Republic of
the
Supreme Court
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PEOPLE
OF THE |
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G.R.
No. 167755 |
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Plaintiff-Appellee, |
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Present: |
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PUNO,
C.J., |
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QUISUMBING, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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CARPIO, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CARPIO
MORALES, |
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- versus - |
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AZCUNA,
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TINGA, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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VELASCO, Jr., |
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NACHURA, |
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REYES, |
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DE CASTRO, and |
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BRION, JJ. |
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NESTOR VELUZ, |
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Promulgated: |
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Accused-Appelant. |
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November
28, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For review before this Court is the
February 9, 2005 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00073 which affirmed the
Decision[2]
dated April 30, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch
96, finding Nestor Veluz (appellant) guilty of one
count of rape of a minor mental retardate and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death, with modification as to the damages awarded to the victim.
The Information,
dated
That on October 23, 1999 or earlier in x x x, Aurora and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, and
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge for four times of thirteen
year old AAA[3]
who has a mental age only of four (4) to five (5) years old and the said accused
was then aware of the mental disability and or physical handicap of the said
offended party.[4]
When arraigned,
appellant pleaded “not guilty.”[5] Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution
presented eight witnesses, namely: 1) Senior Police Officer 3 (SPO3) Loreto Gavina; 2) Nimia C. de Guzman; 3)
Dr. Rodolfo Eligio; 4) BBB, the aunt of AAA; 5) AAA;
6) Corazon Rivera; 7) Loreto Cuaresma; and 8) CCC,
the father of AAA.
On the other
hand, the defense presented two witnesses, namely: 1) appellant and 2) Kathleen
Veluz (Kathleen), his daughter.
The prosecution
evidence seeks to establish the following facts:
AAA testified
that she was called by Kathleen to go to the latter’s house; and when inside
the house, she was raped by appellant.[6]
Corazon Rivera
(Rivera) testified that on
Upon reaching
the house of appellant, BBB saw appellant and AAA lying naked on the bed. After seeing the scene inside the house of
appellant, BBB called appellant and requested that AAA be allowed to go out. Since appellant did not immediately answer,
BBB said that she would call a bantay bayan. BBB did
not find a bantay bayan
but instead she saw Loreto Cuaresma (Cuaresma), one of the barangay
kagawads. Cuaresma told BBB to go ahead and that he would follow. When BBB went back to the house of appellant,
she saw AAA at the back of the said house, sitting on the ground and
perspiring. She asked AAA what happened
and the latter answered, “Iniyot ng matagal.”[8] BBB asked AAA when she was “iniyot” and the latter answered, “Nabayagon.”[9]
Furthermore, BBB
asked AAA how many times she had intercourse. AAA responded by showing her four
fingers. In addition, when AAA told BBB
that she had intercourse a long time ago, BBB asked if it happened again on
that day and the answer was “wen” or yes.[10]
Cuaresma followed BBB after five minutes. Upon reaching the house of appellant, he saw
AAA sitting and perspiring and her hair entangled. Cuaresma observed
that AAA looked as if she was out of her mind. Cuaresma asked AAA
what appellant did to her and the latter answered, “Iniyot
nak.” When
asked how many times, AAA raised her four fingers. Cuaresma asked AAA
who molested her and the latter answered that it was appellant. Cuaresma then told
BBB to bring AAA home and that he would look for CCC, the father of AAA.[11]
Upon locating
CCC, Cuaresma told him that he should go home because
something happened to AAA. Later, BBB
told CCC that AAA was raped by appellant. CCC asked AAA if she was raped by
appellant and the latter answered, “Yes.”[12]
BBB and CCC
immediately brought AAA to the XXX police station. SPO3 Loreto Gavina (SPO3 Gavina) told the
group to bring AAA to a doctor for a medical examination.[13]
AAA was then
brought to the
After Dr. Eligio conducted his examination, BBB and CCC brought AAA
back to the XXX police station at
On
For the defense,
evidence is as follows:
Kathleen, 12 years
old, testified that on October 23, 1999, she did not call AAA to play; that she
was at the house of her uncle on October 22, 1999 because her grandmother died,
and that she went home in the morning of October 23, 1999 to get some clothes; and
that appellant, her father, was not at their house in the morning of October
23, 1999. In addition, Kathleen claimed
that she did not see AAA inside their house nor did she see AAA on her way home
that day.[19]
Appellant testified as follows: on
Appellant was awakened when BBB
called AAA. He then realized that AAA
was lying on his left arm. Appellant
went down the house and told AAA to leave. AAA went out through the window because she
was probably afraid of her aunt. Appellant
told BBB that AAA was not there, but BBB did not believe him since she saw the
slippers of AAA. Appellant claimed that
it was not true that he had sexual intercourse with AAA for four times on
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Nestor Veluz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape defined under Article 266-A, par. 1(d) and punished under Article 266-B
(10) and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Death; and to pay
victim AAA the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00) by way of
civil indemnity; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Appellant appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed
the RTC decision with modification as to damages, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
x x x
x
This Court finds accused-appellant Nestor Veluz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape defined under Article 266-A, par. 1(d) and punished under Article 266-B
(10). Said accused-appellant is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of DEATH
and to pay private complainant AAA the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(Php75,000.00) as actual damages, Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral
damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00) as exemplary damages and the
costs.
