Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
VALENTE
RAYMUNDO, Petitioner, - versus - TEOFISTA
ISAGON VDA. DE SUAREZ, DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ, MARCELO I. SUAREZ,
JR, EVELYN SUAREZ, ET AL., Respondents. |
G.R. No. 149017
Present: PUNO, C.J.* YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: November 28, 2008 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This
petition, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assails the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 58090 which reversed, set aside and recalled the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Orders[3] in Civil
Case No. 51203.
First,
the long settled facts.
Marcelo
and Teofista Isagon Suarez’[4]
marriage was blessed with both material wealth and progeny in herein
respondents, namely, Danilo,[5]
Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr., Evelyn, and Reggineo,[6]
all surnamed Suarez. During their marriage, governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains regime, they acquired numerous properties, which included
the following: (1) a parcel of land situated in Barrio Caniogan, Pasig with an
area of 348 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
30680; (2) property located in Pinagbuhatan,
After
the death of Marcelo Sr. in 1955, Teofista and herein respondents, as well as
Elpidio Suarez,[7] executed
an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,[8] partitioning
Marcelo Sr.’s estate, thus:
WHEREAS, the said deceased is survived by the parties hereto who are his only legal heirs: TEOFISTA ISAGON, being the surviving spouse, and EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, ELPIDIO SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ, EVELYN SUAREZ, MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and REGGINEO SUAREZ, being the legitimate children of the deceased with the said TEOFISTA ISAGON;
WHEREAS, the minors ELPIDIO, SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ, EVELYN SUAREZ, MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and REGGINEO SUAREZ are represented herein by EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, in her capacity as the guardian and legal administrator of the property of the said minors;
WHEREAS, there are no known debts or financial obligations of whatever nature and amount against the estate of the deceased;
NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the Parties have agreed
to settle and liquidate the assets of the conjugal partnership between the
deceased and TEOFISTA ISAGON, and to settle and adjudicate the estate of the
said deceased, by and pursuance to these presents, in the following manner, to
wit:
1. That TEOFISTA ISAGON, as the surviving spouse and partner of the deceased, shall receive in absolute and exclusive ownership the following properties as her lawful share in the assets of the conjugal partnership of gains between her and the deceased, to wit:
(a) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6938, situated at Sitio Pantayan, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal;
(b) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6939, situated at Sitio Pantayan, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal;
(c) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 38291, situated at Barrio Rosario, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal;
(d) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 38290, situated at Barrio Rosario, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal;
(e) TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY
PESOS AND NINETY (P12,530.90) deposited with the Commercial Bank and
Trust Company of the P39.00) deposited with Prudential Bank.
2. That the Parties TEOFISTA ISAGON, EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, ELPIDIO SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ, EVELYN SUAREZ, MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and REGGINEO SUAREZ, shall each and all receive and be entitled to a share equivalent to one-seventh (1/7) of the estate of the deceased MARCELO SUAREZ, which estate is comprised of the following properties, to wit:
(a) A parcel of land covered by TCT No.
30680, situated at Barrio Kaniogan, P4,150.00.
(b) Three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. 33982, 33983 and 33984, situated at Barrio Pineda, Municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal, with an assessed value of P560.00.
(c) A parcel of land covered by TCT 33986, situated
at Barrio Pineda, P440.00.
(d) Two (2) parcels of land, being Lots Nos.
42 and 44 of the amendment-subdivision plan TY-4653-Amd., being a portion of P590.00.
(e) Two parcels of land, being Lots Nos. 43
and 45 of the amendment-subdivision plan TY-4653-Amd., being a portion of P1,190.00.
(f) A parcel of land, being Lot No. 6,
Block 269 of the subdivision plan pos-112, being a portion of Lot 2, Block 348,
Psd-3188, G.L.R.O. Record Nos. 375,699 and 917, situated at San Felipe Neri,
Province of Rizal, with an assessed value of P6,340.00.
