Republic of the
Supreme
Court
THIRD
DIVISION
|
JAIME L.
YANEZA, Petitioner, - versus - THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, MANUEL A. DE JESUS and WILHELMINA M. MANZANO, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 149322
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: November 28, 2008 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65,
Jaime L. Yaneza, petitioner, assails the Court of Appeals’ denial of his Motion
for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on the ground that it was
filed after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing the appeal.
Petitioner is the owner of a 603-square-meter
parcel of land, denominated as
Respondents, Manuel A. de Jesus and
Wilhelmina M. Manzano, are the owners of
On
Apparently, respondents did not agree
to the proposition because two days later, petitioner wrote another letter to
them, offering instead a perpetual easement of right of way (4 meters wide) and
stating that he will prepare the necessary document to facilitate the
transaction.[2]
Instead of a deed of perpetual
easement, it appears that petitioner and respondents executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale[3] on October 20, 1995 over a
175-sq m portion of Lot 2730-A, to be used as an access road 5-meters wide, for
a consideration of P20,000.00. The Deed of Absolute Sale contained the
following terms and conditions:
1] The portion subject of this sale agreement is as per the sketch plan attached herein as Annex “A” and made as an integral part of this instrument;
2]
The total purchase for the aforesaid portion of lot shall be in the sum of
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, payable on cash
basis upon the signing and execution of this deed, the signature of the VENDOR
being his acknowledgment that he already received the said amount
satisfactorily;
3] The realty taxes and assessments on the lot subject of this sale agreement, costs of preparation of the document of sale, all other taxes, cost of subdivision survey to segregate the portion of lot, and all the incidental expenses to facilitate issuance of the individual transfer certificate of titles for the resulting lots shall be for the sole account and expense of the VENDEE;
4]
The use of the aforesaid portion of lot sold shall be for … the purpose of the
… right of way of and for the abovesaid property of the VENDEE, whereby the
VENDOR, by virtue whereof, shall have the perpetual right and/or privilege to
use the same as right of way for his own purposes.
Almost a year later, or on
When respondents refused to honor the
cancellation, petitioner filed a Complaint[6]
for Cancellation of Contract with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Teresa-Baras on
In their Answer with Counterclaims,
respondents averred that they purchased the disputed 280-sq m portion of P20,000.00 in consideration of
the petitioner’s desistance from further pursuing his claim over the 280 sq m
area. Petitioner prepared the Deed of Absolute Sale and respondents agreed to sign
it without prejudice to the resolution of the civil case (Civil Case No.
777-M), filed by Llagas against the petitioner, on the issue of the ownership
of the property.[7]
Respondents narrated that, after they
signed the Deed of Absolute Sale but before they could deliver the P20,000.00,
they discovered that it covered only 175 sq m, not 280 sq m. There was an
immediate renegotiation between the parties and, for an additional
consideration of P40,000.00, petitioner agreed to sell the entire 280 sq
m. Relying on the petitioner’s assurance that he will prepare a new deed of
sale to reflect the new agreement, respondents paid him the additional P40,000.00
as evidenced by an Acknowledgment Receipt. Despite several demands, petitioner failed
to present the new deed of sale.[8]
According to the respondents, petitioner
initially allowed them peaceful possession and use of the area even when he
started constructing his house adjacent to the access road. However, while
petitioner was constructing his house, a serious misunderstanding took place
between petitioner and respondents’ caretaker, Benjamin Manzano, brought about
by the latter’s refusal to allow petitioner to tap water and electricity from
the respondents’ property. Petitioner allegedly retaliated and took possession
of the eastern half portion of the 280-sq-m area by constructing a fence along
the length of the access road, which reduced it to a narrow passage that could
not allow trucks to pass through. On account of this dispute, Manzano, upon
respondents’ authority, filed a complaint before the Barangay Lupon to compel the petitioner to remove the fence but the
petitioner did not attend the conciliation proceedings. Respondents obtained
from the barangay a certification to
file an action in court, but petitioner preempted them by filing the instant
case. Respondents pointed out that the petitioner did not seek the intervention
of the Barangay Lupon before he filed
the instant case; hence, the petitioner’s complaint should be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action.[9]
In claiming damages, respondents
alleged that the construction of the fence caused them difficulties when they
started developing their property because the trucks that carried the necessary
materials could not pass through the access road. They purportedly incurred
additional costs since they had to hire laborers to manually carry the
construction materials from the barangay
road to the construction site.[10]
Respondents further asserted that
what was agreed upon was a sale and not only an easement of right of way. They
denied the existence of the Deed of Undertaking which does not even bear their
signatures. And respondents argued that the deed of sale may not be canceled unilaterally
by the petitioner since they already acquired full ownership over the property
by virtue thereof.[11]
Finally, respondents stressed that it
is the petitioner who is actually enjoying a right of way along the access road
in compliance with the condition stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale. It is the
petitioner who violated the terms of the contract when he obstructed the access
road with the concrete fence he built thereon. For this violation, petitioner
should be denied his right of way over the access road. Moreover, petitioner’s property
abuts the barangay road; hence, there
is actually no need for him to be granted a right of way.
