THIRD DIVISION
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OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, - versus - LALINETH
LISONDRA, TERESITA SERGIO, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER
TWENTY-FIRST DIVISION), Cagayan de Oro City, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 174045 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65[1]
of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) seeking
to set aside the Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals dated
The
antecedent facts as narrated by petitioner are:
Administrative charges for dishonesty
and grave misconduct were filed by complainant Renato
S. Muñoz, Mayor of the P300,000.00 as payment for the delivery of 2,400 bags of
Portland cement intended to be used for the concreting of
To substantiate his complaint,
complainant submitted to the OMB the sworn affidavits of MSO Sergio and MPDO Lisondra.
Acting on the foregoing complaint, the
OMB, on
In her counter-affidavit,[4]
Orlandez asserted that the complaint against her is
politically motivated. She averred that
the determination of whether or not there was actual delivery is not within her
duties and responsibilities as the Treasurer of the
Gomez also filed his counter-affidavit
and categorically declared that as a Storekeeper I under the Office of the
Economic Enterprise, he never inspected nor was informed of any delivery of
2,400 bags of Portland cement from Ronwood
Construction Supply.
Torralba,
Clerk III of the said Municipality, maintained that he was present during the
delivery of the 2,400 bags of Portland cement and, in fact, personally made the
inspection together with MPDO Lisondra.
On the basis of the sworn statement of
Orlandez, the OMB issued an Order dated
On the same day, the OMB issued Subpoena Duces Tecum for the production of the original or certified
true copies of all documents relative to the subject matter of the case before
it.
On
1. Request for Obligation of Allotment
2. Unnumbered Disbursement Voucher
3. Photocopy of the LBP Check
4. Status of Appropriation dated
5. Photocopy of Official Receipt with Serial No. 3299 issued by Ronwoood Construction Supply
6. Photocopy of Sales Invoice with Serial No. 5281
7. Purchase Request dated
8. Call of Quotations
9. Purchase Order
10. Certificate of Inspection
Upon perusal of the Certificate of
Inspection, it appears that aside from MPDO Lisondra,
Torralba, and Gomez, the other signatories therein are
Melly B. Campos and Teresita
G. Sergio. Thus, on
In the meantime, on
It is our practice that because we travel to various
areas in
She declared in her counter-affidavit
that receiving supplies was not part of her duties and functions but somehow
her name was included in the Certificate of Inspection form as one of the signatories
therein.
On 30 January 2003, Campos, the
representative from the Municipal Treasury whose signature similarly appears on
the Certificate of Inspection, filed her counter-affidavit and corroborated the
earlier statement of her co-respondent Torralba that
there was actual delivery of 2,400 bags of Portland cement at the Municipal gym
of La Paz.
As to Sergio, she averred that when
the Certificate of Inspection was presented to her by co-respondent Torralba on
The OMB scheduled the case for a
preliminary conference on
In a Decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents Tomas B. Gomez, Lalineth Lisondra, Rey Torralba, Melly B. Campos and Teresita Sergio are hereby found guilty of DISHONESTY and are hereby meted the supreme penalty of DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government owned or controlled corporation. The herein case against respondent Milagros Orlandez is hereby dismissed.[6]
Respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the OMB denied in its Order dated
MPDO Lisondra
and Sergio filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals.[7]
The
appellate court, in a Decision dated
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED in
so far as it seeks to set aside the finding of the Ombudsman that Petitioners
LALINETH A. LISONDRA and TERESITA SERGIO are administratively liable for
dishonesty. The petition is GRANTED in
so far as it seeks to nullify the penalty directly imposed by the OMBUDSMAN
upon Petitioners. The OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN is hereby DIRECTED TO TRANSMIT ITS FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
relative to this case to the incumbent Municipal Mayor or Chief Executive
Officer of the
The OMB filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, which, in a Resolution dated
WHEREFORE, Public Respondent’s motion for reconsideration and Petitioners’ urgent motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction are hereby DENIED.[9]
The Court of Appeals found precedent
in the following cases and explained:
In Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502 (1995), the Supreme Court declared:
The powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman have been categorized into the following headings: Investigatory Power, Prosecutory Power, Public Assistance Functions, Authority to Inquire and Obtain Information, and Function to Adopt, Institute and Implement Preventive Measures.