(g) A parcel of land covered by OCT No. 391,
situated in the Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal, with an assessed
value of P1,840.00.
(h) TWELVE THOUSAND (12,000) shares of stock of the Consolidated Mines, Inc. represented by Certificate No. 71-5-B (for 1,000 shares) and Certificate No. 12736 (for 11,000 shares).
PROVIDED, that their title to the properties hereinabove mentioned shall be in common and the share of each heir being pro indiviso.
Curiously,
despite the partition, title to the foregoing properties, explicitly identified
in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate as forming part of Marcelo’s and
Isagon’s property regime, remained in the couple’s name. Not surprisingly,
Teofista continued to administer and manage these properties. On the whole,
apart from those now owned exclusively by Teofista, all the properties were
held pro indiviso by Teofista and her
children; and respective titles thereto were not changed, with Teofista as de facto administrator thereof.
In
1975, Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal Realty) and Teofista, the latter owning
ninety percent (90%) of the former’s shares of stock, were sued by petitioner Valente
Raymundo, his wife P70,000.00.[9]
When
the judgment of the CFI became final and executory, herein subject properties
were levied and sold on execution on P94,170.00. As a result,
a certificate of sale was issued to them and registered in their favor on
Parenthetically,
before expiration of the redemption period, or on
Meanwhile,
the RTC, Branch 151,
formerly the CFI, Branch 1,
in Civil Case Nos. 21376 to 21379,
issued an Order[10] directing
Teofista: (1) to vacate the subject properties, (2) to desist from despoiling, dismantling,
removing or alienating the improvements
thereon, (3) to place petitioner
Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion in peaceful
possession
thereof, and (4) to surrender to them
the owner’s duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents. Herein respondents, joined by their mother,
Teofista, filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the subject
properties are co-owned by them and further informing the RTC of the filing and
pendency of Civil Case No. 51203. Nonetheless, the trial court denied Teofista’s
and herein respondents’ motion, reiterated its previous order, which included,
among others, the order for Teofista and all persons claiming right under her,
to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale.
Undaunted,
Teofista and herein respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to annul the foregoing orders. The
appellate court, on
We believe this petition cannot prosper for two reasons. First, as purported case for certiorari it fails to show how the respondent judge had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The two orders being assailed were preceded by a final judgment, a corresponding writ of execution, a levy on execution and a judicial sale, all of which enjoy a strong sense presumption of regularity.
Secondly, as far as [petitioner] Teofista Suarez is concerned, she cannot complain about the levy because she was a party in the consolidated cases where judgment was rendered against her in her personal capacity. Since she did not appeal from the decision, she cannot say that the judgment is erroneous for an obligation that belong to the corporation. And with respect to the children of Teofista Suarez, who are co-petitioners in this proceedings [herein respondents], suffice it to point out that not being parties in the consolidated cases, what they should have done was to immediately file a third party claim. The moment levy was made on the parcels of land, which they claim are theirs by virtue of hereditary succession, they should have seasonably filed such claim to protect their rights. As the record discloses, however, the children chose to remain silent, and even allowed the auction sale to be held, filing almost a year later a half-hearted complaint to annul the proceedings which they allowed to be dismissed by not diligently prosecuting it.
In
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied
and the restraining order previously issued is DISSOLVED, with costs against
petitioners.[11]
On
the other litigation front concerning Civil Case No. 51203, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by the RTC Pasig, Branch 155, on February 25,
1985, enjoining petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion from
transferring to third parties the levied properties based on its preliminary
finding that the auctioned properties are co-owned by Teofista and herein respondents. Subsequently, however, Civil Case No. 51203
was dismissed by the RTC, Branch 155, at the instance of petitioner Valente for
failure of herein respondents to prosecute. But in yet another turn of events,
the RTC, Branch 155, lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed the
issuance of alias summons.
