FIRST DIVISION
|
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
Petitioner, -
versus - LEONILO A. MAGLASANG and OSCAR S. MAGLASANG, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 155407
Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CORONA, AZCUNA, and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. Promulgated: November 11, 2008 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the January 23, 2002 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 67341, as reiterated in its Resolution[2] of
September 20, 2002, affirming with modification the Joint Judgment [3] dated December 16, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (
On
On
The subject parcels of land are located at
Lim-ao,
The
On
Upon conduct of hearing and ocular
inspections and reception of the parties’ position papers and documentary
evidence, Atty. Reforzado submitted a Commissioners’ Report dated P 1,000.00
per square meter,[4] Clerk of
Court Reforzado pegged the value of the lots at P 900.00 per square
meter.[5] In his report, Mr. Pongos arrived at the
lowest valuation of P 400.00 per square meter for the developed area and
P 85.00 for the undeveloped area. [6]
Confronted with the commissioners’ varying
land valuations, the trial court made its own determination of the just
compensation taking into account the range of prices recommended in the
Commissioners’ Report and documentary evidence presented by the parties. Setting the reckoning period for the
computation of the just compensation at the time of the filing of the
complaints, the trial court pegged the value of the two lots at P 300.00
per square meter. However, in the same
decision, the trial court further increased said initial valuation to P
700.00 per square meter to compensate for what it termed as inflation factor and adjustment factor. Relying on
the case of Cosculluela v. Court of
Appeals,[7]
the trial court ruled:
After examining
the data, the Court would like to take the mean position but similar to the
ones taken by the Commissioners. For
this, therefore, the Commissioners’ Report is hereby accepted. From the reckoning date of 1994, the Court
wants to apply a three-year period therefrom to ascertain the prevailing
price. The court has in mind the dictum
in Cosculluela vs. Court of Appeals (164 SCRA 393) which runs as follows: ‘just
compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid
to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is made
to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land.’
The Court thus
believes an inflation factor is to be applied in the computation considering
the time that elapsed since late 1994 up to the present. Also an adjustment factor commonly adopted by
appraisers is included in the computations.
x x x
Wherefore, after
considering all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered fixing the amount of
P 700.00 per square meter as just compensation for P
44,333,100 and for Lot 11907 under OCT No. P-P
68,744,200 to be paid by the plaintiff to the respective defendants plus cost
of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
From the foregoing decision, both parties
filed their respective appeals with the CA.
On P 700.00 to P 300.00. In arriving at such a decision, the CA
ratiocinated, thus:
We are of the
opinion that the trial court reversibly erred in taking into account such ‘inflation
factor’ and ‘adjustment factor’ for the determination of just compensation in
this case. It has misapplied the ruling
in Cosculluela by substituting such
‘inflation factor’ and or ‘adjustment factor’ for the legally mandated interest
in the price to be paid as just compensation in expropriation cases.
xxx
Nowhere in the said decision may it be inferred that damages for such delay in
the payment of just compensation, other than the legal interest provided by
law, may be granted in addition or considered in computing the amount of just
compensation such as the ‘inflation factor’ applied by the trial court. On the contrary, our Supreme Court has even
ruled that the de facto devaluation
of the peso is not a factor in land valuation for purposes of
expropriation. Therefore, there is
absolutely no legal basis for the trial court’s application of an ‘inflation
factor’ and ‘adjustment factor’ in the determination of just compensation in
these expropriation cases. The
consistent rule has always been that the owner of the property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his
compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of
the property at the time it is taken.
This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just, i.e., just ‘not only to the individual
whose property is taken, but to the public, which is to pay for it.’ Hence, the price level for 1994 when the
property was taken by plaintiff-appellant should be the proper valuation for
defendant-appellants’ properties and not their subsequent increased value after
the passage of time.
x
x x
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the present appeals are hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Joint Judgment appealed from in Civil
Case Nos. 3267-O and 3273-O is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the
just compensation for the expropriated properties is hereby ordered to be paid
to defendant-appellants in the amount of P 300.00 per square meter, or
the total amounts of P18,999,900.00 to defendant-appellant Oscar S.
