PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - CONRADO
DIOCADO @ “Jun,”
Accused-Appellant. |
G.R. No. 170567
Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, carpio MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ. Promulgated: November 14, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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We review[1] in this Decision the decision dated October 25, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00280[2] that
affirmed the decision dated August 18, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Masbate City in
Criminal Case No. 8775.[3]
The RTC decision found accused-appellant
Conrado Diocado (Diocado) alias “Jun” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua; to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
for moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the
costs.[4]
BACKGROUND
On April 30,
1998, Diocado was indicted for
the crime of rape under the following Information[5]:
That on or about
February 7, 1998, in the afternoon thereof at Sitio Matungao, Brgy. Tugbo,
Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously had carnal knowledge
with AAA, an 11 year old girl, against her will.
Contrary to law.
Diocado, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charge. In the trial on the merits that ensued, the
prosecution presented the testimonies of: (1) Dr. Artemio Capellan (Dr.
Capellan), the Municipal Health Officer of Masbate; (2) private complainant
AAA;[6]
and (3) BBB, the private complainant’s older sister. The defense presented: (1)
Diocado himself; (2) CCC (his wife and the mother of AAA); (3) Maria Manlapaz;
and (4) Joey Cantojos.
The RTC
summarized the prosecution’s version of events based on the testimony of AAA, as
follows:
… it appears that at
about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 7, 1998, [AAA] was in their
house in Matungao, Tugbo, Masbate together with Conrado, the live-in partner of
her mother [CCC], who was then frying fish, felt urinating, so she went to the
bathroom to take a pee. When she was about to go out from the bathroom, she was
barred from doing so by Conrado who, armed with a knife, had followed her
inside. Threatening her with the knife, Conrado proceeded to undress her by
removing her shorts and panty after which she was told to bend forward. While
on that bending position, Conrado touched and fingered her vagina, then
inserted his penis therein. AAA felt pain in her vagina and could just only cry.
She could not move away from Conrado because she was being held by the same at
her waist. Neither could she shout because Conrado would sometimes cover her
mouth with his hand or threaten her with the knife. She, however, noticed that,
after a while a white fluid came out from the penis of Conrado. When Conrado
was done with her, he went out of the bathroom and proceeded upstairs. She, in
turn, put on her clothes, went back to the kitchen and still crying, continued
frying fish…
AAA further
testified on cross-examination that she could not shout for help during the sexual
assault because she was afraid of Diocado who was holding a knife.[7]
The physical
and medical examination conducted by Dr. Capellan yielded the following findings: [8]
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1.
Abrasion linear in shape posterior location
right/left thigh.
2.
Lacerated wound right hypochondrium area.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1.
Old healed laceration 9:00 & 12:00 o’clock
in position in the face of the clock.
x x x
CONCLUSION:
Physical virginity
lost.
According to Dr. Capellan, the old healed lacerations were
due to the rupture of AAA’s hymen caused by the penetration of a penis.[9]
Dr. Capellan further testified that the
lacerations in the private complainant’s hymen were already healed because AAA
had an elastic type of hymen (i.e., the
type that easily heals).[10]
Although the injury to the private complainant’s hymen might have been caused
by carabao, horseback, or bicycle riding, Dr. Capellan considered the external
findings conducted on AAA; they showed that the abrasion and lacerated wounds
were caused by a sharp object like fingernails or a stone that gave the
impression of sexual abuse.[11]
BBB testified that she confronted CCC with what had happened
to AAA, but CCC insisted that it was not true.[12]
She was later informed that AAA had been
placed under the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.[13]
Aside from testimonial evidence, the prosecution submitted
documentary evidence consisting of the Medical Certificate executed by Dr.
Capellan (Exhibit “A” with submarkings); the affidavit of AAA (Exhibit “B” with
submarkings); and the complaint signed by AAA (Exhibit “C” with submarkings).
Diocado relied on the defenses of denial and alibi adduced through
testimonial evidence, and presented a different version of events. The RTC
summarized Diocado’s story, as follows:
… He declared that in
the afternoon of February 7, 1998, he was at the Circle E Lodging House and
Restaurant where he works as a carpenter with a 7:00 o’clock in the morning
until 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon work schedule. On that particular day,
being a Saturday and a payday, he was not able to go home at 5:00 o’clock
because he waited for the manager for his salary. At around 6:00 p.m. the
manager arrived and after receiving his salary, he went home. When he arrived
home at past 6 in the evening, his wife CCC, who was then tending a sari-sari
store, was there, together with their children DDD, EEE and FFF. x x x They took their supper at around 7:00
o’clock in the evening and after resting for a while, Conrado, together with
his wife and the three children, went next door to the house of his parents to
watch TV. At 9 o’clock they went home.
