Republic
of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
NATIONAL POWER G.R. No. 165969
CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
HEIRS
OF NOBLE CASIONAN,
Respondents. November 27, 2008
x - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
PETITIONING
power company pleads for mitigation of awarded damages on ground of
contributory negligence. But is the
victim in this case partly to blame for his electrocution and eventual demise?
This
is a review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) which found the National Power Corporation (NPC)
liable for damages for the death of Noble Casionan due to electrocution from the
company’s high tension transmission lines.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the trial
court are as follows:
Respondents are the parents of Noble
Casionan, 19 years old at the time of the incident that claimed his life on
A trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon,
existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used by members of the
community. Sometime in the 1970’s, petitioner
NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines of 69 kilovolts (KV)
traversing the trail. Eventually, some
of the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing their distance
from the ground to only about eight to ten feet. This posed a great threat to
passersby who were exposed to the danger
of electrocution especially during the wet season.
As early as 1991, the leaders of
Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and written requests for NPC to institute safety
measures to protect users of the trail from their high tension wires. On
In a letter dated
On
As Noble was going uphill and turning
left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling
high tension wires. Melchor, who was
walking behind him, narrated that he heard a buzzing sound when the tip of
Noble’s pole touched the wire for only about one or two seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to Noble and shook him but the
latter was already dead. Their
co-workers heard Melchor’s shout for help and together they brought the body of
Noble to their camp.
A post-mortem examination by Dra.
Ignacia Reyes Ciriaco, Municipal Health Officer of Itogon, Benguet, determined
the cause of death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to ventricular fibulation,
secondary to electrocution.[2] She also observed a small burned area in the
middle right finger of the victim.
Police investigators who visited the
site of the incident confirmed that portions of the high tension wires above the trail hung very
low, just about eight to ten feet
above the ground.
They noted that the residents, school
children, and pocket miners usually used the trail
and had to pass directly underneath the
wires. The trail was the only viable way
since the other side was a precipice. In
addition, they did not see any danger warning signs installed in the trail.
The elders and leaders of the
community, through Mayor Cresencio Pacalso, informed the General Manager of NPC
in Itogon of the incident. After
learning of the electrocution, NPC repaired the dangling and sagging
transmission lines and put up warning signs around the area.
Consequently, the heirs of the
deceased Noble filed a claim for damages against the NPC before the Regional
Trial Court (
At the trial, NPC witnesses testified
that the cause of death could not have been electrocution because the victim did not
suffer extensive burns despite the
strong 69 KV carried by the transmission lines.
NPC argued that if Noble did die by electrocution, it was due to his own
negligence. The company counter-claimed
for attorney’s fees and cost of litigation.
RTC Disposition
On
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant NPC as follows:
1. Declaring defendant NPC guilty of Negligence (Quasi-Delict) in connection with the death of Noble Casionan;
2. Ordering NPC as a consequence of its negligence, to pay the plaintiffs Jose and Linda Casionan, as heirs of the deceased, Noble Casionan, the following Damages:
a. P50,000.00
as indemnity for the death of their son Noble Casionan;
b. P100,000.00
as moral damages;
c. P50,000.00
as exemplary damages;
d. P52,277.50
as actual damages incurred for the expenses of burial and wake in connection
with the death of Noble Casionan;
e. P720,000.00
as the loss of unearned income; and
f. P20,000.00
as attorney’s fees and the cost of suit; and
3. Dismissing the
counter claim of the NPC for lack of merit.[3]
The
Melchor
Jimenez was very vivid in his account.
He declared that he and Noble Casionan cut two bamboo poles, one 14 feet
and the other about 18 feet. The shorter
bamboo pole was carried by Noble Casionan and the longer bamboo pole was
carried by him. And they walked along the trail underneath the transmission lines. He was following Noble Casionan. And when
they were going uphill in the trail and Noble Casionan was to turn left in a
curve, the bamboo pole of Casionan swung around and its tip at the back touched
for one or two seconds or for a split moment the transmission line that was
dangling and a buzzing sound was heard. And Casionan immediately fell dead and
simply stopped breathing. What better
account would there be than this?
