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EVA FLOYD and RODOLFO CALIXTRO, Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 169047
Present: |
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- versus - |
Quisumbing,
J., Chairperson, Carpio
Morales, Tinga, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. |
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BENJAMIN GONZALES, ATILANO
NANQUIL, LINDA NISPEROS, LILIAN NISPEROS, SALVADOR NISPEROS & VIRGILIO
CONSTANTINO, Respondents. |
Promulgated: November 3,
2008 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse
the Decision[1]
dated
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows.
Petitioners Eva Floyd and Rodolfo Calixtro are occupants of a
lot in
On
On
In June 1991, when
respondents Sheriffs Benjamin Gonzales and Atilano Nanquil went to the subject
land to implement the writs, they found that petitioners and Fe Ongsotto were
also occupying the property. To prevent
the demolition, petitioners and Ongsotto filed a complaint[9]
for injunction, SP. Civil Action No. 234-0-91, before the RTC of Olongapo City.
On
The complaint was transferred to the RTC of San Fernando City by virtue of Supreme Court A.M. No. 00-11-523-RTC, following a judicial audit.
On
Petitioners and Ongsotto, separately, appealed the judgment in the injunction case before the Court of Appeals.
On
WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION
that the awards of moral damages and attorney’s fees are DELETED.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The Court of Appeals held that petitioners have not shown a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, and found that they occupied the land during the pendency of the ejectment case, thereby taking advantage of such conflict.[14]
On
Before us, petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:
I.
The honorable court of
appeals erred in affirming the decision in civil case no. 234-0-91 holding that
the petitioners are bound by the decision in civil case no. 139-0-86 although
they were not impleaded as party defendants therein.
II.
The honorable court of
appeals erred in ruling that the petitioners are not entitled to a writ of
injunction although the property they are in possession of is owned and titled
in the name of another person.
III.
The honorable court of
appeals erred in ruling that the land subject of civil case no. 139-0-86
includes the lots being occupied and possessed by the petitioners.[18]
Simply stated, the issues are as follows: Are petitioners bound by the decision in the ejectment case? Are they entitled to an injunctive writ to prevent the demolition of their houses? Who has a better right of possession over the land where their houses are erected?
Petitioners aver that only Abarnas was ordered by the
Olongapo City RTC to surrender possession of the land and remove any
construction thereon, and that they are not trespassers, squatters, or Abarnas’
relatives, successors-in-interest, or privies.
They further contend that judgments in ejectment cases are in
personam. Thus, even assuming that
they are occupying the premises subject of the ejectment case, the judgment
cannot be enforced against them as they were not made parties to it. Petitioners likewise point to several pieces
of documentary evidence which allegedly show that the Nisperoses are not the
true owners of the lots on which the houses sought to be demolished stand,
since said lots are registered in the name of one Rodrigo C. Domingo, Jr. They further argue that there is no factual
basis for the appellate court’s finding that they impliedly admitted that the
lots they are occupying form part of the property claimed by the Nisperoses.[19]
The Nisperoses on the other hand state that petitioners were
not impleaded as defendants in the ejectment case as the latter were not yet on
the premises “or hid themselves” during the pendency of the case until the time
the latter were served with a notice to vacate on December 21, 1988. They claim that petitioners connived with
Abarnas and his wife Angelina, and insist that petitioners are privies of the
Abarnases. They accuse petitioners of
bad faith in applying for a Miscellaneous Sales Application and for belatedly
securing other documents, which were “self-serving.” Lastly, they aver that the genuineness of the
documents presented by petitioners and the ownership of the lots mentioned in
it can only be determined in a full-blown trial.[20]
An ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein judgment is binding only upon parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard.[21] Petitioners were not made party-defendants by the Nisperoses. Hence, they can be bound by said judgment in the ejectment suit, even if they were not impleaded as defendants, only if they are shown to be (a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) transferees pendente lite; (d) sub-lessees; (e) co-lessees; or (f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant.[22] In such cases, court hearing is a must to determine the character of such possession. If the execution court finds that they are mere successors-in-interest, guests, or agents of the defendant, the order of execution shall be enforced against them.[23]
In the forcible entry case, petitioners had not been given their day in court to present their side to prove their alleged bona fide possession. Neither was a court hearing held to prove that they are mere successors-in-interest, guests, or agents of defendant Abarnas when the ejectment judgment was sought to be enforced against them. Thus, they cannot be bound by the decision in the ejectment case.
We now go to the second issue.
A writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued upon a clear showing that there exists a right to be protected and that the action sought to be enjoined is violative of that right.[24] From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that petitioners have a right to be protected against the summary demolition of their houses. Hence, the RTC correctly issued a writ of preliminary injunction. However, whether the injunction should be made permanent is another matter.