Conrado further testified that on the night in question,
his step-daughter AAA (the private offended party) was not at their house as
she was then at the house of Shirlyn Ramirez[14]
to do some laundry work, and it was only on February 9, 1998 that she returned
home because she was fetched by her older brother. x x x
CCC corroborated Diocado’s testimony and narrated that she
was at their house at around 5:00 p.m. of February 7, 1998, taking care of her
children with Diocado. [15]
AAA was also there but she (AAA) later went out without permission; she only
came back at around 8:00 p.m.[16]
CCC narrated that she heard no complaint
from AAA that night or the day after;[17]
AAA also never gave her any reason for leaving home that night.[18]
On cross-examination, CCC admitted that the reason AAA left
home was because she (CCC) did not believe AAA’s story that Diocado sexually
abused her.[19] Subsequently recalled to the witness stand (six
months later), she varied her testimony, this time declaring that at 5:00 p.m.
of February 7, 1998, they had a lady visitor (whose name she did not know) in their
house waiting for Diocado who was still at work;[20]
and it was only her three children who watched the television that night while
she and Diocado rested.[21]
She again insisted that AAA’s accusation against Diocado was not true and
claimed that their bathroom was not enclosed by a curtain but had a door
without a lock.[22] She maintained that she did not know of any
motive why AAA would falsely accuse Diocado.[23]
The other defense witness, Maria Manlapaz, testified that at
5:00 p.m. of February 7, 1998, she went
to the house of CCC (who was alone) to collect money from her but was told to
wait for Diocado.[24]
At 6:30 p.m., Diocado arrived and gave her P100.00 as payment.[25]
On cross-examination, she admitted that she came to know CCC in 1998 at the Bureau
of Jail and Management Penology (BJMP) when her husband and Diocado were both
in jail.[26]
Joey Cantojos, a roomboy who also acted as a paymaster at
Circle E Lodge and Restaurant, confirmed that Diocado was there at around 5:00
p.m. of February 7, 1998; and that Diocado went home at around 6:30 p.m. after
receiving his salary.[27]
The RTC’s decision of August 18, 2004 gave greater weight to
the prosecution’s evidence and rejected Diocado’s defenses of denial and alibi. It believed the testimony of AAA which it described as “straightforward,
and unshaken” despite her tender
years and the rigorous cross-examination she underwent. In arriving at its
conclusion, the RTC also considered that AAA’s testimony was compatible with
the physical evidence confirming the fact and the manner of her sexual abuse.
In contrast, the court discredited the accused-appellant’s
defenses of denial and alibi and took note of the
contradictions in the testimonies of defense witnesses CCC and Maria
Manlapaz. The trial court also found that
the testimony of Joey Cantojos did not disprove Diocado’s guilt as it was not physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Similarly, the RTC debunked
-- for lack of supporting evidence -- Diocado’s claim that AAA had improper
motive to falsely accuse and testify against him.
Diocado appealed his conviction to the CA, but the appellate
court affirmed the RTC’s decision. He now supports the present appeal with the argument
that the RTC and CA committed reversible error when they anchored his
conviction on AAA’s incredible testimony.
THE ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I.
THE
LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING DIOCADO BASED SOLELY ON THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II.
THE
LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING DIOCADO GUILTY BEYOND REASONBALE DOUBT
[OF] THE CRIME OF RAPE.
OUR RULING
We
DENY the appeal and affirm Diocado’s conviction.
First, we have held in a long line of cases that the findings of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and of their testimonies are
accorded great respect.[28] It is the trial
judge who sees the behavior and demeanor of the witnesses in court, their possession
or lack of intelligence, as well as their understanding of the obligation of an
oath.[29] The trial court’s evaluation
or assessment acquires greater significance in rape cases because of the nature
of the offense; oftentimes, the only evidence available is the victim's
testimony.[30]
Our own independent examination of the records discloses no
compelling reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, particularly its view
that the testimony of AAA was straightforward and unshaken despite her tender
years as she narrated the sexual abuse she suffered in the hands of Diocado. We thus gave great weight to her testimony on
direct examination on October 14, 1999 when she testified:[31]
Q Please do so?
A After urinating, my stepfather entered the bathroom armed
with a knife threatening me not to go out.
Q What else did the accused do?
A After threatening me with his knife, he undressed me.
x x x
Q What part of your clothing was undressed by the accused?
A My short and panty.
x x x
Q After that, what happened next?
