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SANTOSA B. DATUMAN, Petitioner, – versus – FIRST COSMOPOLITAN MANPOWER AND
PROMOTION SERVICES, INC., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 156029 Present: pUNO, C.J.,* CARPIO,** AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*** CARPIO MORALES,***
and LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, JJ. Promulgated: November
14, 2008 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]
dated
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1989, respondent First
Cosmopolitan Manpower & Promotion Services, Inc. recruited petitioner
Santosa B. Datuman to work abroad under the following terms and conditions:
Site of employment -
Employees Classification/Position/Grade - Saleslady
Basic Monthly Salary - US$370.00
Duration of Contract - One (1) year
Foreign Employer - Mohammed Sharif Abbas
Ghulam Hussain[2]
On
On
In May 1995, petitioner filed a complaint
before the POEA Adjudication Office against respondent for underpayment and
nonpayment of salary, vacation leave pay and refund of her plane fare, docketed
as Case No. POEA ADJ. (L) 95-05-1586.[6] While the case was pending, she filed the
instant case before the NLRC for underpayment of salary for a period of one
year and six months, nonpayment of vacation pay and reimbursement of return
airfare.
When the parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement before the Labor Arbiter, they were required to file their
respective position papers, subsequent pleadings and documentary exhibits.
In its Position Paper,[7]
respondent countered that petitioner actually agreed to work in
On
From the foregoing
factual backdrop, the only crucial issue for us to resolve in this case is
whether or not complainant is entitled to her monetary claims.
x x x
In the instant case,
from the facts and circumstances laid down, it is thus self-evident that the
relationship of the complainant and respondent agency is governed by the
Contract of Employment, the basic terms a covenants of which provided for the
position of saleslady, monthly compensation of US$370.00 and duration of
contract for one (1) year. As it is,
when the parties – complainant and respondent Agency – signed and executed the
POEA – approved Contract of Employment, this agreement is the law that governs
them. Thus, when respondent agency
deviated from the terms of the contract by assigning the position of a
housemaid to complainant instead of a saleslady as agreed upon in the
POEA-approved Contract of Employment, respondent Agency committed a breach of
said Employment Contract. Worthy of
mention is the fact that respondent agency in their Position Paper paragraph 2,
Brief Statement of the Facts and of the Case – admitted that it had entered
into an illegal contract with complainant by proposing the position of a
housemaid which said position was then not allowed by the POEA, by making it
appear in the Employment Contract that the position being applied for is the
position of a saleslady. As it is, we
find indubitably clear that the foreign employer had took advantage to the
herein hopeless complainant and because of this ordeal, the same obviously rendered
complainant’s continuous employment unreasonable if not downright impossible. The facts and surrounding circumstances of
her ordeal was convincingly laid down by the complainant in her Position Paper,
from which we find no flaws material enough to disregard the same. Complainant had clearly made out her case and
no amount of persuasion can convince us to tilt the scales of justice in favor
of respondents whose defense was anchored solely on the flimsy allegations that
for a period of more than five (5) years – from 1989 until 1995 – nothing was
heard from her or from her relatives, presuming then that complainant had no
problem with her employment abroad. We
also find that the pleadings and the annexes filed by the parties reveal a
total lapse on the part of respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower and
Promotions – their failure to support with substantial evidence their
contention that complainant transferred from one employer to another without
knowledge and approval of respondent agency in contravention of the terms of
the POEA approved Employment Contract.
Obviously, respondent Agency anchored its disquisition on the alleged
“contracts” signed by the complainant that she agreed with the terms of said
contracts – one (1) year duration only and as a housemaid – to support its
contention that complainant violated the contract agreement by transferring
from one employer to another on her own volition without the knowledge and
consent of respondent agency. To us,
this posture of respondent agency is unavailing. These “documents” are self-serving. We could not but rule that the same were
fabricated to tailor-fit their defense that complainant was guilty of violating
the terms of the Employment Contract.
Consequently, we could not avoid the inference of a more logical
conclusion that complainant was forced
against her will to continue with her employment notwithstanding the fact that
it was in violation of the original Employment Contract including the illegal
withholding of her passport.