Maglasang for Lot No. 11900 and P 29,461,800.00 to defendant-appellant
Leolino A. Maglasang for Lot No. 11907, with interest at the legal rate of 6%
per annum from October 25, 1994 and November 10, 1994, respectively, until full
payment is made.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO
ORDERED
Still unsatisfied, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision but its motion was denied
by the CA in the resolution of
Unable to accept the CA’s decision for
allegedly being contrary to law and established jurisprudence, PNOC is now
before the Court with the following grounds in support of its petition:
A. CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF
THE HONORABLE COURT OF AP
300.00 PER SQUARE METER IS NOT WELL SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AS
REPRESENTING THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE EXPROPRIATED PARCELS OF LAND.
B. LIKEWISE CONTRARY TO THE
RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WERE
AGRICULTURAL, NOT INDUSTRIAL, PARCELS OF LAND AT THE TIME THEY WERE TAKEN FOR
PUBLIC USE.
As we see it, other than the question as to the precise time the
fixing of just compensation should be reckoned, the rest of petitioner’s
arguments dwell solely on questions of fact.
In expropriation proceedings, the value of
the land and its character at the time it was taken by the government are the
criteria for determining just compensation.[9]
This is so because, there are
instances when the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the
expropriation suit, in which situation just compensation shall be determined as
of the time of taking.[10] The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara,[11] is that —
(W)here property
is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof
may be enchanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the
plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there
may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the
complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his
compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of
his property at the time it is taken. This
is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., 'just not
only to the individual whose property is taken,' 'but to the public, which is
to pay for it.
Here, petitioner insists that contrary to
the findings of the two courts below, the determination of just compensation
should be reckoned prior to the time of the filing of the complaint for
expropriation. According to petitioner
in Civil Case No. 3267-O, petitioner
took possession of the land on
We are not persuaded.
In the context of the State’s inherent
power of eminent domain, there is “taking” where the owner is actually deprived
or dispossessed of his property; where there is a practical destruction or a
material impairment of the value of his property; or when he is deprived of the
ordinary use thereof.[13]
In Republic
v. Castellvi, [14] this
Court held that there is a “taking” when the expropriator enters private
property not only for a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for
the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. Thus, in that case, we rejected the State’s
contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to a permanent
right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made for a
determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land, ceases upon the day fixed,
without need of a demand. Neither can it
be said that the right of eminent domain may be exercised by simply leasing the
premises to be expropriated. Where, as
here, the owner was compensated and not deprived of the ordinary and beneficial
use of his property by its being diverted to public use, there is no taking
within the constitutional sense.
In fixing the just compensation reckoned
from 1994, the trial court took the Commissioners’ Report into consideration:
II.
Time
of the Taking.
In both cases the
time of the taking may be reckoned in 1994. For Lot 11900, on October 24, 1994, the date
of the filing of the complaint although the plaintiff took possession of the
property in 1991 due to a lease contract executed between plaintiff and
defendant yet the intention to expropriate was manifested only upon the filing
of the complaint (NPC
vs. CA and Macapanton Magondata, 254
SCRA 577).
For
Accordingly, we quote with approval the
trial court’s ruling on this point:
Contrary to
plaintiff’s position, the lease in 1992 should not be construed as taking in
the constitutional sense. What
constitutes ‘taking’ is when the property is ‘directly appropriated’ and not to
‘consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power’ (Tañada
and Carreon, Political Law of the
Following the doctrine in Castellvi, the trial court committed no
error when it reckoned the time of taking of the subject properties from the
date of filing of petitioner’s complaints for eminent domain.
Petitioner would next argue that the
subject lots were erroneously classified as industrial land when in fact they
were agricultural land at the time they were taken for expropriation.
