Republic of the
Supreme
Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
OTILIA
STA. ANA, Petitioner, - versus - SPOUSES LEON G. CARPO and
AURORA CARPO, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 164340
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: November
28, 2008 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this
Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision[2]
dated March 5, 2004 which reversed and set aside the Decision[3]
of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated June 24,
1998 and reinstated the Decision[4]
of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Laguna dated October
12, 1993.
The Facts
Respondent Leon Carpo[5]
(Leon) and his brother Francisco G. Carpo are the registered co-owners of a
parcel of land designated as Lot No. 2175 of the Santa Rosa Estate Subdivision,
situated at Sta. Rosa, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-17272[6]
of the Register of Deeds of Laguna, with an area of 91,337 square meters, more
or less. A portion thereof, consisting
of 3.5 hectares, pertained to Leon and his wife, respondent Aurora Carpo. It was
devoted to rice and corn production (subject land) and was tenanted by one
Domingo Pastolero (Domingo), husband of Adoracion Pastolero (Adoracion).[7]
When Domingo passed away, Adoracion
together with her son Elpidio Pastolero, assumed the tenancy rights of Domingo
over the subject land.
However, on P72,500.00,
transferred her rights in favor of petitioner Otilia Sta. Ana[9]
(petitioner) who, together with her husband, Marciano de la Cruz (Marciano),
became the new tenants of the subject land.
At the outset, the parties had a
harmonious tenancy relationship.[10]
Unfortunately, circumstances transpired which abraded the relationship. The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) mediated in order to amicably settle the
controversy, but no settlement was reached by the parties. Thus, the instant
case.
In their Complaint for Ejectment due to Non-Payment of
Lease Rentals[11]
dated December 1, 1989, respondents alleged that it was their agreement with
petitioner and Marciano to increase the existing rentals from 36 cavans to 45
cavans, and that, if respondents wanted to repossess the property, they only
had to pay the petitioner the amount of P72,500.00, the same amount paid by the latter to
Adoracion. Respondents further averred
that despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to pay the actual rentals from
July 1985 to September 1989, in violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 817;
and that the subject land had been declared, upon the recommendation of the
Human Settlements Committee, suitable for commercial and industrial purposes,
per Zoning Ordinance of 1981 of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondents prayed that petitioner be ejected
from the subject land and be directed to pay P75,016.00 as unpaid rentals.
In their Answer[12]
dated January 26, 1990, petitioner and Marciano denied that there was an
agreement to increase the existing rental which was already fixed at 36 cavans
of palay, once or twice a year depending on the availability of irrigation
water; that neither was there an
agreement as to the future surrender of the land in favor of the respondents; that they did not refuse to pay the rentals
because they even sent verbal and written notices to the respondents, advising them to accept the
same; and that in view of the latter’s failure to respond, petitioner and
Marciano were compelled to sell the harvest and to deposit the proceeds thereof
in Savings Account No. 9166 with the
Universal Savings Bank at Sta. Rosa, Laguna under the names of Leon and
Marciano. As their special affirmative
defense, petitioner and Marciano claimed that Marciano is a farmer-beneficiary
of the subject land pursuant to P.D. 27. Petitioner and Marciano prayed for the
outright dismissal of the complaint and for the declaration of Marciano as full
owner of the subject land.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The PARAD’s
Ruling
On P40,000.00 with the Universal Savings Bank for the
unpaid rentals. As such the PARAD considered the deposits as late payments and
as implied admission that indeed petitioner and Marciano did not pay the past
rentals when they fell due. The PARAD further held and disposed thus:
The intent of the defendant to subject the said area under PD 27 should pass the criteria set. Foremost is the determination of the aggregate riceland of plaintiff. He must have more than seven (7) hectares of land principally devoted to the planting of palay. Area over seven (7) hectares shall be the one to be covered by PD 27 on Operation Land Transfer (OLT). In the case at bar, defendants failed to prove that plaintiff has more than the required riceland. In fact the subject 3.5 hectares are jointly owned by two. Hence, coverage for OLT is remote.
