THIRD
DIVISION
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ALFREDO, PRECIOSA, ANGELITA and
CRISOSTOMO, all surnamed BUENAVENTURA,
Petitioners, - versus
- AMPARO PASCUAL and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 168819 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,* AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: November 27, 2008 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, challenging the Decision[1]
dated
The factual
and procedural antecedents of the instant Petition are as follows:
On 28 April
1993, private respondent Amparo Pascual filed with the RTC of Makati an
application[4]
for confirmation and registration of title, in accordance with the provisions
of the Public Land Act,[5]
as amended, to a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 5001-A, situated at San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila,
with an area of 1,184.52 square meters (subject lot). Private respondent alleged, inter alia, that the subject lot was not
within any reservation; that to the best of her knowledge and belief, there was
no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting the said land, nor
was there any person having any interest thereon; and that she was the occupant
of the subject lot and had been in actual, open, continuous, adverse and
exclusive possession thereof by herself and through her predecessor-in-interest
since time immemorial. Attached to the
application were the following documents: (1) the tracing cloth plan and
duplicate blue print plan of the subject lot[6];
(2) the technical description of the subject lot[7];
and (3) Tax Declaration No. 016-10453 covering the subject lot for the year
1993.[8]
Upon private
respondent’s ex-parte motion,[9]
the case was transferred to the RTC of Parañaque on
The RTC
thereafter ordered that the initial hearing of LRC Case No. M-197 be held on 27
September 1993.[12]
On 27
September 1993, petitioners Alfredo, Preciosa, Angelita, and Crisostomo, all
surnamed Buenaventura, filed an Opposition[13]
to private respondent’s application for confirmation and registration of title
to the subject lot, contending that they and their predecessors-in-interest were
the owners and possessors of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 5001, Cad-299,
Parañaque Cadastre, of which the subject lot formed apart, since time
immemorial. Not one of them gave consent
to or authority for the issuance and approval of the subdivision plan where the
subject lot was segregated from Lot No. 5001, and petitioner Preciosa never
affixed her signature to such plan, thus, making the said subdivision plan falsified
and illegal. Petitioners averred that
they, instead of private respondent, were entitled to the confirmation of their
title to the subject lot and to the registration of the same in their names.
The
Republic of the
Hearings on
LRC Case No. M-197 were held where the parties presented their respective
evidence.
According
to private respondent’s evidence, the subject lot was originally owned by her grandfather
Mariano Pascual (Mariano).[16]
Upon Mariano’s death, he was succeeded
by his two sons, Arcadio and Agripino.[17]
As early as when she was 12 years old, private
respondent was already aware that her father, Arcadio, owned the subject lot
where she used to play, gather fish from a fishpond, and get fruits from the
trees growing thereon.[18]
Her brother Ruben, however, claimed to
be already 40 years old when he first saw the subject lot.[19] Upon the death of Arcadio and his wife
Josefa, the subject lot passed on to their three children: private respondent,
Ruben, and Jose. Ruben and Jose executed
on
On the
other hand, petitioners presented evidence to support their claim that in 1941,
brothers Arcadio and Agripino Pascual sold the subject lot to their parents
Amado Buenaventura and Irene Flores. Agripino confirmed such a sale in his Affidavit
executed on
I, Agripino
Pascual, of lawful age, married to Leonor de Leon, and resident of Parañaque,
Rizal, after being duly sworn under oath, depose and say the following:
That on
That the said Mariano Pascual who was the previous
absolute owner of the said parcel of land was our legitimate father and we two
are the only legitimate and forced heirs to the said parcel of land. Hence, for taxation and assessment purposes I
hereby testify that the said parcel of land should now be declared in the name
of the said Amado Buenaventura and Irene Flores, for they are now the absolute
owners of the said property.
In witness whereof, I hereby signed (sic) this affidavit
in the City of
(Sgd.)
Affiant[24]
The subject
lot was declared in the name of petitioners’ mother Irene in 1948, 1967, 1974
and 1984.[25] In 1978, petitioners became owners and
possessors of the subject lot when their parents executed a deed of sale over
the same in their favor.[26]
The subject property was then declared
in petitioners’ names in 1979 and 1985. Petitioners and their parents had been
religiously paying for the realty taxes on the subject lot from 1948 up to
1994, during which LRC Case No. M-197 was being heard. As of 1994, there were no improvements on the
subject lot, as petitioners were filling it up so that they could sell it for a
higher price.[27] The subject lot was not part of any forest,
sea, military or naval reservation, or any land of the public domain; and it
had been possessed by petitioners and their parents publicly, usefully, adversely,
and continuously from 1941 to 1994.[28]
On
In refusing
to give credence to private respondent’s evidence, the RTC reasoned that:
A perusal of
the records of this case will reveal that [herein respondent’s] claim of
rightful ownership over the property in question is less than credible.
