THIRD DIVISION
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SPOUSES
ALFREDO and SHIRLEY
Petitioners, - versus - INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK,[1]
SHERIFF RENATO C. FLORA and/or OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT,
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 175145 Present: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., Acting Chairperson, TINGA,* CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and
REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside the Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95074 dated 11 July 2006 which dismissed
petitioner-spouses Alfredo and Shirley Yap’s petition for certiorari which questioned the Order[3] of
Branch 264 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 68088
recalling and dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 13 August
2001, and its Resolution[4]
dated 9 October 2006 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are as
follows:
Respondent International Exchange
Bank (iBank, for brevity) filed a collection suit with application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Alberto Looyuko and Jimmy
T. Go in the RTC of P96,000,000.00),
plus penalty.
A Writ of Execution on the judgment
against Mr. Looyuko was implemented.
Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued against Mr. Go for his part
of the liability. Thereupon, respondent
Renato C. Flora, Sheriff of Branch 150 of the RTC of Makati City, issued a
Notice of Sheriff’s Sale on 12 May 2000 notifying all the parties concerned, as
well as the public in general, that the following real properties, among other
properties, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. PT-66751, No. PT-66749,
No. 55469 and No. 45229 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, TCT No. 36489
of the Registry of Quezon City, and TCTs No. 4621 and No. 52987 of the Registry
of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Mr. Go will be sold at public
auction on
On
A second Notice of Sheriff’s
On
As
scheduled, the public auction took place on
Petitioners
filed with the RTC of Pasig City the instant case for Annulment of Sheriff’s
Auction Sale Proceedings and Certificate of Sale against iBank, the Clerk of
Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Engracio M. Escariñas, Jr., Clerk of
Court VII and Ex-Officio Sheriff of
In an Order dated
A
hearing was held on the application for preliminary injunction. On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, plaintiffs’ application for issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED, and defendants and their representatives are
enjoined from proceeding further with the execution, including consolidating
title and taking possession thereof, against plaintiffs’ real properties covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. PT-66751, PT-66749, 55469, 45229, 4621,
52987 and 36489.
The Writ
of Preliminary Injunction shall be issued upon plaintiffs’ posting of a bond
executed to defendant in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00)
to the effect that plaintiffs will pay defendants all damages which the latter
may sustain by reason of the injunction if it be ultimately decided that the
injunction is unwarranted.[13]
On P3,000,000.00), Judge Janolo issued
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[14]
Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed on
With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration,
respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction[17]
praying that it: (a) issue immediately a temporary restraining order enjoining
Judge Janolo from taking any action or conducting any further proceeding on the
case; (b) annul the Orders dated 18 July 2001 and 21 November 2001; and (c)
order the immediate dismissal of Civil Case No. 68088.
In its decision dated
Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora thereafter filed with
this Court a Petition for Certiorari
which we dismissed. The Court’s Resolution
dated
Considering
the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari,
the Court Resolves to DISMISS the petition for being a wrong remedy under the
Rules and evidently used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Besides, even if treated as a petition under
Rule 65 of the said Rules, the same would be dismissed for failure to
sufficiently show that the questioned judgment is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.[20]
Accordingly, an Entry of Judgment was issued by the Supreme
Court certifying that the resolution dismissing the case had become final and
executory on
Subsequently, respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed
with the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 264, an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Motion to
Dismiss Complaint and/or Dissolve Injunction) dated 31 January 2006 praying that
their pending Motion for Reconsideration dated 26 February 2001 which seeks for
the dismissal of the case be resolved and/or the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
previously issued be dissolved.[22]
On
In a Manifestation dated
In an Order[29]
dated
WHEREFORE,
this Court’s writ of preliminary injunction dated
The Branch
Clerk of Court is directed to issue a Writ Dissolving Preliminary Injunction
upon the filing and approval of defendants’ counter-bond.[30]
The trial court
explained its ruling in this wise:
In
our jurisdiction, the provisions of Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court allow
the issuance of preliminary injunction.
This court granted plaintiffs’ prayer preliminary injunction in the
Order dated
Defendants
in this case, however, are not without remedy to pray for dissolution of
preliminary injunction already granted because it is only interlocutory and not
permanent in nature.
The
provisions of Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court allow
dissolution of the injunction granted provided there is affidavit of party or
persons enjoined; an opportunity to oppose by the other party; hearing on the
issue, and filing of a bond to be fixed by the court sufficient to compensate
damages applicant may suffer by dissolution thereby.
A
preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main
case subject to the latter’s outcome.
Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the
case. The status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation
which precedes a controversy. The status quo should be that existing at
the time of the filing of the case. A
preliminary injunction should not establish new relations between the parties,
but merely maintain or re-establish the pre-existing relationship between them. x x x.
When
the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a
clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not
proper and constitutes grave abuse of discretion. x x x. In the case at bar, plaintiffs’ deed of sale
was purported to be not duly notarized.