Thus,
it was now petitioner Valente’s, Violeta’s, Virginia’s and Maria Concepcion’s
turn to file a petition for certiorari
with the CA, assailing the various orders of the RTC, Branch 155, which all
rejected their bid to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The CA granted their
petition, thus:
And the fact that herein private respondents, as the legal heirs of Teofista Vda. de Suarez and supposedly not parties in Civil Case Nos. 21376 - 21379 does not preclude the application of the doctrine of res judicata since, apart from the requisites constitutive of this procedural tenet, they were admittedly the children of Teofista Suarez, who is the real party-in-interest in the previous final judgment. As successors-in-interest of Teofista Suarez, private respondents merely stepped into the shoes of their mother in regard to the levied pieces of property. Verily, there is identity of parties, not only where the parties in both actions are the same, but where there is privity with them as in the cases of successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or where there is substantial identity.
Finally, the action to annul the judicial sale filed by herein private respondents is not the reinvindicatory suit, much less the third party claim contemplated by Section 17 of Rule 39.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the questioned orders dated February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989 and February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby annulled; further respondent judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203.[12]
From
this ruling, herein respondents appealed to the Supreme Court. In Suarez v. Court of Appeals,[13]
we reversed the appellate court, thus:
Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner [herein respondents] and private respondents [petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion] and the developments subsequent to the filing of the complaint, [w]e cannot but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.
It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and the manner of publicly selling en masse the subject properties for auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of land [subject properties] should have been the subject of the auction sale.
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the case:
The rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.”
Article 888 further provides:
“The
legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
The latter
may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate
children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.”
Article 892, par. 2 likewise provides:
“If there
are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall
be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate
children or descendants.”
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners [herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their mother [Teofista]. Petitioners [herein respondents] became co-owners of the property not because of their mother [Teofista] but through their own right as children of their deceased father [Marcelo Sr.]. Therefore, petitioners [herein respondents] are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated
It was at this point when another series
of events transpired, culminating in the present petition.
Upon
our reinstatement of Civil Case No. 51203, each and every pleading filed by
herein respondents, as plaintiffs therein, was hotly contested and opposed by
therein defendants, including petitioner Valente. Moreover, even at that stage,
when the case had been remanded with a directive to “determine that portion
which belongs to [herein respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said
portion,” Civil Case No. 51203 had to be re-raffled and transferred, for varied
reasons, to the different court branches in Pasig City. In between all these,
petitioner Valente, along with the other defendants, repeatedly filed a Motion
to Dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 for the purported failure of herein respondents
to prosecute the case. Most of these Motions to Dismiss were denied.
With
each transfer of Civil Case No. 51203, the judge to which the case was raffled
had to study the records anew. Expectedly, part of the records went missing and
were lost. On
1. The
first volume of the record in the above-entitled case was recorded as received
on
2. That the staff of Branch 71 at this time was sharing a small room with Branch 161 at the First Floor of the Justice Hall, and as the Branch was newly formed, it had no equipment or furniture of its own, and was still undermanned;
3. That sometime in August 1990, Branch 71 moved to the staffroom of Branch 159 at the Second Floor of the Justice Hall;
4. That on October 25, 1990, this Court received a Notice of Judgment dated October 22, 1990 from the Court of Appeals that ruled the dismissal of the above-entitled case, and as per standing instructions of Judge Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall, the same was bound as volume 2 of the case;
5. That just before the Christmas vacation in 1991, the branch was forced to hastily move all of its records and equipment to branch 69, because of the unexpected notice we received that the room we were occupying was to be demolished in order to meet the schedule for the renovation of the building;
6. That unfortunately, the room was demolished before the undersigned could make a last check to see if everything was transferred;
7. That it was only later on that this office discovered that important documents were indeed lost, including transcripts of stenographic notes in a case that was submitted for decision;
8. That sometime in May 1992, the branch moved its Office to its present location;
9. That
on
10. That it was at this time that the first volume of this case, which was bundled along with other cases which were decided and/or archived, was reported as missing;
11. That from the time the same was found to be missing, Judge Claravall ordered that a search for the same be made in all of the offices wherein this branch was forced to share a room with, as well as the Court of Appeals, in the event that the same was transmitted to said Court;
12. That all the efforts were in vain, as said record could not be located anywhere;
13. That
the undersigned now concludes that the first volume of the above-entitled case
was probably lost during the renovation of the
In this regard, herein respondents
filed a Motion for Reconstitution of Records[15]
of the case. Initially, petitioner Valente, and the
other defendants --
Thereafter,
three (3) incidents, among numerous others, set off by the parties’ pleadings,
are worth mentioning, to wit:
1. A Motion for Leave to File and Admit
Supplemental Complaint[18]
filed by herein respondents. The Supplemental Complaint additionally prayed
that the levy and sale at public auction of the subject properties be annulled
and set aside, as the bid price was unconscionable and grossly inadequate to
the current value of the subject properties. The Supplemental Complaint further
sought a re-bidding with respect to Teofista’s share in the subject properties.