Defendant claimed that plaintiff is covered by LOI 474, and therefore, he is zero retention of area. In reference to said law, wherein it provides landowner with other agricultural land of more than 7 hectares, or have other industrial lands from where he and his family derived resources, then, the owner cannot retain any riceland. However, this is not applicable in the instant case, as the defendant failed to prove that plaintiff has other source of income from where they will derive their sustenance.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Ordering the ejectment of defendant from the subject landholding for non-payment of lease rentals;
b) Ordering the defendant Marciano de la Cruz to surrender the possession and cultivation of the subject land to herein plaintiffs;
c)
Ordering the defendant to pay as actual
damage the amount of P75,016.00
corresponding to the unpaid rentals from July 18, 1985 up to September 16,
1989[; and]
d) [D]eclaring the subject land not covered by Presidential Decree No. 27, Republic Act [No.] 6657, and Executive Order No. 228.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner
and Marciano sought relief from the DARAB.[13]
The DARAB’s Ruling
On
It is a fundamental rule in this jurisdiction that for non-payment of lease rentals to warrant the dispossession and ejectment of a tenant, the same must be made in a willful and deliberate manner (Cabero v. Caturna, et al., CA-G.R. 05886-R, March 10, 1977). For a valid ouster or ejectment of a farmer-tenant, the willful and deliberate intent not to pay lease rentals and/or share can be ascertained when there is a determination of will not to do a certain act.
Considering the circumstances obtaining in this case, it cannot be concluded that the defendants-appellants deliberately failed or refused to pay their lease rentals. It was not the fault of defendants-appellants herein that the rentals did not reach the plaintiffs-appellees because the latter choose to lend a deaf ear to the notices sent to them. Clearly, therefore plaintiffs-appellees failed to show by substantial evidence that the defendants-appellants deliberately failed or refused to pay their lease rentals. It has been held that the mere failure of a tenant to pay the landowner’s share does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay (Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, 1 SCRA 1106).
Thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the appeal interposed by the defendants-appellants to be meritorious, the Decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and another judgment issued as follows:
1. Enjoining plaintiffs-appellees to respect the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land in suit by the defendants-appellants; and
2. Directing the MARO of Sta. Rosa, Laguna to assist the parties in the proper accounting of lease rentals to be paid by the defendants-appellants to the plaintiffs-appellees.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the
CA. On
The CA’s
Ruling
On
In the case at bar, We opted to give more weight to
the petitioners contention that the “subject landholding is for residential,
commercial, and industrial purposes as declared by zoning ordinance of 1981 of
the town of Sta. Rosa, Laguna upon recommendation of the Human Settlement
Committee xxx.” The vicinity map of the
subject landholding shows that it is almost beside Nissan Motors Technopa[r]k
and surrounded by the South Expressway and several companies such as the
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. and Toyota Motors Philippines along the
Pulong Santa Cruz,
The
CA ruled in favor of the respondents in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter, the present Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board-Central Office, Elliptical Road, Diliman, Quezon City (promulgated on June 24, 1998) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered- REINSTATING the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board-Region IV, Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, Sta. Cruz, Laguna (dated October 12, 1993). No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15]
assailing the aforementioned Decision which the CA, however, denied in its
Resolution[16]
dated
Hence, this Petition based on the
following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ARROGATING UPON ITSELF WHAT IS OTHERWISE DAR’S POWER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SUBJECT AGRICULTURAL LAND HAS BECOME RESIDENTIAL/INDUSTRIAL/COMMERCIAL.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT EQUATED “LAND RECLASSIFICATION” WITH “LAND CONVERSION” FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE PROPRIETY OF EJECTMENT OF AN AGRICULTURAL LESSEE.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO NOTE THAT AN
EJECTMENT SUIT BASED ON A CLAIM OF NON-PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTAL IS DIAMETRICALLY
ANTITHETICAL TO THE CLAIM THAT THE
THE
DECISION DATED
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RESORTING TO SURMISES AND CONJECTURES WHEN IT RULED THAT THE FAILURE OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER AND HER DECEASED HUSBAND TO DELIVER THE LEASE RENTALS TO HEREIN RESPONDENTS, WAS DONE SO IN BAD FAITH AND WITH DELIBERATE INTENT TO DEPRIVE THE LAND OWNERS THEREOF.
