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JOHN DY, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondents. |
G.R. No. 158312
Present: Quisumbing, Acting C.J., Chairperson, Carpio Morales, Tinga, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: November 14,
2008 |
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QUISUMBING,
Acting C.J.:
This appeal prays for the reversal of the
Decision[1] dated January 23, 2003 and the Resolution[2] dated May 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 23802. The appellate
court affirmed with modification the Decision[3] dated November 17, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court (
The facts are undisputed:
Since 1990, John Dy has been the distributor
of W.L. Food Products (W.L. Foods) in Naga City, Bicol, under the business name
Dyna Marketing. Dy would pay W.L. Foods
in either cash or check upon pick up of stocks of snack foods at the latter’s
branch or main office in Quezon City. At
times, he would entrust the payment to one of his drivers.
On June 24, 1992, Dy’s driver went to the
branch office of W.L. Foods to pick up stocks of snack foods. He introduced himself to the checker, Mary
Jane D. Maraca, who upon confirming Dy’s credit with the main office, gave him
merchandise worth P106,579.60.
In return, the driver handed her a blank Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC) Check with Check No. 553602 postdated July 22, 1992. The check was signed by Dy though it did not
indicate a specific amount.
Yet again, on July 1, 1992, the same driver
obtained snack foods from Maraca in the amount of P226,794.36 in
exchange for a blank FEBTC Check with Check No. 553615 postdated July 31, 1992.
In both instances, the driver was issued an
unsigned delivery receipt. The amounts
for the purchases were filled in later by Evelyn Ong, accountant of W.L. Foods,
based on the value of the goods delivered.
When presented for payment, FEBTC dishonored
the checks for insufficiency of funds.
Raul D. Gonzales, manager of FEBTC-Naga Branch, notified Atty. Rita
Linda Jimeno, counsel of W.L. Foods, of the dishonor. Apparently, Dy only had an available balance
of P2,000 as of July 22, 1992 and July 31, 1992.
Later, Gonzales sent Atty. Jimeno another
letter[5] advising her that FEBTC Check No. 553602 for P106,579.60
was returned to the drawee bank for the reasons stop payment order and drawn
against uncollected deposit (DAUD), and not because it was drawn against insufficient
funds as stated in the first letter.
Dy’s savings deposit account ledger reflected a balance of P160,659.39
as of July 22, 1992. This, however,
included a regional clearing check for P55,000 which he deposited on
July 20, 1992, and which took five (5) banking days to clear. Hence, the inward check was drawn against the
yet uncollected deposit.
When William Lim, owner of W.L. Foods, phoned
Dy about the matter, the latter explained that he could not pay since he had no
funds yet. This prompted the former to
send petitioner a demand letter, which the latter ignored.
On July 16, 1993, Lim charged Dy with two
counts of estafa
under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d)[6] of the Revised Penal Code in two
Informations, which except for the dates and amounts involved, similarly read
as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of June,
1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
[willfully] and feloniously defraud W.L. PRODUCTS, a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines with business
address at No. 531 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches, this City, in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which he made to
complainant to the effect that Far East Bank and Trust Co. check No. 553602
dated July 22, 1992 in the amount of P106,579.60, payable to W.L.