At the outset, we reiterate that the Court
recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert lands
through local ordinance.[16]
On this score, we quote the findings of the
commissioners as contained in their report on the ocular inspection conducted
on
xxx (1) Lot 11907
was only recently flattened, there are no more trees, no more plants except
cogon grass and other wild plants; Lot 11900 has also been flattened in the
middle of which are two reinjection pumps, and also found therein are some
fruit bearing coconut trees; (2) adjacent
lots are partly forested areas; (3) the trees in both lots had been felled,
including fruit bearing coconut trees, but the number of those felled are
unknown, there being no records available; what remains are cogon grass and
other wild plants and the traces of rivulets created by torrential rains. The terrain is rolling and mountainous
although these areas have long been developed and used by the PNOC before the
filing of the cases, which though not traversed directly by the provincial or
national roads, are already accessible by all-weather roads and are adjacent to
different PNOC buildings.
The Commissioners’ Report discussed in
detail the circumstances which led to the reclassification of subject lots from
agricultural to industrial land upon declaration of the city of
Taking its cue from the Commissioners’
Report, the trial court took into consideration among others the lots’
classification as industrial land in fixing the just compensation. Throughout the entire proceedings in the
trial court, no objection was proffered by petitioner on this matter.
As it were, the Court cannot but agree with
the CA when it ruled that petitioner’s belated objection on appeal of the
classification of the subject lots could no longer be entertained. For the same reason the Court refuses to
consider petitioner’s Manifestation[17]
stating that a property adjacent to the subject lots was purchased at P
80.00 per square meter and urging the Court to peg the value of the subject
properties at the same amount. Suffice it to state that issues raised for the
first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower
court are barred by estoppel. Matters,
theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be
considered on review or appeal where they are raised for the first time. To consider the alleged facts and arguments
raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair
play, justice and due process.[18]
Finally, on the basis of all its arguments,
petitioner asks this Court to set aside the lower courts’ factual finding as to
the just compensation for the subject expropriated lots.
It must be stressed that only questions of
law may be raised in petitions to review decisions of the CA filed before this
Court. The factual findings of the CA
affirming those of the trial court are final and conclusive. They cannot be reviewed by this Court, save
only in the following circumstances, which we find absent in the instant case: (1)
when the factual conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when the CA went beyond the issues of the case in making
its findings, which are further contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the CA’s findings are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) when the conclusions do not cite the specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
and (10) when the CA’s findings of fact, supposedly premised on the absence of
evidence, are contradicted by the evidence on record.[19]
Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish
that the present case falls under any of the exceptions enumerated above. A perusal of the facts and evidence presented
does not convince this Court to deviate from the findings of fact of the two
courts below. The lower courts properly
appreciated the evidence submitted by both parties as regards the nature of the
expropriated lots. These courts have determined
that the lots were industrial at the time of the taking by petitioner for
expropriation.
To recapitulate, in denying the instant petition,
the Court relies on a well-established doctrine. Thus, in the present case, the findings of
fact of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, cannot be disturbed,
modified or reversed by this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED and the assailed decision
and resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZC
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, with Associate Justices Conchita A. Carpio Morales (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) and Sergio L. Pestaño (ret.), concurring; rollo, pp. 29-37.
[2]
[3]
[4] Rollo, p. 128.
[5]
[6]
[7] G.R. No. L-77765,
[8] Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[9] Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No 109338,
[10] Ansaldo
v. Tantuico, G.R. No. 50147,
[11] 96 Phil. 170, 177 (1954).
[12] Rollo, pp. 154-156.
[13]
[14] G.R. No. L-20620,
[15] Rollo,
p.133.
[16] Juan B. Amante, et al. v. Luis Yulo, Jesus Miguel Yulo, C-J Yulo &
Sons, Inc., Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation, et al.,
G.R. No. 118838, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 432, 459, citing Section 20, Republic
Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) and Memorandum Circular 54, series of
1993, Office of the President.
[17] Rollo, pp. 176-179.
[18] Sps. Luis V. Cruz and Aida Cruz v. Sps. Alejandro Fernando, Sr., and Rita Fernando, G.R. No. 145470,
[19] Republic of the Philippines
and Cavite College of Fisheries v. Maxima Lensico, Rufina Lensico, Rogelio
Lensico and Victor Lensico, G.R. No. 158919, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 361,
369.