EN BANC
|
LIZA M. QUIROG and
RENE L. RELAMPAGOS, Petitioners, - versus - GOVERNOR ERICO B. AUMENTADO, Respondent. x--------------------------------------x CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Petitioner, -versus - COURT OF APPEALS and GOV. ERICO B.
AUMENTADO,
Respondents. |
G.R. No.
163443
G.R. No. 163568 Present: PUNO, C.J. QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO*, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO JR., NACHURA, REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, JJ. Promulgated: November
11, 2008 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court are two consolidated petitions
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court both assailing and seeking to
set aside the Court of Appeals’ (CA) Decision[1] dated March 31, 2003 and the Resolution[2] dated April 12, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70255. The Decision set
aside Resolution Nos. 011812 and 020271 dated November 20, 2001 and February
22, 2002, respectively, of the Civil Service Commission in Administrative NDC
No. 01-88 and reinstated the (a) June 28, 2001 Order and (b) July 23, 2001
Decision of the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. VII.
The facts as culled from the records are as
follows:
On
Before the issuance of the permanent appointment,
the Personnel Selection Board (
A copy of the Monthly Report on Personnel Actions
(ROPA) covering the months of May and June 2001 of the provincial government
was submitted to the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No.
In the Order dated
Both Relampagos
and Quirog moved for reconsideration of the CSCROVII Order, alleging that when
the latter took her oath of office on
In a decision[11]
dated July 23, 2001, the CSCROVII denied Quirog’s and Relampagos’ motion for
reconsideration for lack of legal personality to file such pleading, citing
Section 2, Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 40, series of 1998. The
CSCROVII explained that only the appointing officer may request reconsideration
of the disapproval of an appointment by the Civil Service Commission. Even if Relampagos was the one who appointed
Quirog, he could not file a motion for reconsideration because his term as
governor had already expired.
Aggrieved, the petitioners in G.R. No.
163443 appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) where their joint appeal
was docketed as Adm. NDC No. 01-88.
On
WHEREFORE, the
joint appeal of former Governor Rene L. Relampagos and Liza M. Quirog is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision dated
According
to the CSC, since Relampagos had ceased to be the appointing authority upon the
expiration of his term as governor and incumbent Governor Erico B. Aumentado
was not the official who made the subject appointment, equity dictates that the
appointee Quirog be allowed to question the decision to obviate possible damage
or injury to the delivery of public service.
The CSC also declared that the appointment of Quirog was not a
On
In Resolution No. 020271[18]
dated
On
WHEREFORE,
based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, the
assailed CSC Resolution Nos. 011812 and 020271, dated November 20, 2001 and
February 22, 2002 respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The CSCROVII’s June 28, 2001 Order and its
July 23, 2001 Decision are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
On
From the adverse decision of the
CA, the CSC as well as Relampagos and Quirog interposed separate petitions for
review on certiorari. Relampagos and
Quirog’s petition[22]
filed on
In the Resolution[24]
dated
The
consolidated petitions present the following issues for the Court’s resolution:
(1) whether or not petitioners Relampagos and Quirog have the legal standing to
file a motion for reconsideration of, or appeal from, the disapproval of the
latter’s appointment by the Civil Service Commission, (2) whether or not
Quirog’s appointment violated Item 3 of CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated June 4,
2001, and 3) whether or not the subject appointment was a midnight appointment.
In the herein challenged decision, the CA held that
only the appointing authority could challenge the CSC’s disapproval of an
appointment. In arriving at such a
conclusion, the CA relied solely on Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum
Circular (MC) No. 40, series of 1998[25]
which provides:
Sec. 2. Requests
for reconsideration of, or appeal from, the disapproval of an appointment may
be made by the appointing authority and submitted to the Commission within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the disapproved appointment.
The
petitioners share the view that the word may
in the afore-quoted provision simply means that a request for reconsideration
or appeal from a disapproved appointment is not vested exclusively in the
appointing authority and that Quirog’s appeal should have been given due course
because she was the real party-in-interest, being the one aggrieved by the
disapproval of the appointment.
Petitioners
Quirog and Relampagos contend that their appeal before the CA should not have
been dismissed on a mere technicality such as lack of legal personality. They argued that litigants must be afforded
full opportunity for the adjudication of their case on the merits.
