Republic
of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
SPS.
Petitioners,
Present:
-
versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
RODRIGO
APOSTOL, FIDEL CHICO-NAZARIO,
LOZANO,
ERNESTO SIMBULAN, NACHURA, and
MAYOR
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, REYES, JJ.
MUNICIPALITY
OF KORONADAL
(
PROVINCE
OF SOUTH COTABATO,
represented
by the MUNICIPAL
TREASURER
and/or MUNICIPAL
MAYOR
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL,
and
THE FIRST INTEGRATED Promulgated:
BONDING
COMPANY,
INC. ,
Respondents. November 27, 2008
x - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
Challenged
in this petition for review on certiorari
is the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (
The Facts
On
The
pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing
the
Marvin sustained severe head injuries
with subdural hematoma and diffused cerebral contusion.[7] He was initially treated at the
Petitioners spouses
In their respective Answers, all
respondents denied liability for Marvin’s death. Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took
the pick-up truck without their consent.
Likewise, Miguel and Lozano pointed out that Marvin’s sudden sprint
across the highway made it impossible to avoid the accident. Yet, Miguel denied being on board the vehicle
when it hit Marvin. The
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the
The complaint against defendant First Integrated Bonding Insurance Company,
Inc. is hereby ordered dismissed there being no cause of action against said
insurance company.
However,
defendants Fidel Lozano, Rodrigo Apostol, and Mayor Fernando Miguel of
Koronadal,
1.
One Hundred Seventy Three Thousand
One Hundred One and Forty Centavos (P173,101.40) Pesos as actual damages
with legal interest of 12% per annum computed from
2. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos as moral damages;
3. Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages;
4. Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos as Attorney’s fees;
5. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos for the death of Marvin Jayme;
6. Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
as litigation expenses; and
7. To pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Dissatisfied
with the
CA Disposition
In his appeal, Mayor Miguel contended
that the
On
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as defendant-appellant Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel is concerned, and the complaint against him is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[13]
The CA held that Mayor Miguel should
not be held liable for damages for the death of Marvin Jayme. Said the appellate court:
Moreover,
plaintiffs-appellees admitted that Mayor Miguel was not the employer of
Lozano. Thus, paragraph 9 of the
complaint alleged that the
The
CA also reiterated the settled rule that it is the registered owner of a
vehicle who is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages
incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries or death
sustained in the operation of the vehicle.
Issues
The spouses
Jayme have resorted to the present recourse and assign to the CA the following
errors:
I.
the HONORABLE Court of Appeals erred IN holding
that MAYOR FERNANDO MIGUEL cannot be held liable for the death of marvin jayme
which conclusion is contrary to law
II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS
Our Ruling
The doctrine of vicarious liability or
imputed liability finds no application
in the present case.
Spouses Jayme contend, inter alia, that vicarious liability
attaches to Mayor Miguel. He was not a
mere passenger, but instead one who had direct control and supervision over
Lozano during the time of the accident.
According to petitioners, the element of direct control is not negated
by the fact that Lozano’s employer was the
Article 2180[16]
of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for one’s own
quasi-delictual acts, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible
for. This liability is popularly known
as vicarious or imputed liability. To
sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the following
requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the
employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in
accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all
times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by
reason of the functions entrusted to him.[17]
Significantly, to make the employee
liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be established that the
injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was performing
his functions.[18]
Furthermore, the employer-employee
relationship cannot be assumed. It is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant
evidence. In Belen v. Belen,[19] this
Court ruled that it was enough for defendant to deny an alleged employment
relationship. The defendant is under no
obligation to prove the negative averment. This Court said:
It is an old and well-settled rule of the courts that the burden of proving the action is upon the plaintiff, and that if he fails satisfactorily to show the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exceptions. This rue is in harmony with the provisions of Section 297 of the Code of Civil Procedure holding that each party must prove his own affirmative allegations, etc.[20]
In resolving the present controversy,
it is imperative to find out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano
and therefore liable for the negligent acts of the latter. To determine the existence of an employment
relationship, We rely on the four-fold test.
This involves: (1) the
employer’s power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other remuneration; (3)
the employer’s right to control the method of doing the work; and (4) the
employer’s right of suspension or dismissal.[21]
Applying the foregoing test, the CA
correctly held that it was the
Spouses Jayme argued that Mayor
Miguel had at least supervision and control over Lozano and how the latter
operated or drove the Isuzu pick-up during the time of the accident. They, however, failed to buttress this claim.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or
directions to Lozano, he still can not be held liable. In Benson
v. Sorrell,[23] the New
England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does
not establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of
the driver. This Court, in Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,[24] ruled in a similar vein, to wit:
x x x The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts and omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency. x x x[25] (Emphasis supplied)
Significantly, no negligence may be
imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have the right to
control the manner of the vehicle’s operation.[26] In
the absence of an employer-employee relationship establishing vicarious
liability, the driver’s negligence should not be attributed to a fellow
employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle.[27] Whatever right of control the occupant may
have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of
the doctrine of vicarious liability. Handley v.