Petitioner asseverates that there is
no evidence to support respondents' claim that the failure to pay the lease
rentals was tainted with malevolence, as the records are replete with acts
indicative of good faith on the part of the petitioner and Marciano and bad
faith on the part of respondents.
Moreover,
petitioner claimed that the power to determine whether or not the subject land
is non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), lies with the DAR, and not with the courts; that
mere reclassification by way of a zoning ordinance does not warrant the
dispossession of a tenant but conversion does, and entitles the tenant to payment
of disturbance compensation; the legal concepts of reclassification and
conversion are separate and distinct from each other; that respondents'
complaint before the PARAD alleged and established the fact that the subject
land is a riceland, therefore, agricultural;
that the CA failed to explain why it upheld the findings of the PARAD on
the issue of non-payment of lease rentals; and that though the issue of
non-payment of lease rentals is a question of fact, due to the conflict of the
factual findings of the PARAD and CA with those of the DARAB, petitioner asks
that this Court review the evidence on record, and pursuant to the CA decision
in Cabero v. Caturna, et al.,[17]
rule on whether petitioner willfully and deliberately refused to pay lease
rentals as to warrant her dispossession from the subject land.[18]
On the
other hand, respondents aver that petitioner and her family are wealthy, as
they own numerous properties in Sta. Rosa, Laguna including a luxurious house;[19]
that, as such, petitioner cannot be
considered as a landless tenant deserving the protection of agrarian reform
laws; that the DARAB negated the highest degree of respect the factual findings
of the PARAD deserved; that petitioner's claims that
Marciano repeatedly made
verbal and
written notices[20]
for Leon to accept their lease rentals were fraudulent designs to disguise the
deliberate intent of petitioner not to pay the lease rentals; that when Leon
went to petitioner's residence, petitioner did not pay the P10,000.00 due as lease
rentals; that during the hearing before the PARAD, when respondents' counsel
requested that they be furnished a bank certificate as to the existence of said
bank deposits in Republic Planters Bank as of April 20, 1987 and October 1,
1987, petitioner herself commented, “Nagdeposito
ho talaga kami sa pangalan namin”;[21]
that the statement of petitioner is an admission that bank deposits, if any,
were made, not in the name of Leon as contained in the written notices, but
rather in the names of petitioner and Marciano; that such certificate was not
introduced in evidence and that upon inquiry, said deposits do not actually exist;
that per recent inquiry, the bank deposit in Universal Savings Bank only
contains P1,020.19
due to previous withdrawals made by Marciano; that the foregoing circumstances
indicate a pattern of fraudulent misrepresentations by the petitioner to mislead
the DARAB into believing that petitioner and Marciano did not deliberately
refuse to pay the lease rentals; that from July 18, 1985 up to the present,
petitioner failed to pay the lease
rentals showing again, the deliberate refusal to pay; that this default on the
part of the petitioner has been recurring for several years already, thus
depriving the respondents as landowners of their share of the subject land in
violation of the principle of social justice; that as raised in respondents
Omnibus Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration[22]
before the DARAB and as found by the CA based on its vicinity map,[23]
the subject land is of a residential, commercial and industrial character, exempted
from agrarian reform coverage; and that the DARAB erred in not finding the sale
of the tenancy rights of Adoracion to
petitioner and Marciano for P72,500.00 violative of P.D. 27 even if the same was with
Leon's consent. The sale, respondents contend was therefore, null and void ab initio, not susceptible of any
ratification.[24]
Our Ruling
Before we
resolve this case on the merits, a procedural issue must be disposed of.