The determination as to whether petitioners are entitled to a permanent injunction rests on the issue of who between petitioners and respondents have a better right of possession over the land on which the houses sought to be demolished stand.
It is relevant to point out that in the pre-trial conference before the Olongapo City RTC the parties agreed on the following issues for resolution:
(1)
Whether
or not the plaintiffs were mere trespassers in the property in question or do
they have title over the premises in question.
(2)
Whether
or not the plaintiffs can be ejected or their house demolished erected on the
land in question inasmuch as they are not parties in the case of Linda Nisperos, et al. versus Rodolfo Calixtro
and Fe Ongsotto, Civil Case No. 139-0-86.
(3)
Whether
or not the spaces which plaintiffs’ houses are erected are owned by plaintiffs.[25]
Clearly, apart from the matter of enjoining the execution against petitioners of the judgment in Civil Case No. 139-0-86, the issue of who between the petitioners and respondents are entitled to possession of, as a consequence of title over, the land where the formers’ houses are erected was also squarely raised and fully tried before the lower courts. During trial, petitioners fully ventilated their claim / right to possession of the subject land. Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court states that “[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.” Under the circumstances, it is just and proper to resolve the issue of possession over the subject land. To rule otherwise and require respondents to file another case for ejectment, or institute supplemental proceedings in Civil Case No. 139-0-86, against petitioners would not be in accord with justice and would only entail more unnecessary expenses and contribute to the clogged court dockets.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals categorically
found that respondents have the better right to possession of the land. The RTC ruled that “[petitioners’] claim of
possession that started in 1988 must … yield to that of the Nisperoses who
trace their possession of the property to that of their
predecessor-in-interest, their father Igmedio who began occupying the property
in 1950.”[26] The Court of Appeals, for its part, ruled
that:
…[Petitioner] Floyd occupied the property only in 1986;
[petitioner] Calixtro occupied the property in 1988 while admitting that the
property was owned by I. Hauseco Subd.
Appellant Ongsotto likewise occupied the property in 1988 and expressed
that she derived her alleged title from a waiver and quitclaim executed by Angelina
Abarnas, the wife of … Clemente Abarnas, defendant in
the ejectment case. Thus, she is
considered as the latter’s successor-in-interest, bound by the judgment in the
ejectment case which is conclusive between the parties and their
successors-in-interest. The MSAs [Miscellaneous
Sales Applications] and unapproved survey plans presented by … Floyd and
Ongsotto are self-serving and of little evidentiary value.
In
sum, the [petitioners] have not proved a clear and unmistakable right to the
possession of the property. On the other
hand, Nisperos’ better right was established by final judgment in Civil Case
No. 139-0-86….[27]
We find no cogent reason
to overturn the consistent findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
that, as against petitioners, the Nisperoses are
entitled to possession of the subject land where the petitioners’ houses are
erected. Applicable to the instant case,
which is an offshoot of an ejectment case and which also in part partakes of an
ejectment case, is the following pronouncement of the Court on the matter of
ejectment and possession in Pajuyo v. Court
of Appeals:[28]
The only question that the courts must
resolve in ejectment proceedings is–who is entitled to the physical possession
of the premises, that is, to the possession de
facto and not to the possession de
jure. It does not even matter if a
party’s title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded
into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved
by the proper government agency. Regardless
of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable
quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of
property allowed. Courts will always
uphold respect for prior possession.
Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security
that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right
lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only
issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to
physical possession.[29]
Petitioners Floyd and Calixtro, in SP. Civil Action No.
234-0-91 admitted having possessed the subject land only in 1986 and 1988
respectively. These cannot prevail over
the Nisperoses’ possession through their father
Igmedio that started in 1950. Since the Nisperoses have proven prior possession in time, they
indeed have a better right to the possession of the land. Hence, petitioners must relinquish possession
of the land to the Nisperoses and accordingly remove
their houses which are built on the subject land.
WHEREFORE,
the Decision dated
Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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ARTURO
D. BRION Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 33-42. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas concurring.
[2] Records, pp. 528-537. Penned by Judge Adelaida Ala-Medina. Dated
[3] Civil Case No. 2467.
[4] Records, pp. 186-189. Penned by Judge Esther Nobles Bans.
[5]
[6] CA rollo, pp. 89-90.
[7]
[8] Records, p. 111.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] CA
rollo, p. 114.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Rollo, pp. 11-12.
[19]
[20]
[21] Biscocho v. Marero, A.M. No.
P-01-1527,
[22] Equitable PCI Bank v. Ku, G.R. No. 142950, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 309, 312.
[23] Gozon v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 919, 921 (1947).
[24] Tan v. Mueco, G.R. No. 141540,
[25] Records, pp. 227-228. See also the RTC Decision, records, p. 531.
[26]
[27] CA rollo, p. 113.
[28] G.R. No. 146364,
[29]