The power to dismiss is not found in the above enumerations of the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman; neither can it be logically placed under any of the abovementioned categories.
In Tapiador vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and Atty. Ronaldo
P. Ledesma, G.R. No. 129124, March 15, 2002, the
Supreme Court emphatically held that “[u]nder Section
13, subparagraph (3), of the Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman
can only `RECOMMEND’ THE REMOVAL OF THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE FOUND TO BE
AT FAULT, TO THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL CONCERNED.”
(Emphasis Ours) Likewise, in PNB-REPUBLIC BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, G.R. No. 127370,
The power of the Ombudsman is only investigatory in character and its resolution cannot constitute a valid and final judgment because its duty, assuming it determines that there is an actionable criminal or non-criminal act or omission, is to file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan (Italics supplied for emphasis.).[10]
To show its vigorous dissent, the OMB
filed the instant Petition before us raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE 30 MAY 2006 RESOLUTION CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT BAR THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FROM EXERCISING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OVER PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES IN GENERAL.
B. CONGRESS CONSTITUTIONALLY CLOTHED THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN WITH FULL ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OVER PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES IN GENERAL, COMPLETE WITH ALL THE REQUISITE COMPONENTS AS CONTAINED IN R.A. NO. 6770, CONSIDERING THAT:
i. THE 1987 CONSTITUTION EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED CONGRESS TO GRANT THE OMBUDSMAN ADDITIONAL POWERS;
ii. CONGRESS, BOTH PURSUANT TO ITS EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY IN THE CASE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWERS, ENACTED R.A. NO. 6770 PROVIDING THEREIN THE OMBUDSMAN’S FULL AND COMPLETE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER AND DUTY;
iii. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE SAID STATUTORY GRANT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER WHICH CAN BE REMOTELY CONSIDERED INCONSISTENT WITH THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND
iv. VESTING THE OMBUDSMAN WITH FULL DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY IS ABSOLUTELY IN CONSONANCE WITH THE SOVEREIGN INTENT, AS EXPRESSED BY THE LETTER OF, AND IN THE DELIBERATIONS ON, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, I.E., THE INTENT TO CREATE AN EFFECTIVE, RATHER THAN EFFETE (sic), PROTECTOR OF THE PEOPLE INSULATED FROM POLITICAL INFLUENCE.
C. THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE OMBUDSMAN INCLUDES THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE PENALTY AND TO CAUSE THE SAME TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE HEAD OF AGENCY CONCERNED, CONSIDERING THAT:
i. R.A. NO. 6770 CONTAINS EXPRESS PROVISIONS GRANTING THE OMBUDSMAN THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE AND CAUSE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES;
ii. A DISCIPLINARY POWER BEREFT OF THE NECESSARY COMPONENT OF DETERMINING THE PENALTY AND CAUSING THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF IS OTIOSE (sic);
iii. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PENALTIES ASSESSED BY THE OMBUDSMAN IS SUBJECT TO SECTION 13(3), ART. XI OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE INDEPENDENT FIRST PART OF SECTION 15(30) OF R.A. NO. 6770, THE LATTER PROVISIONS STILL EMPOWER THE OMBUDSMAN TO “ENSURE COMPLIANCE” WITH ITS “RECOMMENDATIONS;” AND
iv. A CONTRARY RULE CAN ONLY RESULT IN FURTHER LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ABSURDITIES.[11]
We find merit in the Petition and rule
to grant the writ of certiorari.
OMB’s postulation may be summarized
into whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly held that OMB has no power
to impose penalty on public officers.
The OMB is a constitutionally created
office. The mandate of the OMB is expressed in Section 12, Article XI of the
Constitution:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.[12]
Section 13,
Article XI of the Constitution enumerates the powers, functions, and duties of
the OMB:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
3. Direct the Officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
5. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
However,
the framers of the Constitution did not mean for the foregoing enumeration to
be exclusive. They still intended to
confer on Congress the discretion to give the OMB other powers, functions, and
duties that will enable it to effectively execute its general mandate as
protector of the people from the abuses of public officials and employees. The following debate of Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during the
interpellation by Commissioner Rodrigo in the Constitutional Commission of 1986
relative to the powers, functions, and duties of the Ombudsman is enlightening:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us go back to the division between the powers of the Tanodbayan and the Ombudsman which says that:
The Tanodbayan . . . shall continue to function and exercise its powers as provided by law, except those conferred on the office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.