A I was made to bend down (which means in the local dialect
“towad”).
Q Can you make it clear, Witness, can you demonstrate in what
way you were required to bend your body or towad?
A I was made to bend down (witness demonstrating by bending
her body with her head down with her buttocks up).
Q While in that position, what did the accused do if there was
any?
A First, he fingered me.
Q What do you mean by you were fingered?
A He fingered my vulva.
Q After your vulva was fingered by the accused, what happened
next?
A He inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q Did the penis of the accused able to penetrate your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
She
remained steadfast in this narration and her identification of Diocado as the
perpetrator despite the rigorous cross-examination she underwent.[32] Her
credibility was strengthened when she cried at certain points of her testimony
as she related the details of the rape.[33] It was further reinforced by its marked
compatibility with the physical evidence reflected in Dr. Capellan’s findings. These findings were consistent with her
testimony that she was made to bend down while Diocado held her by the waist as
she was raped.
Second, Diocado’s attempt to
discredit AAA by pointing out the discrepancies in her sworn affidavit and her
court testimony on the actual date when the rape took place is more imagined
than real. We found no real variance as both the sworn affidavit and testimony
of AAA spoke of February 7, 1998 as the date of the rape. In any case, even assuming that discrepancies
exist, these are not material if they relate to minor matters and do not negate
the fact of rape, or if they do not relate to the material aspects of the
crime. Discrepancies can also be
disregarded when they are explained by other trustworthy evidence.
In these regards, we note that an exact allegation
of the actual date and time of the rape is not an element of this crime; what
must be proven is the carnal knowledge of the accused with the private
complainant without her consent.[34] Thus,
as a rule, the exact time of the commission of the rape is not a ground for
acquittal once the prosecution has clearly established the sexual act between
the rapist and the victim without the latter’s consent.[35] All
throughout the trial, AAA remained consistent and never wavered in her
testimony relating to the events that transpired before, during, and after the
commission of the rape, and her positive identification of Diocado as the
perpetrator.
In terms of corroboration, we find it significant
that immediately after the rape, AAA reported the matter to CCC who herself
confirmed what AAA did.[36] It is also important that AAA’s actions after
the rape were consistent with the actions of a young female who had been
grossly wronged. AAA herself testified that she left home without permission
three days after the incident and the reason she left was CCC’s refusal to
believe that Diocado raped her.[37] We additionally note that aside from running
away, (a) AAA refused to go back home despite the whipping she suffered from
her older brother; (b) aside from her mother, she also reported the rape to her
grandmother and to a friend; and (c) she voluntarily submitted herself to
medical examination and went through the process of filing a rape case and
testifying against Diocado. To our mind, these are manifestations that cannot
simply be negated by claims that discrepancies exist regarding the date the
rape took place.
Third, as the trial court did, we
cannot give any credit to Diocado’s argument that AAA did not even shout for
help when she was allegedly raped. We believe that AAA satisfactorily explained
why this happened: she was afraid of Diocado who was holding a knife and who
also covered her mouth with his hands:
Q You did not shout?
A I could not shout because
he was covering my mouth with his hands.
COURT
Q While the accused was
inserting his penis into your vagina, your mouth was not covered by the hands
of the accused?
A No, sir.
ALFORTE
Q Why did you not shout?
A Because he was
threatening me with his knife.[38]
x x x
x x x
BADILLOS
Q The houses in the
neighborhood are very close to each other, in fact, the house of the mother of
your stepfather is just adjacent to your house, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And, have you shouted or
… had you shouted (sic) people in the neighborhood could have heard you?
A Yes, sir.
Q But you did not shout?
A Because I was afraid to
(sic) him.
COURT
Q Why did you not shout?
A I was afraid of my
stepfather.[39]
This explanation, to our mind, is completely
plausible. AAA was physically
restrained during the rape. She was also emotionally prevented from calling
for help because her stepfather was holding a knife. If a person of age and ordinary prudence can
be subdued into submission and silence by these kinds of restraints, can a
young innocent girl act any differently?
Even if AAA had not been so restrained, we emphasize
that her failure to shout for help cannot per
se be read as an indicator that no rape took place. Our judicial experience in handling rape
cases teaches us that no hard and fast rule can be made on how rape victims react,
especially when the victim is young and is related to the accused. The approach we have consistently adopted in
these types of cases is to regard normal behavior to be a relative term; people
faced with the same kind of stimulus may react differently. This is all the more true in crimes like rape
which does not only entail violence against the person of the victim; it is a
crime that cannot but emotionally affect the victim and give rise to untold
feelings, especially in a culture like ours where a stigma attaches to rape
victims.
