Republic of the
Supreme Court
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A.M. No. RTJ-06-1973 |
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Complainant, |
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(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2329-RTJ) |
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Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., |
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- versus - |
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Chairperson, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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JUDGE RUSTICO D. PADERANGA, |
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REYES, JJ. |
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Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, |
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Mambajao, Camiguin, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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March 14,
2008 |
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R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before the Court is an
Administrative Complaint filed by Asuncion Reyes (complainant) dated July 14,
2005 charging Judge Rustico D. Paderanga
(respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28, Mambajao, Camiguin, with bias,
ignorance of the law and procedure, antedating orders, failure to resolve cases
within the reglementary period and refusal to inhibit
in several cases pending before his court.[1]
The charges emanate from five civil
cases, as follows:
(1) In Civil Case No. 676, entitled “Spouses
Jose and Dorothy Reyes v.
Complainant avers that respondent was
guilty of gross ignorance of the law particularly of Section 9, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court[2]
when he ordered the garnishment of complainant's Dollar Deposit Account with
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the amount of US$10,000.00 when the judgment
debt was only P100,000.00; and undue delay in
resolving a motion, as it took him 105 days to resolve complainant's motion to
withdraw deposit in excess of P100,000.00. Complainant asserts that such delay was
aggravated by the fact that she told respondent that the reason she filed the
motion was to be able to buy medicines for her 98-year old ailing mother. She claims that initially, respondent refused
to act on the motion to withdraw, saying that he would not allow the withdrawal
of any amount as long as the other party would object. When complainant filed a Motion to Inhibit on
(2) In Civil Case No. 517, entitled “Julio Vivares, as Executor of the Estate of Torcuato
Reyes and Mila Reyes-Ignalig, as heir v. Engr. Jose J. Reyes,” for Partition.
Complainant claims: It was only when
respondent judge handled the case, i.e., seven years from the filing of
the complaint, that defendant's counsel, who is respondent's relative within
the fifth civil degree, filed a motion for preliminary hearing of defendant's
affirmative defenses. Respondent refused
to inhibit himself despite obvious bias and prejudice, and dismissed the case,
through a Resolution dated
(3) In Civil Case No. 683, entitled “
Complainant alleges that
respondent took 105 days to resolve a motion to dismiss, and that he was guilty
of bias, hostility and ignorance of the law,[5] without
elaborating, however, on the reasons therefor. In a letter to then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., dated
(4) In Civil Case No. 681, entitled “Arturo Jacot v. Delia Nacasabog and Pacita Mabilanga,” for Appeal
for Forcible Entry with Damages.
Complainant narrates that respondent
initially disqualified himself from trying the case because the opposing
counsel, Atty. Avelino P. Orseno,
Jr., is respondent's nephew;[7]
respondent, however, recalled his inhibition when Atty. Orseno
withdrew his appearance, with his appointment as Attorney III in the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR); complainant moved for reconsideration seeking
respondent's inhibition from the case, as well as the disqualification of appellee's new counsel, Atty. Charlito
Sabuga-a, on the ground that Atty. Sabuga-a was also a DAR lawyer and he could not be
disassociated from Atty. Orseno; respondent, however,
denied the said motions.[8]
(5) In Civil Case No. 687, entitled “Delia Jacot-Mabilanga and Pacita Jacot v. Arturo, Ronnie and Ricky, all surnamed Jacot,” for Quieting of Title of Real Property with
Damages.
Complainant claims that respondent
displayed manifest bias when, without any request for extension, respondent motu proprio issued
an Order on January 17, 2005 giving defendants' counsel additional 15 days
within which to submit their memorandum. The original lawyer of the defendants was
Atty. Orseno, respondent's nephew. Complainant asserts that respondent's refusal
to inhibit himself constituted a violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court, notwithstanding the withdrawal of Atty. Orseno
in the appeal.[9]
Respondent submitted his Comment
refuting the charges against him.[10] Complainant thereafter filed a Reply
reiterating her claims.[11]
The Court assigned Associate Justice
Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores
of the Court of Appeals (CA) Cagayan de Oro City to investigate and submit her report and
recommendation.[12]
On
September 12, 2007, the Court received Justice Dy-Liacco
Flores's report finding that, of the many charges hurled against respondent,
only two were duly proven: gross ignorance of the law and procedure for
dismissing Civil Case No. 517; and delay in resolving a motion in Civil Case
No. 676, for which the imposition of fines in the amounts of P20,000.00 and P15,000.00, respectively, is recommended.[13]
The Court's
Ruling
The Court agrees with the findings
and recommendation of the Investigating Justice with certain modifications.