Finally, it prayed that TCT No. 6509 in the name of petitioner Valente,
2. A Manifestation and Motion (to
Execute/Enforce Decision dated September 4, 1992 of the Supreme Court)[19]
filed by herein respondents pointing out that the Supreme Court itself had
noted the current increased value of the subject properties and that petitioner
Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion unjustly enriched themselves in
appropriating the subject properties worth millions then, for a measly bid
price of P94,170.00, for a judgment obligation worth only P70,000.00.
3. An Urgent Motion [to direct compliance by
plaintiffs (herein respondents) with Supreme Court Decision or to consider the
matter submitted without evidence on the part of plaintiffs][20]
filed by therein defendants, including herein petitioner Valente, pointing out
that plaintiffs (herein respondents) have yet to comply with the RTC, Branch 67
Order commanding them to submit (to the RTC) any evidence showing
settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo Suarez, in order for the court
to determine the portion in the estate which belongs to Teofista. The Urgent
Motion stated in paragraph 2, thus:
2. The
defendants [including herein petitioner Valente] did everything possible to
expedite the disposition of this case while the plaintiffs [herein respondents]
did everything possible to DELAY the disposition of the same obviously because
the plaintiffs [herein respondents] are in full possession and enjoyment of the
property in dispute. In its decision of
On
these incidents, the records reveal the following Orders issued by the
different branches of the RTC:
1. Order dated
2. Order dated
From the foregoing uncontroverted
facts, this Court is convinced beyond a shadow of doubt that the Decision of
the Supreme Court of
x x x x
On the request for Answers to Written Interrogatories filed by the defendants, it is obvious that at this stage of the proceedings where the Supreme Court had already pronounced the undisputed facts, which binds this court, the answer sought to be elicited through written interrogatories, therefore, are entirely irrelevant, aside from having been filed way out of time.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this
court, implements the decision of the Supreme Court dated
“xxx and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioner and to annul the sale with regard to said portion.”
In order to enforce such mandate of the Supreme Court, this court orders that:
a. The auction sale of the five (5) parcels of land and all prior and subsequent proceedings in relation thereto are declared null and void.
b. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 6509 in the name of defendant Valente Raymundo is also
declared null and void, and the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
c. Teofista
Suarez is ordered to reimburse the amount of P94,170.00, plus legal
interest from the date of issuance of this order, and failing which, the
portion of the estate of Marcelo Suarez belonging to the surviving spouse,
Teofista Suarez, may be levied on execution.
d. [Herein respondents], including Teofista Suarez, are hereby ordered to submit to this court any evidence showing settlement of the estate of the deceased, Marcelo Suarez, in order for this court to determine the portion in the estate which belongs to Teofista Suarez.