Products is a good check and will be honored by the bank on its maturity date,
and by means of other deceit of similar import, induced and succeeded in
inducing the said complainant to receive and accept the aforesaid check in
payment of snack foods, the said accused knowing fully well that all his
manifestations and representations were false and untrue and were made solely
for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact he did obtain the aforesaid snack
foods valued at P106,579.60 from said complainant as upon presentation
of said check to the bank for payment, the same was dishonored and payment
thereof refused for the reason stop payment and the said accused, once in
possession of the aforesaid snack foods, with intent to defraud, [willfully],
unlawfully and feloniously misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same
or the value thereof to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice
of said W.L. Products, herein represented by RODOLFO BORJAL, in the
aforementioned amount of P106,579.60, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.[7]
On even date, Lim also charged Dy with
two counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in two Informations which
likewise save for the dates and amounts involved similarly read as follows:
That
on or about the 24th day of June, 1992, the said accused, did then
and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to
W.L. FOOD PRODUCTS to apply on account or for value a Far East Bank and Trust
Co. Check no. 553602 dated July 22, 1992 payable to W.L. FOOD PRODUCTS in the
amount of P106,579.60 Philippine Currency, said accused knowing fully
well that at the time of issue he/she/they did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented 90 days from the date thereof was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason “Payment stopped” but
the same would have been dishonored for insufficient funds had not the accused
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, failed to pay said W.L. Food
Products the amount of said check or to make arrangement for payment in full of
the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[8]
On November 23, 1994, Dy was arrested in Naga
City. On arraignment, he pleaded not
guilty to all charges. Thereafter, the
cases against him were tried jointly.
On November 17, 1999 the
WHEREFORE, accused
JOHN JERRY DY ALDEN (JOHN DY) is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
swindling (ESTAFA) as charged in the Informations in Criminal Case No. 93-46711
and in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46713, respectively. Accordingly, after applying the provisions of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law and P.D. No. 818, said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46711 and
of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, in
Criminal Case No. Q-93-46713.
Likewise, said
accused is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of B.P. 22
as charged in the Informations in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46712 and in Criminal
Case No. Q-93-46714 and is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment of one (1)
year for each of the said offense and to pay a fine in the total amount of P333,373.96,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
FINALLY, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of private complainant, W. L. Food Products, herein
represented by Rodolfo Borjal, and against herein accused JOHN JERRY DY ALDEN
(JOHN DY), ordering the latter to pay to the former the total sum of P333,373.96
plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from September 28, 1992
until fully paid; and, (2) the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Dy brought the case to the Court of Appeals. In the assailed Decision of January 23, 2003,
the appellate court affirmed the
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No. Q-93-46711 (for estafa), the accused-appellant JOHN JERRY DY ALDEN (JOHN
DY) is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum plus eight
(8) years in excess of [P]22,000.00.
In Criminal Case No.
Q-93-46712 (for violation of BP 22),
accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of one (1) year and to
indemnify W.L. Food Products, represented by Rodolfo Borjal, the amount of ONE
HUNDRED SIX THP]106,579.60).
In Criminal Case No. Q-93-46713
(for estafa), accused-appellant
is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
thirty (30) years as maximum. Finally,
in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46714
(for violation of BP 22), accused-appellant
is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of one (1) year and to indemnify W.L.
Food Products, represented by Rodolfo Borjal, the amount of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY
SIX P]226,794.36).
SO ORDERED.[10]
Dy moved for reconsideration, but his motion was
denied in the Resolution dated May 14, 2003.
Hence,
this petition which raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVEN THE GUILT OF ACCUSED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ESTAFA ON TWO (2) COUNTS?
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVEN THE GUILT OF ACCUSED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF BP 22 ON TWO (2) COUNTS?
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, W.L. FOOD PRODUCTS,
THE TOTAL SUM OF [P]333,373.96?[11]
Essentially, the issue is whether John Dy is liable for estafa
and for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
First, is petitioner guilty of estafa?
Mainly, petitioner contends that the
checks were ineffectively issued. He
stresses that not only were the checks blank, but also that W.L. Foods’
accountant had no authority to fill the amounts. Dy also claims failure of consideration to
negate any obligation to W.L. Foods.
Ultimately, petitioner denies having deceived Lim inasmuch as only the
two checks bounced since he began dealing with him. He maintains that it was his long established
business relationship with Lim that enabled him to obtain the goods, and not
the checks issued in payment for them.
