Republic of the
Supreme
Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
(formerly Jose D. Malvas),
Director of Petitioners, -versus- HON. NORMELITO J.
BALLOCANAG, Presiding Judge, Branch 41, Regional Trial Court,
Pinamalayan, Oriental Respondents. |
G.R. No. 163794
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: November 28, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O
N
NACHURA, J.:
Before
this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision[2]
dated
The
facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in 1970, [private respondent Danilo] Reyes bought the subject 182,941-square-meter land at Bgy. Banus, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro [subject land] from one Regina Castillo (or Castillo) in whose name it was titled under Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-2388 issued pursuant to Free Patent No. V-79606. Right after his purchase, Reyes introduced improvements and planted the land with fruit trees, including about a thousand mango[es], more than a hundred Mandarin citrus, and more than a hundred guyabanos. He also had the title transferred in his name and was issued TCT No. 45232.
Reyes so prized this land which he bought in good faith. Unfortunately, it turned out that about 162,500 square meters of this land is part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro and, therefore, cannot be subject to any disposition or acquisition under any existing law, and is not registrable.
Thus, in the Complaint (Annex “A”, pp. 15 to 21, rollo) for “Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion” filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (or OSG) in behalf of the Republic [petitioner], as represented by the Bureau of Forest Development (or BFD), it was explained that the source[,] Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-2388 of Castillo, issued pursuant to Free Patent No. V-79606, is spurious, fictitious and irregularly issued on account of:
a)
ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (162,500) SQUARE METERS,
more or less, of the land covered by OCT No. P-2388 was, at the time it was
applied for patent and or titling, a part of the timberland of Oriental
Mindoro, per BFD Land Classification Map Nos. 2319 and 1715. Copy of said maps are attached hereto as Annexes
“B” and “C”;
b)
The 162,500 square meters covered by OCT No. P-2388 are entirely inside
the 140 hectares Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175 in favor of Atty.
Augusto D. Marte[4]
[Atty. Marte], copy of the Map of AFFLA No. 175 and AFFLA No. 175 are attached
hereto as Annexes “D” and “E”;
c) Neither the private defendant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property because the rightful occupant is Atty. Augusto D. Marte by virtue of the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement [AFFLA] No. 175, issued to him by the Ministry of Natural Resources in 1986 to expire on December 21, 2011;
d) Since the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 45232, in the name of defendant Danilo Reyes, is a part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro, per BFD Land Classification Map Nos. 2319 & 1715, the same cannot be the subject of any disposition or acquisition under any existing law (Li Hong Giap vs. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693; Veno vs. Gov’t of P.I. 41 Phil. 161; Director of Lands vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5). (pp. 18 to 19, rollo)
Aside from the documentary evidence presented to support these allegations, the Republic presented as well and called to the witness stand:
a) Armando Cruz, the supervising cartographer of the DENR, who explained that based on Land Classification Map No. 1715 (Exh. “A”) which was later amended to LC Map No. 2319 (Exh. “B”), the plotting shows that the 162,000 square meters covered by OCT No. 2388 are entirely inside the 140 hectares of the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175 in favor of Atty. Marte and the alienable and disposable area of Castillo’s land is only around two (2) hectares;
b) Alberto Cardiño, an employee of the DENR who conducted the survey on the land under litigation, corroborated the testimony of Cruz that only two hectares is alienable and disposable land; and
c) Vicente Mendoza, a Geodetic Engineer, who expounded on the procedure before the title could be issued to an applicant for a disposable and alienable public land. He clarified that he did not make the survey for Castillo but upon presentation to him of the carpeta in open court he noticed that, while it appears to be valid, it however has no certification of the Bureau of Forestry - an essential requirement before title could be issued.
For his side, Reyes presented evidence showing his extensive development of and investment in the land, but however failed to traverse squarely the issue raised by the Republic against the inalienability and indisposability of his acquired land. His lame argument that the absence of the Certification by the Bureau of Forestry on his carpeta does not necessarily mean that there was none issued, failed to convince the court a quo.