For all these reasons, we cannot give any credit to
Diocado’s defense in so far as it seeks to impugn AAA’s testimony for her
failure to shout during the act of rape.
Fourth, we cannot avoid considering that
this is a case where AAA is pitted against the testimonies of her stepfather
and her own mother. What is involved,
however, is not a straight line weighing of statements against statements, with
two statements being always better than one.
In a court of law, we look at the totality of the evidence adduced and
we weigh these using the scales of reason, experience and credibility based on
insights into the human character, all made within the parameters of the
law. All these now tell us that, under
the circumstances of this case, the mother’s word cannot prevail against the word of her wronged daughter.
The testimonial evidence of rape, supported by convincing physical evidence,
cannot be defeated by a mother’s contrary testimony. That CCC was in fact at home in the afternoon
of February 7, 1998 does not negate the commission of the rape. Time and again, we have declared that lust is
no respecter of time and place. It is a
master that does not recognize decency or morality but cares only for the
fulfillment of its selfish desires. CCC’s changing testimonies also tell us
that at some point she might have chosen the practical option of siding with
the husband who provides for her and her family. Thus, we cannot give credit to
what CCC, as mother, said with respect to her daughter’s charge of sexual abuse
in the hands of her stepfather.
Lastly, the defenses of denial
and alibi of Diocado cannot
prevail as against the positive, straightforward and consistent testimony of
AAA that both the RTC and the CA found credible. The established dictum is that denial is an intrinsically weak defense that must be
supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[40] In
the same manner, for the defense of alibi
to prosper, not only must the accused-appellant prove that he was in another
place at the time of the commission of the crime; he must also show that it was
impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the appointed time.[41]
In the present case, the evidence on
record shows that it was not physically impossible for Diocado to have
committed the rape as the distance of his house to his place of work is only
one kilometer. This distance can be
negotiated in 10 minutes when riding a bicycle and in less than 5 minutes when
riding a tricycle.[42]
Rather than disturb the appreciation by
the RTC and the CA of the testimonies of the defense witnesses, we quote with
approval the following CA findings:
In contrast, appellant’s defense of alibi is far
from convincing. His testimony and those of his witnesses collided with each
other. Tessie Diocado declared that, at the time of the incident, she was at
their house with her children including the private complainant; that private
complainant went out but returned around 8:00 p.m.; and that the private
complainant left the house on February 9, 1998. But Maria Manlapaz, their
supposed visitor, affirmed that Tessie was all alone in the house, when she
visited their house. On the other hand, the appellant testified that, when he
arrived at the house, the private complainant was not there and she came home
only on February 9, 1998; and he never mentioned having met Manlapaz that
evening. Notably, Tessie Diocado stated that they had a lady visitor on the
date and time of the incident but she does not know the name of said visitor.
However, Maria Manlapaz, who was the visitor that Tessie was referring to, said
that Tessie bought some goods from her that was why she went to Tessie’s house
to collect payment. Furthermore, appellant’s co-employee, Joey Cantojos,
testified that, on the day of the incident, he was the one who gave the salary
of the appellant. Yet, appellant claimed that it was the manager who released
their wages. Such discordant and irreconcilable testimonies indicated a
tendency to prevaricate and to twist the facts.
These weaknesses have
not been remedied by testimonial records showing (a) CCC’s silence when asked
by the RTC who she would believe between her daughter and her husband;[43]
(b) Maria Manlapaz’ testimony that she only met CCC in 1998 at the BJMP when
Diocado was already committed to jail and where her (Manlapaz’) husband was
also a detention prisoner;[44]
and (c) Joey Cantojos’ admission that he was requested by Diocado to help him
in the case, and his uncorroborated explanation for his delay in clearing
Diocado’s name.[45] These
weaknesses, when considered against AAA’s positive and steadfast testimony,
give us comfort that our conclusion to convict Diocado cannot be wrong.
The
Proper Penalty
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended,[46]
defines and penalizes the crime of rape as follows:
Art. 335. When and
how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force and intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve
years of age or is demented.
x x x
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpertua.