As such, the legal right of what the plaintiffs claim is still doubtful
and such legal right can only be threshed out in a full blown trial where they
can clearly establish the right over the disputed properties.
Moreover,
defendants are willing to post a counter bond which could cover up to the
damages in favor of plaintiffs in case the judgment turns out to be adverse to
them. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure,
this is perfectly allowed and the dissolution of the writ of injunction can
accordingly be issued. In the case of
Lasala vs. Fernandez, the highest court has enunciated that “a court has the
power to recall or modify a writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by
it. The issuance or recall of a
preliminary writ of injunction is an interlocutory matter that remains at all
times within the control of the court.”
(G.R. No. L-16628,
On
During
the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari,
petitioners filed before the trial court a Very Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proceedings[33] to
which respondents filed a Comment.[34]
On
After being granted an extension of thirty days within
which to file a petition for certiorari,
petitioners filed the instant Petition on
I
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE LEONCIO M. JANOLO,
JR. GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN DISSOLVING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DATED
1.
DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLVED WITH FINALITY THAT YOUR PERITIONERS WILL “SUFFER
IRREPARABLE INJURY” (
2.
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
HON. SUPREME COURT RULED WITH FINALITY THAT THE COURT A QUO DID NOT ABUSE ITS
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE INJUNCTION DATED
II
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE LEONCIO M. JANOLO,
JR. GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
BY FIXING THE PHP10,000,000.00 COUNTER-BOND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO PETITIONERS AS A RESULT OF DISSOLVING THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION OR COULD NOT BE
QUANTIFIED.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSING YOUR PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN
CA-GR SP NO. 95074, AS IT FAILED TO APPLY EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE TO THE EFFECT
THAT A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAY BE DISPENSED WITH WHERE THE CONTROVERTED
ACT IS PATENTLY ILLEGAL OR WAS PERFORMED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AS HELD IN HAMILTON VS. LEVY, (344 SCRA 821)
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
CLEARLY POINTING OUT TO THE COURT THAT AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE, THE
REQUIRED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAY BE DISPENSED WITH.
At the outset, it must be said that
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated P10,000,000.00. The
dissolution thereof is primed on the filing of the counter-bond.
Petitioners argue that the trial
court abused its discretion when it ordered the dissolution of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, the propriety of its issuance having been affirmed by
both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. There being an Order by this Court that the injunction issued by the trial court was not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the dissolution of said writ is
a clear defiance of this Court’s directive.
Respondents, on the other
hand, contend that the trial court has the authority and prerogative to set
aside the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
They add that since petitioners’ Deed of Sale was not duly notarized,
the latter’s application for preliminary injunction is devoid of factual and
legal bases. They assert that, not being
public documents, the subject deeds of sale are nothing but spurious, if not
falsified, documents. They add that the
continuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction would cause them irreparable
damage because it continues to incur damage not only for the nonpayment of the
judgment award (in Civil Case No. 98-791 before the RTC of Makati City, Br.
150), but also for opportunity losses resulting from the continued denial of
its right to consolidate title over the levied properties.
There is no dispute that both
the Court of Appeals and this Court have ruled that the issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction by the trial court was not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Respondents tried to undo
the issuance of said writ but to no avail.
The Resolution on the matter attained finality on
This, notwithstanding,
respondents filed with the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 264, an Omnibus Motion (To
Resolve Motion to Dismiss Complaint and/or Dissolve Injunction) dated 31 January
2006 praying that their Motion for Reconsideration dated 26 February 2001 of
the trial court’s denial of their Motion to Dismiss which the trial court
failed to resolve, be resolved and/or the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
previously issued be dissolved. With
this Omnibus Motion, the trial court issued the Order dated P10,000,000.00 counter-bond.
The question is: Under
the circumstances obtaining in this case, may the trial court recall and
dissolve the preliminary injunction it issued despite the rulings of the Court
of Appeals and by this Court that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse
of discretion?
We hold that the trial
court may still order the dissolution of the preliminary injunction it
previously issued. We do not agree with
petitioners’ argument that the trial court may no longer dissolve the
preliminary injunction because this Court previously ruled that its issuance
was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The issuance of a
preliminary injunction is different from its dissolution. Its issuance is governed by Section 3,[38]
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure while the grounds for its
dissolution are contained in Section 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. As long as the party seeking the
dissolution of the preliminary injunction can prove the presence of any of the
grounds for its dissolution, same may be dissolved notwithstanding that this
Court previously ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Section 6 of Rule 58 reads:
Section
6. Grounds
for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of, injunction or restraining
order. – The application for injunction or restraining order may be denied,
upon a showing of its insufficiency. The
injunction or restraining order may also be denied, or, if granted, may be
dissolved, on other grounds upon affidavits of the party or person enjoined,
which may be opposed by the applicant also by affidavits. It may further be denied, or, if granted, may
be dissolved, if it appears after hearing that although the applicant is
entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance
thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the party or
person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages
as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court
conditioned that he will pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by the
denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. If it appears that the extent of the
preliminary injunction or restraining order granted is too great, it may be
modified.