x x x
x
SO ORDERED.[22]
Hence, herein
appeal with the following assignment of errors:
First Assignment of Error
THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT RAPE HAD BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
AS:
THE
FACT OF CARNAL KNOWLEDGE BY THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WAS NOT ESTABLISHED BY THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND PROSECUTION WITNESSES CORAZON RIVERA AND BBB.
THE
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE DO NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING, AND DISPROVE THE
TESTIMONIES OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, CORAZON RIVERA AND BBB, THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAPED THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ON OCTOBER 23, 1999.
Second Assignment of Error
THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY AS THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF MENTAL DISABILITY WAS NOT PROVEN IN ACCORIDANCE WITH STANDARDS SET FORTH BY
CONTROLLING CASE LAW.
Third Assignment of Error
THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CIVIL INDEMNITY TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AS A
CONSEQUENCE OF HER ALLEGED RAPE BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[23]
The appeal is not meritorious.
This Court has ruled that in the
review of rape cases, the Court is guided by the following precepts: (a) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility, but it is more difficult for the
accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (b) the complainant's testimony must
be scrutinized with extreme caution since, by the very nature of the crime,
only two persons are normally involved; and (c) if the complainant's testimony
is convincingly credible, the accused may be convicted of the crime.[24]
Appellant claims that the testimony
of AAA is incredible and inconsistent. However,
it is settled that when credibility is in issue, the Supreme Court generally
defers to the findings of the trial court considering that it was in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment during trial.[25] In the instant case, the Court finds nothing
on record to justify a departure from the findings of the trial court. The testimony of AAA leaves no doubt that
appellant had in fact raped her, to wit:
x x x
x
Q. When
you were already inside their house, did you see Nesty
inside their house?
A. No
answer sir.
Q. Was Nesty in the sala?
A. Yes
sir.
Q. What
did Nesty do when you were there?
A. Iniyot po niya
ako sir.
x x x
x
Q. Where
did he had [sic] sexual intercourse with you?
A. In
the upper part of their house sir.
Q. Before
he had sexual intercourse with you, what did he do to you?
A. No
answer
Q. When
you went to the house of Nesty what were you wearing
then? Is it pants with t-shirt, shorts with t-shirt or skirt with t-shirt?
A. I
was wearing a short sir.
Q. What
is your upper garment?
A. He
removed my clothes sir. (Inalis po
niya ang damit ko).
Q. You
said that he removed your clothes, you mean to say that he removed your shorts
and your upper dress?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. When
he removed your dress what did he do?
A. Iniyot po ako.
Q. You
said that Nesty had sexual intercourse with you? Does
Nesty has a clothes or naked?
A. Yes
sir, he has clothes. (Mayroon po)
Q. When
Nesty had sexual intercourse with you, have you seen
his penis.
A. Yes
sir.
Q. Now,
were you able to see the penis of Nesty if he has a [sic]
clothes?
A. He
removed his shorts sir. (Hinubad po
niya ang short niya)
Q. After
removing his shorts, what did he do?
A. No
answer.
Q. Does
[sic] he standing when he removed his shorts?
A. He
is standing sir.
x x x
x
Q. You
said that Nesty had sexual intercourse with you, how
many times?
A. Four
times sir.
Q. Can
you show it thru your fingers?
A. (The
witness showed her four fingers)
Q. When
Nesty was removing his shorts, do you still have
clothes on?