Petitioner renounces personal liability on the checks since he was
absent when the goods were delivered.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State,
avers that the delivery of the checks by Dy’s driver to Maraca, constituted
valid issuance. The OSG sustains Ong’s prima
facie authority to fill the checks based on the value of goods taken. It observes that nothing in the records showed
that W.L. Foods’ accountant filled up the checks in violation of Dy’s
instructions or their previous agreement.
Finally, the OSG challenges the present petition as an inappropriate
remedy to review the factual findings of the trial court.
We find that the petition is partly meritorious.
Before
an accused can be held liable for estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885,[12]
the following elements must concur: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2)
insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof.[13] These elements are present in the instant
case.
Section
191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law[14]
defines “issue” as the first delivery of an instrument, complete in form, to a
person who takes it as a holder.
Significantly, delivery is the final act essential to the negotiability
of an instrument. Delivery denotes
physical transfer of the instrument by the maker or drawer coupled with an
intention to convey title to the payee and recognize him as a holder.[15] It means more than handing over to another;
it imports such transfer of the instrument to another as to enable the latter
to hold it for himself.[16]
In this case, even if the checks were given to W.L. Foods in
blank, this alone did not make its issuance invalid. When the checks were delivered to Lim,
through his employee, he became a holder with prima facie authority to
fill the blanks. This was, in fact,
accomplished by Lim’s accountant.
The pertinent provisions of Section 14 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law are instructive:
SEC. 14. Blanks; when may be filled.–Where the
instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks
therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the
signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument
operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any
amount. …. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the law merely requires that the instrument be in the possession
of a person other than the drawer or maker.
From such possession, together with the fact that the instrument is
wanting in a material particular, the law presumes agency to fill up the
blanks.[17] Because of this, the burden of proving want
of authority or that the authority granted was exceeded, is placed on the
person questioning such authority.[18] Petitioner failed to fulfill this
requirement.
Next,
petitioner claims failure of consideration.
Nevertheless, in a letter[19]
dated November 10, 1992, he expressed willingness to pay W.L. Foods, or to
replace the dishonored checks. This was
a clear acknowledgment of receipt of the goods, which gave rise to his duty to
maintain or deposit sufficient funds to cover the amount of the checks.
More
significantly, we are not swayed by petitioner’s arguments that the single
incident of dishonor and his absence when the checks were delivered belie
fraud. Indeed damage and deceit are
essential elements of the offense and must be established with satisfactory
proof to warrant conviction.[20] Deceit
as an element of estafa is a specie of fraud. It is actual fraud which consists in any
misrepresentation or contrivance where a person deludes another, to his
hurt. There is deceit when one is misled
-- by guile, trickery or by other means -- to believe as true what is really
false.[21]
Prima facie
evidence of deceit was established against petitioner with regard to FEBTC
Check No. 553615 which was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. The letter[22]
of petitioner’s counsel dated November 10, 1992 shows beyond reasonable doubt
that petitioner received notice of the dishonor of the said check for
insufficiency of funds. Petitioner, however, failed to deposit the amounts
necessary to cover his check within three banking days from receipt of the
notice of dishonor. Hence, as provided
for by law,[23]
the presence of deceit was sufficiently proven.
Petitioner failed to overcome the said proof of
deceit. The trial court found no
pre-existing obligation between the parties.
The existence of prior transactions between Lim and Dy alone did not
rule out deceit because each transaction was separate, and had a different
consideration from the others. Even as
petitioner was absent when the goods were delivered, by the principle of
agency, delivery of the checks by his driver was deemed as his act as the
employer. The evidence shows that as a
matter of course, Dy, or his employee, would pay W.L. Foods in either cash or
check upon pick up of the stocks of snack foods at the latter’s branch or main
office. Despite their two-year standing
business relations prior to the issuance of the subject check, W.L Foods
employees would not have parted with the stocks were it not for the
simultaneous delivery of the check issued by petitioner.[24] Aside from the existing business relations
between petitioner and W.L. Foods, the primary inducement for the latter to
part with its stocks of snack foods was the issuance of the check in payment of
the value of the said stocks.
