Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD
DIVISION
|
FERDINAND
A. DELA CRUZ and RENATO A. DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, - versus - AMELIA G. QUIAZON, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 171961
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: November 28, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioners, Ferdinand and Renato dela
Cruz, seek the review of the Court of Appeals Decision[1]
dated
The case arose from the following
antecedents:
Estela Dizon-Garcia, mother of
respondent Amelia G. Quiazon, was the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 107576, situated in Sto.
Domingo II, Capas, Tarlac. The property
was brought under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.[2] On
On
On May 15, 1993, respondent filed a Complaint
with the Provincial Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
against petitioner Ferdinand dela Cruz, alleging that in 1991, he entered into
a leasehold contract with respondent, by virtue of which he bound himself to
deliver 28 cavans of palay as rental. Since 1991, petitioner Ferdinand dela Cruz allegedly
failed to deliver the stipulated rental because he had already abandoned the
landholding. For this reason, respondent prayed for his ejectment from the
property and the termination of their tenancy relationship.[4]
In his Answer, petitioner Ferdinand
dela Cruz, through petitioner Renato dela Cruz, alleged that the execution of
the leasehold contract was erroneous considering that a CLT had already been
issued in favor of his father. He
contended that by virtue of the CLT, they became the owners of the landholding,
without any obligation to pay rentals to respondent but only to pay
amortizations to the Land Bank of the
Later, respondent amended the
complaint to implead Feliciano and Renato dela Cruz.[6] The amended complaint alleged that petitioners
Ferdinand and Feliciano dela Cruz were already immigrants to the United States
of America (U.S.A.) and that petitioner Renato dela Cruz, the actual tiller of
the land, was a usurper because his possession of the land was without the
consent of the landowner. Respondent
argued that by migrating to the
In turn, petitioners amended their
Answer. They averred that their father
was just temporarily out of the country and that petitioner Renato’s possession
and cultivation of the land did not need the consent of the landowner because
it was done in aid of their father’s cultivation of the land.[7]
On
On
Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. In an Order[10] dated
On
Unknown to petitioners, respondent
and her siblings, as heirs of Estela Dizon-Garcia, had filed an Application for
Retention before the DAR Regional Office for Region III, as early as
WHEREFORE,
all premises considered, Order is hereby issued, as follows:
1. GRANTING the application for retention of the Heirs of Estela Dizon-Garcia over a landholding covered by TCT No. 107576, with a total area of 12.5431, located at Sto. Domingo, Capas, Tarlac, to be divided among the heirs as follows:
Rosita Garcia -
3.9641 has.
Buena Garcia -
2.5796 has.
Bella Garcia -
3.0000 has.
Estellita Garcia - 3.0000 has.
2. ORDERING the herein landowners-applicant to maintain in peaceful possession the tenants of the subject landholding, namely: Renato dela Cruz, Carlos Aquino and Francisco Manayang as leaseholders; and
3. DIRECTING the herein landowners-applicant to cause the segregation of the retained area at their own expense and to submit report to this Office within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.[15]
In a letter[16]
dated
On
On October 19, 1999, respondent filed
a Petition for Relief from Judgment,[20] claiming
that she just arrived from the U.S.A. on September 10, 1999 and it was only
then that she found out about the July 7, 1999 DARAB Decision. She purportedly tried to contact her counsel
only to discover that he died on
In its Resolution dated
WHEREFORE,
all of the above premises considered, and in the interest of agrarian justice,
the decision of this Board dated
1. Declaring the dissolution of the tenancy relationship between the parties-litigants;
2. Declaring the cancellation of the CLT issued in the name of defendant Feliciano dela Cruz, the land subject thereof being part of the retention area of petitioner per order dated February 8, 1996; and
3. Ordering the respondents or any person acting in their behalf to vacate the subject land in favor of the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[21]
On
Petitioners thereafter filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA). Pending the resolution of
the appeal, Feliciano dela Cruz passed away.