Therein defendants, including
petitioner Valente, filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the trial court denied
on
3. Order dated September 10, 1996, issued by
Judge Santos denying the appeal interposed by petitioner Valente from the
January 22, 1996 and May 29, 1996 Orders, ruling that these are interlocutory
orders, and, therefore, not appealable.[23]
4. Order dated
Considering that counsel for the plaintiffs does not have the birth certificates of the heirs of the plaintiff to prove their affiliation with the deceased which is one of the matters written in the decision of the higher court which must be complied with, and in order for counsel for the plaintiffs [herein respondents] to have the opportunity to complete all documentary evidence and in view of abbreviating the proceedings and as prayed for, today’s scheduled pre-trial is re-set for the last time to May 19, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.
In this connection, counsel for plaintiffs [herein respondents] is advised to secure all the documentary evidence she needs material to this case which will expedite the disposition of this case.[24]
This
last Order and therein defendants’ Urgent Motion spawned another contentious
issue between the parties. In this connection, Judge Estrella issued an Order[25]
requiring the parties to file their respective position papers due to the
“divergent views on the nature of the hearing that should be conducted in
compliance with” our decision in Suarez.
Both parties duly filed their position papers, with herein respondents attaching
thereto a copy of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate executed by the heirs
of Marcelo Suarez in 1957.
In
resolving this latest crossfire between the parties, the RTC, Branch 67, issued
an Order dated
This Court is of the view that the Honorable Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, precisely it directed that the records of this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.
x x x x
It is a matter of record that there was no trial on the merits completed in the Regional Trial Court. xxx The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and ordered the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 51203. Naturally, there was no trial on the merits before this Court that allowed the parties to adduce evidence to establish their respective claims in the plaintiffs’ [herein respondents] complaint and in the defendants’ [including petitioner Valente] counter-claim, respectively. It is in this context that the Honorable Supreme Court reinstated the “action [of herein respondents] to annul the auction sale to protect their [herein respondents] own interest.
While this Court is of the view that trial on the merits is necessary for the purpose of giving the plaintiffs [herein respondents] a chance to adduce evidence to sustain their complaint and the defendants [including petitioner Valente] to prove their defense, consistent with the directive of the Honorable Supreme Court (in its Decision promulgated on September 4, 1992), the Court is, however, confronted with the very recent decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in “Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay, et al. vs. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999” where it held that –
The declaration of heirship must be made in an administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solve vs. Court of Appeals (182 SCRA 119, 128). The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as “one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong” while a special proceeding is “a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.” It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
In as much as the leading case on
the matter is that of “Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320,
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, this Court holds that in the light of the doctrine laid down in the case of “Heirs of Yaptinchay vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999” this case is dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs’ [herein respondents’] filing a special proceeding consistent with said latest ruling.[26]
Herein respondents moved for
reconsideration thereof which, however, was denied by the RTC, Branch 67 on
Consequently,
herein respondents filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order
dismissing Civil Case No. 51203 without prejudice. All the defendants in the
trial court were impleaded as private respondents in the petition. Yet,
curiously, only petitioner Valente filed a Comment thereto. The appellate court granted the petition,
recalled and set aside RTC, Branch 67’s Orders dated
We agree with [herein respondents].
On September 4, 1992, the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 94918) reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and mandates that Civil Case No. 51203 be reinstated in order to determine the portion in the estate which belongs to Teofista Suarez. The sale of the parcels of land was declared null and void. Necessarily, the title (TCT No. 5809) in the name of respondents was also declared null and void. xxx
x x x x
Hon. Apolinario Santos of Br. 67, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, on January 22, 1996 and on motion of [herein respondents], issued an order to execute/enforce the decision of the Supreme Court xxx.
x x x x
[Petitioner Valente,
The denial of petitioner Valente’s
Motion for Reconsideration prompted the filing of this present petition for certiorari.