Preliminarily, let it be stressed
that in administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of
establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of her complaint. Substantial evidence is such evidence which a
reasonable mind will accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.[14] If complainant fails to discharge said
burden, respondent cannot be held liable for the charge.[15]
On the charge of
bias
Complainant
charges respondent with bias in all the civil cases subject of the present
administrative complaint. Apart from the averments in her complaint, however,
she was not able to present any clear and convincing proof that would show that
respondent was intentionally acting against her. Mere suspicion of partiality is not
enough. There must be sufficient
evidence to prove the same, as well as a manifest showing of bias and
partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source or some other basis. A judge's
conduct must be clearly indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice before it can
be stigmatized as biased and partial.[16] As
there is no substantial evidence to hold respondent liable on this point, the
Investigating Justice correctly recommended the dismissal of this charge
against him.
On the charge of
refusal to inhibit
Closely related to the charge of bias is the charge of
refusal to inhibit. Again, the
Investigating Justice correctly recommended the dismissal of this charge
against respondent, because when a case does not fall under the instances
covered by the rule on mandatory disqualification of judges as expressly enumerated in Section
1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges.
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he
has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by
them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above. (Emphasis supplied)
inhibition is
discretionary and primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the
part of the judge.[17] This discretion is an acknowledgment of the
fact that judges are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition,
as they are the ones who directly deal with the litigants in their courtrooms.[18]
As aptly explained by respondent in
his Comment, the grounds mentioned by complainant in her motions to inhibit are
not mandatory grounds for disqualification. He is related to Atty. Hermosisima,
counsel in Civil Case No. 517 only by the fifth degree of affinity, which
relationship is not included in Rule 137.
Complainant failed to cite any specific act that would indicate bias,
prejudice or vengeance warranting his inhibition from the cases.[19]
On the charge of
antedating orders
On this point, the Investigating
Justice correctly observed that a gap of few days from the date of the order
and the date of mailing is a weak circumstance from which a conclusion of
antedating may be drawn.[20] Respondent's explanation in his Comment that
the mailing of orders was not promptly done during the period of
On the charges
of gross ignorance of the law
Of the several charges of gross
ignorance of the law, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco
Flores found basis to hold respondent administratively liable therefor anent his issuance of the December 9, 2004 Resolution
in Civil Case No. 517.
Civil Case No. 517 for Partition and
Recovery of Share of Real Estate was filed by Julio Vivares
(Julio) as Executor of the Estate of Torcuato Reyes
and Mila Reyes-Ignalig (Mila), heir of Torcuato, against Jose Reyes (Jose) on
Seven years after the filing of the
case, respondent assumed office as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 28 where the
case was pending.[30] On
Before
The Court agrees with the
Investigating Justice in finding respondent guilty of ignorance of the law. Jose actively participated in pre-trial which
thereafter led to a partial settlement of the properties; and since he
benefited in the partial judgment rendered by the court, Jose can no longer
move for the dismissal of the action. Respondent
is aware of the pendency of the action before the
Supreme Court regarding the issue of receivership, as he in fact earlier issued
an order suspending the proceedings of the case only to reverse himself thereafter
by dismissing the main case, effectively mooting the case before the Supreme
Court. The resolution caught the parties
by surprise, as there was still a scheduled hearing for
It is basic that the active
participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court is
tantamount to recognition of that court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on
impugning the court’s jurisdiction.
