THIRD
DIVISION
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ELMER F.
GOMEZ, Petitioner, - versus - MA. LITA
A. MONTALBAN, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 174414 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse (1) the Order[1]
dated
On P40,000.00 with a voluntary proposal on her part to pay 15%
interest per month; upon receipt of the proceeds of the loan, respondent issued
in favor of petitioner, as security, Capitol Bank Check No. 0215632, postdated
26 October 1998, in the sum of P46,000.00,
covering the P40,000.00 principal loan amount and P6,000.00
interest charges for one month; when the check became due, respondent failed to
pay the loan despite several demands; thus, petitioner filed the Complaint
praying for the payment of P238,000.00, representing the principal loan
and interest charges, plus 25% of the amount to be awarded as attorney’s fees,
as well as the cost of suit.
Summons was served, but despite her receipt thereof,
respondent failed to file her Answer. Consequently, she was declared[4]
in default and upon motion, petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
After considering the evidence presented by petitioner, the
RTC rendered a Decision[5]
on
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
decides this case in favor of [herein petitioner] and against [herein
respondent], ordering [respondent] to pay [petitioner] the following amounts:
1. P40,000.00 representing
the principal amount of the loan;
2. P57,600.00 representing
interest at the rate of 24% per annum reckoned from
3. P15,000.00 representing
attorney’s fees.
On P40,000.00, an
amount falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
After petitioner filed his Answer[7] to
the Petition for Relief from Judgment and respondent her Reply,[8]
the said Petition was set for hearing.
After
several dates were set and called for hearing, respondent, thru counsel, failed
to appear despite being duly notified; hence, her Petition for Relief was
dismissed[9]
for her apparent lack of interest to pursue the petition.
Respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10]
of the dismissal of her Petition for Relief, stating that her counsel’s failure
to appear was not intentional, but due to human shortcomings or frailties,
constituting honest mistake or excusable negligence.
On
In regard to the motion for reconsideration file by
[herein respondent] of the order of the court dismissing her petition for
relief from judgment, the court, in the interest of justice, shall give
[respondent] one more chance to present the merits of her position in a
hearing. The dismissal of the petition is therefore reconsidered and set aside.
On
WHEREFORE, the petition
for relief is hereby GRANTED. The decision of this court dated
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
afore-quoted Order, but the same was denied by the RTC in another Order[13]
dated
Hence, the present Petition filed directly before this
Court.
In his Memorandum,[14] petitioner raises the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
1.
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over this case for sum of money, damages and attorney’s fees where
the principal amount of the obligation is P40,000.00 but the amount of the
demand per allegation of the complaint is P238,000.00;
2. Whether or not respondent’s relief from judgment is proper during the period for filing a motion for reconsideration and appeal.
Before the Court dwells on the
principal issues, a few procedural matters must first be resolved.
Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court categorically provides that in all cases where only questions of law are
raised, the appeal from a decision or order of the RTC shall be to the Supreme
Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.[15]
The distinction between
questions of law and questions of fact has long been settled. A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence
to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination
of probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances,
as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability
of the situation.[16]
Simple
as it may seem, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is
sometimes complicated. In a case involving a “question of law,” the
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of
the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query
requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or
relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the
issue in that query is factual.[17]
The first issue raised in the present
petition is one of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter - meaning,
the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought. Jurisdiction is the right to act or the power
and authority to hear and determine a cause.
It is a question of law.[18] The second issue refers to the aptness of the
grant of a Petition for Relief from Judgment.
These questions are undoubtedly one of law, as they concern the correct
interpretation or application of relevant laws and rules, without the need for
review of the evidences presented before the court a quo.
Thus, with only questions of law
raised in this Petition, direct resort to this Court is proper.[19]
The Court shall now discuss whether
the RTC has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 29,717-03.
Petitioner’s
Complaint before the RTC reads:
3.
On or about P40,000.00) with a voluntary proposal on her part to
pay as much as 15% interest per month.
Machine copy of Cash Voucher dated
4.
Upon receipt of the
proceeds of the said loan, [respondent] issued in favor of the Plaintiff
Capitol Bank Check with check nos. 0215632 postdated on October 26, 1998 for
the sum of Forty Six Thousand Pesos (P46,000.00) as security on the loan
with P6,000.00 as the first month of interest charges. When the check became due, [respondent]
defaulted to pay her loan despite several allowances of time and repeated
verbal demands from the [petitioner].
The said check was later on dishonored for the reason: “Account Closed”.
Machine copy of Capitol Bank Check wit nos. 0215632 is herewith attached as
Annex “B”.
5.