During trial, petitioner testified
for himself and presented his brother, Cesar Yaneza, as witness. Petitioner
narrated that Cesar handed to him the P20,000.00 and that he constructed
the iron fence during the latter part of 1996 because respondents did not
comply with the conditions set out in the Deed of Undertaking. Cesar Yaneza
testified that he was the one who delivered the Deed of Absolute Sale to the office
of respondent Manuel de Jesus in
For the respondents, respondent
Manuel de Jesus, Rudy Llagas and Benjamin Manzano testified. Rudy Llagas admitted
that he indeed sold to the respondents the subject property which is on the
western side; what he sold to the petitioner was on the eastern side of his
property.[12] Respondent Manuel de
Jesus swore that he and petitioner agreed on a price of P20,000.00 for
the 5-m by 35-m area and an additional P40,000.00 to increase the area
to 8-m by 35-m, so that the total consideration was P60,000.00. He
claimed he had to agree to the additional amount because by then he had already
constructed the gate to, and trucks could not enter, their property.[13]
And finally, Benjamin Manzano attested that when petitioner started
constructing his house, petitioner asked him if he could tap water and
electricity from respondents’ property, but he did not agree. He said that,
after a few days from said incident, petitioner constructed the low level iron
fence in the middle of the road right of way.[14]
On
In view of the foregoing considerations, this Court hereby resolves to order the following:
1. To dismiss the complaint as well as the plaintiff’s claim for damages and attorney’s fees;
2. For plaintiff to execute a new deed of absolute sale covering the access road or road right of way of 8 meters wide by 35 meter long, including the meter easement beside the irrigation canal; with a total area of 280 sq. m. from the northwest portion of Lot 2730, now covered by TCT No. 50181 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Morong Branch, without prejudice to the outcome of Civil Case No. 777-M filed by Rudy Llagas against plaintiff Jaime Yaneza;
3. To cancel and declare as null and void the plaintiff’s right of way over the access road of defendants;
4. For plaintiff to remove at his expense, the steel fence or structure he caused to be constructed at about the middle of defendants’ access road or found within the 280 sq.m. area that obstruct, impede or alter the full and peaceful use by defendants of subject realty;
5. To restore defendants to the full, adequate and peaceful possession and use of subject realty;
6. For plaintiff to pay to the defendants the following:
a.
P1,000,000.00 as actual
damages;
b.
P1,300,000.00 as moral
damages;
c.
P300,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
d.
P300,000.00 as attorney’s
fees;
e.
P30,000.00 as reimbursement
for incidental litigation expenses;
f. 6% interest on the actual damages from the time they were incurred up to the time of finality of the decision;
g. 6% interest on the award for moral, exemplary, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses from the promulgation of the decision until its finality;
h. Costs.
SO
ORDERED.[15]
On
Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration with respect to the deletion of the award of damages, but the
same was denied for failure to include a Notice of Hearing. Respondents filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment, the status of which was not disclosed by the
parties in this petition.
Meanwhile, petitioner’s counsel
received a copy of the RTC Decision on
On
Disgruntled with the CA Resolutions,
petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition, raising the following issues:
WHETHER THE PETITION SHOULD BE GIVEN DUE COURSE IN THE LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING THE TIMELINESS OF THE FILING THEREOF.
WHETHER THE APPEALED DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WAS RENDERED AND WRITTEN AS REQUIRED BY THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULES OF COURT.
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION.
WHETHER THE PETITIONER MAY BE COMPELLED TO EXECUTE A DEED OF CONVEYANCE AGAINST HIS WILL AND IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW, AND THE CIVIL LAW AGAINST UNJUST ENRICHMENT.[19]
The petition has no merit.
In the interest of substantial
justice, petitioner begs this Court’s indulgence for the late filing of his motion
for extension of time, which he claims is due to an honest mistake.
Certainly, we cannot ascribe grave
abuse of discretion upon a court that denies a motion for extension of time filed
after the expiration of the reglementary period to file a petition. A motion
for extension of time to file a petition should be filed prior to the
expiration or lapse of the period set by law, otherwise, there is no longer any
period to extend and the judgment or order to be appealed from will have become
final and executory.[20] Once
the judgment becomes final and executory, the appellate court is without
jurisdiction to modify or reverse it.
