THIRD
DIVISION
GERARDO R.
VILLASEÑOR G.R. No. 180700
and RODEL A.
Petitioners, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.,
- versus
- Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
SANDIGANBAYAN
(5th Division) and
REYES, JJ.
LOUELLA MAE OCO-PESQUERRA
(Office of the Special Prosecutor, Promulgated:
Ombudsman),
Respondents. March 4, 2008
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R
E S O L U T I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
DOES
preventive suspension in an administrative proceeding bar
preventive suspension in a criminal case founded on the
same facts and circumstances?
The question is posed in this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. Petitioners seek to
annul and set aside the Sandiganbayan[1]
Resolution[2] of
Factual
Antecedents
On
Petitioners, together with other
officials of the City Engineering Office of Quezon City, are presently facing criminal charges
before the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan for the crime of multiple homicide
through reckless imprudence and for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. They were also
charged administratively with gross
negligence, gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the
service in connection with the Manor Hotel inferno.
In two separate Orders dated
On
Petitioners opposed[8] the motion,
contending that they had already been suspended for six (6) months relative to
the administrative case, based on the same facts and
circumstances. They posited that any
preventive suspension that may be warranted in the criminal case was already
absorbed by the preventive suspension in the administrative case because both
the criminal and administrative cases were anchored on the same set of facts.
In the assailed Resolution[9] of
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, accused Romeo M. Montallana,
Romualdo C. Santos, Gerardo R. Villaseñor, and Rodel A. Mesa are hereby
suspended from their respective public positions as earlier enumerated, and
from any other public office which they may now or hereafter be holding for a
period of ninety (90) days from receipt of this resolution, unless a motion
for reconsideration is seasonably filed.
While the prosecution sought to suspend accused Alfredo N. Macapugay, it
appears, however, that he was already dismissed from the service, hence, he can
no longer be subjected to this suspension order.
Let a copy of this resolution be
furnished Honorable Feliciano Belmonte, Quezon City Mayor for implementation of
this suspension. He is hereby requested
to inform this Court of his action thereon within five (5) days from receipt of
this resolution.
The suspension of the accused shall
be automatically lifted upon the expiration of the ninety-day period from the
time of the implementation of this resolution.
SO ORDERED.[10]
In the equally assailed Resolution[11] of
Issue
Petitioners have
resorted to the present recourse, hoisting the lone issue
of “WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
Our
Ruling
Mandatory nature of
preventive suspension
It is well-settled that preventive
suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is mandatory. It is evident from the very wording of the
law:
Suspension and loss of benefits. – Any incumbent
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property,
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of the
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office. x x x (Underscoring
supplied)
A whole slew of cases reinforce this
provision of law. In Luciano
v. Provincial Governor,[13] the Court pronounced that suspension of a
public officer under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is mandatory. This was reiterated in Luciano
v. Mariano,[14] People v.
Albano,[15] Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan[16] and Bunye v. Escareal.[17] In the last mentioned
case, the Court said:
Adverting to this Court’s observation in Ganzon v. CA, 200 SCRA 271,
272, that the sole objective of an administrative suspension is “to prevent the
accused from hampering the normal course of the investigation with his
influence and authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off the records
and other evidence” and “to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any,
against an erring official,” the petitioners insist that as no such reason for
their suspension exists, then the order suspending them should be set aside as
a grave abuse of the court’s discretion.
x x x x
The Court finds no merit in those
arguments. Section 13 of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public
officials “shall be suspended from office” while the criminal
prosecution is pending in court.
In Gonzaga
v. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, 422, 426, this Court ruled that
such preventive suspension is mandatory; there are no ifs and buts about it.[18] (Underscoring supplied)
Again, in
Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan,[19] the
Court stressed the mandatory nature of preventive suspension as follows:
x x x It is now settled
that Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan
to suspend any public official against whom a valid information charging
violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed. The court trying a case has neither
discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to
prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate
his prosecution or continuing committing malfeasance in office. The presumption
is that unless the accused is suspended he may frustrate his prosecution or
commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a
finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is
likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.[20] (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there can
be no doubt as to the validity of the Sandiganbayan’s suspension
of petitioners in connection with the
pending criminal case before it. It was
merely doing what was required of it by law.
Criminal and administrative
cases separate and distinct
Significantly, there are
three kinds of remedies that are available against a public
officer for impropriety in the performance of his powers and the discharge of
his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3) administrative. These remedies may be invoked separately,
alternately, simultaneously or successively.
Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three kinds of
remedies.[21]
Defeat of any of the three remedies
will not necessarily preclude resort to other remedies or affect decisions
reached thereunder, as different degrees of evidence are required in these
several actions. In criminal cases,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas a mere preponderance of evidence
will suffice in civil cases.[22] In administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence is required.