In a
number of cases,[25]
the Court has considered good faith as a defense to a charge of estafa
by postdating a check. This good faith
may be manifested by making arrangements for payment with the creditor and
exerting best efforts to make good the value of the checks. In the instant case petitioner presented no
proof of good faith. Noticeably absent
from the records is sufficient proof of sincere and best efforts on the part of
petitioner for the payment of the value of the check that would constitute good
faith and negate deceit.
With
the foregoing circumstances established, we find petitioner guilty of estafa
with regard to FEBTC Check No. 553615 for P226,794.36.
The
same, however, does not hold true with respect to FEBTC Check No. 553602 for P106,579.60.
This check was dishonored for the reason that it was drawn against uncollected
deposit. Petitioner had P160,659.39 in his savings deposit account
ledger as of July 22, 1992. We disagree
with the conclusion of the RTC that since the balance included a regional
clearing check worth P55,000 deposited on July 20, 1992, which cleared
only five (5) days later, then petitioner had inadequate funds in this
instance. Since petitioner technically
and retroactively had sufficient funds at the time Check No. 553602 was
presented for payment then the second element (insufficiency of funds to cover
the check) of the crime is absent. Also
there is no prima facie evidence of deceit in this instance because the
check was not dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds. Uncollected deposits are not the same as
insufficient funds. The prima facie presumption of deceit arises only
when a check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds. Notably, the law speaks of insufficiency of
funds but not of uncollected deposits.
Jurisprudence teaches that criminal laws are strictly construed against
the Government and liberally in favor of the accused.[26] Hence, in the instant case, the law cannot be
interpreted or applied in such a way as to expand its provision to encompass
the situation of uncollected deposits because it would make the law more
onerous on the part of the accused.
Clearly,
the estafa punished under
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is committed when a check
is dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds or closed account, and
not against uncollected deposit.[27] Corollarily, the issuer of the check is not
liable for estafa if the remaining balance and the uncollected deposit, which was duly
collected, could satisfy the amount of the check when presented for payment.
Second,
did petitioner violate B.P. Blg. 22?
Petitioner
argues that the blank checks were not valid orders for the bank to pay the
holder of such checks. He reiterates
lack of knowledge of the insufficiency of funds and reasons that the checks
could not have been issued to apply on account or for value as he did not
obtain delivery of the goods.
The OSG
maintains that the guilt of petitioner has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. It cites pieces of evidence that
point to Dy’s culpability: Maraca’s acknowledgment that the checks were issued
to W.L. Foods as consideration for the snacks; Lim’s testimony proving that Dy
received a copy of the demand letter; the bank manager’s confirmation that
petitioner had insufficient balance to cover the checks; and Dy’s failure to
settle his obligation within five (5) days from dishonor of the checks.
Once
again, we find the petition to be meritorious in part.
The
elements of the offense penalized under B.P.
Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check
to apply to account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or
issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[28] The case at bar satisfies all these elements.
During
the joint pre-trial conference of this case, Dy admitted that he issued the
checks, and that the signatures appearing on them were his.[29] The facts reveal that the checks were issued
in blank because of the uncertainty of the volume of products to be retrieved,
the discount that can be availed of, and the deduction for bad orders. Nevertheless, we must stress that what the law punishes is
simply the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating thereto.[30] If inquiry into the reason for which the
checks are issued, or the terms and conditions of their issuance is required,
the public’s faith in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes will certainly erode.[31]
Moreover, the gravamen of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for
payment. The act effectively declares
the offense to be one of malum prohibitum. The only valid query,
then, is whether the law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad check, without so much regard
as to the criminal intent of the issuer.[32] Indeed, non-fulfillment of the obligation is
immaterial. Thus, petitioner’s defense
of failure of consideration must likewise fall. This is especially so since as
stated above, Dy has acknowledged receipt of the goods.