We have repeatedly pronounced that perfection
of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory
and jurisdictional.[21]
The failure to perfect an appeal is not a mere technicality as it deprives the
appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.[22]
Hence, anyone seeking an exemption from the application of the reglementary
period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of an exceptionally
meritorious instance warranting such deviation.[23] But
none obtains in this case.
Even on the merits, we find the petition
noticeably infirm. The petitioner’s complaint for cancellation of the contract was
correctly dismissed by the MCTC.
Petitioner’s cause of action for
cancellation of the contract is based on a breach of contract as provided in Article
1191[24]
of the Civil Code and is properly denominated “rescission,” or “resolution”
under the Old Civil Code. It is grounded on the respondents’ alleged
noncompliance with the conditions embodied in the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
Deed of Undertaking. In particular, petitioner claims that respondents constructed
a road three meters wider than what was agreed upon in the deed of sale and
failed to comply with their undertaking to facilitate the transfer of the title
over the subject area.
To state the obvious, the
construction of the road beyond the stipulated area does not constitute a
breach of contract. Breach of contract implies a failure, without legal excuse,
to perform any promise or undertaking that forms part of the contract.[25]
Although the contract specifically stated the area covered by the sale, it did
not contain a promise by the respondents that they will only occupy such area. Albeit
apparently wrong, petitioner’s cause of action should not have been based on
the contract of sale.
Neither could the respondent be faulted
for not facilitating the transfer of the title over the subject area. Respondents
did not sign the Deed of Undertaking, and thus, could not have assumed the obligations
contained therein. Moreover, considering that the respondents specifically denied
the existence of the document and petitioner failed to authenticate it, the RTC
was correct in declaring that it has no probative weight.
Besides, rescission of a contract will not be
permitted for a slight or casual breach but only for a substantial and fundamental
breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement.[26] It
must be a breach of faith that destroys or violates the reciprocity between the
parties.[27] The alleged breach by the respondents was
definitely not of such level and magnitude.
Most importantly, rescission of a contract
presupposes the existence of a valid and subsisting obligation. The breach
contemplated in Article 1191 is the obligor’s failure to comply with an
existing obligation.[28]
It would be useless to rescind a contract that is no longer in existence. Here, we find that the contract of sale sought to
be canceled by the petitioner does not exist anymore; hence, the filing of the
petition for cancellation was an exercise in futility.
The records show that the parties’ original
agreement, embodied in the Deed of Absolute Sale, had already been superseded or
novated by a new contract, albeit an oral one, covering an increased area of
280 sq m. In his
testimony, petitioner admitted that he received from his brother, Cesar Yaneza,
the P20,000.00 that respondents paid. This, taken with the respondents’
narration of the circumstances surrounding the signing of the deed of sale and
the subsequent renegotiation for an increased area, together with the
Acknowledgment Receipt showing that an additional P40,000.00 was paid to
the petitioner, reasonably leads us to
believe that the parties had actually entered into a new agreement which
covered the entire 280-sq m area where the access road was laid.
The new contract of sale between the parties is
valid despite it not being evidenced by any writing.[29] The requirement under the Statute of
Frauds does not affect
the validity of the contract of sale but is needed merely for its
enforceability. In any case, it applies only to contracts which are executory,
and not to those which have been consummated either totally
or partially,[30] as in the new contract of
sale herein.
The existence of the new contract of sale over the
280-sq m area therefore having been established, it follows that the petitioner
may be compelled to execute the corresponding deed of sale reflecting this new
agreement. After the
existence of the contract has been admitted, the party bound thereby may be
compelled to execute the proper document.[31]
This is clear from Article 1357, viz.:
Art. 1357. If
the law requires a document or other special form, as in the acts and contracts
enumerated in the following article [Article 1358], the contracting parties may
compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. This
right may be exercised simultaneously with the action upon the contract.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
CA Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 83.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Ditching v. Court
of Appeals, 331 Phil. 665, 677 (1996).
[21] Petilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150792, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 254, 261.
[22] Zaragosa v. Nobleza, G. R. No. 144560,
May 13, 2004, 428 SCRA 410, 419.
[23] Eda v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 155251,
[24] Article 1191 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with articles 1385 and 1388 of the Mortgage Law.
[25] See Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 171.
[26] Barredo
v. Leaño, G.R. No. 156627, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 106,
115.
[27] Francisco v. DEAC
Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 171312,
[28] Velarde v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 360, 373 (2001).
[29] See Article 1356 of the New Civil Code.
[30] Swedish Match v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128120,
[31] Cenido v.
Apacionado, 376 Phil. 801, 820 (1999).