A. I
have sir.
Q. So,
do you mean to tell us that he only removed your clothes after he had removed
his shorts?
A. None
sir. (Wala po)
Q. What
do you mean by the word none?
A. No
answer.
Q. You
said that Nesty had sexual intercourse with you and
you saw his penis, what did he do with his penis?
A. He
placed his penis in my vagina sir. (Inilagay po niya sa
aking Oki)
Q. What
did you feel when he placed his penis in your vagina?
A. Painful
sir. (Masakit po sir)
Q. After
placing his penis in your vagina, what did you do?
A. No
answer sir.
Q. When
he placed his penis in your vagina were you lying down or standing?
A. Lying,
sir.
Q. Were
you facing downward or upward?
A. Downward
sir.
x x x
x
Q. When
the penis is inside your vagina, where was Nesty? Was
he beside you or on top of you?
A. He
is on top of me sir.
Q. While
he was on top with you what he is doing? Is is [sic]
moving?
A. Yes
sir.
Q. How
was he moving? Moving sideward or up and down?
A. (The
witness demonstrated her answer by swaying her hands)
Q. Did
he stay long on top of you?
A. Yes
sir.[26] (Emphasis supplied)
As a rule, testimonies of child
victims of rape are given full weight and credit, for youth and immaturity are
badges of truth.[27]
Generally, when a woman, more so if she
is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed.
And so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility and unless
the same is controverted by competent physical and
testimonial evidence, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.[28]
In his Brief, appellant contends
that the testimony of AAA are general statements and constitute the standard
and stereotypical narration of rape.[29] The Court does not agree. Studies show that children, particularly very
young children, make “perfect victims” of rape. Certainly, children have more problems in
providing accounts of events because they do not understand everything they
experience. Moreover, children have a
very limited vocabulary.[30] Although AAA was 13 years old, she had the
mental capacity of a 4-5-year old child. The lower courts, and this Court as well,
could therefore not expect AAA to narrate and describe the exact details of how
she was raped the way a 13-year old child could do.
Moreover, the Court does not agree
with appellant's argument that the reply of AAA, “Inilagay
po niya sa
aking oki,” cannot be
automatically be taken to mean that appellant placed his penis inside her
vagina. Appellant contends that “iniligay” (to place) is not the same or synonymous
with “ipinasok” (to insert or place
inside).[31]
In the first place, as already
mentioned, children have a very limited vocabulary. Moreover, in cases where penetration was not
fully established, the Court had consistently enunciated that rape was
nevertheless consummated on the victims testimony that she felt pain.[32] The pain could be nothing but the result of
penile penetration, sufficient to constitute rape.[33] In the case at bar, AAA categorically
testified that she felt pain.
This Court rejects appellant's
contention that AAA was instructed by CCC and BBB on what to say before the
Court. It bears stressing that “no young
and decent lass will publicly cry rape if such were not the truth.”[34] Also, it is unnatural for a parent to use his
offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to
disgrace.[35]
The CA observed that AAA on redirect-examination
answered “yes” to the query if her father and aunt told or “taught” her to tell
the truth.[36]
This Court agrees with the finding of
the CA that even though AAA answered in the affirmative when she was asked if
her father and BBB instructed her on what to say before the Court, the same
cannot be taken literally, considering her mental condition.
Furthermore, AAA's testimony is
corroborated by Rivera, to wit:
Q. Upon
reaching his house, the house of Nestor Veluz, what
did you do if any?
A. I
tried to look at the window, sir.
Q. When
you looked into the window what did you see if any?
A. I
saw them lying, sir.
Q. You
mention them in your statement to whom are you referring to?
A. Nestie and AAA, sir.
x x x
x
Q. What
did you observed [sic] when you saw him inside the house?
A. They
were naked, sir “NAKAHUBAD.”
Court
Q. Which
of the two are [sic] naked?
A. The
man your honor he is moving and his bottocks [sic]
was moving.
x x x
x
Pros. Casar
Q. What
did you observed [sic] in her physical appearance?
A. Her
blouse was roll [sic] up, sir.
Q. How
about Nestor Veluz where was he when the blouse of
AAA was roll [sic] up?
A. They
were lying down facing each other side by side, sir.
Q. You
mention they who are those persons lying?
A. AAA
and Veluz, sir.
x x x
x
Q. In
what manner the bottocks [sic] was moving?
A. It
just moving up and down as demonstrated by the witness, sir [sic].
Q. Are
you married?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. That
motion of the bottocks [sic] of Nestor Veluz moving what was the motion if you know?
x x x
x
A. It
is somewhat “PAALON-ALON,” sir.
Q. Being
a married woman what can you say about that?
A. “INIYOT
PO NIYA”, he was making a sexual intercourse [sic], sir.
Q. How
long that you said Nestor Veluz doing this pumping
motion on AAA?
A. More
or less three minutes, sir.[37]
Appellant argues that the
description of AAA of her alleged rape is inconsistent with the testimony of
Rivera.[38] Appellant cites the testimony of AAA that she
was facing downward[39]
and the appellant lay on top of her[40]
when the intercourse took place. Rivera,
on the other hand, testified that he and AAA were lying on their side and
facing each other during the sexual intercourse. It must be remembered that a rape victim, most
especially in case of a retarded person, cannot be expected to remember or
recount in utmost clarity and consistency the details of her harrowing and
humiliating experience.[41] In addition, victims of rape are not expected
to have an errorless recollection of the incident which was so humiliating, and
painful that they might in fact be trying to obliterate it from their memory.[42] Thus, inaccuracies and inconsistencies are to
be expected in the rape victim's testimony.[43]
This Court agrees with the finding
of the CA that the testimony of BBB was not incredible simply because she first
sought the help of a barangay kagawad instead of immediately helping AAA. As repeatedly stressed, there is no standard
form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange,
startling or frightful experience.[44] Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience
that elicits different reactions from the witnesses and for which no clear-cut
standard form of behavior can be drawn.[45] The same observation can be applied to the
reaction of Rivera who instead of immediately calling for help, opted to watch
appellant and AAA for three minutes.
Appellant contends that there was
nothing in the testimony of BBB which corroborated AAA's testimony that
appellant had carnal knowledge of her.[46] The foregoing is inconsequential, considering
that AAA positively identified appellant as her assailant. Likewise, the testimony of Kathleen to the
effect that she did not call AAA to go to appellant’s house on
Furthermore, appellant questions the
discrepancy between BBB's sworn statement and her testimony in open court as to
the fact of her seeing appellant sucking the breast of AAA.[47] Appellant cites Rivera's testimony that when
BBB looked into the window after having been fetched by Rivera, appellant and
AAA had already left the place where Rivera saw them earlier and had gone down
(bumaba na sila).[48] Thus, appellant argues that BBB could not
have seen appellant sucking the breast of AAA.
Such argument must fail. Inconsistencies in the narration of the
prosecution witnesses on minor details do not affect the weight of their
testimonies. Testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses cannot be expected to be uniform to the last details.[49] Moreover, the testimonies of witnesses to a
crime could not be expected to be error-free all throughout. Different persons have different impressions
and recollections of the same incident.[50] Even
the most truthful witnesses can make mistakes or innocent lapses that do not
necessarily affect their credibility.[51] Thus, findings of trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal, and the rule
is not changed simply because of some inconsequential inconsistencies that are
discovered upon a fault-finding scrutiny of the records.[52]
Likewise, this Court is not
persuaded by appellant's contention that there should have been visible signs
of intercourse on the vagina of AAA such as discoloration of the inner lips or
redness of the labia minora, none of which were found
by Dr. Eligio.[53] Appellant argues that Dr. Eligio
only found healed lacerations which belie AAA's claim that she was raped two hours
prior to the medical examination. In
addition, appellant argues that there should have been welts, marks or even
bruises on the body of AAA resulting from her lying down on the bamboo floor.[54]
It is well settled that proof of hymenal laceration is not an element of rape, neither is a
medico-legal report indispensable in the prosecution of a rape case, it being
merely corroborative in nature.[55] More
importantly, a freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape, and
healed lacerations do not negate rape,[56] neither does the absence of spermatozoa
negate rape.[57] In addition, absence of external signs of
physical injuries does not cancel out the commission of rape, since proof of
injuries is not an essential element of the crime.[58] It
must be borne in mind that AAA has a mental capacity of a 4-5-year old. Most likely, she did not put up a resistance
that could bring about physical injuries. Moreover, prosecution witness Dr. Eligio testified that AAA could have been “used” once or twice
before in view of the presence of healed lacerations; and that if the penis is
of normal size, subsequent intercourse would no longer cause lacerations.
