Republic
of the
SUPREME
COURT
SECOND DIVISION
|
MARIA
REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, Petitioner, -
versus - THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, Respondents. x-------------------------------------------x MARIA
REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, Petitioner, - versus
- VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 155635 Present: QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO,
JR., and BRION,
JJ. G.R. No. 163979 Promulgated: November
7, 2008 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before
us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay
Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
In
the first, a petition for certiorari[1]
under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30,
2002 Resolution[2] of
the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,[3]
granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente
Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court’s grant of support pendente lite
to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule
45,[4]
docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision[5]
of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain
orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.
Per
its Resolution of
The Facts
Vicente
and Rebecca were married on
On
Meanwhile,
on
On
On
On
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca
interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce
to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim
contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints
against each other. Specifically,
Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the
other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the
Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente
Lite
On
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to
Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED.
Petitioner’s Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente
Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is
hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the
proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
SO ORDERED.[19]
The RTC declared, among other things, that
the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual
trial. As to the grant of support pendente
lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against
Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial[20]
of his motion for reconsideration of the above
Grant of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On
IN VIEW OF ALL
THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court
from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order
dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case
No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Rebecca
moved[24]
but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned
The
adverted CA resolutions of
Ruling of
the CA
Pending resolution of G.R.
No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and
the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state
a cause of action. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.[26]
To the CA, the RTC ought to have
granted Vicente’s motion to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in
determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.[27] Applying said rule in the light of the
essential elements of a cause of action,[28]
Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right
in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union
having previously been dissolved on
(3) Rebecca’s contention about the
nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign
divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino
citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time
of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen.
The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also
did not indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying
her American citizenship, having professed to have that nationality status and
having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her life,
such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c)
when she applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18,
1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn
petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14,
1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship,
being born of a purportedly Filipino father in
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration
of the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed
The
Issues
In G.R.
No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for
the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that
the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTC’s orders which would
have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of
the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS
THE FACT OF PETITIONER’S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND
ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE
IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE
TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND
CONCURRENT ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH
LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.[30]
We
shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being
determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three
legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a
Philippine national may be recognized in the
Given the
foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e.,
the propriety of the granting of the
motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of:
first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the
divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and
second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are
its consequent legal effects?
The
Court’s Ruling
The
petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca
an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
There can
be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained
her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent
proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances
indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña,
And as
aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and
represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her
marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of
Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention
may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment[34]
in which she stated being an American citizen.
It is
true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification
(ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized
as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such
recognition was given only on
For
clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May
Concern:
This is to
certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and
thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this
Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:
Place of
Birth:
Sex: female Civil
Status: married Color of Hair: brown
Color of
Eyes: brown
Distinguishing marks on face: none
was – r e c o g n i z e d – as a
citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1,
Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed
by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly
affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st
Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for
identification purposes only. NOT VALID
for travel purposes.
Given under my
hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official
Receipt No. 5939988
issued
at
dated
From
the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may
be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of
Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the
1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming
Rebecca’s recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of
recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on
What
begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued
by the Bureau on
Under
extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship
require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as
the 1987 Administrative Code,
specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is
tasked to “provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws governing citizenship
and the admission and stay of aliens.”
Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for
Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.
Pertinently,
Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002[35]
on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:
The Bureau [of
Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the
Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72
days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of
the Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be
issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any
Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of
Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Not
lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only
on
When Divorce Was Granted
Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino
Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The
Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is
indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized
as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the
The
Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily
withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No.
96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of
her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition
shows that, while bearing the date
As may
be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under
Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the
ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted of the
following material documents: Marriage
Contract (Annex “A”) and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To
Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss dated
At any
rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to
dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said
petition, taken together with Vicente’s motion to dismiss and Rebecca’s
opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a
case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.
Validity
of Divorce Decree
Going
to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.
First, at
the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino
citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At
the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American
citizenship to govern her marital relationship.
Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American
citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently
declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the
parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the
existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M.
BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled
and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x,
who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN
ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine
nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502
Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court
represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special
power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before
the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and
authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this case.[37] (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being
an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding
in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized
here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the
national law of the alien spouse.[39]
Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when
she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of
the States of the Union,[40] the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as
here, sufficient.
It
bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied,
but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the
jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings
on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both
appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to
the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v.
Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect
of res judicata to a foreign judgment
[of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment
had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), to wit:
SEC.
50. Effect of foreign judgments.––The
effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a)
In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;
(b)
In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of
a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential
that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order
for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court
clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and,
as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.[41]
As the
records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign
divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro
Torrens, in said proceedings. As things
stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the
Finally,
the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force
of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October
6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify
or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on
February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or
not a divorce secured abroad would come
within the pale of the country’s policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning
point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.[42]
Legal Effects
of the Valid Divorce
Given
the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be
given a res judicata effect in this
jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is
considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain
language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As the
divorce court formally pronounced: “[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA
M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving
them free to remarry after completing the legal requirements.”[43]
Consequent
to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband’s
obligation under the Civil Code. He
cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to Rebecca.[44]
The
divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art.
26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (As
amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic
v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the
second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x
x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that
has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.[45]
Both
elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of
marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their
professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to
be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the
Agreement executed on
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal
property which they acquired during their marriage consists only of the
real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at
This property
settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which,
per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997,
ordered that, “THIRD: That the agreement
entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in
Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference
but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply
with each and every provision of said agreement.”[47]
Rebecca
has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is
thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that
her and Vicente’s conjugal property was not limited to their family home in
Ayala Alabang.[48]
No Cause
of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon
the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks,
under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v.
Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or
omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically
admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient
to constitute a cause of action
against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the
court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.[49]
One
thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca’s underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente’s
motion to dismiss and Rebecca’s opposition thereof, with the documentary
evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a
marriage.
To
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show
that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.[50] With the valid foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be
dissolved or nullified.
The
Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and
Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had
discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been
born on
Upon
the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue
tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca’s right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement
to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil
Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil
Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and
effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente
lite.
WHEREFORE, the
petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while
the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 3-34.
[2]
[3]
[4] Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 10-43.
[5]
[6]
[7] See Certification of Birth from the
Government of
[8] Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 146-150.
[9]
[10] Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 151-158.
[11]
[12] Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 206-212.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 512-590.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Supra note 5, at 583.
[27]
G.R. No. 137898,
[28]
Enumerated in San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 116825 March 26, 1998, 288 SCRA
115, 125: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation
of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right.
[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 597.
[30]
[31] Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322,
[32] Llorente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
124371,
[33] Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 388-389, issued
on
[35]
Adopted on
[36] Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 268-292.
[37]
[38] Supra note 10.
[39] Supra note 31.
[41] G.R. No. 142820,
[43] Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 148, 216.
[45]
G.R. No. 154380,
[46] Rollo
(G.R. No. 155635), p. 154.
[47] Rollo
(G.R. No. 163979), p. 215.
[49]
G.R. No. 165500,
[50] Azur
v. Provincial Board, No. L-22333,