOUSES
LORETO LEYBA and MATEA LEYBA, Petitioners, - versus - RURAL
BANK OF CABUYAO, INC. and ZENAIDA REYES, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 172910 Present: QUISUMBING,
J.,* Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO,
JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: November
14, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This
is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
85410 entitled Spouses Loreto Leyba and Matea Leyba v. Rural Bank
of Cabuyao, Inc. and Zenaida Reyes, which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 92 in
The Facts
Petitioners-spouses
Loreto and Matea Leyba filed a complaint for Nullification of Real Estate
Mortgage and Special Power of Attorney (SPA) against respondents Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. (RBCI) and
Zenaida Reyes. They alleged, among others, that: (1) they are the
registered owners of a parcel of land in Calamba, Laguna; (2) Reyes enticed
Matea to work in Japan subject to a PhP 150,000 placement fee; (3) Matea was
made to sign an SPA, granting Reyes the authority to mortgage the subject land
in exchange for a PhP 50,000 loan for the placement fee; and (4) Reyes used the
SPA to obtain a PhP 500,000 loan from RBCI guaranteed by a real estate mortgage
over the subject land.
A
pre-trial conference was set for
On their appeal to the CA, petitioners
asserted that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 3148-01-C
for “lack of interest to further prosecute” and (2) denying petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration.
The CA’s Ruling
The CA ruled that the petition had no
merit.[2] It cited Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides that the plaintiff’s failure to appear at the
pre-trial when so required shall be a cause for dismissal of the action and
such dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. The
CA observed that petitioners did not submit medical certificates to support
their claim that their failure to attend the pre-trial conference was due to
hypertension. The records also show that they wrote their lawyer telling the
latter to withdraw the case.
The CA, thus, affirmed the assailed RTC orders.
Petitioners
raise the following issues in this recourse: (1) whether the CA erred in not
granting an extension to file a motion for reconsideration; (2) whether
petitioners’ failure to attend the scheduled pre-trial warrants the dismissal
of the complaint; and (3) whether the trial court may dismiss the complaint on
the ground of lack of interest to prosecute despite one of the defendants
having already been declared in default.
On
This Court’s Ruling
Petitioners
claim that the dismissal of their case on a pure technicality would be highly
unfair.
Indeed,
the circumstances in the instant case merit a reversal of the trial court’s
order of dismissal. It is the policy of the Court to afford party-litigants the
amplest opportunity to enable them to have their cases justly determined, free
from the constraints of technicalities.[3] It
is undisputed that petitioners were present in all the scheduled pre-trial
conferences, except for the last one set on
We
note that the subject matter of the complaint is to petitioners a valuable parcel
of land measuring 259 square meters. Petitioners stand to lose a lot on account
of a mere technicality. They have manifested their interest to pursue the case
even on appeal. They also have adequately explained their failure to attend the
pre-trial conference. It has not been shown that a remand of the case for trial
would cause undue prejudice to respondents. In the interest of substantive
justice, we allow the petitioners an opportunity to present their side during a
trial on the merits, to obviate jeopardizing substantive justice. This
liberality underscores the importance of an appeal in our judicial grievance
structure to give party-litigants the amplest opportunity for the just
disposition of their cause freed from the noose of technicalities.
As held in RN Development, Inc. v. A.I.I. System, Inc.:
While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or a scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss.[4]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED
to the RTC of origin for further proceedings.
SO
ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate Justice
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[2]
[3] Vette Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Cheng, G.R. Nos. 170232 & 170301, December 5, 2006, 509 SCRA 532, 543.
[4] G.R. No. 166104, June 26, 2008; citing Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117385, February 11, 1999, 303 SCRA 19.