The powers of the Ombudsman are enumerated in Section. 12.
MR. COLAYCO: They are not exclusive.
MR. RODRIGO: So, these powers can also be exercised by the Tanodbayan?
MR. COLAYCO: No, I
was saying that the powers enumerated here for the Ombudsman are not exclusive.
MR.
RODRIGO: Precisely, I am coming to
that. The last of the enumerated
functions of the Ombudsman is: “to exercise such powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law.”
So, the legislative may vest him with powers taken away from the Tanodbayan, may it not?
MR. COLAYCO: Yes.
MR. MONSOD: Yes.
x x x x
MR. RODRIGO: And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that can be performed by the Ombudsman are “such functions or duties as may be provided by law.”
x x x x
MR.
COLAYCO: Madam President, that is correct.
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, perhaps it might be helpful if we give the spirit and intendment of the Committee. What we wanted to avoid is the situation where it deteriorates into a prosecution arm. We wanted to give the idea of the Ombudsman a chance, with prestige and persuasive powers, and also a chance to really function as a champion of the citizen.
However,
we do not want to foreclose the possibility that in the future, the Assembly,
as it may see fit, may have to give additional powers to the Ombudsman; we want
to give the concept of a pure Ombudsman a chance under the Constitution.
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a constitutional body which has neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only persuasive powers, we might be raising the hopes of our people too much and then disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD: I agree with the Commissioner.
MR. RODRIGO: Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?
MR. MONSOD: Yes, because we want to avoid what happened in 1973. I read the committee report which recommended the approval of the 27 resolutions for the creation of the office of the Ombudsman, but notwithstanding the explicit purpose enunciated in that report, the implementing law – the last one, P.D. No. 1630 – did not follow the main thrust; instead it created the Tanodbayan (2 record, 270-271).
x x x x
MR. MONSOD (reacting to statements of Commissiner Blas Ople): May we just state that perhaps the [H]onorable Commissioner has looked at it in too much of an absolutist position. The Ombudsman is seen as a civil advocate or a champion of the citizens against the bureaucracy, not against the President. On one hand, we are told he has no teeth and he lacks other things. On the other hand, there is the interpretation that he is a competitor to the President, as if he is being brought up to the same level as the President.
With respect to the argument that he
is a toothless animal, we would like to say that we are promoting the concept
in its form at the present, but we are
also saying that he can exercise such powers and functions as may be provided
by law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of Commissioner
Rodrigo. We did not think that at this
time we should prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future
time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the Ombudsman need
in order that he be more effective. This
is not foreclosed.
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability.[13] (Emphases supplied.)
Clearly, the Legislature, as it deems
fit, may enact a statute that would identify with even more particularity or
even add to the powers, functions, and duties of the OMB already enumerated in
Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. In the exercise of this discretion, Congress
thus enacted Republic Act No. 6770.
Republic Act No. 6770[14]
provides for the functional and structural organization of the OMB. In passing Republic Act No. 6770, Congress
deliberately endowed the OMB with the power to prosecute offenses committed by
public officers and employees to make him a more active and effective agent of
the people in ensuring accountability in public office.[15] Moreover, the Legislature has vested the OMB
with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.[16]
Section 15
of Republic Act No. 6770, specifying the powers, functions and duties of the
OMB, includes the following paragraph:
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
The proviso in Section 3 forecloses any
doubt as to the powers of the OMB to impose disciplinary sanctions. Unmistakably, one can easily glean from the
foregoing that: 1) the OMB has the power
to order the removal, suspension, or demotion of an erring officer or employee
and/or to impose a fine or censure and prosecute the same; and 2) the refusal
by an officer without just cause to comply with an order imposing such afore-named
sanctions shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
We held in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals[17]
that Republic Act No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution, who conferred on Congress the discretion to give the OMB
powers that are not merely persuasive in character. Thus, in addition to the power of the OMB to
prosecute and conduct investigations, the lawmakers, by enacting Republic Act
No. 6770, intended to provide the OMB with the power to punish for contempt and
preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an investigation
when the case so warrants.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals[18] is more
succinct and elaborate. Here, we found
that the provisions of Republic Act No. 6770 reveal the manifest intent of
Congress to bestow on the OMB full administrative disciplinary authority including
the power to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute the erring
public official or employees, thus:
These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty.
x x x x.