Respondents
strongly argue that the instant Petition was filed out of time because, while
petitioner originally claimed to have received her copy of the CA Resolution[25]
dated June 28, 2004, denying her Motion for Reconsideration,[26]
on July 12, 2004, petitioner eventually admitted, after respondents showed
proof to the contrary, that she actually received the said Resolution on July
7, 2004.[27]
Thus, petitioner had only up to
Petitioner alleges that on
Rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the application of the
Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their
operation. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax
compliance with the procedural rules, even the most mandatory in character,
mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put an end to litigation speedily
and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.[31]
Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo[32]
is instructive:
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
In this case, petitioner was one day late in filing her
Motion for Extension. To deny the Petition on this ground alone is too harsh a penalty
for a day’s delay, taking into consideration the time, resources and effort spent
by petitioner and even by the respondents, in order to pursue this case all the
way to this Court. Thus, we dispense with the apparent procedural defect and
resolve this case on the merits. The
ends of justice are better served when cases are determined on the merits — with
all parties given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses —
rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.[33]
The Petition is impressed
with merit.
In sum,
there are two (2) ultimate issues that require resolution in this case:
1) Whether the CA erred in ruling that the
subject land had already become
residential, commercial and/or industrial, thus, excluded from the coverage of our laws on agrarian reform; and
2) Whether the petitioner, as an agricultural tenant, failed to pay
her lease rentals when the same fell due as to warrant her dispossession of the
subject land.
On the first issue, we rule
in the affirmative.
To recapitulate, the instant case sprang from a Complaint for Ejectment based on Non-Payment of lease rentals. Though an allegation was made by the respondents that the land had been declared, upon the recommendation of the Human Settlements Committee, suitable for commercial and industrial purposes, per Zoning Ordinance of 1981 of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, no argument was advanced by respondents to support such allegation, in the same way that no prayer for the ejectment of the tenants was raised based on that allegation. The PARAD held that petitioner should be ejected for non-payment of lease rentals. It also ruled that the subject land is not covered by P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 6657, and E.O. No. 228, not on the basis of the allegation in the complaint, but on the respondents' right of retention.
On appeal, the DARAB concentrated
on the issue of petitioner’s failure to pay lease rentals. When the DARAB ruled
that petitioner and Marciano did not deliberately fail to pay said rentals,
respondents raised a new issue in their Omnibus Motion that the transaction
between Adoracion and petitioner was void in violation of P.D. No. 27, despite
the conformity of
Finally,
when the case reached the CA, the appellate court affirmed the findings of the
PARAD that petitioner and Marciano deliberately and in bad faith did not pay
the lease rentals. The CA, however, also
held that the subject land had already become a residential, commercial and
industrial area based on the vicinity map showing that the land was surrounded
by commercial and industrial establishments.
Without
doubt, the PARAD acted without jurisdiction when it held that the subject land was
no longer covered by our agrarian laws because of the retention rights of the
respondents. The CA likewise acted
without jurisdiction when it ruled that the land had become non-agricultural
based on a zoning ordinance of 1981— on the strength of a mere vicinity map.
These rulings violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has
initially been lodged in an administrative body of special competence. For
agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1)
quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and
(2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.[34]
In Department
of Agrarian Reform v. Abdulwahid,[35]
we held:
As held by this Court in Centeno v. Centeno [343 SCRA 153], "the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program." The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. No. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations."
Under Section 3 (d) of
R.A. No. 6657 (CARP Law), "agrarian dispute" is defined to include
"(d) . . . any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy
relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor and lessee."
Simply put,
agrarian disputes, as defined by law and settled in jurisprudence, are within
the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB,
while issues of retention and non-coverage of a land under agrarian reform,
among others, are within the domain of the DAR Secretary.