Hence, Judge Edilberto Ramos, the then Presiding Judge of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, held[5] that:
The defendants in this case did not
assail the evidence of the plaintiff but concentrated itself to the expenses
incurred in the cultivation and in the planting of trees in that disputed
areas. Aside thereto, the plaintiff
cited that it is elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable
of registration their inclusion in a certification of ownership or confer title
on the registrant. (Republic of the
In
view thereof, it appears that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants and therefore it is hereby declared that
Free Patent No. V-79606 issued on
The
two-hectare lot, which appears disposable and alienable, is declared null and
void for failure to secure certification from the Bureau of
The counter-claim of the defendant is hereby denied for lack of merit, with cost against the defendant.[6]
Reyes appealed the aforementioned
RTC Decision to the CA. In its Decision[7]
dated
Thus, Reyes sought relief from this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
But in our Resolution[9]
dated
On
Petitioner opposed the motion, citing
the principle of accession under Article 440[13]
of the Civil Code. It further argued that the
subject land, being
timber
land, is property of public dominion and, therefore, outside the commerce of
man and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object of any contract. This
being the case, there are no improvements to speak of, because the land in
question never ceased to be a property of the Republic, even if Reyes claimed
that he was a purchaser for value and in good faith and was in possession for more
than thirty (30) years. Moreover, petitioner averred that, assuming Reyes was
initially a planter/sower in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot
be of absolute application since from the time the reversion case was filed by
the petitioner on
Meanwhile,
on March 2, 1998, Atty. Marte filed a Complaint for Injunction With an
Ancillary Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
against Reyes for allegedly encroaching upon and taking possession by stealth,
fraud and strategy some 16 hectares of his leased area without his permission
or acquiescence and planted trees thereon in bad faith despite the fact that
the area is non-disposable and part of the public domain, among others.
But the respondent RTC
dismissed the said complaint in the assailed Joint Order and ruled in favor of
Reyes, finding Rule 39, Section 10, paragraph (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, applicable. The RTC ratiocinated:
Under the circumstance, it is but just and fair and equitable that Danilo Reyes be given the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of his labor on the land which he honestly believes was legally his. He was not aware that his certificate of title which was derived from OCT No. P-2388 issued in 1957 by the government itself in the name of Regina Castillo contained legal infirmity, otherwise he would not have expoused (sic) himself from the risk of being ejected from the land and losing all improvements thereon. Any way, if the court will grant the motion for the defendant’s (sic) Danilo Reyes to remove his improvements on the disputed property, it will not prejudice Augusto Marte, otherwise, as the court sees it, he will immensely [benefit] from the toils of Danilo Reyes.
and then disposed, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to remove improvements filed by defendant Danilo Reyes dated January 28, 1998 is hereby GRANTED pursuant to the provisions of section 10, paragraph (d) of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and he is given a period of one (1) year from the issuance of this ORDER to remove, cut and appropriate the fruit-bearing trees which he had planted in the property in disputes (sic).
The COMMENT filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General dated
The [C]omplaint for Injunction filed
by Augusto D. Marte on
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed its
Motion for Reconsideration[15]
which was denied by the RTC.[16]
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA via Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure[17]
ascribing to the RTC grave abuse of discretion and acting without jurisdiction
in granting Reyes' motion to remove improvements.
However, the CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari, and affirmed the
ruling of the RTC, in this wise:
It is notable that in the course of the suit for “Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion” there was not an iota of evidence presented on record that Reyes was in bad faith in acquiring the land nor in planting thereon perennial plants. So it could never be said and held that he was a planter/sower in bad faith. Thus, this Court holds that Reyes sowed and planted in good faith, and that being so the appropriate provisions on right accession are Articles 445 and 448 also of the Civil Code.[18]
Hence, this Petition based on the sole
ground that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HOLDING THAT THE MOTION TO REMOVE IMPROVEMENTS FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS BUT AN INCIDENT OF THE REVERSION CASE OVER WHICH THE TRIAL COURT STILL HAS JURISDICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DECISION IN THE REVERSION CASE HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.[19]
The OSG posits that Reyes' assailed
motion is barred by prior judgment under Section 47, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure because said motion merely sprang from the civil case of
reversion tried and decided on the merits by the RTC, and the decision is
already final, after it was duly affirmed by the CA and by this Court. The OSG
stresses that one of Reyes' assigned errors in the reversion case before the CA
was that the RTC “erred in not granting his (Reyes') counterclaims as well as
his claims for improvements.” The OSG claims that such assigned error was duly
resolved by the CA when it held, to wit:
The non-award of appellant's “counterclaims” is understandable.
To begin with, no evidence whatsoever was presented by the appellant to sustain his plea for damages. In fact, appellant never testified to prove his allegations as regards his counterclaims.
Then, too, there is no showing that appellant paid the docket fees for the court to acquire jurisdiction over his purported counterclaims (Metal Engineering Resources Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 273).