Under Republic Act No. 7659, the
penalty of death shall be imposed if the crime is committed when the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that the minority of the complainant and her
filiation with the accused or the fact that the accused was the common-law
spouse of her parent must be alleged in the Information. Although the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure came after the commission of the rape in this case,
its provisions may be applied retroactively considering that it is favorable to
the accused. Accordingly, while the
Information stated that AAA was 11 years old at the time of the commission of
the rape, it failed to indicate (although it was later on established during
the trial) that Diocado is the common-law spouse of AAA’s mother. Thus, both the RTC and CA are correct that
Diocado is only guilty of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
The RTC
and CA correctly awarded the private complainant the amount of P50,000
as civil indemnity and another P50,000 as moral damages, in
accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence.[47] Civil indemnity is in the nature
of actual and compensatory damages that must be awarded upon a finding of guilt
in rape cases.[48] Moral damages, on the other hand, are
automatically awarded to rape victims without the necessity of proof; the law
assumes that the victim suffered moral injuries entitling her to this award.[49]
We increase the award of exemplary damages to P25,000.00
in accordance with existing jurisprudence.[50] The award of exemplary damages is warranted
after the prosecution established that Diocado is the common-law spouse of CCC and
has lived under the same roof with AAA since the latter was only 7 to 9 years
old;[51] AAA also regarded him as the
stepfather who sent her to school.[52] Likewise undisputed is the
circumstance that the rape took place in the bathroom of AAA’s own house where she
should have felt safe and protected.
These circumstances show that the aggravating
circumstances of abuse of confidence and commission of the crime in the
dwelling of the offended party were present pursuant to the terms of Article
14, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.[53]
While these circumstances cannot be used to increase the penalty because they were
not alleged in the Information, they nevertheless suffice as bases to award
exemplary damages.[54]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
hereby DENY the accused-appellant’s
Petition for Review. The appealed
Decision dated October 25, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00280 finding accused-appellant Conrado Diocado @ Jun guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of simple rape is hereby AFFIRMED but the award of exemplary damages is MODIFIED and increased to P25,000.00.
The other portions of the appealed Decision are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Acting Chief Justice
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CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate
Justice Renato C.
Dacudao with Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin and Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo,
concurring; rollo, pp. 109-127.
[3] Penned by Hon. Pazlinda A. Villamor-Joaquin; records, pp. 101-119.
[4] Id.,
pp. 118-119.
[5] Id., p. 1.
[6] The real name of the victim as well as those of her immediate
family members are withheld per Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (An Act Providing
for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes) and R.A. No. 9262 (An
Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefore, and for Other
Purposes).
[7] TSN, October 14, 1999, p. 38.
[8] Records, p. 54.
[9] TSN, September 14, 1999, p. 6.
[10] Id.,
p. 7
[11] Id.,
pp. 5 and 7-9.
[12] TSN, March 9, 2000, pp. 5-6.
[13] Id.,
p. 6.
[14] Also referred to as “Shirleyn”; “Shirley”; or
Sherlyn Alcovindas
[15] TSN, April 6, 2001, pp. 4-6.
[16] Id., pp. 5-6.
[17] Id.,
p. 7.
[18] Id.,
p. 8
[19] Id.,
p. 17.
[20] TSN, October 11, 2001, p. 4.
[21] Id.,
p. 6.
[22] Id.,
p. 7.
[23] Id.,
p.12.
[24] TSN, May 31, 2002, pp. 3-4.
[25] Id.,
p. 4.
[26] Id.,
p.8.
[27] TSN, December 5, 2002, pp. 3-4.
[28] People
v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 148134, July 8, 2003, 405 SCRA 396, 402.
[29] Id.
[30] Id.
[31] TSN, October 14, 1999,
pp. 9-10.
[32] Id.,
pp. 26-39.
[33] Id., p.
10.
[34] People v. Escaño, G.R.
Nos. 140218-23, February 13, 2002, 376 SCRA 670, 686.
[35] Id., p.
687.
[36] TSN, April 6, 2001, p. 17.
[37]
TSN, October 14, 1999, pp. 14-15.
[38] Id., October 14, 1999, p. 10.
[39] Id.,
p. 38.
[40] People
v. Soriano, G.R. No. 135027, July 3, 2002, 383 SCRA 676.
[41] Id.
[42] TSN, March 11, 2004, p. 11.
[43] TSN, October 11, 2001, p. 26.
[44] TSN, May 31, 2002, p. 8.
[45] TSN, December 5, 2002, pp. 10-11.
[46] As amended by R.A. No. 7659, “An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.”
[47] People
v. Suarez, G.R. Nos. 153573-76, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 333, 352 (2005).
[48] Id.
[49] Id.
[50] People
v. Blancaflor, supra note 28,
p. 366.
[51] TSN, March 11, 2004, p. 7.
[52] Id.,
and TSN, October 14, 1999, p. 5.
[53] People
v. Blancaflor, supra note 50,
p. 366.
[54] Ibid.