With the foregoing, we
find and so rule that respondent Agency failed to discharge the burden of
proving with substantial evidence that complainant violated the terms of the
Employment Contract, thus negating respondent Agency’s liability for
complainant’s money claims. All the
more, the record is bereft of any evidence to show that complainant Datuman is
either not entitled to her wage differentials or have already received the same
from respondent. As such, we are
perforce constrained to grant complainant’s prayer for payment of salary
differentials computed as follows:
January 1992 April 1993
(15 months)
US$370.00 agreed salary
US$100.00 actual paid salary
US$270.00 balance
US$270.00 x 15 months = US$4050.00
We are also inclined to grant complainant’s entitlement
to a refund of her plane ticket in the amount of BD 180 Bahrain Dinar or the
equivalent in Philippine Currency at the rate of exchange prevailing at the
time of payment.
Anent complainant’s claim for vacation leave pay and
overtime pay, we cannot, however, grant the same for failure on the part of
complainant to prove with particularity the months that she was not granted
vacation leave and the day wherein she did render overtime work.
Also, we could not grant complainant’s prayer for award
of damages and attorney’s fees for lack of factual and legal basis.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered, finding respondent Agency liable for violating the term of Employment
Contract and respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotions is hereby
ordered:
To pay complainant the amount of US$ FOUR THOUSAND AND
FIFTY (US$4,050.00), or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment,
representing her salary differentials for fifteen (15) months;
To pay complainant the amount of BD 180.00 or its
equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment, representing the refund of
plane ticket;
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO OR
On appeal, the
NLRC, Second Division, issued a Decision[10]
affirming with modification the Decision of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr., by
reducing the award of salary differentials from US$4,050.00 to US$2,970.00
ratiocinating as follows:
Accordingly, we find
that the claims for salary differentials accruing earlier than April of 1993
had indeed prescribed. This is so as
complainant had filed her complaint on
x x x
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the assailed Decision by
reducing the award of salary differentials to $2,970.00 to the complainant.
The rest of the
disposition is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[11]
On
On
On
On
Under Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA
Rules and Regulations, the local agency shall assume joint and solidary
liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in
connection with the implementation of the contract, including but not limited
to payment of wages, health and disability compensation and repatriation.
Respondent Commission
was correct in declaring that claims of private respondent “for salary
differentials accruing earlier than April of 1993 had indeed prescribed.” It must be noted that petitioner company is
privy only to the first contract.
Granting arguendo that its liability extends to the acts of its foreign
principal, the Towering Recruiting Services, which appears to have a hand in
the execution of the second contract, it is Our considered opinion that the
same would, at the most, extend only up to the expiration of the second
contract or until
However, this Court declares respondent Commission as not
only having abused its discretion, but as being without jurisdiction at all, in
declaring private respondent entitled to salary differentials. After decreeing the money claims accruing
before April 1993 as having prescribed, it has no more jurisdiction to hold
petitioner company for salary differentials after that period. To reiterate, the local agency shall assume joint
and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which
may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract. Which contract? Upon a judicious consideration, we so hold
that it is only in connection with the first contract. The provisions in number 2, Section 10 (a),
Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code Section 1 (f),
Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations were not made to make
the local agency a perpetual insurer against all untoward acts that may be done
by the foreign principal or the direct employer abroad. It is only as regards the principal contract
to which it is privy shall its liability extend. In Catan v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 160 SCRA 691 (1988), it was held that the responsibilities of
the local agent and the foreign principal towards the contracted employees
under the recruitment agreement extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the
said recruitment agreement.
x x x
Foregoing considered, the assailed Decision dated 24
February 2000 and the Resolution dated 23 June 2000 of respondent Commission in
NLRC NCR CA 016354-98 are hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration[17]
thereon was denied in the assailed Resolution[18]
dated
Hence, the
present petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ABANDONED THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AS
AFFIRMED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT AGENCY IS ONLY A [sic]
PRIVY AND LIABLE TO THE PRINCIPAL CONTRACT.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE PETITIONER
ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
The respondent
counters in its Comment that the CA is correct in ruling that it is not liable
for the monetary claims of petitioner as the claim had already prescribed and
had no factual basis.
Simply put, the issues boil down to
whether the CA erred in not holding respondent liable for petitioner’s money claims pursuant to their Contract of
Employment.