Thus,
Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. — The Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters involving the administrative implementation of RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative orders, which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his issuances, to wit:
3.1 Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the agrarian reform program and the initial issuance of CLOAs and EPs, including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of such coverage;
3.2 Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or disqualification of potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries;
3.3 Subdivision surveys of land under CARP;
3.4 Recall, or cancellation of provisional lease rentals, Certificates of Land Transfers (CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the issuance, recall, or cancellation of EPs or CLOAs not yet registered with the Register of Deeds;
3.5 Exercise of the right of retention by the landowner;
3.6 Application for exemption from coverage under Section 10 of RA 6657;
3.7 Application for exemption pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44 (1990);
3.8 Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for livestock, swine, and poultry raising;
3.9 Cases of exemption/exclusion of fish pond and prawn farms from the coverage of CARP pursuant to RA 7881;
3.10 Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for land subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) found unsuitable for agricultural purposes;
3.11 Application for conversion of agricultural land to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses and purposes including protests or oppositions thereto;
3.12 Determination of the rights of agrarian reform beneficiaries to homelots;
3.13 Disposition of excess area of the tenants/farmer-beneficiary's landholdings;
3.14 Increase in area of tillage of a tenant/farmer-beneficiary;
3.15 Conflict of claims in landed estates administered by DAR and its predecessors; or
3.16 Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
Verily,
there is an established tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents
in this case. An action for Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease rentals is
clearly an agrarian dispute, cognizable at the initial stage by
the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB.[36] But issues with respect to the retention
rights of the respondents as landowners and the exclusion/exemption of the
subject land from the coverage of agrarian reform are issues not cognizable by
the PARAD and the DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary because, as aforementioned,
the same are Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.
It has not
escaped our notice that, as this case progressed and reached a higher level in
the hierarchy of tribunals, the respondents would, invariably, proffer an
additional theory or defense, in order to effect petitioner’s eviction from the
land. As a consequence, the simple issue
of ejectment based on non-payment of rentals has been muddled.
Proof
necessary for the resolution of the issue of the land being covered by, or
excluded/exempted from, P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 6657, and other pertinent
agrarian laws, as well as of the issue of the right of retention of the
respondents, was not offered in evidence.
Worse, the PARAD resolved the issue of retention even if it was not
raised by the respondents at that level, and even if the PARAD had no
jurisdiction over the same.
Likewise,
the CA ruled that the land had ceased being agricultural on the basis of a mere
vicinity map, in open disregard of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, since
the issue was within the province of the Secretary of DAR.
We take
this opportunity to remind the PARAD and the CA that “courts of justice have no
power to decide a question not in issue.”
A judgment that goes beyond the issues, and purports to adjudicate
something on which the parties were not heard, is extra-judicial, irregular and
invalid. This norm applies
not only to
courts of justice, but also to quasi-judicial
bodies such
as the PARAD. Accordingly, premature and
irregular were the PARAD ruling on the retention rights of the respondents, and
the CA decision on the non-agricultural character of the land subject of this
controversy -- these issues not having passed the scrutiny of the DAR Secretary
-- are premature and irregular.[37]
Thus, we
cannot allow ourselves to fall into the same error as that committed by the
PARAD and the CA, and resolve the issue of the non-agricultural nature of the
subject land by receiving, at this stage, pieces of evidence and evaluating the
same, without the respondents having first introduced them in the proper forum.
The Office of the DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve the issues
on retention and exclusion/exemption from agrarian reform coverage, being the
agency lodged with such authority inasmuch it possesses the necessary expertise
on the matter.[38]
Likewise,
we refrain from entertaining the issue raised by respondents that petitioner
and her family are not landless tenants and are therefore not deserving of any
protection under our laws on agrarian reform, because fairness and due process
dictate that issues not raised in the proceedings below should not be raised
for the first time on appeal.[39]
On the second issue, we rule
in the negative.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No.
3844,[40]
as amended, coupled with the fact that the respondents are the complainants
themselves, the burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee rests upon the
respondents as
agricultural
lessors.[41]
This proceeds from the principle that a
tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to security of
tenure. Petitioner can only be ejected
from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law.[42] Section 36 of the same law pertinently
provides:
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
x x x x
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished;
x x x x
Respondents
failed to discharge such burden. The agricultural tenant's failure to pay the
lease rentals must be willful and deliberate in order to warrant his
dispossession of the land that he tills.
Petitioner's
counsel opines that there appears to be no decision by this Court on the matter;
he thus submits that we should use the CA decision in Cabero v. Caturna. This is
not correct. In an En Banc Decision by this Court in Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, et al.,[43]
we held that under our law and jurisprudence, mere failure of a tenant to pay
the landholder's share does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject
the former when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to
pay. This ruling has not been overturned.