On
the second element, petitioner disputes notice of insufficiency of funds on the
basis of the check being issued in blank.
He relies on Dingle v.
Intermediate Appellate Court[33]
and Lao v. Court of Appeals[34]
as his authorities. In both actions,
however, the accused were co-signatories, who were neither apprised of the
particular transactions on which the blank checks were issued, nor given notice
of their dishonor. In the latter case,
Lao signed
the checks without knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, knowledge she was
not expected or obliged to possess under the organizational structure of the
corporation.[35] Lao was only a minor employee who had nothing
to do with the issuance, funding and delivery of checks.[36] In
contrast, petitioner was the proprietor of Dyna Marketing and the sole
signatory of the checks who received notice of their dishonor.
Significantly,
under Section 2[37]
of B.P. Blg. 22, petitioner was prima
facie presumed to know of the inadequacy of his funds with the bank when he
did not pay the value of the goods or make arrangements for their payment in
full within five (5) banking days upon notice.
His letter dated November 10, 1992 to Lim fortified such presumption.
Undoubtedly,
Dy violated B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing
FEBTC Check No. 553615. When said check
was dishonored for insufficient funds and stop payment order, petitioner did
not pay or make arrangements with the bank for its payment in full within five
(5) banking days.
Petitioner
should be exonerated, however, for issuing FEBTC Check No. 553602, which was dishonored for the reason
DAUD or drawn against uncollected deposit.
When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank
because the check deposit made by petitioner, which would make petitioner’s
bank account balance more than enough to cover the face value of the subject
check, had not been collected by the bank.
In Tan
v. People,[38]
this Court acquitted the petitioner therein who was indicted under B.P. Blg. 22, upon a check which was
dishonored for the reason DAUD, among others.
We observed that:
In the second place, even without relying on the credit line,
petitioner’s bank account covered the check she issued because even though
there were some deposits that were still uncollected the deposits became “good”
and the bank certified that the check was “funded.”[39]
To be
liable under Section 1[40]
of B.P. Blg. 22, the check must be dishonored
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.
In the
instant case, even though the check which petitioner deposited on July 20, 1992
became good only five (5) days later, he was considered by the bank to
retroactively have had P160,659.39 in his account on July 22, 1992. This was more than enough to cover the check
he issued to respondent in the amount of P106,579.60. Under the circumstance obtaining in this
case, we find the petitioner had issued the check, with full ability to abide
by his commitment[41]
to pay his purchases.
Significantly,
like Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, B.P. Blg. 22 also
speaks only of insufficiency of funds and does not treat of uncollected
deposits. To repeat, we cannot interpret
the law in such a way as to expand its provision to encompass the situation of
uncollected deposits because it would make the law more onerous on the part of
the accused. Again, criminal statutes
are strictly construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the
accused.[42]
As regards petitioner’s civil liability, this Court has previously ruled
that an accused may be held civilly liable where the facts established
by the evidence so warrant.[43] The rationale for this is simple. The
criminal and civil liabilities of an accused are separate and distinct from
each other. One is meant to punish the
offender while the other is intended to repair the damage suffered by the
aggrieved party. So, for the purpose of
indemnifying the latter, the offense need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt
but only by preponderance of evidence.[44]
We therefore sustain the appellate court’s award of
damages to W.L. Foods in the total amount of P333,373.96,
representing the sum of the checks petitioner issued for goods admittedly
delivered to his company.
As to the appropriate penalty, petitioner was charged
with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818[45] (P.D. No.
818).
Under Section 1[46]
of P.D. No. 818, if the
amount of the fraud exceeds P22,000, the penalty of reclusión
temporal is imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional P10,000 but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30)
years, which shall be termed reclusión perpetua.[47] Reclusión
perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense, but merely
describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud
involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. John
Dy is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal
Case No. Q-93-46711 for estafa, and Criminal Case No. Q-93-46712 for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, but he is ORDERED
to pay W.L. Foods the amount of P106,579.60 for goods delivered to his
company.