While it is true that failure to comply with a condition precedent can
be a basis for dismissing an action, the defendant must raise such matter in a
motion to dismiss and not file an answer and actively participate in the trial
of the case; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have waived said defense.[39]
In Civil Case No. 517, defendant
Jose's active participation in the case was manifested by the following
incidents: the order of then Presiding Judge Sinforoso
V. Tabamo, Jr. on October 17, 1996 stated that “by
agreement, defendant Jose is directed to release to plaintiff Julio A. Vivares the sum of P3,000.00
with which to finance the procurement of the documents needed.”[40] Records also show that Jose entered into a partial
settlement with Mila, his mother and siblings on
Respondent should have realized that
with these incidents showing Jose's active participation in the case, defendant
Jose could no longer move for the dismissal of the same.
The Investigating Justice also
correctly pointed out that respondent's December 9, 2004 Resolution placed
doubt on the validity of the trial court's Partial Judgment dated January 29,
1997. It effectively mooted the petition
for review pending before the Supreme Court, and it caught the parties by
surprise, as there was still a scheduled hearing for
While a judge may not be held liable
for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is
also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic,
lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[44] Indeed, even though a judge may not always be
subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he
renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and
arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.[45] It does not mean that a judge need not
observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official
functions.[46] This is because if judges wantonly misuse the
powers vested in them by the law, there will be not only confusion in the
administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic
requirements of due process.[47]
Respondent, in the performance of
his duties, failed to observe due care, diligence, prudence and circumspection,
which the law requires in the rendition of any public service.[48] When an error is so gross and patent, such
error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law.[49]
The Investigating Justice also
correctly opined that while it is a basic principle that an administrative case
should not be resorted to when a judicial remedy is available, in this case
judicial remedies have already been exhausted, i.e., a motion for
reconsideration, an appeal and a petition for certiorari were already
filed which all ended in dismissal; thus, an inquiry into a judge's
administrative liability arising from his judicial acts is already proper.[50]
Gross ignorance of the law or
procedure is classified as a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, which took effect on P20,000.00
but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering that this is
respondent's first administrative infraction, the Court finds the recommended
penalty of P20,000.00 to be proper.[51]
As to the other charges of gross
ignorance of the law, the Investigating Justice correctly dismissed the same
for lack of basis.
Complainant's claim that respondent
ordered the garnishment of her entire US$10,000.00 deposit account is belied by
the records. There is nothing in respondent's
Order dated
As to the charge of gross ignorance
of the law in Civil Case No. 683, complainant merely mentioned said charge
under the said civil case without even offering any explanation why respondent
should be held liable therefor.[54] As there is no basis for the other charges of
gross ignorance of the law, the same should be dismissed.
On the charges
of undue delay
Of the several charges of undue
delay, the Investigating Justice found respondent guilty thereof only in the
Resolution dated
Respondent's only defense on this
point is that, from the time complainant filed her motion on August 23, 2004
until he issued his Resolution on December 6, 2004, the interval is only a
little over three months; and that, in between, the parties filed several
pleadings setting forth their respective arguments, which respondent had to
consider before resolving the motion.[55]
Indeed, records show that after
complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Deposits, the opposing party, upon order
of respondent, filed a Comment on
The Investigating Justice found,
however, that the motion to withdraw was simple and non-litigable, since Jose,
the opposing party, had no right to object to the release of complainant's
deposit in excess of the award in his favor.
And granting that respondent just wanted to be cautious before granting
complainant's motion, the last pleading that respondent should have considered
was Jose's comment on the motion which was filed on
The Court agrees that the Motion to
Withdraw Deposits is non-litigable; thus, it should have been resolved right
away. While all written motions should be heard, excepted from this rule are
non-litigious motions or those motions which may be acted upon by the court
without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party.[58] The garnishment covers only the amount
mentioned in the writ of execution.
There should be no dispute, therefore, as to the right of
complainant over the deposit in excess of the said amount.
The Investigating Justice also found
that respondent incurred a delay of 19 days in deciding the appeal in Civil
Case No. 676. Considering, however, that respondent
issued other resolutions regarding the case; that he had so many cases for
trial and decision at the time he assumed office; and that an arithmetical
computation of the period may not always be a good measure to determine whether
there is delay, the Investigating Justice recommended that respondent should
not be held liable for said offense.[59]
On this matter, the Court disagrees.
