Republic of
the
Supreme Court
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RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., |
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G.R. No. 169888 |
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City Mayor, |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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CARPIO,* J., |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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- versus - |
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Acting
Chairperson, |
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AZCUNA,*** and |
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NACHURA, JJ. |
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4th Division, and
PEOPLE |
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OF THE |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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November 11,
2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Herein
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeks the nullification of the Resolution[1] dated
October 3, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan issued in Criminal Case No. 27738 –
where Mayor Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. (petitioner) and the City Councilors are
prosecuted for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.
The assailed Resolution
ordered petitioner's preventive suspension for ninety (90) days in accordance
with Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.
The facts of the case:
Criminal
and administrative complaints were filed by Elan Recreation, Inc. (ELAN) against
petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman.
The complaints alleged that petitioner, in his capacity as mayor of the
City of Lucena, had unlawfully granted favors to a third party with respect to
the operation of bingo games in the city, to the damage and prejudice of the
complainants.[2]
On
As
a result, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the filing of three
criminal charges for violation of R.A. No. 3019:
1.
Criminal Case No. 27737. For causing undue injury
to complainants when petitioner as mayor of
2.
Criminal Case No. 27738. For giving unwarranted
benefits to Jose Sy Bang by approving an ordinance granting to Sy Bang a local
franchise to operate bingo games in the city; and
3.
Criminal Case No. 27739. For causing undue injury
to complainants when petitioner closed down their bingo operations temporarily.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation[4]
questioning the finding of the Special Prosecutor. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
the Office of the Ombudsman.
On
An
Amended Information[8] and
Second Amended Information[9] were
filed by the prosecution in the Sandiganbayan. The first included the members of the City
Council of Lucena City (City Councilors), as additional accused, while the
Second Amended Information (Information) alleged conspiracy between petitioner
and the City Councilors. Over the
opposition[10]
of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan admitted both amended informations.[11]
On
February 21, 2005, petitioner and the City Councilors filed a Motion to Quash[12] the
Information on the ground that there is no valid information on which the Sandiganbayan
has a finding of probable cause because the second amended information’s
allegations do not constitute an offense, there being no violation of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 771 as it has no applicability to bingo
operations and P.D. No. 771 has been superceded by P.D. No. 1869 and R.A. No
7160. The Sandiganbayna denied[13] the
petition and it likewise denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.[14]
On
On
Pendente
Lite.[15] Petitioner and
his co-accused filed an Opposition[16] to the
motion. Thereafter, respondent ordered
the suspension of the petitioner and his co-accused, to wit:
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the prosecution's
motion for suspension pendente lite is hereby GRANTED, and accused Ramon
Y. Talaga, Jr., Godofredo V. Faller, Danilo R. Zaballero, Salome S. Dato, Simon
N. Aldovino, Wilfredo F. Asilo, and Aurora C. Garcia are hereby directed to CE
Petitioner then filed the present
petition for certiorari with an urgent application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order on
Assailing
his suspension, petitioner alleges:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT C
II
ASSUMING THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS MANDATORY, THE
III
THE HONOR
The petition is devoid
of merit.
Petitioner
argues that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when in imposing the
sanction of suspension, it only relied on the
“mandatory” provision of Section 13 insensate to the weight and cogency of the
peculiar circumstances of the case before it.[20] Moreover, petitioner argues that the bare
reliance of respondent on Section 13 without calibrating the weight of diverse
and dueling evidence pertinent to the issue of appropriateness of ordering his
suspension is a clear abdication of respondent's constitutional duty to
exercise its judicial function.[21] In addition, petitioner contends that
respondent should have looked into the “environmental circumstances” of the
case and thus it was unwarranted to apply the presumption in Bolastig v.
Sandiganbayan[22] that
unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate or commit further acts of
malfeasance or do both.