On
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE DARAB IN DSCA NO. 0151, WHICH GAVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE DARAB IN DSCA NO. 0151 WHEREBY IT WAS RULED THAT PETITIONERS HAD THE OBLIGATION TO PAY LEASE RENTALS AND WERE GUILTY OF ABANDONMENT.
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE DARAB IN DSCA NO. 0151 WHEREBY IT WAS RULED THAT RESPONDENT HAD THE RIGHT TO RETAIN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY VIRTUE OF THE DECISION IN THE DAR RETENTION CASE.[23]
Petitioners argue that there was no
basis for the grant of the petition for relief from judgment because it was
respondent’s own neglect, and not her counsel’s demise, that caused the loss of
her right to appeal. They claim that as
early as
Secondly, petitioners contend that respondent
had no legal standing to file the petition for relief from judgment because she
no longer had any interest in the
subject property since respondent already waived her rights over the same in
favor of her siblings.
In addition, petitioners posit that with
the issuance of the CLT in favor of their father, their tenancy relationship
with respondent ceased, and ownership over the subject property was effectively
transferred to them. In any case, they
deny that they have abandoned the landholding as it is still being cultivated
by petitioner Renato dela Cruz, son of the farmer-beneficiary. Assuming that
they have abandoned the property, the right of action to oust them from the
property lies with the Republic of the
Finally, petitioners assert that the
DAR Decision in the retention case is null and void for lack of due process;
hence, the DARAB erred in relying on the said decision. They complain that they were not impleaded as
parties in the said case, nor were they given notice of its filing. Petitioners likewise point out that the
retention right of the heirs, who merely succeeded to the rights of their
mother, the landowner, should be limited to five hectares only.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, we sustain respondent’s
personality to file the petition for relief from judgment. A petition for
relief from judgment is a remedy available to a party who, through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, was prevented from taking an appeal from a judgment or final order
therein. The personality to file a
petition for relief from judgment, therefore, resides in a person who is a
party to the principal case. This legal
standing is not lost by the mere transfer of the disputed property pendente lite. The original party does not lose his
personality as a real party-in-interest merely because of the
transfer of interest
to another pendente lite.[25]
Nonetheless, even as we acknowledge
the legal personality of respondent, we hold that the DARAB, as sustained by
the CA, erred in granting the petition for relief from judgment.
A petition for relief from judgment is an
equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no
other available or adequate remedy. When
a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for
new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail
himself of this remedy. Indeed, relief
will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence;
otherwise, the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal
which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.[26]
In this case, respondent’s failure to
avail herself of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the CA was due to
her inexcusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which
ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.[27] We note that a copy of the July 7, 1999 DARAB
Decision was in fact served on the respondent herself at her residence, based
on her narration that when she arrived from the U.S.A., her helper handed to
her the envelope containing the DARAB Decision.[28] By her own account, she arrived on
Moreover, we cannot disregard the
fact that respondent was able to engage the services of a new counsel to represent
her in another case pending before the RTC as early as June 5, 1995, in
compliance with the court’s directive for her to hire a substitute for her
deceased counsel. Given this, respondent
cannot claim lack of knowledge of the death of her former counsel, and use it
as an excuse for her failure to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal
from the said DARAB Decision.
Besides, the case had been pending
before the DARAB for almost five years. To
recall, she filed, through counsel, her notice of appeal on
Not only did the DARAB err in granting the petition
for relief from judgment, it also erred in canceling the petitioners’ CLT and
ordering them to vacate the property based on a finding that petitioners had
abandoned the landholding.