In Criminal Case No. Q-93-46713 for estafa, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prisión
mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30) years of reclusión perpetua, as
maximum.
In Criminal Case No. Q-93-46714 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, and John
Dy is hereby sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment and ordered to indemnify
W.L. Foods in the amount of P226,794.36.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Acting Chief Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
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C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Acting Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 31-50. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos, with Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Regalado E. Maambong concurring.
[2] Id. at 51.
[3] Records, pp. 438-457. Penned by Presiding Judge Salvador C. Ceguera.
[4] An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes, approved April 3, 1979.
[5] Records, p. 270.
[6] ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
x x x x
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
x x x x
(d) By postdating a check, or
issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in
the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been
dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As
amended by Rep. Act No. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)
x x x x
[7] Records, pp. 2, 14-15.
[8] Id. at 8, 20-21.
[9] Id. at 457.
[10] Rollo, p. 49.
[11] Id. at 15.
[12] An Act to Amend Section Two, Paragraph (d), Article Three Hundred Fifteen of Act Numbered Thirty-Eight Hundred and Fifteen, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Penal Code, approved June 17, 1967.
[13] People v. Romero, G.R. No. 112985, April 21, 1999, 306 SCRA 90, 96.
[14] Also known as ACT No. 2031. An Act Entitled “The Negotiable Instruments Law”, enacted February 3, 1911.
[15] De la Victoria v. Burgos, G.R. No. 111190, June 27, 1995, 245 SCRA 374, 379.
[16] Lewis County et al. v. State Bank of Peck, 170 Pacific Reporter 98, 100 (1918), citing Bigelow, Bills, Notes and Checks, 2nd Ed., p. 13.
[17] I A.F. Agbayani, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines, 168 (1987 ed.).
[18] J.C. Campos, Jr. and M.C. Lopez-Campos, Notes and Selected Cases on Negotiable Instruments Law, 351 (3rd ed., 1971).
[19] Records, p. 43.
[20] People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 436, 445; People v. Dimalanta, G.R. No. 157039, October 1, 2004, 440 SCRA 55, 61-62.
[21] People v. Romero, supra note 13 at 97.
[22] Records, p. 43.
[23] ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). –
x x x x
(d) x x x The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.) (Emphasis supplied.)
[24] TSN, July 19, 1995, pp. 507, 516.
[25] People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 436; People v. Dimalanta, G.R. No. 157039, October 1, 2004, 440 SCRA 55.
[26] See U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil 243 (1917); People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil 725, 728 (1956).
[27] Cf. Salazar v. People, G.R. No. 151931, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 598.
[28] Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112389-90, August 1, 1994, 234 SCRA 639, 643-644.
[29] Records, p. 400.
[30] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108738, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 301, 307.
[31] People v. Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 79, 85.
[32] Cueme v. People, G. R. No. 133325, June 30, 2000, 334 SCRA 795, 805.
[33] No. L-75243, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 595.
[34] G. R. No. 119178, June 20, 1997, 274 SCRA 572.
[35] Id. at 590.
[36] Id. at 596.
[37] SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
[38] G. R. No. 141466, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 777.
[39] Id. at 781.
[40] SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less that thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
x x x x
[41] Cf. Idos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110782, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 194, 212.
[42] See U.S. v. Abad Santos, supra note 26; People v. Yu Hai, supra note 26.
[43] Eusebio-Calderon v. People, G.R. No. 158495, October 21, 2004, 441 SCRA 137, 147.
[44] Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128927, September 14, 1999, 314 SCRA 370, 379.
[45] Amending Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by Increasing the Penalties for Estafa Committed by Means of Bouncing Checks, done October 22, 1975.
[46] SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act. No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall [in] no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua;
x x x x
[47] People v. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, October 28, 1999, 317 SCRA 617, 629.