It is clear, then, that
criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each other.[23] The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters, such that the first two will
not inevitably govern or affect the third and vice versa.[24] Verily, administrative cases may
proceed independently of criminal proceedings.[25]
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan,[26] citing the Court’s
pronouncements in Luciano v. Provincial Governor,[27]
recounted:
The Court then hastened to clarify
that such a view may not be taken as an encroachment upon the power of
suspension given other officials, reiterating in the process that a line should be
drawn between administrative proceedings and criminal actions in court, that
one is apart from the other. x x x[28] (Underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, criminal actions will not preclude
administrative proceedings, and vice-versa, insofar as the application of the
law on preventive suspension is concerned.
Preventive suspension not
a penalty
Imposed during the pendency of
proceedings, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that
the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from
office. Thus, preventive suspension is
distinct from the penalty. While the
former may be imposed on a respondent during the investigation of the charges
against him, the latter may be meted out to him at
the final disposition of the case.[29]
The Court’s discussion in Quimbo v.
Gervacio[30] is
enlightening:
Jurisprudential law establishes a
clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions,
is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.
Preventive suspension is merely a
preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The
purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the
case against him. If after such investigation,
the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty.
That preventive suspension is not a
penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order
No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Sec. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment
or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure.[31]
The accused public officers whose
culpability remains to be proven are entitled to the constitutional presumption
of innocence.[32] The law itself provides for the reinstatement
of the public officer concerned and payment to him of the salaries and benefits
for the duration of the suspension in the event of an acquittal:
Suspension and loss of benefits. – Any incumbent
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property,
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of the
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement and gratuity benefits under the
law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.[33] (Underscoring supplied)
Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 3019
not a penal provision but a procedural one
It is petitioners’ contention that as a penal
statute, the provision on preventive suspension should be strictly construed
against the State and liberally in their favor.
We
cannot agree. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 on
preventive suspension is not a penal provision. It is procedural in nature. Hence, the strict construction rule finds no
application. The Court
expounded on this point in Buenaseda
v. Flavier:[34]
Penal statutes
are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed
(Crawford, Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in determining if a statute is penal
is whether a penalty is imposed for the punishment of a wrong to the public or
for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658;
Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497).
A Code prescribing the procedure in criminal cases is not a penal
statute and is to be interpreted liberally (People
v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).[35] (Underlining supplied)
As We have already established, preventive
suspension is not, in actual fact, a penalty at all. It is a procedural rule.
Automatic lift of
suspension after ninety (90) days
It must be borne in mind that
the preventive suspension of petitioners will only last ninety (90) days, not
the entire duration of the criminal case like petitioners seem to think. Indeed, it would be constitutionally
proscribed if the suspension were to be of an indefinite duration or for an
unreasonable length of time. The Court
has thus laid down the rule that preventive suspension may not exceed the
maximum period of ninety (90) days, in consonance with
Presidential Decree No. 807,[36] now
Section 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987.[37]
Even the dispositive portion itself of
the assailed July 3, 2007 Resolution[38] could
not be any clearer:
WHEREFORE, x x x.
x x x x
The suspension of the accused shall
be automatically lifted upon the expiration of the ninety-day period from the
time of the implementation of this resolution.
SO ORDERED.[39]
In fine, the preventive suspension
against petitioners must be upheld, as the Sandiganbayan committed
no grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] 5th Division.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Cristina G.
Cortez-Estrada, with Associate Justices Roland B. Jurado and Teresita V.
Diaz-Baldos, concurring; rollo, pp. 62-69.
[3] The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
[4] Rollo, pp. 73-75.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
G.R. No. L-30306,
[14]
G.R. No. L-32950,
[15]
G.R. Nos. L-45376-77,
[16]
G.R. No. 96131,
[17]
G.R. No. 110216,
[18]
[19]
G.R. No. 110503,
[20] Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 108.
[21] Sobremente v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-60602,
[22] Cruz, C.L., The Law of Public Officers, 1999 ed., p. 161.
[23] Morono v. Lomeda, A.M. No. MTJ-90-400,
[24] Suzuki v. Tiamson, A.M. No. 6542,
[25] Bejarasco, Jr. v. Buenconsejo, A.M.
No. MTJ-02-1417,
[26] G.R. Nos. 116259-60,
[27] Supra note 13.
[28] Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, supra at 804.
[29] Beja, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97149,
[30]
G.R. No. 155620,
[31] Quimbo v. Gervacio, id. at 281-282.
[32] Berona v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 142456,
[33] Republic Act No. 3019, Sec. 13.
[34]
G.R. No. 106719,
[35] Buenaseda v. Flavier, id. at 652-653.
[36] The Civil Service Decree.
[37]
[38] Rollo, pp. 62-69.
[39]