Petitioner asks this Court to first look into the circumstances of
the case and thereafter determine the propriety of issuing a suspension
order. The Court could not be more
explicit than its ruling in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan,[23] thus:
Petitioners would now have this Court strike down
these resolutions because supposedly rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. The Court will not do so. In no sense may the
challenged resolutions be stigmatized as so clearly capricious, whimsical,
oppressive, egregiously erroneous or wanting in logic as to call for
invalidation by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. On the contrary, in
promulgating those resolutions, the Sandiganbayan did but adhere to the clear
command of the law and what it calls a “mass of jurisprudence” emanating from
this Court, sustaining its authority to decree suspension of public officials
and employees indicted before it. Indeed that the theory of “discretionary
suspension” should still be advocated at this late date, despite the “mass of
jurisprudence” relevant to the issue, is little short of amazing, bordering on
contumacious disregard of the solemn magisterial pronouncements of the Highest
Court of the land.[24]
x x x x
While petitioners concede that this Court has “almost
consistently ruled that the preventive suspension contemplated in Section 13 of
RA 3019 is mandatory in character,” they nonetheless urge the Court to consider
their case an exception because of the “peculiar circumstances” thereof. They assert that the
evils sought to be avoided by “separating a public official from the scene of
his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated” -- e.g., “to
preclude the abuse of the prerogative of (his) office, such as through
intimidation of witnesses,”or the tampering with documentary evidence -- will
not occur in the present situation where:
1. The
Project has been canceled.
2. (Their) ** official duties no longer
pertain, in any manner, to the prequalification of contractors dealing with
NPC. Neither are they now involved in any bidding for or
awarding of contracts, ** it (being) emphasized (in this connection) that they
were merely designated as ad hoc members of the Committee without
additional compensation for their additional duties.
3. All
the relevant documentary evidence had been either submitted to the Ombudsman or
to the Honorable Sandiganbayan.
They conclude that their preventive suspension “at this
point would actually be purposeless, as there is no more need for precautionary
measures against their abuse of the prerogatives of their office.”
The arguments are not new. They have been advanced and
rejected in earlier cases. They will again be so rejected in this case.
The Court’s
pronouncements in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, are
germane:
x x x The fact is that the possibility that
the accused would intimidate witnesses or otherwise hamper his prosecution is
just one of the grounds for preventive suspension. The other one is, to
prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.[25] (Emphasis supplied)
Ineluctably,
the theory of petitioner that “environmental circumstances” of the case should
first be explored has no leg to stand on.
Section 13, R.A. No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, provides:
Suspension and loss of
benefits. - Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Berońa v.
Sandiganbayan,[26] the
Court explicitly ruled:
Section
13 is so clear and explicit that there is hardly room for any extended court
rationalization of the law. Section 13
unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending
a criminal prosecution under R.A. 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code or for any offense involving public funds or property or fraud on
government. This Court has repeatedly
held that such preventive suspension is mandatory, and there are no “ifs” and
“buts” about it.
As early as Luciano v. Mariano,[27] the
Court has set out the guidelines to be followed by the lower courts in the
exercise of the power of suspension, to wit:
x x x x
(c) By way of
broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of
suspension from office of public officers charged under a valid information
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to section 13 of said Act, it may be
briefly stated that upon the filing of such information, the trial court should
issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause
at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from
office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either
the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the
accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the
validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be
necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the
parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and
thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension
should it uphold the validity of the information or withhold such suspension in
the contrary case.
(d) No specific
rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state
that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge
the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not
been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation, the act for which he
stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 or of bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant
his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act, or he may
present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in the
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed by the act
upon determination of the pendency in court or criminal prosecution for
violation of the Anti-Graft Act or for bribery under a valid information
requires at the same time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly
protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act.
Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the ground alleged in the quashal motion
not to be indubitable, then it shall be called upon to issue the suspension
order upon its upholding the validity of the information and setting the same for
trial on the merits.[28] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Stated
differently, the purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to
determine the validity of the information so that the court can have a basis to
either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the
case, or withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of
the proceedings that impairs its validity.
That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the
information by way of a motion to quash.[29] In this case, respondent had determined the
validity of the Information when petitioner filed his Motion to Quash. The hearings or proceedings held thereon, in
effect, constituted a pre-suspension hearing.