Firstly, [respondent] claimed that the land applied for,
consisting of 1,854.62 sq. meters, was first in the possession of her
grandfather. Upon the death of the
latter, which year she could not recall, the possession was then taken over by
her father and her uncle. When the
[respondent] was merely 12 years old, her father cultivated the land and
planted the same with trees where she occasionally harvested fruits therefrom. A portion of the land was likewise covered by
a fishpond where she used to catch fish at her father’s invitation. But upon marrying the late Arcadio Nicolas,
the [respondent], together with her four children, was (sic) no longer in
possession of the property as evidenced by her testimony that each time she and
her children passed by the questioned property, she merely told her children
that the same used to be owned by their family.
Moreover, she further testified that “when I left the property, I didn’t
see anything anymore. If there is
anybody who takes anything, I don’t know about that” (tsn,
Although the [respondent] may have proven her stay over
the property dating back in her childhood days, such fact, however, failed to
prove that her predecessors-in-interest were actually in possession of the
property publicly, peacefully and openly for more than thirty (30) years. Moreover, the Pascual brothers, in their
Affidavit of Renunciation, merely made allegations that they acquired the
property in question from their grandfather, but failed to prove by concrete
evidence how they came into possession of the parcel of land from which they
based their claim or right (even granting that the same was indeed acquired by
means of succession from their grandfather as rightful owner/possessor
thereof). Neither did they make mention
about the manner by which their predecessors-in-interest possessed the same
land.
In the instant case, the [respondent] failed to present
specific facts that would show the nature of such possession. xxx
Secondly, the Affidavit of Renunciation introduced in
evidence by the [respondent] where her brothers renounced their rights over the
subject property in her name merely evidenced the fact that the parcel of land applied
for was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain but insufficient
to clearly establish the length of time of the possession of their
predecessors-in-interest.
Finally, even assuming arguendo that
the [respondent] and her predecessors-in-interest were consistent in paying the
corresponding taxes over the property starting in the year 1955, the same is of
no moment, since the important thing to consider is the compliance of the
thirty (30) year period of open and continuous possession of her
predecessors-in-interest.[29]
As to
petitioners’ evidence, the RTC made the following evaluation thereof:
An evaluation
of the evidence presented by the [herein petitioners] in support of their claim
is likewise far from credible.
The allegation of the [petitioners] that their parents
already possessed the land as early as 1941 has not been duly proved nor
documented. Granting that the subject
lot was transferred to the parents of the [petitioners] sometime in 1947 by
virtue of a sale, there was no showing that a notarized deed of sale was ever
executed nor was the sale of the land entered in the Registry of Property. If indeed, a sale over the property took
place, this Court cannot dismiss the fact that from 1947 until the present or
approximately forty-six (46) years thereafter until the time of the filing of
the land registration case, did the predecessors-in-interest of herein
[petitioners] take the initiative of securing a title over the said property in
their name.
The contention that the subject lot has been owned by the
Sps. Buenaventura by mere Affidavit of Confirmation of Sale (Exh. “1”) cannot
be taken lightly. Ordinarily, where the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. xxx
Lastly, [petitioners’] argument that [they] took over the
possession of the property by the year 1978 or after the death of their parents
is untenable. [They] failed to establish
the nature of their possession of the land in question, whether the same may
have been acquired by means of succession or donation or otherwise, since no
documentary evidence had been presented to trace the acquisition of the
property from the hands of the predecessors-in-interest of [petitioners] to
them.[30]
In the end,
the RTC held that:
It having been insufficiently established that the lots (sic) in controversy have been under the continuous,
open, meritorious, peaceful and adverse possession of [herein respondent’s] and
[herein petitioners’] predecessors-in-interest, in the concept of [an] owner,
during the period required by law, this Court finds no legal basis to uphold
their respective claims.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for
registration of Lot No. 5001-A of Cad-299 in the name of the [petitioner]
Pascual, is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
The [petitioners’] claim is likewise, (sic) dismissed for
being devoid of merit.[31]
On
WHEREFORE, under the premises, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.[35]
The Court
of Appeals declared that private respondent failed to discharge the burden of
proving that the subject lot had been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest, in the concept of
an owner, for the prescribed period prior to the filing of her application. Private respondent’s brother, Ruben,
acknowledged that neither private respondent nor her predecessors-in-interest
ever resided on the subject lot. Even private
respondent herself admitted during trial that she was not the actual occupant
of the subject lot. The tax declaration and realty tax receipts presented by
private respondent were inconclusive evidence of her ownership. And the Affidavit of Renunciation executed in
1993 by private respondent’s brothers Ruben and Jose over their rights,
interest, and participation over the subject lot in favor of private respondent
did not state how long their predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject
lot.