The term
“deliberate” is characterized by or results from slow, careful, thorough
calculation and consideration of effects and consequences.[44] The term “willful,” on the other hand, is
defined as one governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to
reason.[45]
We agree
with the findings of the DARAB that it was not the fault of petitioner that the
lease rentals did not reach the respondents because the latter chose to ignore the
notices sent to them. To note, as early as
These
factual circumstances negate the PARAD findings of Marciano’s and petitioner's
deliberate and willful intent not to pay lease rentals. Good faith was clearly
demonstrated by Marciano and petitioner when, because respondents refused to accept
the proffered payment, they even went to the point of seeking government
intervention in order to address their problems with respondents. Absent such deliberate and willful refusal to
pay lease rentals, petitioner's ejectment from the subject land is not
justified.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60640 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 21-72.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Associate Justice Eliezer R. Delos Santos, concurring; id. at 74-85.
[3]
[4]
[5] Also referred to as Leony Carpo and Leon Carpio in other pleadings and documents.
[6] Records, p. 232.
[7] Also referred to as Asuncion Pastolero in other pleadings and documents.
[8] CA rollo, pp. 213-214.
[9] Also referred to as Otilla and
Otelia Sta. Ana-de la Cruz and
Ofelia de la Cruz in other pleadings and documents.
[10] In a handwritten affidavit dated
“Ito ay bilang pagpapatunay na si G. Marciano dela Cruz, aking magsasakang namumuwisan ay bayad ng lahat sa buwis sa aking bukid na kanyang sinasaka subalit mayroon pa naging utang na Dalawampu at pito (27) cavans at nangangako rin siya na ang nasabing utang ay babayaran niya bago sumapit ang Oktubre 31/85.
Sa katunayan ay lumagda kaming dalawa sa ibaba nito bilang pag-sangayon.” (Records, p. 110)
[11]
[12]
[13] Notice of Appeal dated
[14] Rollo, p. 117.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Petitioner's Memorandum dated
[19] Respondents' Comment dated
[20] Per record, the first written
notice sent by Marciano was dated P10,000.00 from Marciano's residence
until
[21] TSN,
[22] Rollo, pp. 469-501.
[23] CA rollo, p. 103.
[24] Respondents' Memorandum filed on
[25]
[26]
[27] Respondents' Opposition to the
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review dated
[28]
[29] Respondents' Supplement to the
Memorandum dated
[30]
[31] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Planters Development
Bank, G.R. No. 160395, May 7, 2008,
citing Great Southern Maritime Services
Corporation v. Acuña, 452 SCRA 422 (2005) and Barnes v. Padilla, 461 SCRA 533 (2005).
[32] G.R.
No. 173415, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 348, 364, citing Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633, 643 (2005).
[33] Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada, G.R. No. 168943, October
27, 2006, 505 SCRA 828, 843.
[34] Ros v. Department
of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 132477, August 31, 2005 468 SCRA 471, 483-484,
citing Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. de
Villena, 438 SCRA 259, 262-263 (2004).
[35] G.R. No. 163285,
[36] 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, Rule II, Section 1, Item No. 1.4.
[37]
[38] Roxas
& Co., Inc., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999,
321 SCRA 106, 154.
[39]
Tan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 166143-47,
[40]
Entitled "An Act to Ordain the Agricultural Land Reform Code and to
Institute Land Reforms in the Philippines, Including the Abolition of Tenancy
and the Channeling of Capital into Industry, Provide for the Necessary
Implementing Agencies, Appropriate Funds therefor and for other purposes;"
which took effect on August 8, 1963.
[41] Mon v. Court of Appeals; supra note 37, at 177.
[42] Heirs of Enrique Tan, Sr. v.
Pollescas, G.R. No. 145568, November
17, 2005, 475 SCRA 203, 212.
[43] G.R. No. L-16963, April 26, 1961, 1 SCRA 1106, 1108, citing Section 50 (c), Republic Act 1199 and Paz, et al. v. Santos, et al., L-12047, September 30, 1959 (unreported- 106 Phil. 1161).
[44] Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, Copyright © 1993.
[45]
[46] Records, p. 112.
[47] Supra note 20.
[48] Records, p. 119.
[49]
[50]