Petitioner
Valente posits that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in
recalling and setting aside the Orders of Judge Estrella and reinstating those
of Judge Santos because:
1. The CA ruled that the Orders dated May
29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos were final and executory,
and yet the latter did not allow an appeal to be taken therefrom ratiocinating
that the questioned orders were interlocutory, and therefore, not appealable;
and
2. The CA ignored and violated the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v.
Del Rosario[28] which held that a declaration of
heirship must be made in a special proceeding and not in a civil action.
We
find the petition bereft of merit.
At
the outset, we note that petitioner Valente incorrectly filed a petition for certiorari to appeal the CA decision. Petitioner
should have filed a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Simply imputing in a petition that the decision
sought to be reviewed is tainted with grave abuse of discretion does not
magically transform a petition into a special civil action for certiorari. The CA decision disposed of
the merits of a special civil action, an original petition, filed thereat by
herein respondents. That disposition is a final and executory order, appealable
to, and may be questioned before, this Court by persons aggrieved thereby, such
as petitioner Valente, via Rule 45.
On
this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright. However, we
have disregarded this procedural flaw and now resolve this case based on the
merits or lack thereof.
Petitioner
asseverates that the assailed CA ruling “is unfair and it amounts to a trickery
to prevent an appeal against a final order by claiming that the appealed order
is merely interlocutory and later maintain that the same order has become final
after declaring it to be interlocutory.”
We
reject petitioner’s paltry contention. Petitioner apparently does not
comprehend the distinction between an interlocutory order which is final and
executory, and a final order which disposes of the controversy or case; much
less, understand the available remedies therefrom.
We have defined an interlocutory
order as referring to something between the commencement and the end of the
suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the
whole controversy.[29] It
does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but
leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on
the merits.[30] Upon the other hand, a final order is one
which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the case.[31]
On more than one occasion, we laid
down the test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final i.e., “Does it leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case?” If it does, it
is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is
interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the
case.[32] The Orders dated
Contrary to petitioner Valente’s
stance, there is no trickery or chicanery in the CA’s distinction between an
interlocutory and a final order. Indeed, as ruled by the CA, the RTC Order
denying petitioner Valente’s Notice of Appeal attained finality when he failed
to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
We cannot overemphasize the rule that
the correct identification of the nature of an assailed order determines the remedies
available to an aggrieved party. The old
Rules of Court in Section 2, Rule 41 reads, thus:
SEC. 2. Judgments or orders subject to appeal.—Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal. No interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other.
x x x x
With the advent of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, Section 1, Rule 41 now provides for the appropriate remedy to
be taken from an interlocutory order, thus:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
x x x
(c) An interlocutory order;
x x x
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Clearly, the denial of therein
defendants’ (including petitioner Valente’s) appeal from the Orders dated
Further, on this crucial distinction
as applied to this case, petitioner Valente filed a petition for certiorari from the CA decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 58090, which is not an
interlocutory order. It is a final order which completely disposed of the
merits of the case with nothing more left to be done therein. The correct and
available remedy available to petitioner Valente was, as previously discussed,
a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In fine, petitioner Valente
erroneously sought relief through reversed remedies. He tried to appeal the interlocutory orders
of the RTC which are unappealable. Thus,
the RTC properly denied his Notice of Appeal, and the CA correctly upheld the
RTC. He should have filed a petition for
certiorari; under Rule 65. On the other hand, from the final order of
the CA, he comes before this Court on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper remedy is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
In the recent case of Jan-Dec Construction Corporation v. Court of
Appeals[33] we ruled in this wise:
As a rule, the
remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules.
Under
Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e.,
regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed
to the Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation
of the appellate process over the original case. It seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court,
tribunal, or officer. In contrast, a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein
provided and proper only if there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is an extraordinary process
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and cannot be availed of as a
substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal.
Independently of this procedural
infirmity, even on the merits of the case, the petition does not fare
otherwise. It must be dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner Valente insists that, following
our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del
Rosario,[34] herein
respondents must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an
action to annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property
of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.
We disagree. Our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay is not applicable.