The CSC
for its part, pointed out that in previously decided cases, the CSC allowed the
appointees to take relief from the disapproval of their appointments as an
exception to the rule on legal standing.
Upon
the other hand, respondent Aumentado maintains that the controlling rule on the
matter of legal standing is the afore-cited Section 2, Rule VI, CSC MC No. 40,
series of 1998. He anchors his argument
in Mathay, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,[26]
where the Court laid down the ruling that only the appointing authority can
request for reconsideration of a CSC-disapproved appointment.
The Court rules for the petitioners.
In the
recent case of Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service
Commission,[27] the
Court declared that both the appointing authority and the appointee are equally
real parties in interest who have the requisite legal standing to bring an
action challenging a CSC disapproval of an appointment. In said case, we held that:
The CSC’s disapproval of an appointment
is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing authority’s discretion. The appointing authority must have the right
to contest the disapproval. Thus,
Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 is justified
insofar as it allows the appointing authority to request reconsideration or
appeal.
x x x
Although the earlier discussion
demonstrates that the appointing authority is adversely affected by the CSC’s
Order and is a real party in interest, the appointee is rightly a real party in
interest too. He is also injured by the
CSC disapproval, because he is prevented from assuming the office in a
permanent capacity. Moreover, he would
necessarily benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained, as an approved
appointment would confer on him all the rights and privileges of a permanent
appointee.
x x x
Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum
Circular 40, s. 1998 should not be interpreted to restrict solely to the
appointing authority the right to move for a reconsideration of, or to appeal,
the disapproval of an appointment. PD 807 and EO 292, from which the CSC
derives the authority to promulgate its rules and regulations, are silent on
whether appointees have a similar right to file motions for reconsideration of,
or appeals from, unfavorable decisions involving appointments. Indeed, there is no legislative intent to bar
appointees from challenging the CSC’s disapproval.
The view that only the appointing
authority may request reconsideration or appeal is too narrow. The appointee should have the same
right. Parenthetically, CSC Resolution
99-1936 recognizes the right of the adversely affected party to appeal to the
CSC Regional Offices prior to elevating a matter to the CSC Central
Office. The adversely affected party
necessarily includes the appointee.[28]
Also,
in Abella, Jr, we held that the right of the appointee to
seek reconsideration or appeal was not the main issue in Mathay:
This judicial pronouncement does not
override Mathay v. Civil Service Commission xxx. The Court merely noted in passing -- by way
of obiter -- that based on a similar provision, only the appointing officer
could request reconsideration of actions taken by the CSC on appointments.
In that case, Quezon City Mayor Ismael A.
Mathay Jr. sought the nullification of CSC Resolutions that recalled his
appointment of a city government officer.
He filed a Petition assailing the CA Decision, which had previously
denied his Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy and for being
filed out of time. We observed then that
the CSC Resolutions were already final and could no longer be elevated to the
CA. Furthermore, Mathay’s Petition for
Certiorari filed with the CA was improper, because there was an available
remedy of appeal. And the CSC could not
have acted without jurisdiction, considering that it was empowered to recall an
appointment initially approved.
The right of the appointee to seek reconsideration
or appeal was not the main issue in Mathay.
At any rate, the present case is being decided en banc, and the ruling may reverse previous doctrines laid down by
this Court. [29]
Clearly, pursuant to Abella, Jr., Quirog had the right to ask
for reconsideration of, or to appeal the adverse ruling of CSCROVII. In contrast, Relampagos, by reason of the
expiration of his term as governor, had lost the legal personality to contest
the disapproval of the appointment.
As to
the validity of Quirog’s appointment, the CSCROVII disapproved Quirog’s
appointment for non-compliance with Item No. 3 of CSC Resolution No. 010988
dated
3. All
appointments, whether original, transfer, reemployment, reappointment,
promotion or demotion, x x x which are
issued AFTER the elections, regardless of their dates of effectivity and/or
date of receipt by the Commission, x x x shall be disapproved unless the
following requisites concur relative to their issuance:
a)
The appointment has gone through the regular screening by the Personnel
Selection Board (
b)
That the appointee is qualified;
c)
There is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately in order not to
prejudice public service and/or endanger public safety;
d)
That the appointment is not one of those mass appointments issued after
the elections.