Melchor Jimenez was an eye witness as to how it all happened.[4] (Emphasis added)
The
2. On the matter of whether plaintiffs have a cause
of action against defendant NPC, obviously, they would have. x x x This negligence of the NPC was well
established and cannot be denied because previous to this incident, the
attention of NPC has already been called by several requests and demands in
1991, 1993 and 1995 by elders and leaders of the community in the area to the
fact that their transmission lines were dangling and sagging and the
clearance thereof from the line to the ground was only 8 to 10 feet and not
within the standard clearance of 18 to 20 feet but no safety measures were
taken. They did not even put danger and warning signs so as to warn persons
passing underneath.[5] (Emphasis
added)
Disagreeing with the ruling of the trial
court, NPC elevated the case to the CA. In
its appeal, it argued that the
CA Disposition
On
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of moral damages is REDUCED to Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00); and the award of attorney’s fees in the sum of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) is DELETED.[6]
The
CA sustained the findings of fact of the trial court but reduced the award of
moral damages from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00. The CA further disallowed the award of
attorney’s fees because the reason for the award was not expressly stated in
the body of the decision.
Issues
The following issues are presented
for Our consideration: (i) Whether the award for damages should be deleted in
view of the contributory negligence of the victim; and (ii) Whether the award
for unearned income, exemplary, and moral damages should be deleted for lack of
factual and legal bases.[7]
Our Ruling
I
That the victim Noble died from being
electrocuted by the high-tension transmission wires of petitioner is not
contested by petitioner. We are,
however, asked to delete or mitigate the damages awarded by the trial and
appellate courts in view of what petitioner alleges to be contributory
negligence on the part of the victim.
As
a rule, only questions of law may be entertained on appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. The finding of negligence on the part of petitioner
by the trial court and affirmed by the CA is a question of fact which We cannot
pass upon since it would entail going into factual matters on which the finding
of negligence was based.[8] Corollary to this, the finding by both courts
of the lack of contributory negligence on the part of the victim is a factual
issue which is deemed conclusive upon this Court absent any compelling reason
for Us to rule otherwise.
But even if We walk the extra mile, the finding of liability on the part
of petitioner must stay.
Petitioner contends that the mere
presence of the high tension wires above the trail did not cause the victim’s
death. Instead, it was Noble’s negligent
carrying of the bamboo pole that caused his death. It insists that Noble was negligent when he
allowed the bamboo pole he was carrying to touch the high tension wires. This is
especially true because
other people traversing the trail have not been similarly electrocuted.
Petitioner’s
contentions are absurd.
The sagging high tension wires were
an accident waiting to happen. As
established during trial, the lines were sagging
around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required distance of 18 to
20 feet. If the transmission lines were
properly maintained by petitioner, the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not
have touched the wires. He would not
have been electrocuted.
Petitioner cannot excuse itself from
its failure to properly maintain the wires by attributing negligence to the
victim. In Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[9] this
Court held that the responsibility of maintaining the rails for the purpose of
preventing derailment accidents belonged to the company. The company should not have been negligent in
ascertaining that the rails were fully connected than to wait
until a life was lost due to an accident. Said the Court:
In
this petition, the respondent court is faulted for finding the petitioner
guilty of negligence notwithstanding its defense of due diligence under Article
2176 of the Civil Code and for disallowing the deductions made by the trial
court.
Investigation of the accident revealed that
the derailment of the locomotive was caused by protruding rails which had come
loose because they were not connected and fixed in place by fish plates. Fish plates are described as strips of iron
8" to 12" long and 3 ½" thick which are attached to the rails by
4 bolts, two on each side, to keep the rails aligned. Although they could be removed only with
special equipment, the fish plates that should have kept the rails aligned could not
be found at the scene of the accident.
There is no question that the maintenance of
the rails, for the purpose, inter alia, of preventing derailments, was the
responsibility of the petitioner, and that this responsibility was not
discharged. According to Jose Reyes,
its own witness, who was in charge of the control and supervision of its train
operations, cases of derailment in the milling district were frequent and there
were even times when such derailments were reported every hour. The petitioner should therefore have taken
more prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life
was finally lost because of its negligence.[10]
Moreover,
We find no contributory negligence on Noble’s part.