Herein respondents’ status as
legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista ― and thus, Marcelo Sr.’s
heirs ― has been firmly established, and confirmed by this Court in Suarez v. Court of Appeals.[35] True,
this Court is not a trier of facts,[36]
but as the final arbiter of disputes,[37]
we found and so ruled that herein respondents are children, and heirs of their
deceased father, Marcelo Sr. This having
been settled, it should no longer have been a litigated issue when we ordered a
remand to the lower court. In short, petitioner Valente’s, Violeta’s,
As was set forth in the dispositive
portion of Suarez, “Civil Case No.
51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to [herein
respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion.” There is
clearly no intimation in our decision for the RTC to have to determine an
already settled issue i.e., herein
respondents’ status as heirs of Marcelo Sr.
Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail,
directly or indirectly, the status of herein respondents as legitimate children
of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that herein respondents first
prove their filiation to Marcelo Sr. The
following records bear out Marcelo, Sr.’s and Teofista’s paternity of herein
respondents, and the latter’s status as legitimate children:
1. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 10646
to 10649 where Teofista, along with herein respondents, questioned the RTC,
Branch 151’s Orders dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986. Although the
CA ruled against Teofista and herein respondents, it explicitly recognized the
latter’s status as legitimate children of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.; and[38]
2. The
CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 20320 which incorrectly ruled that herein
respondents were, as children of Teofista, merely successors-in-interest of the
latter to the property and by virtue thereof, bound by the judgment in Civil
Case Nos. 21376 to 21379 consistent with the doctrine of res judicata.[39]
We subsequently reversed this ruling on the wrong application of res judicata in the conclusive case of Suarez. We retained and affirmed,
however, the CA’s factual finding of herein respondents’ status as heirs of
Marcelo Sr. We categorically held therein that “the proprietary interest of
[herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned [properties] is different from
and adverse to that of [Teofista]. [Herein respondents] became co-owners of the
property not because of [Teofista] but through their own right as children of
their deceased father [, Marcelo Sr.].”
Clearly, herein respondents’ long
possessed status of legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista cannot be
indirectly or directly attacked by petitioner Valente in an action to annul a
judicial sale.
Articles 262,[40]
263,[41]
265 and 266[42] of the
Civil Code, the applicable law at the time of Marcelo’s death, support the
foregoing conclusion, to wit:
Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may impugn the legitimacy of the child only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If the husband should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted from the same;
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the recording of birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the
period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in the
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
In
Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint
for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of certain TCT’s was dismissed for
failure of the petitioners to demonstrate “any proof or even a semblance of it”
that they had been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses
Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the
records of this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo
Sr.’s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein respondents as Marcelo Sr.’s
legitimate children and heirs. The same document settles and partitions the
estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofista’s paraphernal properties, and separates
the properties she owns in common with her children, herein respondents. Plainly,
there is no need to re-declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and
prolong this case interminably.
Petitioner Valente, along with
Compulsory
succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not categorized as such in
Article 778[43] of the
Civil Code. It reserves a portion of the
net estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or
combination of heirs, prevailing over all kinds of succession.[44]
The portion that is so reserved is the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code
defines legitime as “that part of the testator’s property which he cannot
dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are,
therefore, called compulsory heirs.” Herein respondents are primary compulsory
heirs,[45]
excluding secondary compulsory heirs,[46] and
preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in the distribution of the decedent’s
estate.[47]
Even without delving into the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.’s estate in 1957, it must be stressed
that herein respondents’ rights to the succession vested from the moment of
their father’s death.[48]
Herein respondents’ ownership of the subject properties is no longer inchoate; it
became absolute upon Marcelo’s death, although their respective shares therein
remained pro indiviso. Ineluctably,
at the time the subject properties were sold on execution sale to answer for Teofista’s
judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein respondents’ share therein was
null and void.
In
fine, Teofista’s ownership over the subject properties is not absolute.