On P 239,000.00), inclusive of
interest charges for 32 months. Machine
copy of Demand Letter and its registry receipt and return card is herewith
attached as Annexes “C”; “C-1” and C-2”, respectively.
6.
In view of
[respondent]’s refusal to pay her loan, [petitioner] is constrained to engage
the services of counsel to initiate the instant action for a fee of 25% for
whatever amounts is collected as flat attorney’s fee. [Petitioner] will
likewise incur damages in the form of docket fees.
PRAYER
WHERFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the
Honorable Court that Decision be rendered ordering the [respondent] to pay
[petitioner] as follows:
1.
The amount of P238,000.00 with interest charges
at the sound discretion of the Honorable Court starting on
2.
The sum equivalent to
25 % of the amount awarded as attorney’s fee;
3.
Cost of suit;
4.
Other relief that the
Honorable Court may find just and equitable under the premises are likewise
prayed for.[20]
[Emphasis ours.]
The
Court gleans from the foregoing that petitioner’s cause of action is the
respondent’s violation of their loan agreement.[21] In that loan agreement, respondent expressly agreed
to pay the principal amount of the loan, plus 15% monthly interest. Consequently, petitioner is claiming and
praying for in his Complaint the total amount of P238,000.00, already
inclusive of the interest on the loan which had accrued from 1998. Since the interest on the loan is a primary
and inseparable component of the cause of action, not merely incidental
thereto, and already determinable at the time of filing of the Complaint, it
must be included in the determination of which court has the jurisdiction over
petitioner’s case. Using as basis the P238,000.00
amount being claimed by petitioner from respondent for payment of the principal
loan and interest, this Court finds that it is well within the jurisdictional
amount fixed by law for RTCs. [22]
There
can be no doubt that the RTC in this case has jurisdiction to entertain, try,
and decide the petitioner’s Complaint.
To this
Court, it is irrelevant that during the course of the trial, it was proven that
respondent is only liable to petitioner for the amount of P40,000.00
representing the principal amount of the loan; P57,000.00 as interest
thereon at the rate of 24% per annum reckoned from 26 August 1998 until the
present; and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Contrary to respondent’s contention,
jurisdiction can neither be made to depend on the amount ultimately
substantiated in the course of the trial or proceedings nor be affected by
proof showing that the claimant is entitled to recover a sum in excess of the
jurisdictional amount fixed by law.
Jurisdiction is determined by the cause of action as alleged in the
complaint and not by the amount ultimately substantiated and
awarded.[23]
Basic as a hornbook principle is that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.[24] The
nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it,
is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.[25]
The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the
ones to be consulted.[26] Once vested by the
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein.[27]
On the propriety of the granting by
the RTC of respondent’s Petition for Relief from Judgment, the Court finds and
so declares that the RTC did indeed commit an error in doing so.
First of all, a petition
for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is only
available against a final and executory judgment.[28] Since respondent allegedly[29]
received a copy of the Decision dated
Second, based on respondent’s
allegations in her Petition for Relief before the RTC, she
had no cause of action for relief from judgment.
Section 1 of Rule 38 provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. – When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court, the court may grant relief from judgment only “[w]hen a judgment
or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a
party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
x x x.”
In her Petition for Relief from Judgment
before the RTC, respondent contended that judgment was entered against her
through “mistake or fraud,” because she was not duly served with summons as it
was received by a Mrs. Alicia dela Torre who was not authorized to receive
summons or other legal processes on her behalf.
As used in Section 1, Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court, “mistake” refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates
to the case.[30] The word “mistake,” which grants relief from
judgment, does not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error
which the court might have committed in the trial. Such errors may be corrected
by means of an appeal.[31]This
does not exist in the case at bar, because respondent has in no wise been
prevented from interposing an appeal.
“Fraud,” on the other hand, must be
extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party
from having a trial or presenting his case to the court,[32]or
was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy.[33]This
is not present in the case at hand as respondent was not prevented from
securing a fair trial and was given the opportunity to present her case.
Negligence to be
excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against.[34]
Under Section 1, the “negligence” must be excusable and generally
imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding
on the client.[35] To follow a contrary rule and allow a party
to disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative,
and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek
administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal
of the court’s ruling.[36]
Third, the certificate of service of
the process server of the court a quo is
prima facie evidence of the facts as
set out therein.[37] According to the Sheriff’s Return of Service,[38]
summons was issued and served on respondent thru one Mrs. Alicia dela Torre,
thus:
“THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on June 25, 2003 at around 1:45 p.m. the undersigned sheriff caused the service of summons issued in the above-entitled case together with attached complaints and annexes for and in behalf of defendant [respondent] thru a certain Mrs. Alicia Dela Torre inside their compound at the given address who acknowledged receipt by signature and notation of said dela Torre appearing thereof.