Respondent has followed the dictates of the law.
This brings the
Court to petitioner’s third assigned error that there is no valid Information
under which petitioner stands charged.
In effect,
petitioner is stating once again that the allegations in the Information do not
constitute an offense. Petitioner is
holding on to a thin straw in claiming that the Information is fatally defective since it failed to allege that
petitioner by enacting and approving Ordinance No. 1963 had “caused injury to
any party, whether the government or private party”, an essential element in
the crime charged.
The Information reads:
That
on or about June 5, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Lucena
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused RAMON TALAGA , JR., being the City Mayor of Lucena, Quezon
and GODOFR
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, under which petitioner is
charged, provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of
public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
x x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to
officers and employees charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Contrary
to the argument of petitioner, the law does not require that the information
must allege that the acts in question “caused injury to any party, whether the
government or private party.” The
presence of the word “or” clearly shows that there are two acts which can be
prosecuted under Section 3: First, causing any undue injury to any party,
including the government, and, Second, giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantages or preference. Moreover, in Quibal v. Sandiganbayan,[30] the
Court ruled that violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 requires proof of
the following facts:
x x x x
1.
His action caused undue injury to the Government
or any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference to such parties.[31]
Section
9, Rule 110, Rules of Court provides the guideline for the determination of the
validity or sufficiency of allegations in an information,
to wit:
SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. — The acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
The test is whether the crime is
described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to appraise the
accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison
d’etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense.[32]
Based on the foregoing test, the Information sufficiently
apprises petitioner of the charges against him.
The Information charged the petitioner of evident bad faith and manifest
partiality when as Mayor of Lucena City, petitioner, in conspiracy with the
City Council, gave unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang. Moreover, it states the specific act which
constituted the giving of unwarranted benefits, namely, granting unto the said
Jose Sy Bang a local franchise to operate a bingo business in
Finally, petitioner’s second assigned error deserves scant consideration. The
validity of Section 13,
R.A. No. 3019 may no
longer be put
at issue, the
same having been
repeatedly upheld by
this Court.[33] Basic
is the rule
that every law
has in its
favor the presumption
of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.[34]
The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of
preventive suspension lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed;
once a case is filed in court, all other acts connected with the discharge of
court functions - including preventive suspension – should be acknowledged as
within the competence of the court that has taken cognizance thereof, no
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers being perceivable in that
acknowledgement.[35] As earlier mentioned, the court must first
determine the validity of the information through a pre-suspension
hearing. But once a proper determination
of the validity of the information has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty
of the court to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.[36]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED, there being
no showing that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
issuing its Resolution of
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO S.
AZC Associate
Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third
Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
In lieu of
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, per Raffle dated
** In lieu of Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Raffle dated
*** In lieu of Justice Ruben T. Reyes, per Special Order No. 521.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada with the
concurrence of Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong (Chairman) and Associate
Justice Jose. R. Hernandez; rollo, pp. 45-58
[2] Rollo,
p. 310.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Rollo,
p. 383.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Rollo,
pp. 240-244.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Rollo,
pp. 14-15.
[20]
[21]
[22] G.R.
No. 110503,
[23] G.R.
No. 124067,
[24] Segovia v. Sandiganbayan,
supra note 23, at 336.
[25]
[26]
G.R. No. 142456,
[27] No.
L-32950, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 187.
[28] Luciano v. Mariano,
supra note 27, at 202-203.
[29] Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151
(1996).
[30] G.R.
No. 109991,
[31] Quibal v. Sandiganbayan,
supra note 30, at 231.
[32] Matilde,
Jr. v. Jabson, No. L-38392,
December 29, 1975, 68 SCRA 456.
[33] Segovia
v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 23, at 336.
[34] La
Bugal-Balaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, January
27, 2004, 421 SCRA 148, 247.
[35] Segovia
v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 23, at 337.
[36] La Bugal-Balaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra note 34, at 177.