However, contrary to petitioners’
posture, the issuance of a CLT does not vest full ownership in the holder.[29] The issuance of the CLT does not sever the
tenancy relationship between the landowner and the tenant-farmer. A certificate
of land transfer merely evinces that the grantee thereof is qualified to avail
himself of the statutory mechanism for the acquisition of ownership of the land
tilled by him as provided under P.D. No. 27. It is not a muniment of title that vests in
the farmer/grantee absolute ownership of his tillage. [30] It
is only after compliance with the conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to
an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership
in the landholding—a right which then would have become fixed and established,
and no longer open to doubt or controversy.[31]
For this reason, the landowner retains an interest over the property
that gives him the right to file the necessary action to evict the tenant from
the landholding should there be an abandonment despite the fact that land
acquired under P.D. No. 27 will not revert to the landowner.[32]
Nonetheless, we agree with petitioners that they
have not abandoned the subject landholding, as in fact they have continuously
cultivated the property. Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute
intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property; and
(b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into
effect. The intention to abandon implies
a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming
the right and the interest that have been abandoned.[33] The
immigration of the original farmer-beneficiary to the
Without doubt, the landowner’s right
of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite the issuance of a CLT
to farmer-beneficiaries.[35]
However, the cancellation of a CLT over the subject landholding as a necessary
consequence of the landowner’s exercise of his right of retention is within the
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary, not the DARAB, as it does not involve an agrarian dispute.[36]
Under Section 1(g), Rule II of the then
DARAB Rules of Procedure,[37]
matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of agrarian laws
shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the
DAR. Although Section 1(f) of the said Rules
provides that the DARAB shall have jurisdiction over cases involving the
issuance of a CLT and the administrative correction thereof, it should be understood
that for the DARAB to exercise jurisdiction in such cases, there must be an
agrarian dispute between the landowner and the tenant.[38]
In Tenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison v. Court of Appeals,[39] the
Court sustained the authority or jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary to cancel
the CLT issued to tenant-beneficiaries after the landowners’ right to retain
the subject landholding was upheld. The
Court ruled that the issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land
transfer falls within the Secretary’s administrative jurisdiction as
implementor of P.D. No. 27.
To conclude, respondent’s remedy is to raise
before the DAR Secretary the matter of cancellation of petitioner’s CLT as an
incident of the order granting the landowners’ application for retention over
the said landholding. In the same forum,
petitioners can raise the issue of the validity of the DAR order granting the
application for retention based on their claim of denial of due process, or in
a separate action specifically filed to assail the validity of the judgment. A collateral attack against a judgment is generally
not allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face or its nullity is
apparent by virtue of its own recitals.[40]
But as a reminder to respondent, this
tack can achieve only the cancellation of petitioner’s CLT. Under Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657, if the area
retained is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to
remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land
with similar or comparable features. Petitioners
may not be ejected from the subject landholding even if their CLT is canceled,
unless they choose to be beneficiaries of another agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition is GRANTED. The January 19, 2006 Decision and
March 21, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and Sesinando E. Villon concurring; rollo, pp. 37-50.
[2] Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to Them the Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the Instrument and Mechanism Therefor.
[3] Rollo, p. 60.
[4] CA
rollo, p. 50.
[5]
[6] Rollo, pp.
108-110.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] CA
rollo, p. 186.
[12] Rollo, p. 180.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Marcopper Mining
Corporation v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 134049, June 17, 2004, 432
SCRA 360, 382.
[26] Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 178-179 (1996).
[27] Azucena
v. Foreign Manpower Services, G. R. No. 147955, October 25, 2004, 441
SCRA 346, 355.
[28] Rollo, p. 203.
[29] Planters Development Bank v. Garcia, G.R. No. 147081, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 185, 199; Vinzons-Magana v. Estrella, G.R. No. 60269, September 13, 1991, 201 SCRA 536, 540.
[30] Martillano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148277, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 195, 203-204.
[31] Pagtalunan
v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281,
[32] See Estolas v. Mabalot, 431 Phil. 462, 469 (2002).
[33] Corpuz v. Grospe, 388 Phil. 1100, 1111 (2000).
[34] Verde v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 151342, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 97, 106-107; Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 238 (2004); Palele v. Court of Appeals, 414 Phil. 417, 429 (2001).
[35] Daez v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 742, 754 (2000).
[36] Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657
defines “agrarian dispute,” thus:
(d) Agrarian Dispute
refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
stewardship or, otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy
relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor and lessee.
[37] Repealed and/or modified by the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure and
[38] See Heirs of Julian dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,
G.R. No. 162890, November 22, 2005, 475
[39] G.R. No. 93045,
[40] Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250, 264 (1997).