Lombardi[28] is instructive on this exception to the rule on vicarious
liability:
Plaintiff was not the master or principal of the driver of
the truck, but only an intermediate and superior employee or agent. This being so, the doctrine of respondeat
superior or qui facit per alium is not properly applicable to him. His power to direct and control the driver was not as master,
but only by virtue of the fact that they were both employed by Kruse, and the
further fact that as Kruse’s agent he was delegated Kruse’s authority over the
driver. x x x
In the case of actionable negligence, the rule is well
settled both in this state and elsewhere that the negligence of a subordinate
employee or subagent is not to be imputed to a superior employee or agent, but
only to the master or principal. (Hilton v. Oliver, 204 Cal. 535 [61 A. L. R. 297, 269 Pac. 425];
Guild v. Brown, 115 Cal. App. 374 [1 Pac. (2d) 528]; Ellis v. Southern Ry. Co., 72 S. C. 464 [2 L. R. A. (N. S.)
378, 52 S. E. 228]; Thurman v. Pittsburg & M. Copper Co., 41 Mont.
141 [108 Pac. 588]; 2 Cor. Jur., p. 829; and see the elaborate note
in 61 A. L. R. 277, and particularly that part commencing at p.
290.) We can see no logical reason for drawing any distinction in this regard between
actionable negligence and contributory negligence. x x x[29]
The rule was reiterated in Bryant v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co.[30]
and again in Sichterman v. Hollingshead Co.[31]
In Swanson v. McQuown,[32] a
case involving a military officer who happened to be riding in a car driven by
a subordinate later involved in an accident, the Colorado Supreme Court adhered
to the general rule that a public official is not liable for the wrongful acts
of his subordinates on a vicarious basis since the relationship is not a true
master-servant situation.[33]
The court went on to rule that the only exception is when
they cooperate in the act complained of, or direct or encourage it.[34]
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was
neither Lozano’s employer nor the vehicle’s registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between
him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin’s
death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger
at the time of the accident.
Parenthetically, it has been held
that the failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by providing him warnings
or by serving as lookout does not make the passenger liable for the latter’s
negligent acts.[35] The driver’s duty is not one that may be
delegated to others.[36]
As
correctly held by the trial court, the true and lawful employer of Lozano is
the
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.[38]
Verily, liability attaches to the
registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. The CA observation along this line are worth
restating:
Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences incident (sic) to its operation x x x.[39]
The accidental death of Marvin Jayme
is a tragic loss for his parents.
However, justice demands that only those liable under our laws be held
accountable for Marvin’s demise. Justice
can not sway in favor of petitioners simply to assuage their pain and
loss. The law on the matter is clear:
only the negligent driver, the driver’s employer, and the registered owner of
the vehicle are liable for the death of a third person resulting from the
negligent operation of the vehicle.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED and the
appealed Decision AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 45-51. Dated
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] CA rollo,
p. 53.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Rollo, p. 46.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Civil Code, Art. 2180 provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers
shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
The
State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but
not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be
applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
[17] Cammarota, 449, cited in Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, p. 522.
[18] Marquez v. Castillo, 68 Phil. 568 (1939); Cerf v. Medel, 33 Phil. 37 (1915).
[19] 13 Phil. 202 (1909).
[20] Belen v. Belen, id. at 206.
[21] Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. v.
Climaco, G.R. No. 146881,
[22] Rhone-Poulenc Agrochemicals, Phil.,
Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 102633-65,
[23] 627 NE
2d 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 5th Dist., 1994).
[24] G.R.
No. 66207,
[25] Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, id. at 51.
[26] § 796,
[27] Handley v. Lombardi, 122
[28]
[29] Handley v. Lombardi, id. at 869.
[30] 174
[32] Supra.
[33]
Citing 38 Am. Jur. 921, 922, Sec. 235, Negligence. Dowler v. Johnson, 225 N.Y. 39,
121 NE 487, 3 A.L.R. 146.
[34] Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646, 91 Eng. Reprint 1332; Bailey v. Mayor, etc. of City of New York, 3 Hill 531, 538, 38 Am. Dec. 669; Cardot v. Barney, 63 N.Y. 281, 20 Am. Rep. 533; Robertson v. Sichel, 127 US 507, 8 S. Ct. 1286, 32 L. Ed. 203; Ely v. Parsons, 55 Conn. 83, 10 A. 499; Story, Agency, § 319.
[35]
[36] Capretz v. Chicago Great Western R. Co.,
157
[37] G.R.
No. 52179,
[38]
[39] Rollo, p. 249.