Negligence is
the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person,
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.[11]
On the other hand, contributory
negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is
required to conform for his own protection.[12] There
is contributory negligence when the party’s act showed lack of ordinary care
and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger.[13] It is an act or omission amounting to want of
ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the
defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.[14]
The underlying precept on
contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the
consequences of his own negligence.[15]
If indeed there was
contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is proper to reduce
the award for damages. This is in consonance with the
Civil Code provision that liability will be mitigated in consideration of the
contributory negligence of the injured party. Article 2179 of the Civil Code is explicit on
this score:
When
the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having
contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on an impending danger
to health and body. This Court held
then that the victim was not guilty of contributory
negligence as there was no showing that the caboose where he was riding was a
dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or
signs of impending danger.[16]
In this case, the trail where Noble
was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the
impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension
wires. Also, the trail was the only
viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence,
Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary
routine to other workers in the area.
Petitioner
further faults the victim in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited by
the DENR in the area.
In Añonuevo
v. Court of Appeals,[17]
this Court ruled that the violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that
the violation was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury
that happened was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the statute. In said case, the allegation of contributory
negligence on the part of the injured party who violated traffic regulations
when he failed to register his bicycle or install
safety gadgets thereon was struck down. We
quote:
x x x The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at
the time of the accident may have sufficiently established some degree of
negligence on his part, but such negligence is without legal consequence unless
it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. If
anything at all, it is but indicative of Villagracia’s failure in fulfilling
his obligation to the municipal government, which would then be the proper
party to initiate corrective action as a result. But such failure alone
is not determinative of Villagracia’s negligence in relation to the
accident. Negligence is relative or comparative, dependent upon the
situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
particular circumstances reasonably require. To determine if Villagracia was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely
solely on the violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine
Villagracia’s behavior in relation to the contemporaneous circumstances of the
accident.
x x x x
Under American case law, the
failures imputed on Villagracia are not grievous
enough so as to negate
monetary relief. In the absence of statutory requirement, one is not
negligent as a matter of law for failing to equip a horn, bell, or other
warning devise onto a bicycle. In most cases, the absence of proper lights on a
bicycle does not constitute negligence as a matter of law but is a question for
the jury whether the absence of proper lights played a causal part in producing
a collision with a motorist. The absence
of proper lights on a bicycle at night, as required by statute or ordinance,
may constitute negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the bicyclist is
struck by a motorist as long as the absence of such lights was a proximate
cause of the collision; however, the absence of such lights will not preclude
or diminish recovery if the scene of the accident was well illuminated by
street lights, if substitute lights were present which clearly rendered the
bicyclist visible, if the motorist saw the bicycle in spite of the absence of
lights thereon, or if the motorist would have been unable to see the bicycle
even if it had been equipped with lights. A bicycle equipped with defective
or ineffective brakes may support a finding of negligence barring or
diminishing recovery by an injured bicyclist where such condition was a
contributing cause of the accident.
The above doctrines reveal a
common thread. The failure of the
bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed
by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is established between such failure
and the injury sustained. The principle likewise finds affirmation in
Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared
that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of
the injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto. Añonuevo had the
burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence of Villagracia was the
proximate or contributory cause of the latter’s injury.[18]
(Emphasis added)
That the pocket miners
were unlicensed was not a justification for petitioner to leave their
transmission lines dangling. We quote
with approval the observation of the
The claim of NPC that the pocket miners have no right to
operate within the area of Dalicno, Itogon, Benguet as there was no permit
issued by DENR is beside the point. The
fact is that there were not only pocket miners but also there were many
residents in the area of Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet using the
trail. These residents were using this
trail underneath the transmission lines x x x.
They were using this trail even before the transmission lines were
installed in the 1970’s by NPC. The pocket miners, although they have no
permit to do pocket mining in the area, are also human beings who have to eke
out a living in the only way they know how.
The fact that they were not issued a permit by the DENR to do pocket
mining is no justification for NPC to simply leave their transmission lines
dangling or hanging 8 to 10 feet above the ground posing danger to the life and
limb of everyone in said community. x
x x[19]
(Emphasis added)
In
sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a
mitigation of its liability.