Under
the afore-quoted section, a preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it
appears after hearing
that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order,
the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause
irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while the applicant can be
fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the former files a
bond in an amount fixed by the court on condition that he will pay all damages
which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction
or restraining order. Two conditions
must concur: first, the court in the exercise
of its discretion, finds that the continuance of the injunction would cause
great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for
such damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files a counter-bond.[39] The Order of the trial court dated
In the case
at bar, the trial court, after hearing, found that respondents duly showed that
they would suffer great and irreparable injury if the injunction shall continue
to exist. As to the second condition,
the trial court likewise found that respondents were willing to post a
counter-bond which could cover the damages that petitioners may suffer in case
the judgment turns out to be adverse to them.
The Order of the trial court to recall and dissolve the preliminary
injunction is subject to the filing and approval of the counter-bond that it
ordered. Failure to post the required counter-bond
will necessarily lead to the non-dissolution of the preliminary injunction. The Order of Dissolution cannot be
implemented until and unless the required counter-bond has been posted.
The
well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court,
and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that
it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or, otherwise, in
grave abuse of discretion. By the same
token, the court that issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve
the writ as the circumstances may warrant.[40] In the case on hand, the trial court issued
the order of dissolution on a ground provided for by the Rules of Court. The same being in accordance with the rules,
we find no reason to disturb the same.
Petitioners contend that the Court of
Appeals erred and gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed outright
their Petition for Certiorari by
failing to apply existing jurisprudence that a motion for reconsideration may
be dispensed with where the controverted act is patently illegal or was
performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand, respondents urge the Court
to deny the Petition for Review, arguing that the Court of Appeals properly applied
the general rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition
sine qua non in order that certiorari will lie.
We find petitioners’ contention to be
untenable.
The rule is well settled that
the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition to the
filing of a special civil action for certiorari.[41]
It must be stressed that
a petition for certiorari is an
extraordinary remedy and should be filed only as a last resort. The filing of a
motion for reconsideration is intended to afford the trial court an opportunity
to correct any actual error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the
legal and factual issues.[42]
By their failure to file a motion for reconsideration, they deprived the trial
court of the opportunity to rectify any error it committed, if there was any.
Moreover, a perusal of
petitioners’ petition for certiorari filed
with the Court of Appeals shows that they filed the same because there was no
appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law except via
a petition for certiorari. When same was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s Order,
they argue that while the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a sine
qua non before a petition for certiorari
is instituted, the same is not entirely without exception like where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction. It was only when
the Court of Appeals dismissed their Petition did they argue that exceptions to
the general rule should apply. Their
invocation of the application of the exceptions was belatedly made. The application of the exceptions should be
raised in their Petition for Certiorari and
not when their Petition has already been dismissed. They must give their reasons and explain
fully why their case falls under any of the exceptions. This, petitioners failed to do.
Petitioners’ argument that they filed the Petition for Certiorari without filing a motion for
reconsideration because there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law except via a Petition for Certiorari does not convince. We have held that the “plain” and “adequate remedy” referred
to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a motion for reconsideration
of the assailed Order or Resolution.[43]
The mere allegation that there is “no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy” is not one of the exceptions
to the rule that a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua non before a
petition for certiorari may be filed.
All told, we hold that the act of the
trial court of issuing the Order dated
Our pronouncements in this case are
confined only to the issue of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction and
will not apply to the merits of the case.
WHEREFORE, all
considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED.
The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 95074 dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MA. ALI
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Now Union Bank of the
* Per Special Order No. 497, dated
[2] Penned by Associate Justice (now Presiding Justice) Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo and Enrico A. Lanzanas, concurring; rollo, pp.38-39.
[3] Penned by Hon. Leoncio M. Janolo,
Jr.; rollo, pp. 42-49.
[4] Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[5]
[6] Deed of Absolute Sale dated 22
September 1999 between Jimmy Go, as vendor, and Shirley Yap, as vendee, over
parcels of land covered by TCTs No. 4621 and No. 52987 in consideration of P4.05
million.
Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 15 October 1997 between Jimmy Go, as vendor, and Alfredo Yap, as
vendee, over parcels of land covered by TCTs No. PT-66749, No. PT-66751, No.
55469, No. 45229 and No. 36489 in consideration of P3.5 million.
[7] Rollo, pp. 86-90.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] Law Firm of Valerio Ong Saavedra Vicerra & Protasio.
[24] Rollo, pp. 253-260.
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38] Section 3. Grounds
for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant
is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission,
continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
[39] Cafino
v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 137655,
[40] Technology
Developers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94759,
[41] Acance
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159699,
[42] Nisce
v. Equitable PCIBank, Inc., G.R. No. 167434,
[43]