Wherefore, this
summons is respectfully returned to the Honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch 13,
Finally, even assuming arguendo
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over respondent on account of the non-service
upon her of the summons and complaint, the remedy of the respondent was to file
a motion for the reconsideration of the
In
Tuason v. Court of Appeals,[40]
the Court explained the nature of a petition for relief from judgment:
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.[ (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
In
the case at bar, there being no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence that would have prevented petitioner from filing either a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review on certiorari
of the 4 May 2004 Decision of the RTC, her resort to a Petition for Relief
from Judgment was unwarranted.
This Court also notes
that when respondent was declared in
default for her failure to file an Answer to the Complaint, she did not
immediately avail herself of any of the remedies provided by law. Lina
v. Court of Appeals[41]
enumerates the remedies available to a party declared in default:
a) The
defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before
judgment, file a motion, under oath,
to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he
has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]);
b) If the judgment has already been
rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has
become final and executory, he may file a motion
for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default
after the judgment has become final and executory, he may
file a petition for
relief under Section 2 [now Section 1] of Rule 38;
and
d) He may also
appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to
the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been presented by him (Sec. 2, Rule 41). (Emphasis added)
In addition, and as this
Court earlier mentioned, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment
by default is also available if the trial court improperly declared a party in
default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party in default, if
grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration.[42]
If respondent is really
vigilant in protecting her rights, she should have exhausted all the legal remedies
above-mentioned to nullify and set aside the order of
default against her, and should no longer have waited for the judgment to be
rendered. Respondent does not deny that
she did receive the summons, although she alleges that it was not properly
served upon her, yet she chose to sit on her rights and did not act
immediately. For respondent’s
failure to act with prudence and diligence in protecting her rights, she cannot
now elicit this Court’s sympathy.
Respondent’s petition for relief from judgment is clearly
without merit and should not have been granted by the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
herby GRANTED. Consequently, the
Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 7-9.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Bukidnon
Doctors’ Hospital, Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No.
161882, 8 July 2005, 463 SCRA 222, 232.
[16] Chiang Kai Shek College v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 152988, 24 August 2004, 437 SCRA 171, 183.
[17] Microsoft
Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946,
[18]
[19] Bukidnon
Doctors’ Hospital, Inc. v. Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Co., supra
note 15 at 234.
[20] Rollo,
pp. 37-38.
[21] Cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another (Section 2, Rule 2 of the
Rules of Court).
[22] Section
1(8) of Republic Act No. 7691 otherwise known as “An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, Otherwise Known as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,”provides:
SECTION 1.
Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the “Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980,” is hereby amended as follows:
x x x x
8) In all other cases in
which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or such
other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned
items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos ( P200,000.00).
[23] Dionisio v. Puerto, 158 Phil. 671, 677 (1974).
[24] Dimo
Realty & Development, Inc. v. Dimaculangan, 469 Phil. 373, 381-382
(2004).
[25] Barangay
Piapi v. Talip, G.R. No. 138248, 7 September 2005, 469 SCRA 409, 413; Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Hon.
Cabato, 384 Phil. 252, 260 (2000).
[26] Serdoncillo
v. Benolirao, G.R. No. 118328, 8 October 1998, 297 SCRA 448, 459; Umpoc v. Mercado, G.R. No. 158166, 21
January 2005, 449 SCRA 220, 232; Lacierda v.
Platon, G.R. No. 157141, 31 August 2005, 468 SCRA 650, 660-662.
[27] Barrazona v.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
[28] Aboitiz
International Forwardes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142272, 2 May
2006, 488 SCRA 492, 506.
[29] Rollo,
pp. 52-57.
[30] Agan
v. Heirs of Sps. Nueva, 463 Phil. 834, 840-841 (2003).
[31] Guevara
v. Tuason and Co., 1 Phil. 27, 28 (1901).
[32] Garcia
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96141,
[33] Magno
v. Court of Appeals, 194 Phil. 271, 278 (1981).
[34] Regalado
v. Regalado, G.R. No. 134154,
[35] Insular
Life Savings and Trust Company v. Runes, Jr., G.R. No. 152530,
[36] Que
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150739,
[37] Aboitiz International Forwarders, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 28 at 506-507.
[38] Rollo,
p. 44.
[40] G.R. No. 116607,
[41] G.R. No. L-63397,
[42] Cerezo
v. Tuazon, 469 Phil. 1020, 1036-1037 (2004).