Significantly, petitioner Valente does not even attempt to dispute the conjugal
nature of the subject properties. Since Teofista owns only a portion of the
subject properties, only that portion could have been, and was actually, levied
upon and sold on auction by the provincial sheriff of Rizal. Thus, a separate declaration of heirship by
herein respondents is not necessary to annul the judicial sale of their share
in the subject properties.
We note the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[49] where we scrutinized our rulings in Heirs of Yaptinchay and the cited cases of
Litam v.
Rivera[50] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[51]
and Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga[52]
cited in Solivio. We ruled thus:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heirs has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
x x x
It appearing, however, that in the
present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the
Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the
case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just
to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceedings.
And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil
case—subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented
evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon
the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In
fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling
reason to still subject
All
told, under the circumstances, in addition to the already settled status of
herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., there is no need to dismiss Civil
Case No. 51203 and require herein respondents to institute a separate special
proceeding for a declaration of their heirship.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58090 is AFFIRMED. The Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996
issued by Judge Santos are REINSTATED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
*
Additional member in lieu of
Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, per raffle dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Mariono M. Umali, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court) and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador concurring, rollo, pp. 38-44.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Bienvenido L. Reyes concurring, id. at 47-48.
[3] Dated January 11, and March 14, 2000, penned by pairing Judge Santiago Estrella, id. at 49-55.
[4] Teofista Isagon Suarez is named as a respondent in the title of this case. However, in the list of parties contained in the petition, Teofista is not included as a respondent. Neither was she a party in CA-G.R. SP No. 58090.
[5] Herein respondents filed a Notice of Death and Substitution of Deceased Party plaintiff Danilo Suarez, Records, pp. 267-269.
[6] Elpidio, another offspring of Marcelo and Teofista and brother of herein respondents, is not impleaded as a respondent in this petition. His name does not appear as a plaintiff, petitioner, respondent or defendant, in the exchange of pleadings between the parties for the entirety of this grueling suit.
[7] See note 6.
[8] Annex “A,” Plaintiffs’ Position Paper, records, pp. 591-602.
[9] Decision of CFI,
[10] Dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986.
[11] Records, pp. 163-164.
[12]
[13] G.R. No. 94918, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 397.
[14] Records, pp. 28-29.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Dated September 9, 1999, id. at 552.
[26] Records, pp. 603-608.
[27]
[28] G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999, 304 SCRA 18.
[29] Bitong
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123553, July 13, 1998, 292 SCRA 503.
[30] Philgreen
Trading Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120408,
April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 719.
[31] Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110147, April 17, 2001, 356 SCRA 563.
[32] Gavina
Maglucot-Aw, et al., v. Leopoldo Maglucot, et al., G.R. No. 132518, March
28, 2000, 329 SCRA 78.
[33] G.R. No. 146818, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 556.
[34] Supra note 28.
[35] Supra note 13.
[36] Nicolas
v. Desierto, G.R. No. 154668, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 154.
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40] Now Article 171 of the Family Code.
[41] Now Article 170 of the Family Code.
[42] Articles 265 and 266 of the Civil Code are now Article 172 of the Family Code.
[44] Balane, Jottings and Jurisprudence in Civil Law (2002), p. 278.
[45] See Art. 887, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code: The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants,
with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants.
[46]
[47] The legitime of the legitimate children/descendants of the decedent shall be satisfied first before that of the surviving spouse. The legitime of the surviving spouse, in the maximum portion allotted by law, never exceeds the share of a legitimate child when there is more than 1 legitimate child to inherit. In case the compulsory heirs are only 1 legitimate child and 1 surviving spouse, the share of the latter is only ¼ of the estate of the decedent.
[48] See
Article 777 of the Civil Code: The rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent.
[49] G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 184.
[50] 100 Phil. 364 (1956).
[51] G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990, 182 SCRA 119.
[52] G.R. L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111.
[53] Supra note 49, 198-200.