HEIRS OF LYDIO “JERRY” ADM. CASE NO. 6876
FALAME,
namely: MELBA
FALAME,
LEO FALAME and Present:
JERRY
FALAME,
Complainants, CARPIO, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
CARPIO
MORALES,
AZCUNA,*
- versus - TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR.,
JJ.
ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga, J.:
On
Petition for Review[1]
is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio
“Jerry” Falame (complainants) against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent),
docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1191.
In
their Complaint[2]
against respondent, complainants alleged that on
Complainants
recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer to
the complaint in the first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the first
civil case were required to file their respective position papers, respondent
used and submitted in evidence the following: (1) a special power of attorney
dated 1 July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-fact;
and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh Falame dated 23 July 1988, executed before
respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property subject of
the first civil case.[4]
Complainants
claimed that even after the
However,
on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame,
respondent filed a case against complainants allegedly involving the property
subject of the first civil case, entitled “Spouses Rally F. Falame and Noemi
F. Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame, Jerry A. Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty
Holdings and Development Corporations, their representatives, agents and
persons acting in their behalf” and
docketed as Civil Case No. 5568 (the second civil case) before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6. The complaint sought the
declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of
deeds, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20241 issued as a consequence of the
registration of the deed of sale, and the real estate mortgage on the said
property. Alternatively, it prayed for specific performance and reconveyance or
legal redemption and damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order.[6]
Firstly,
complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second civil case wherein they were impleaded as defendants, respondent violated his oath of
office and duty as an attorney. Plainly, they contended that the spouses Falame’s interests are adverse to those of his former
client, Lydio.[7]
Secondly,
complainants claimed that respondent
knowingly made false statements of fact in the complaint in the second civil
case to mislead the trial court. In so doing, respondent violated paragraph
(d), Section 20[8]
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,[9] complainants
asserted further.
Lastly,
complainants alleged that the second civil case is a baseless and fabricated
suit which respondent
filed as counsel
for complainants’ uncle against the heirs
of respondent’s deceased client. Specifically, they averred that respondent
filed the case
for the sole purpose
of retaining, maintaining and/or withholding the
possession of the
subject property from complainants
who are its true
owners. Complainants concluded that respondent
violated paragraph (g), Section 20[10] of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[11]
In
his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,[12]
respondent controverted complainants’ allegations. He
emphasizes that it was only Raleigh Falame who personally engaged his legal
services for him and on Lydio’s behalf and that, in fact, it was Raleigh who
paid him the attorney’s fees. He also stated that he signed the jurat in
Respondent
vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as
counsel in any case or transaction. Stressing the long interval of twelve years
separating the termination of the first civil case and his acceptance of the
second civil case, respondent pointed out that the first civil case was not between
Lydio and Raleigh but rather between the heirs of
Emilio T. Sy on one hand and Lydio and Raleigh on the
other where physical possession of property was at stake. Respondent further
averred that in contrast the second civil case is one involving the spouses
Raleigh and Noemi Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba,
Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame, and Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporation, as
defendants—a case which arose from the wrongful acts committed by Melba, Leo
and Jerry Jr. after Lydio’s death.[14]
Respondent
maintained that since the second civil case was still pending before the trial
court, the IBP had no jurisdiction over the instant administrative case. He added
that complainants filed this administrative case when
In
their Position Paper[16] dated
7 September 2004, in addition to their previous charges against respondent, complainants
claimed that respondent violated Rule 15.03[17] of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he represented the cause of the spouses Falame
against that of his former client, Lydio.[18]
On
x x
x The charge lacks specification as to what part
of the lawyer’s oath was violated by the respondent and what confidence was
disclosed. The complainants may have in mind the prohibition against disclosure
of secret information learned in confidence, but there is no specification in
the complaint what secret or information learned in confidence under Civil Case
No. A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed by respondent in Civil Case No.
5568. In administrative complaints for disbarment or suspension against
lawyers, the complainant must specify in the affidavit-complaint the alleged
secrets or confidential information disclosed or will be disclosed in the
professional employment (Uy v. Gonzalez,
426 SCRA 422; 431). In the absence of such specification, the complaint must
fail.