Similarly,
the Court of Appeals pronounced that petitioners failed to prove that their
possession of the subject property was adverse, open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious, peaceful, and in the concept of owner. Petitioners were unable to present a notarized deed to
evidence the alleged sale of the subject lot by the brothers Arcadio
and Agripino to petitioners’ parents. It
further affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the Affidavit executed by Agripino,
confirming the alleged sale of the subject lot by him and his brother Arcadio
to petitioner’s parents was hearsay evidence, because the adverse party was not given the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiant Agripino. Moreover, petitioners -- who not
only opposed private respondent’s application, but who also, in effect,
presented their own application by praying that the RTC confirm their title
over the subject property instead and order the registration of the same in
their name -- failed to comply with the requirement that an application must be
accompanied by a tracing-cloth plan duly approved by the Director of Lands, as
well as two blueprints or photographic copies thereof and copies of the
surveyor’s certificate. Additionally,
the Notice of Hearing of LRC Case No. M-197 as published in the Official Gazette and posted in
conspicuous places pertained only to private respondent’s application. As such, the Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioners could not thereby insist on the registration of the subject lot in
their names.
Petitioners
filed their Urgent Motion for Partial Reconsideration[36]
of the Court of Appeals Decision on
In a
Resolution[38]
dated 30 June 2005, the Court of Appeals found no cogent reasons to disturb its
earlier Decision, and decreed:
WHEREFORE, both
Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED.
On
Petitioners,
on the other hand, filed the instant Petition for Review, submitting the
following issues for the resolution by this Court:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY IN UPHOLDING THE PREVIOUS FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE AFFIDAVIT OF CONFIRMATION OF SALE, EVEN IF EXECUTED ALMOST 50 YEARS AGO, IS
HEARSAY AND, IN THE ABSENCE OF A DULY NOTARIZED DEED OF SALE, CANNOT SUSTAIN
PETITIONERS (sic) CLAIM THAT THEIR PARENTS HAVE PREVIOUSLY ACQUIRED THE
PROPERTY BY WAY OF PURCHASE FROM THE APPLICANT’S PREDECESSORS.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY IN DENYING PETITIONERS (sic) COUNTER-APPLICATION FOR
TITLE BY USING THE SAME SET OF LEGAL CONCLUSIONS PREVIOUSLY APPLIED AGAINST
AMPARO PASCUAL’S FAILED APPLICATION.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS-PRIVATE OPPOSITORS, NOT
HAVING INITIATED THE REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS, CANNOT OBTAIN AN AFFIRMATIVE
RELIEF OF REGISTRATION OF TITLE FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE FORMALITIES
REQUIRED BY LAW.
Fundamentally,
the sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether petitioners are entitled
to the confirmation and registration of the title to the subject lot in their
names.
Petitioners
want this Court to reverse the decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
finding that petitioners failed to submit sufficient evidence to establish
their title over the subject property and to merit its registration in their
names. However, the Court cannot grant
petitioners’ prayer without reviewing the same evidence they presented and
already considered by the trial and appellate courts. When a doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of alleged facts or when a query necessarily solicits
calibration of the whole evidence, considering mostly the credibility of
witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their
relation to each other and to the whole and probabilities of the situation,
questions or errors of fact are raised.[42]
The petitioners
must be reminded that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not our function to review, examine and
evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. A question of fact would arise in such event. Questions of fact cannot be raised in an
appeal via certiorari before the
Supreme Court and are not proper for its consideration.[43]
Time and
again, this Court has stressed that its jurisdiction in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless
the findings of fact complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on
record, or the assailed judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts. The trial court, having heard the witnesses and
observed their demeanor and manner of testifying, is in a better position to
decide the question of their credibility. Hence, the findings of the trial
court must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this Court. Likewise, the Court has ruled that, when
supported by sufficient evidence, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals
affirming those of the trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal. The
rationale behind this doctrine is that review of the findings of fact by the
Court of Appeals is not a function this Court normally undertakes. The Court will not weigh the evidence all over
again unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are
totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious
abuse of discretion.[44]
Although
there are exceptions[45]
to the general rule that the Court is bound by the findings of fact of the
trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, it finds that none exists in
this case to justify a departure therefrom.