The
legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that
the Office of the Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative
disciplinary authority, including the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the
Ombudsman to be “an activist watchman,” not merely a passive one. And this intent was given validation by the
Court in Uy v. Sandiganbayan
[G.R. Nos. 105965-70,
Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model whose function is merely to receive and process the people’s complaints against corrupt and abusive government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and employees. The legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.[19] (Emphasis supplied.)
Immediately following is Estarija v. Ranada,[20]
in which we held that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution,
the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official
other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary thus:
[W]e hold that Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound.[21] The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.[22] (Emphasis supplied.)
Of most recent vintage is Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing[23]
which put to rest any uncertainty on this issue and pronounced that the
manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the OMB full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with
constitutional deliberations. The Court
held:
We
reiterated this ruling in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Laja (GR No.169241
In declaring that the OMB only has the
power to recommend, but not to impose, the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found
to be at fault, the appellate court mainly relied on the following statement
made by the Court in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman[24]:
Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph 3, of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only “recommend” the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.
However, in
Ledesma, we
already elucidated on the weight to be given to the afore-quoted statement in Tapiador, by declaring that the reference to the
power of the OMB in the latter case is, at best, merely an obiter dictum that cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of
this Court.
[A] cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is suspectible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.[25]
In all, it is already well-settled
that the OMB’s power as regards the administrative
penalty to be imposed on an erring public officer or employee is not merely recommendatory. The OMB has the power to directly impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, other than a
member of Congress and the Judiciary, found to be at fault, within the exercise of its administrative
disciplinary authority as provided in the Constitution, Republic Act No.
6770, as well as jurisprudence. This
power gives the said constitutional office teeth to render it not merely
functional, but also effective. Section
21 of Republic Act No. 6770 provides:
Sec. 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
A writ of certiorari
issues for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility which must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[26]
Given the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that
the OMB has no power to impose the administrative penalty of removal on culpable
public officers.
Wherefore, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal with Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Edgardo A. Camello, concurring. Rollo, pp. 90-102.
[3]
[4] Records, pp. 15-16.
[5] Rollo, p. 93.
[6] Rollo, p. 88.
[7] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79242.
[8] Rollo, pp. 101-102.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160675, 16 June 2006, 491 SCRA 92, 108.
[13] Estarija v. Ranada, G.R. No. 159314,
[14] Entitled An Act Providing For The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Office Of Ombudsman, And For Other Purposes.
[15] Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105965-70,
[16]
[17] G.R. No. 161629,
[18] Supra note 12.
[19]
[20] Supra note 13.
[21] Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on
its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at
its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any
act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned
to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend
his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any
officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at
fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law
shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any
appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may provide in its
rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to
contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement
or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the
Commission on Audit for appropriate action;
(5) Request any government
agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and
documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by its
investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4)
hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: Provided, That the Ombudsman under its
rules and regulations may determine what cases may not be made public: Provided, further, That any publicity
issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red
tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government, and make
recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of
ethics and efficiency;
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take
testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and
have access to bank accounts and records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the
Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties
provided therein;
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its
investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the
effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein
or hereinafter provided;
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action
for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after
The
Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against high ranking
government officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints
involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of money
and/or properties.
x
x x x
Sec. 22. Investigatory Power.
– The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious
misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment,
for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.
In all cases of conspiracy between
an officer or employee of the government and a private person, the Ombudsman
and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person in the
investigation and proceed against such private person as the evidence may
warrant. The officer or employee and the
private person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same
penalties and liabilities.
x x x x
Sec. 25. Penalties. – (1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No.
807, the penalties and rules provided therein shall be applied.
[22] Estarija v. Ranada, supra note 13 at 674.
[23] G.R. No. 165416, No. 165584, No.
165731,
[24] 429 Phil. 47, 58 (2002).
[25] Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12 at 106-107.
[26] Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161640,