Lastly,
the allegations made in the Answer in support of the so-called “counterclaims”
clearly negate the nature of the claims as compulsory counterclaim like that of
reimbursement of the useful expenses (Cabangis vs. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA
414).[20]
Thus, the OSG posits that the issue of
the improvements cannot be made the subject of the assailed motion on the
pretext that such removal of improvements is merely incidental to the reversion
case. The OSG submits that the consideration of the issue is now barred by res judicata. Lastly, the OSG argues
that: the RTC and CA cannot vary a decision which has already attained
finality; for purposes of execution, what is controlling is the dispositive
portion of the decision; the RTC, except to order the execution of a decision
which had attained finality, had long lost jurisdiction over the case; and the
RTC erred and acted without jurisdiction when it granted Reyes' motion to
remove the improvements when the dispositive portion of the decision in the
reversion case did not provide for the removal of the same.[21]
In his Comment[22]
on the OSG petition, Reyes avers that the points raised by the OSG are merely
rehashed arguments which were adequately passed upon by the CA. He fully agrees
with the ruling of the CA that: he is a planter/sower in good faith, as such,
Articles 445 and 448 of the New Civil Code are applicable; his motion is not
entirely a new case, but merely an incident to the reversion case, a consequence
of its grant and a legal solution to an important issue overlooked, if not
ignored by the State and by the courts in their decisions in the reversion case;
under Section 10, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, he is allowed
to remove the improvements; and the instant Petition failed to abide with the
proper manner as to the “proof of service” required under Section 13, Rule 13
of the
1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. Most importantly,
Reyes avers that the land on which about 1,000 mango trees, 100 mandarin citrus
trees and 100 guyabano trees are planted, was leased by the government to Atty.
Marte, who entered into the possession of the subject land when the trees were
already bearing fruits. Thus, if said trees are not removed, Atty. Marte would be
unduly enriched as the beneficiary of these fruits without even spending a
single centavo, at the expense of Reyes. Reyes posits that it is a
well-established fact, unrebutted by the petitioner, that he planted these
trees and to deny him the right to remove them would constitute a grave
injustice and amount to confiscation without just compensation which is
violative of the Constitution.
The OSG counters that copies of the
instant Petition were properly served as shown by the photocopies of the
registry return cards. Moreover, the OSG avers that granting, without admitting,
that another person would stand to be benefited by the improvements that Reyes
introduced on the land is beside the point and is not the fault of the
petitioner because the particular issue of the improvements was already
resolved with finality in the reversion case. The OSG claims that a lower court
cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do
so will negate the principle of hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of
review - a final judgment, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.[23]
The instant Petition lacks merit.
In an action for reversion, the
pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed
land.[24]
Indeed, the ownership over the subject land reverted
to the State by virtue of the decisions
of the
RTC and CA
and our Resolution on the matter. But
these decisions simply ordered the reversion of the property to the State, and
did not consider the improvements that Reyes had introduced on the property or
provide him with any remedy relative thereto.
Thus, Reyes was left out in the cold,
faced with the
prospect of losing not only the land which he thought he owned, but also of forfeiting
the improvements that he painstakingly built with his effort, time and money.
We cannot agree with the OSG that the
denial by the CA of Reyes’ counterclaim in the reversion case had the effect of
completely foreclosing whatever rights Reyes may have over these
improvements. We note that the
counterclaim was denied because Reyes failed to prove that it was in the nature
of a compulsory counterclaim, and he did not pay docket fees thereon, even as
the CA found that Reyes “never testified to prove his allegations as regards
his counterclaims.” Yet, the records of
the reversion case reveal that Reyes adduced ample evidence of the extent of
the improvements he introduced and the expenses he incurred therefor. This is reflected in the findings of the CA
in the case at bench, and we concur with the appellate court when it said:
But this Court notes that while Reyes was
half-hearted in his opposition to the reversion, he instead focused on proving
the improvements he has introduced on the land, its extent and his expenses.
Despite these proofs, the Decision of
Correlatively, the courts in the
reversion case overlooked the issue of whether Reyes, vis-à-vis his improvements, is a builder or planter in good faith. In the instant case, the issue assumes full
significance, because Articles 448[25] and 546[26]
of the Civil Code grant the builder or planter in good faith full reimbursement
of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made. A builder or planter in good faith
is one who builds or plants on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof,
unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds or plants on
it. [27]
On this issue, we are disposed to
agree with the CA that Reyes was a planter in good faith. Reyes was of the belief that he was the owner
of the subject land; in fact, a TCT over the property was issued in his
name. He tilled the land, planted fruit
trees thereon, and invested money from 1970.