II
We now determine the
propriety of the awards for loss of unearned income, moral, and exemplary
damages.
From
the testimony of the victim’s mother, it was duly established during trial that
he was earning P3,000.00 a month. To determine the compensable amount of lost
earnings, We consider (1)
the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived (life
expectancy); and (2) the rate of
loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Life expectancy is computed
by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of
Mortality. The second factor is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the
net earnings of the deceased, i.e.,
the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or
income and less living
and other incidental expenses. The net
earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%)
of the gross earnings. Thus, the formula
used by this
Court in computing loss of earning
capacity is: Net
Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at time of death) x (gross annual
income – reasonable and necessary living expenses)].[20]
We
sustain the trial court computation of unearned income of the victim:
x x
x the loss of his unearned income can be computed as follows: two-thirds of 80
years, minus 20 years, times P36,000.00 per year, equals P1,440,000.00. This is because Noble Casionan, at the time
of his death, was 20 years old and was healthy and strong. And, therefore, his life expectancy would
normally reach up to 80 years old in accordance with the above formula
illustrated in the aforesaid cases.
Thus, Noble Casionan had 60 more years life expectancy since he was 20
years old at the time of his death on P36,000.00 since he was earning
about P3,000.00 a month of P36,000.00 a year would be P1,440,000.00.
However, in determining the unearned
income, the basic concern is to determine the damages sustained by the heirs or
dependents of the deceased Casionan. And
here, the damages consist not of the full amount of his earnings but the
support they would have received from the deceased had he not died as a
consequence of the unlawful act of the NPC.
x x x The amount recoverable is
not the loss of the entire earnings but the loss of that portion of the
earnings which the heirs would have received as support. Hence, from the amount of P1,440,000.00,
a reasonable amount for the necessary expenses of Noble Casionan had he lived
would be deducted. Following the ruling
in People v. Quilaton, 205 SCRA 279,
the Court deems that 50 percent of the gross earnings of the deceased of P1,440,000.00
should be deducted for his necessary expenses had he lived, thus leaving the
other half of about P720,000.00 as the net earnings that would have gone
for the support of his heirs. This is
the unearned income of which the heirs were deprived of.[21]
In
quasi delicts, exemplary damages are awarded where the offender was guilty of
gross negligence.[22]
Gross negligence has been defined to be
the want or absence of even slight care or diligence as to amount to a reckless
disregard of the safety of person or property. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.[23]
Petitioner
demonstrated its disregard for the safety of the members of the community of
Dalicno who used the trail regularly when it failed to address the sagging high
tension wires despite numerous previous requests and warnings. It only exerted efforts to rectify the danger it
posed after a death from electrocution already occurred. Gross negligence was thus apparent, warranting
the award of exemplary damages.
As
to the award of moral damages, We sustain the CA reduction of the award. Moral damages are designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer. It is not meant to enrich the
complainant but to enable the injured party to obtain means to obviate the
moral suffering experience. Trial courts
should guard against the award of exorbitant damages lest they be accused of
prejudice or corruption in their decision making.[24]
We find that the CA correctly reduced
the award from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00.
As
for the award for attorney’s fees, well-settled is the rule that the reason for
the award must be discussed in the text of the court’s decision and not only in
the dispositive portion.[25]
Except for the fallo, a discussion on the reason for the award for attorney’s fees
was not included by the
WHREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision of the
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 46-58. CA-G.R. CV No. 59614. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Lambert
v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, G.R. No. 160709,
[9] G.R. No. 83491,
[10]
[11] Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 991, 1002-1003 (1999). (Citations omitted.)
[12] Estacion v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 144723,
[13]
[14] Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9, at 93.
[15] Syki v. Begasa, 460 Phil. 381, 390-391 (2003).
[16] Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9.
[17]
G.R. No. 130003,
[18] Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals, id. at 40-43. (Citations omitted.)
[19] Rollo, p. 95.
[20] Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, supra
note 8, at 294; Pleyto v. Lomboy,
G.R. No. 148737,
[21] Rollo, pp. 96-98.
[22] Civil
Code of the
[23] Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 331 Phil. 633, 641 (1996). (Citations omitted.)
[24]
[25] Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, supra note 8, at 297.