We grant the petition.
On whether respondent
is solidarily liable for petitioner’s monetary claims
Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules
and Regulations states that:
Section
1. Requirements for Issuance of
License. – Every applicant for license
to operate a private employment agency or manning agency shall submit a written application together with the
following requirements:
x
x x
f.
A verified undertaking stating that the applicant:
x x x
(3) Shall assume joint
and solidary liability with the employer
for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the
implementation of the contract; including but not limited to payment of
wages, death and disability
compensation and repatriation. (emphasis supplied)
The above provisions are clear that the private employment
agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer.[19]
This Court has, time and again, ruled
that private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the
foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or
contract of employment.[20] This joint and solidary liability
imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to
assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what
is due him.[21] This is
in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the
working class.
In
the assailed Decision, the CA disregarded the aforecited provision of the law
and the policy of the state when it reversed the findings of the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiter. As the agency which recruited
petitioner, respondent is jointly and solidarily liable with the latter’s
principal employer abroad for her (petitioner’s) money claims. Respondent cannot, therefore, exempt itself
from all the claims and liabilities arising from the implementation of their
POEA-approved Contract of Employment.
We cannot agree with the view of the CA that the solidary liability of
respondent extends only to the first contract (i.e. the original, POEA-approved
contract which had a term of until April 1990).
The signing of the “substitute” contracts with the foreign
employer/principal before the expiration of the POEA-approved contract and any
continuation of petitioner’s employment beyond the original one-year term,
against the will of petitioner, are continuing breaches of the original
POEA-approved contract. To accept the
CA’s reasoning will open the floodgates to even more abuse of our overseas
workers at the hands of their foreign employers and local recruiters, since the
recruitment agency could easily escape its mandated solidary liability for
breaches of the POEA-approved contract by colluding with their foreign
principals in substituting the approved contract with another upon the worker’s
arrival in the country of employment.
Such outcome is certainly contrary to the State’s policy of extending
protection and support to our overseas workers. To be sure, Republic Act No. 8042 explicitly prohibits the substitution
or alteration to the prejudice of the worker of employment contracts already
approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from the
time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of
the expiration of the same without the approval of the DOLE.[22]
Respondent’s contention that it was petitioner herself who violated
their Contract of Employment when she signed another contract in
In Placewell International
Services Corporation v. Camote,[23] we
held that the subsequently executed
side agreement of an overseas contract worker with her foreign employer which
reduced his salary below the amount approved by the POEA is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public
policy. The said side agreement cannot
supersede the terms of the standard employment contract approved by the
POEA.
Hence, in the present case, the diminution in the salary of petitioner
from US$370.00 to US$100 (BD 40.00) per month is void for violating the
POEA-approved contract which set the minimum standards, terms, and conditions
of her employment. Consequently, the solidary
liability of respondent with petitioner’s foreign employer for petitioner’s
money claims continues although she was forced to sign another contract in
Respondent cannot disclaim liability for the acts of the foreign
employer which forced petitioner to remain employed in violation of our laws
and under the most oppressive conditions on the allegation that it purportedly
had no knowledge of, or participation in, the contract unwillingly signed by
petitioner abroad. We cannot give
credence to this claim considering that respondent by its own allegations knew from the outset that the contract
submitted to the POEA for approval was not to be the “real” contract. Respondent blithely admitted to submitting to
the POEA a contract stating that the position to be filled by petitioner is that
of “Saleslady” although she was to be employed as a domestic helper since the
latter position was not approved for deployment by the POEA at that time. Respondent’s evident bad faith and admitted circumvention of the laws and regulations on migrant workers belie
its protestations of innocence and put petitioner in a position where she could
be exploited and taken advantage of overseas, as what indeed happened to her in
this case.
We look upon with great disfavor the unsubstantiated actuations of innocence
or ignorance on the part of local recruitment agencies of acts of their foreign
principals, as if the agencies’ responsibility ends with the deployment of the
worker. In the light of the recruitment
agency’s legally mandated joint and several liability with the foreign employer
for all
claims in connection with the implementation of the contract, it is the recruitment agency’s
responsibility to ensure that the terms and conditions of the employment
contract, as approved by the POEA, are faithfully complied with and implemented
properly by its foreign client/principal.