The Constitution provides that all
lower courts must decide or resolve cases or matters brought before them three
months from the time a case or matter is submitted for decision.[60] Canon 6, Sec. 5 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which became effective on
If a judge is unable to comply with
the 90-day reglementary period for deciding cases or
matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension, which request is
generally granted.[61] Indeed, the Court usually allows reasonable
extensions of time to decide cases in recognition of the heavy caseload of the
trial courts.[62]
As respondent failed to ask for an
extension in this case, he is deemed to have incurred delay.
The need to impress upon judges the
importance of deciding cases promptly and expeditiously cannot be stressed
enough, for delay in the disposition of cases and matters undermines the
people's faith and confidence in the judiciary.
As oft stated, justice delayed is justice denied.[63]
Undue delay in rendering a decision
or order, under Rule 140 as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, is a less serious
charge punishable with either suspension from office without salary and
benefits for not less than one or more than three months, or a fine of more
than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. In many cases, the Court has imposed a fine
upon judges who failed to decide cases within the prescribed period.[64]
For the delay incurred by respondent
in the above-mentioned cases, the Court finds the recommended fine of P15,000.00 to be proper.[65]
Again, as to the other charges of
undue delay, particularly the motion to hear the affirmative defenses in Civil
Case No. 517 and the decision in Civil Case No. 683, the 90-day period within
which to resolve the same was interrupted by the Order dated
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Rustico D. Paderanga is hereby
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law for, which he is fined P20,000.00; and undue delay in resolving a motion and in
deciding an appeal, for which he is fined P15,000.00 with a STERN
WARNING that a more severe penalty will be meted out for the commission of
similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 1.
[2] Section 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. –
x x x x
(c) Garnishment of debts and credits.--- x x x The garnishment shall cover only such amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees.
[3] Rollo, pp. 2-7, 18-21.
[4] Rollo, pp. 7, 10-12, 18-21.
[5]
[6]
[7] Son of respondent's sister.
[8] Rollo, pp. 13-16.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Español v. Mupas, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348,
[15] Tan v. Estoconing, A.M. No.
MTJ-04-1554,
[16]
[17]
[18] Abrajano
v. Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr., G.R. No. 158895,
[19] Rollo, pp. 10, 121.
[20] Rollo, p. 516.
[21]
[22] Records, folder 1, pp. 1-4.
[23]
[24]
[25] See records, folder 1, pp. 18-24.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] See rollo, p. 283.
[30] See records, folder 1, p. 384.
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36] Records, folder 4, pp. 63-64.
[37] Records, folder 1, pp. 458-467.
[38] Rollo, pp. 522-526.
[39]
[40] Records, folder 1, pp. 39-40.
[41]
[42] Records, Folder 1, pp. 50-52.
[43]
[44] Enriquez v. Caminade, A.M. No.
RTJ-05-1966,
[45] Rico v. Rufon, A.M. No.
RTJ-04-1822,
[46] Dayawon v. Garfin, 437 Phil. 139, 149 (2002).
[47] Sanchez v. Vestil, supra note 45.
[48]
[49] Ora v. Almajar, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1599,
[50] Rollo, pp. 527-528.
[51] Balayon, Jr. v. Dinopol, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1969,
[52] Records, folder 3, pp. 221-222, 248-249.
[53]
[54] Rollo, p. 13.
[55]
[56] Records, folder 3, pp. 295, 322-326, 351-356.
[57] Rollo, pp. 538-540.
[58] Bagano v. Hontanosas, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1915,
[59] Rollo, pp. 543-544.
[60] Tan v. Estoconing,
supra note 15, at 18; Office of the Court Administrator v. Madronio, Sr., A.M. No. MTJ-04-1571,
[61] Tan v. Estoconing, supra note 15, at 18; Office of the Court Administrator v. Madronio, Sr., supra note 60, at 211.
[62] Tan v. Estoconing, supra note 15, at 18; Aslarona v. Echavez, 459 Phil. 167, 171 (2003).
[63] Office of the Court Administrator v. Madronio, Sr., supra note 60, at 211.
[64] See Aslarona v. Echavez, supra note 62; Office of the Court Administrator v. Madronio, supra note 60.
[65] Balsamo v. Suan, 458 Phil. 11, 25 (2003).
[66] Rollo, pp. 507-508, 555-556, records folder 1, p. 455.