Appellant relies heavily on this
Court's pronouncement in People of the Philippines v. Cartuano,
Jr.,[59]
that there must be proper historical and physical examination to determine
the existence of mental retardation.
However, in People of the
In the case at bar, the RTC observed
the mental retardation of AAA, as the same was apparently based on her demeanor
and deportment during trial.[63] Even prosecution witness De Guzman, a
psychologist from the
More importantly, appellant knew of
the mental disability of AAA, the latter being his longtime neighbor. Appellant even acknowledged the same during
his testimony.[64]
Thus, there is more than enough evidence
to affirm the finding of the RTC that AAA was suffering from a mental
disability when she was raped by appellant.
Thus, the Court finds no error in
the CA’s affirmance of the RTC decision convicting
appellant of the crime of raping AAA.
Under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed if
the crime of rape is committed “when the offender knew of the mental
disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party
at the time of the commission of the crime.” The Information in this case alleges the
mental disability of AAA and appellant's knowledge of the same at the time of
the commission of the crime of rape. Both
allegations were duly established beyond reasonable doubt during trial. Hence, the imposition of the death penalty by
the trial court was proper.
However,
with the effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346
entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
In
addition, appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9346, which states:
SECTION 3. Persons convicted with
reclusion perpetua, or those whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by
reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
As
regards the award of damages, the CA modified the court a quo’s award as follows: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00
as moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the costs.
This
Court sustains the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity despite the
reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant from death to reclusion perpetua.
As this Court explained in People of the Philippines v. Victor[67]
the said award does not depend upon the imposition of the death penalty;
rather, it is awarded based on the fact that qualifying circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
offense.[68]
On
the other hand, the Court deems it proper to modify the amounts awarded for
moral damages and exemplary damages to bring them at par with prevailing
jurisprudence. Moral damages are awarded
without need of proof for mental, physical and psychological suffering
undeniably sustained by a rape victim.[69]
Exemplary damages are awarded when the victim of the crime is a young girl so
as to set a public example against elders abusing and corrupting the youth.[70]
Thus, the amount awarded as moral
damages is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00,[71]
while the amount awarded as exemplary damages should be reduced from P30,000.00
to P25,000.00.[72]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 00073 dated P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as
moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
No
costs.
SO ORDERED
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO C.
CORONA Associate Justice |
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
(On
official leave)
|
RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando,
with the concurrence of Associate Justices Rosmari D.
Carandang and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, rollo, pp. 3-25.
[2] CA
rollo, pp. 21- 24.
[3] The
Supreme Court took note of the legal mandate on the utmost confidentiality of
proceedings involving violence against women and children set forth in Sec. 29
of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as, Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004; and Sec. 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as, Rule
on Violence Against Women and Their Children effective November 15, 2004.
Hence, in People of the Philippines v. San Antonio, Jr., G.R. No. 176633, September 5,
2007, 532 SCRA 411, citing People of the Philippines v. Cabalquinto,
G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, this Court resolved to
withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and to use fictitious initials
instead to represent her in its decisions. Likewise, the personal circumstances
of the victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise
their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household
members, shall not be disclosed. The names of such victims, and of their
immediate family members other than the accused shall appear as “AAA,” “BBB,”
“CCC,” and so on. Addresses shall appear as “xxx” as in “No. xxx Street, xxx
District, City of xxx.”
[4] CA
rollo, p. 8.
[5] Records,
p. 28.
[6] TSN,
[7] TSN,
[8] No
English translation in the transcript; TSN,
[9]
[10]
[11] TSN,
[12] TSN,
[13] TSN,
[14] TSN,
[15] Records,
p. 10.
[16] TSN,
[17] Records,
p. 9.
[18] TSN,
[19] TSN,
[20] TSN,
[21] CA
rollo, p. 24.
[22] Rollo, p. 24.
[23] CA
rollo, pp. 84-85.
[24] People of the
[25] People
of the
[26] TSN,
[27] People
of the
[28] People of the
[29] CA
rollo, p. 87.
[30] People
of the
[31] Rollo, pp. 85-86.
[32] People
of the
[33] People
of the
[34] People
of the
[35] People
of the
[36] Rollo, p. 18.
[37] TSN,
[38] CA
rollo, p. 87.
[39] TSN,
[40]
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