In the complaint, there is no specific charge against
respondent for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility about the prohibition against representation of conflicting
interest. So, the allegation in paragraph 1, page 8 and 9 of complainants’
position paper stating: With all due
respect, it is submitted that respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility” cannot be countenanced. The reason
being that it is an elementary principle of due process to which the respondent
is entitled that only those charged in the complaint can be proved by the
complainants. A charge not specified in the complaint cannot be proved (Uy v. Gonzales, id.)
x x x But still this charge
will not proper for lack of sufficient bases.
x x x
Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced on 03 October
2000, or three years since the complainants became owners of Lydio Falame’s
properties, is a suit against the complainants, not as representatives of Lydio
Falame, but as owners of their respective aliquot interests in the property in
question (Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA
104; 107-108). The complainants are sued not on the basis of the acts, rights,
obligations and interest of Lydio Falame on the material possession of the
improvements found on Lot 345 litigated in Civil Case No. A-2694 nor even on
such land itself, but rather on the facts alleged in the second amended and
supplemental complaint which give rise to their cause of action against them.
While the complainants could not specify under what
circumstances the respondent committed [the] alleged breach of confidence,
breach of secrecy or revelation of secret or confidential information[,] the
respondent has shown that he did not commit any violation of such duties or
obligations of an attorney.
It is clear that only Raleigh Falame engaged the legal
services of the respondent for his and Lydio Falame’s defense in Civil Case No.
A-2694.
x x x
The other allegations of the complainants that the
respondent violated paragraph (d), Section 20 of Rule 139, Rules of Court, and
his lawyer’s oath when he allegedly betrayed the trust and confidence of his
former client by denying knowledge of the fact that the land was owned by Lydio
Falame and when he did not disclose to the Court that at one time his present
clients categorically declared and unconditionally recognized the full
ownership of the late Lydio Falame and complainant Melba Falame over subject
matter of both cases equally lacks evidentiary basis.
x x x
It is beyond the competence of the complainants to
conclude and is outside the jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission to rule
as to whether or nor (sic) the complaint in Civil Case No.5568 is baseless or
fabricated. It is only the Honorable Court which has the exclusive jurisdiction
to determine the same and cannot be the subject of an administrative complaint
against the respondent.
x x x
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, it is respectfully recommended that this complaint be dismissed on
grounds of prescription, the same having been filed four (4) years after the
alleged misconduct took place and for lack of merit.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[20]
Dissatisfied,
complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court reiterating their allegations in the complaint and their position
paper.[21] They
likewise assert that the IBP erred in holding that the instant administrative
complaint had been filed out of time since it was filed on 16 January 2004, or
three (3) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16) days after the second civil
case was filed on 23 October 2000.[22] In
addition, in their Consolidated Comment (should be Consolidated Reply),[23] complainants
invoke the Court’s ruling in Frias v. Bautista-Lozada[24]
to support their contention that administrative complaints against members
of the bar do not prescribe.[25]
In
his Comment,[26]
respondent principally maintains that the charges imputed to him have never been
proven by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence which is the quantum of proof
required in administrative cases against lawyers, and that complainants have
the burden to prove their accusations as he enjoys the presumption of innocence.[27]
Respondent likewise asserts that in accusing him of violation of Rule 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility only in their position paper and in the
instant petition, complainants infringed his right to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.[28]
There
is merit in the petition.
At
the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not
barred by prescription. As early as 1947, the Court held in Calo,
Jr. v. Degamo,[29]
to wit:
The ordinary statutes of
limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does the
circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a
crime, prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by limitation,
affect the disbarment proceeding x x x (5 Am.
Jur. 434)[30]
This
doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. Bautista-Lozada[31]
where the Court held that
Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP, which provides
for a prescriptive period for the filing of administrative complaints against
lawyers, should be struck down as void and of no legal effect for being ultra
vires.[32]
Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of
prescription, the Court concurs with the Investigating Commissioner’s opinion
that some of the charges raised by complainants in their complaint are
unsubstantiated.