Being the applicants
for confirmation of imperfect title, petitioners bear the burden of proving
that they meet the requirements for the same,[46]
by no less
than clear, positive and convincing evidence.[47]
The requirements necessary for a judicial confirmation of
imperfect title are laid down in Section 14, paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529.[48] In accordance therewith, any person who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, may file in the proper trial court an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives.
Thus, any person seeking
the confirmation and registration of his title under said statutory provision
must specifically prove that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and (2) he has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land under a bona fide
claim of ownership from 12 June 1945 or earlier.
The RTC and the Court of
Appeals dismissed petitioners’ application for having failed to establish
compliance with the second requirement, i.e.,
possession of the subject property for the period and in the nature required by
law. The RTC and the Court of Appeals
have carefully and meticulously dissected each piece of evidence presented by
both private respondent and petitioners, and have thoroughly explained in their
respective decisions the reasons why these pieces of evidence cannot be given
much weight and credence.
The Court is also appalled
by the utter lack of evidence on record establishing the first requirement, i.e., that the subject lot is alienable
and disposable. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals seemed to have merely presumed that the subject lot was already
alienable and disposable.
This Court cannot
countenance such a presumption for two reasons: First, it goes against the Regalian doctrine which states that all
lands of whatever classification belong to the State. The rule applies even to privately owned
unregistered lands which, unless the contrary is shown, are presumed to be public
lands.[49]
Second,
without a definitive date when the subject lot became alienable and disposable,
the determination of whether petitioners possessed the subject lot for the time
period required by law is rendered impossible, since any period of possession
prior to the date when the subject lot was classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of
the period of possession. Such possession can never ripen into ownership; and
unless the land has been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.[50]
Indeed, the only evidence
presented by petitioners on this basic requirement is the testimony of
petitioner Angelita before the RTC, to wit:
Q: At present, will you please tell us who is in possession of
the land applied for?
A: We the oppositors, sir.
Q: Will you please tell us if the parcel of land applied for is
part of any forest, military, naval reservation and sea (sic) or land of public
domain?
A: No, sir.[51]
The self-serving
testimony of one of the petitioners is clearly not enough to overcome the
presumption of State ownership of the subject lot and to establish that it is
alienable or disposable.
To prove that the land
subject of the application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or statute.[52] No such evidence was offered by the petitioners
in this case.
Verily, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply unless and until the land subject thereof is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.[53] Inasmuch as the
petitioners failed to present any proof that the subject lot has indeed been
classified as and forms part of the disposable land of the public domain,
whatever possession they might have had, regardless of the length or nature thereof
cannot ripen into private ownership.
Even on this ground
alone, petitioners’ application for confirmation and registration of title can
already be denied.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is
hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Justice
Antonio T. Carpio was designated to sit as additional member replacing Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; rollo, pp. 84-98.
[2] Rollo, pp. 100-106.
[3] Penned by Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio; rollo, pp. 152-157.
[4] Rollo, pp. 333-334.
[5] Commonwealth Act No. 141.
[6] Records, pp. 13-32.
[7] Rollo, p. 335.
[8]
[9] Records, p. 29.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo, pp. 336-338.
[14] Records, pp. 66-67.
[15] DISCONTINUANCE OF THE SPANISH MORTGAGE SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION AND OF THE USE OF SPANISH TITLES AS EVIDENCE IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.
[16] TSN, 20 December 1993, records, p. 310.
[17]
[18]
[19] TSN,
[20] Rollo, p. 120.
[21] TSN, 21 March 1994, records, p. 374.
[22]
[23]
[24] Records, p. 139.
[25] TSN, 13 June 1994, records, p. 406.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] Rollo,
pp. 155-156.
[30]
[31]
[32] Records, p. 266.
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36] CA rollo, pp. 284-323.
[37]
[38] Rollo, pp. 100-106.
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42] See Secretary of Education v. Heirs of Rufino Dulay, Sr., G.R. No.
164748,
[43] Heirs
of Simeon Borlado v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 257, 262 (2001).
[44] Pacific
Airways Corporation v. Tonda, 441 Phil. 156, 162 (2002).
[45] The following are the recognized
exceptions to the general rule: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion. (Sampayan v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, 14 January 2005, 448 SCRA 220, 229; citing Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 86; citing Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United
Coconut Planters Bank, 400 Phil. 1349, 1356 [2000]; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission, 390 Phil. 1228,
1242-1243 [2000]; Sta. Maria v. Court of
Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 [1998]).
[46] See Collado v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 149, 173 (2002).
[47]
[48] Sec.
14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
[49] Cacho
v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 154, 165-166 (1997).
[50] Republic
v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117,
[51] TSN,
[52] Republic v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 697, 710-711 (2002).
[53] See Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 156, 162 (2000).