He received notice of the Republic’s claim only when the reversion case
was filed on
To order Reyes
to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing trees in favor of the State --
because the decision in the reversion case declaring that the land is part of
inalienable forest land and belongs to the State is already final and immutable
-- would inequitably result in unjust enrichment of the State at the expense of
Reyes, a planter in good faith.
Nemo cum
alterius detrimento locupletari potest.[28] This basic doctrine on unjust
enrichment simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich
himself inequitably at another’s expense.[29] There is unjust enrichment when a person
unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience.[30] Article 22 of the Civil Code states the rule
in this wise:
ART. 22. Every person who, through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him.
The requisites for the
application of this doctrine are present in the instant case. There is enrichment on the part of the
petitioner, as the State would come into possession of -- and may technically
appropriate -- the more than one thousand fruit-bearing trees planted by the
private respondent. There is
impoverishment on the part of Reyes, because he stands to lose the improvements
he had painstakingly planted and invested in.
There is lack of valid cause for the State to acquire these
improvements, because, as discussed above, Reyes introduced the improvements in
good faith. Thus, the Court of Appeals
did not commit any error in ruling that Reyes is entitled to the benefits of
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
Thus, even if we accept
the OSG’s submission that Reyes’ entitlement to these benefits is not absolute
because he can no longer claim good faith after the filing of the reversion
case in 1987, still, there is no gainsaying that prior to that ― all the
way back to 1970 ― he had possessed the land and introduced improvements
thereon in good faith. At the very
least, then, Reyes is entitled to these benefits for the 17 years that he had
been a planter in good faith.
However, we are mindful of
the fact that the subject land is currently covered by Agro-Forestry Farm Lease
Agreement (AFFLA) No. 175 issued by the Ministry of (now Department of
Environment and) Natural Resources in favor of Atty. Augusto D. Marte, which
will expire on December 21, 2011. By the
terms of the AFFLA, the lessee shall, among others, do all in his power to
suppress fires, cooperate with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) in the
protection and conservation of the forest growth in the area and undertake all
possible measures to insure the protection of watershed and environmental
values within the leased area and areas adjacent thereto. This obligation to prevent any damage to the
land subject of the lease is consonant with fundamental principles and state
policies set forth in Section 16,[31]
Article II and Section 4,[32]
Article XII of the Constitution.
To allow Reyes to remove
the fruit-bearing trees now full-grown on the subject land, even if he is
legally entitled to do so, would be risking substantial damage to the
land. It would negate the policy
consideration underlying the AFFLA -- to protect and preserve the biodiversity
and the environment, and to prevent any damage to the land. Further, it would violate the implicit mandate
of Article 547 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART.
547. If the useful improvements can be
removed without damage to the principal thing, the possessor in good faith may
remove them unless the person who recovers the possession exercises the option
under paragraph 2 of the preceding article.
In this light, the options
that Reyes may exercise under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code have been
restricted. It is no longer feasible to
permit him to remove the trees he planted.
The only equitable alternative would be to order the Republic to pay
Reyes the value of the improvements he introduced on the property. This is only fair because, after all, by the
terms of the AFFLA, upon the expiration of the lease or upon its cancellation
if there be any violation or breach of its terms, all permanent improvements on
the land shall pass to the ownership of the Republic without any obligation on
its part to indemnify the lessee.
However, the AFFLA is not
due to expire until
As to the OSG’s insistent
invocation of res judicata and the
immutability of final judgments, our ruling in Temic Semiconductors, Inc. Employees
It is axiomatic that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but it extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been conferred.
The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of a final judgment are: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
In the exercise of our mandate as a court
of justice and equity,[34]
we rule in favor of Reyes pro hac vice.
We reiterate that this Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of
judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of
final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.[35] Indubitably, to order the reversion of the
subject land without payment of just compensation, in absolute disregard of the
rights of Reyes over the improvements which he, in good faith, introduced
therein, would not only be unjust and inequitable but cruel as well.
WHEREFORE,
the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
1)
The Regional Trial Court of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 41, is hereby DIRECTED to determine the
actual improvements introduced on the subject land, their current value and the
amount of the expenses actually spent by private respondent Danilo Reyes for the
said improvements thereon from 1970 until
2) The
Republic, through the Bureau of Forest Development of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, is DIRECTED to pay private respondent Danilo
Reyes the value of such
actual improvements he introduced on the subject land as
determined by the Regional Trial Court, with the right of subrogation
against Atty. Augusto D. Marte, the lessee in Agro-Forestry Farm Lease
Agreement No. 175.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice