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MEDARDO
AG. CADIENTE, Petitioner, |
G.R. No. 161946
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- versus - BITHUEL
MACAS, |
Present: QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
November
14, 2008 |
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QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:
For
review on certiorari are the Decision[1]
dated
The
facts are undisputed.
Eyewitness Rosalinda Palero testified that on
Dr. Hilario Diaz, the orthopedic surgeon who attended to
the respondent, testified that the respondent suffered severe muscular and
major vessel injuries, as well as open bone fractures in both thighs and other
parts of his legs. In order to save his
life, the surgeon had to amputate both legs up to the groins.[4]
Cimafranca had since absconded and disappeared. Records showed that the Ford Fiera was
registered in the name of herein petitioner, Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente. However, Cadiente claimed that when the
accident happened, he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera. He alleged that he sold the vehicle to Engr.
Rogelio Jalipa on
The
victim’s father, Samuel Macas, filed a complaint[6]
for torts and damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente before the RTC of Davao
City, Branch 10. Cadiente later filed a
third-party complaint[7]
against Jalipa.
In
answer, Jalipa claimed that he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera at the
time of the accident. He alleged that he
sold the vehicle to Abraham Abubakar on
After
trial, the court ruled:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff declaring Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente and Engr. Rogelio Jalipa jointly and severally liable for damages to the plaintiff for their own negligence as stated above, and ordering them to indemnify the plaintiff jointly and severally as follows:
(a)
P300,000.00 as compensatory
damages for the permanent and almost total disability being suffered by him;
(b)
P150,000.00 for moral damages;
(c)
P18,982.85 as reimbursement of
medical expenses;
(d)
P30,000.00 for attorney’s fees;
and
(e) costs of suit.
SO
ORDERED.[10]
On
appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the findings of the trial court were in
accordance with the established facts and was supported by the evidence on
record. Thus, it decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED and the decision of
the
SO
ORDERED.[11]
From the
aforequoted decision of the Court of Appeals and the subsequent denial of the
motion for reconsideration, only Cadiente appealed to this Court.
The
instant petition alleges that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of
law in affirming the decision of the trial court. Petitioner Cadiente raises the following as
issues:
I.
WAS THERE …
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE INJURED PARTY?
II.
ARE BOTH
DEFENDANT CADIENTE AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE TO
THE INJURED PARTY?
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S] COMMIT[T]ED GRAVE LEGAL ERROR IN ORDERING DEFENDANT CADIENTE AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT JALIPA JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE.[12]
Essentially, the issues to be resolved are: (1) Whether there was contributory negligence
on the part of the victim; and (2) whether the petitioner and third-party
defendant Jalipa are jointly and severally liable to the victim.
The
petitioner contends that the victim’s negligence contributed to his own
mishap. The petitioner theorizes that if
witness Rosalinda Palero, who was only two and a half meters away from the
victim, was not hit by the Ford Fiera, then the victim must have been so
negligent as to be bumped and run over by the said vehicle.[13]
The petitioner further argues that having filed a
third-party complaint against Jalipa, to whom he had sold the Ford Fiera, the
Court of Appeals should have ordered the latter to reimburse him for any amount
he would be made to pay the victim, instead of ordering him solidarily liable
for damages.[14]
The
respondent, for his part, counters that the immediate and proximate cause of
the injuries he suffered was the recklessly driven Ford Fiera, which was
registered in the petitioner’s name. He
insists that when he was hit by the vehicle, he was standing on the uncemented
portion of the highway, which was exactly where pedestrians were supposed to
be.[15]
The
respondent stresses that as the registered owner of the Ford Fiera which
figured in the accident, the petitioner is primarily liable for the injury caused
by the said vehicle. He maintains that
the alleged sale of the vehicle to Jalipa was tainted with irregularity, which
indicated collusion between the petitioner and Jalipa.[16]
After a
careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, we find the petition without
merit.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
When the plaintiff’s own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible
for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full, but must proportionately
bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant is thus held liable only for the
damages actually caused by his negligence.[17]
In this case, records show that when the accident happened,
the victim was standing on the shoulder, which was the uncemented portion of
the highway. As noted by the trial
court, the shoulder was intended for pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as those
loading or unloading passengers may use the shoulder. Running vehicles are not supposed to pass
through the said uncemented portion of the highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without
so much as slowing down, took off from the cemented part of the highway,
inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and recklessly bumped and ran over an
innocent victim. The victim was just
where he should be when the unfortunate event transpired.
Cimafranca, on the other hand, had no rightful business
driving as recklessly as she did. The
respondent cannot be expected to have foreseen that the Ford Fiera, erstwhile
speeding along the cemented part of the highway would suddenly swerve to the
shoulder, then bump and run him over. Thus, we are unable to accept the petitioner’s
contention that the respondent was negligent.
Coming now to the second and third issues, this Court has recently
reiterated in PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance Co.,
Inc.,[18] that the
registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already sold it to someone
else, is primarily responsible to the public for whatever damage or injury the
vehicle may cause. We explained,
…Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership.[19]
In the
case of Villanueva v. Domingo,[20]
we said that the policy behind vehicle registration is the easy identification
of the owner who can be held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury
caused by the vehicle. This is so as not
to inconvenience or prejudice a third party injured by one whose identity
cannot be secured.[21]
Therefore,
since the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner’s name at the time
when the misfortune took place, the petitioner cannot escape liability for the
permanent injury it caused the respondent, who had since stopped schooling and
is now forced to face life with nary but two remaining limbs.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Acting Chief Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
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C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Acting Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 23-29. Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4] TSN,
[5] Records, pp. 363-364.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 85-86.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 293.
[18] G.R. No. 162267,
[19]
[20] G.R. No. 144274,
[21]