The CSC
ruled that the promotional appointment extended to Quirog by Governor
Relampagos was not violative of the aforesaid CSC Resolution. This
interpretation by the CSC of its own rules should be given great weight and
consideration for after all, it is the agency tasked with interpreting
or applying the same.
Records
disclose that on
Since the retroactive application of a
law usually divests rights that have already become vested, the rule in statutory
construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to
give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used.[31]
Prescinding
therefrom, it cannot be said that Quirog’s appointment violated CSC Resolution
No. 010988, the said Resolution having taken effect after the questioned
appointment was extended.
It
cannot also be said that Quirog’s appointment was a
As the
Court ruled in De Rama v. CA[33]:
The records reveal that when the
petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen
(14) private respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to justify
his action was that these were
We, however, hasten to add that the
aforementioned ruling does not mean that the
raison d’ etre behind the prohibition against midnight appointments may not
be applied to those made by chief executives of local government units, as
here. Indeed, the prohibition is
precisely designed to discourage, nay, even preclude, losing candidates from
issuing appointments merely for partisan purposes thereby depriving the
incoming administration of the opportunity to make the corresponding
appointments in line with its new policies.
As we held in Aytona v. Castillo:
The filling up of vacancies in important
positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action
and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's
qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted.
But the issuance of 350
appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost all of them in a
few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason,
be regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps
taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions
irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new
administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.[34] (Emphasis ours)
The
appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a
Besides,
as correctly held by the CSC:
A careful evaluation of the circumstances
obtaining in the issuance of the appointment of Quirog shows the absence of the
element of hurriedness on the part of former Governor Relampagos which
characterizes a
In any
event, respondent Governor Aumentado, in a
Memorandum[36] dated
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 31,
2003 and the Resolution dated April 12, 2004 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and CSC Resolution Nos. 011812 and 020271 dated November
20, 2001 and February 22, 2002, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
|
(On Leave) CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice
|
RENATO C.
CORONA
Associate
Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice |
|
ADOLFO S. AZC Associate Justice
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate
Justice |
|
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA Associate
Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On Leave
[1] Penned by then Associate Justice
Elvi John S. Asuncion with then Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a member
of this Court) and Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, concurring; G.R. No.
163443, rollo, pp. 169-174.
[2]
[3]
[4] Also called Provincial
Agriculturist.
[5] G.R. No. 163443; rollo,
pp .42-43.
[6]
[7]
[8] Pertinently, Item 3(d) reads:
3. All appointments, whether original,
transfer, reemployment, reappointment, promotion or demotion, x x x which are issued AFTER the elections,
regardless of their dates of effectivity and/or date of receipt by the
Commission, x x x shall be disapproved unless the following requisites concur
relative to their issuance:
x x x
d) That the appointment is not one of those mass
appointments issued after the elections.
[9] Entitled Castro, Ariel, et. al., Re: Appeal, Termination of Services,
[10] G.R. No. 163443; rollo,
p. 37.
[11]
[12]
[13] Pertinently, Item 3(a)
reads:
3. All
appointments, whether original, transfer, reemployment, reappointment,
promotion or demotion, x x x which are issued AFTER the elections, regardless
of their dates of effectivity and/or date of receipt by the Commission, x x x
shall be disapproved unless the following requisites concur relative to their
issuance:
a) The appointment has gone through the
regular screening by the Personnel Selection Board (
[14] No. L-19313,
[15] Rollo,
p. 193.
[16] G.R. No. 163443; id. at 78-89.
[17] CSC Resolution No. 010114 dated
[18] G.R. No. 163443 Rollo, pp. 113-120.
[19]
[20] Supra
note 1.
[21] Supra
note 2.
[22] G.R. No. 163443, rollo, pp. 10-34.
[23] G.R. No. 163568, id., at 10-19.
[24]
[25] Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions.
[26] G.R. No. 1320214,
[27] G.R. No. 152574,
[28]
[29]
[30] Supra note 6.
[31] Paloma v. Mora, et
al., G.R. No. 157783,
[32] The constitutional provision referred to is Section 15,
Article
[33] G.R. No. 131136,
[34] Supra note 14 at 10.
[35] G.R. No.163443; rollo, p. 74.
[36]