Indeed, it is in its best interest to do so to avoid being haled to the
courts or labor tribunals and defend itself from suits for acts of its foreign
principal.
On whether petitioner’s claims for underpaid salaries have prescribed
It should be recalled that the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC similarly found that petitioner is entitled to underpaid salaries,
albeit they differed in the number of months for which salary differentials
should be paid. The CA, on the other
hand, held that all of petitioner’s monetary claims have prescribed pursuant to
Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides that:
Art. 291.
Money Claims. – All money claims arising from employer-employee
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three years from the time that cause of
action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred. (emphasis supplied)
We do not agree with the CA when it held that the cause of
action of petitioner had already prescribed as the three-year prescriptive
period should be reckoned from
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that petitioner
was forced to work until April 1993.
Interestingly, the CA did not disturb this finding but held only that
the extent of respondent’s liability was limited to the term under the original
contract or, at most, to the term of the subsequent contract entered into with
the participation of respondent’s foreign principal, i.e. 1991. We have
discussed previously the reasons why (a) the CA’s theory of limited liability
on the part of respondent is untenable and (b) the petitioner has a right to be
compensated for all months she, in fact, was forced to work. To determine for which months petitioner’s
right to claim salary differentials has not prescribed, we must count three
years prior to the filing of the complaint on
We find that the NLRC correctly computed the salary
differential due to petitioner at US$2,970.00 (US$370.00 as approved salary
rate – US$100.00 as salary received = US$290 as underpaid salary per month x 11
months). However, it should be for the
period
A final note
This Court
reminds local recruitment agencies that it is their bounden duty to guarantee
our overseas workers that they are being recruited for bona fide jobs with bona fide
employers. Local agencies should
never allow themselves to be instruments of exploitation or oppression of their
compatriots at the hands of foreign employers.
Indeed, being the ones who profit most from the exodus of Filipino
workers to find greener pastures abroad, recruiters should be first to ensure
the welfare of the very people that keep their industry alive.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Acting Chairperson |
|
|
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
|
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
||
A T T E S T
A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Acting Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISU
Acting Chief Justice
*
On Official Leave.
**
Acting Chairperson of the
First Division as per Special Order No. 534.
***
Additional Member as per
Special Order No. 535.
[1] Penned
by then Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner and concurred in by Associate
Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Mario L. Guarina III.
[2] Annexes
B – B-2, Court of Appeals (CA) Rollo at 79-81.
[3]
[4] Annex
“A,” CA Rollo at 77.
[5] Petition
for Review in the CA, CA Rollo.
[6] Rollo
at 86.
[7] CA
Petition-Annex “H,” CA Rollo.
[8]
[9] Rollo
at 108-113.
[10] Promulgated
on
[11] Rollo
at 161.
[12] CA
Rollo at 45.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Rollo
at 41-42.
[17] CA
Rollo at 121-133.
[18]
[19] Skippers United
Pacific, Inc. and J.P. Samartzsis Maritime Enterprises Co., S.A. v. Jerry
Maguad and Porferio Ceudadano, G.R. No. 166363,
[20] Hellenic Philippine
Shipping, Inc. v. Siete, G.R. No.
84082, March 13, 1991, 195 SCRA 179, 186; Empire Insurance Company v.
NLRC, G.R. 121879, August 14, 1998, 294 SCRA 263, 271-272.
[21] P.I. Manpower Placements, Inc. v. NLRC (Second Division),
G.R. No. 97369,
[22] Placewell
International Services Corporation v. Camote, G.R. No. 169973,
[23] Id., citing Chavez v. Bonto-Perez, G.R. No. 109808, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 73.
[24] NLRC
Decision, Rollo at 160.
[25] As
an aside, this Court notes that in petitioner’s complaint filed with the Labor
Arbiter, she only claims underpayment of salaries and did not include
nonpayment of salaries as one of her causes of action. Subsequently, in her position paper and other
pleadings, petitioner asserts that she was not paid any salary at all from
September 1991 to April 1993. However,
under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, parties are barred from alleging or proving
causes of action in the position paper that are not found/alleged in the
complaint. Thus, the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC only granted petitioner salary differentials as she herself prayed for
in her complaint.