There
is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. While this charge was not
raised in the initiatory pleading, it was put forward in complainants’ position
paper filed with the IBP and in the petition filed with the Court. In fact,
respondent proffered his defenses to the charge in his position paper before
the IBP and likewise in his comment before the Court. In his very first pleading before the IBP, the
answer with motion to dismiss, he denied having Lydio
as his client. Such absence of attorney-client relationship is the essential
element of his defense to the charge of conflict of interest, as articulated in
his subsequent submissions.
The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that
respondent has been adequately apprised of and heard on the issue. In
administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote
full adversarial proceedings. Actual
adversarial proceedings only become necessary for clarification when there is a
need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies.
Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to
be heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments.[33]
Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A
lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former
client.[34] The
test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to contest
for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when the
possibility of such situation will develop.[35] The
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used.[36] In
addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable
or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent
conflicting interests.[37]
The
rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a
client if that representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a
client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially
adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.[38] In
the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
connected with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the
case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. [39]
The
termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer
to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former
client. The client’s confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere
expiration of professional employment. Even after the severance of the
relation, a lawyer should not do anything which will injuriously affect his
former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should
he disclose or use any of the client’s confidences acquired in the previous
relation.[40]
In
relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed on him. His highest and most
unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to
himself.[41]
The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to
employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation
between them. It even survives the death of the client.[42]
In
the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in the first civil case.
Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio
and respondent was established despite the fact that it was only Raleigh who
paid him. The case of Hilado v. David[43] tells
us that it is immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised or charged
for.[44]
As
defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely owned the property subject of the case. In the
second civil case involving the same property, respondent, as counsel for
Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent position that
The
fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydio’s death or through the completion of the specific
task for which respondent was employed is
not reason for respondent to advocate a position opposed to that of Lydio.[45] Precedents tell us that even after the
termination of his employment, an attorney may not act as counsel against his
client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former
client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client’s disadvantage
in the subsequent adverse employment.[46] And
while complainants have never been respondent’s clients, they derive their
rights to the property from Lydio’s ownership of it
which respondent maintained in the first civil case.
For
representing
potential conflict of interest. Accordingly,
disciplinary action is warranted.[47] Heretofore,
respondent is enjoined to look at any representation situation from “the point
of view that there are possible conflicts”; and further, “to think in terms of
impaired loyalty” that is to evaluate if his representation in any way will
impair loyalty to a client.[48] Considering, however, that this is respondent’s
first offense, the Court resolves to reprimand respondent, with admonition to
observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.[49]
WHEREFORE,
respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests and meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further admonished to
observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession and to bear
in mind that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
SO
ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
*As replacement of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave per Administrative
Circular No. 84-2007.
[8]It
reads as follows:
SEC. 20. Duties of attorneys.- It is the duty of an attorney:
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided
to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek
to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement
of fact or law;
[10]SEC. 20. Duties of attorneys.- It is the duty of an attorney:
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance
of an action or proceeding, or delay any man’s cause, from any corrupt motive
or interest;
[35]Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers, 1st Edition, Copyright 1991, p. 166, citing Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics and U.S. v. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500 (1912).
[37]Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers, 1st Edition, Copyright 1991, p. 166, citing Nombrado v. Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13 (1968) and Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640 (1952).
[40]Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers, 1st Edition, Copyright 1991, p. 167, citing Nombrado v. Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13 (1968), Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640 (1952), San Jose v. Cruz, 57 Phil. 79 (1933) and Hilado v. David,
84 Phil. 569 (1949).
[46]Hilado v. David, supra note 43 at 569, 577,
citing Brown v. Miller, 52 App. D.C.
330; 286, F. 994 and Pierce v. Palmer
(1910), 31 R. I. 432; 77 Atl., Ann Cas., 1912 S, 181.
[47]See
[48]Zitrin, richard a. and langford carol m., legal
ethics in the practice of law, Matthew
Bender and Company, Inc., Second Edition, p. 181.