THIRD DIVISION
|
EDUARDO BUGHAW, JR., Petitioner, -
versus - TREASURE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 173151 Present: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. Acting Chairperson, TINGA,* CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Eduardo Bughaw, Jr., seeking
to reverse and set aside the Decision,[1]
dated
WHEREFORE, discussion considered, the
decision dated
The award of
money claims to [herein petitioner] is NULLIFIED
and RECALLED.[3]
The factual and procedural
antecedents of the instant Petition are as follows:
Sometime in March 1986,
petitioner was employed as production worker by respondent. Respondent was receiving information that
many of its employees were using prohibited drugs during working hours and
within the company premises.[4]
On
In view of Loberanes’s
statement, respondent, on
Notwithstanding said Memo,
petitioner failed to appear before the respondent’s legal counsel on the
scheduled hearing date and to explain his side on the matter.
On
Consequently,
respondent, in a third letter[8]
dated 21 August 2001 addressed to petitioner, terminated the latter’s
employment retroactive to 11 June 2001 for using illegal drugs within company
premises during working hours, and for refusal to attend the administrative
hearing and submit written explanation on the charges hurled against him.
On
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering
[herein respondent] to pay [herein petitioner] the following:
1. Separation pay P
74,100.00
2. Backwages P
27,550.00
3. Unpaid wages P 4,940.00
----------------
Total P
106,590.00
The case against respondent Emmanuel Ong is dismissed for lack of
merit.[11]
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed
the Labor Arbiter’s Decision in its Decision dated
The Motion for Reconsideration
filed by respondent was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution[13]
dated
Resolving
respondent’s Petition for Certiorari, the
Court of Appeals reversed the Decisions of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC on the
grounds of patent misappreciation of evidence and misapplication of law. The appellate court found that petitioner was
afforded the opportunity to explain and defend himself from the accusations
against him when respondents gave him notices of hearing, but petitioner
repeatedly ignored them, opting instead to file an illegal dismissal case
against respondent before the Labor Arbiter. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is simply an opportunity to explain one’s side or to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Due process is not violated where one is
given the opportunity to be heard but he chooses not to explain his side.[14]
Similarly ill-fated was
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution[15]
dated
Hence, this instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari[16]
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court filed by petitioner impugning the foregoing Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution, and raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR
NOT PETITIONER WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED FROM EMPLOYMENT.
Time and again we reiterate the
established rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review,
the Court is not a trier of facts[17] and
does not routinely undertake the reexamination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings
of facts of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in
matters within their respective jurisdiction are generally accorded not only
respect, but even finality, and are binding upon this Court,[18] when
supported by substantial evidence.[19]
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both ruled that
petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment and ordered the payment of
his unpaid wages, backwages, and separation pay, while the Court of Appeals
found otherwise. The Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC, on one hand, and the Court of Appeals, on the other, arrived at
divergent conclusions although they considered the very same evidences
submitted by the parties. It is, thus,
incumbent upon us to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support
the finding of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that petitioner was illegally dismissed. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine
otherwise.[20]
Under the Labor Code, the
requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee are two-fold, the
substantive and the procedural aspects.
Not only must the dismissal be for a just[21]
or authorized cause,[22]
the rudimentary requirements of due process - notice and hearing[23]
– must, likewise, be observed before an employee may be dismissed. Without the concurrence of the two, the
termination would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal,[24]
for employment is a property right of which one cannot be deprived of without
due process.[25]
Hence, the two (2) facets of a
valid termination of employment are: (a) the legality of the act of dismissal, i.e., the dismissal must be under any of
the just causes provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (b) the
legality of the manner of dismissal, which means that there must be observance
of the requirements of due process, otherwise known as the two-notice rule.[26]
Article 282 of the Labor Code
enumerates the just causes for terminating the services of an employee:
ART. 282.
Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for
any of the following causes:
(a)
Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work;
(b)
Gross and
habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c)
Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the
trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative;
(d)
Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous
to the foregoing.
The charge of drug abuse inside the company’s
premises and during working hours against petitioner constitutes serious
misconduct, which is one of the just causes for termination. Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not merely an error in judgment. The misconduct to be serious within the
meaning of the Act must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not
merely trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct,
however serious, must nevertheless, in connection with the work of the employee,
constitute just cause for his separation.[27] This Court took judicial notice of scientific
findings that drug abuse can damage the mental faculties of the user. It is beyond question therefore that any
employee under the influence of drugs cannot possibly continue doing his duties
without posing a serious threat to the lives and property of his co-workers and
even his employer.
Loberanes’s statements given to police during
investigation is evidence which can be considered by the respondent against the
petitioner. Petitioner failed to controvert Loberanes’ claim
that he too was using illegal drugs.
Records reveal that respondent gave petitioner a first notice dated
We thus quote with approval the
disquisition of the Court of Appeals:
The [NLRC] did not find substantial evidence in order to establish the
charge leveled against [herein petitioner] claiming that the statement of
Loberanes is legally infirm as it was an admission made under custodial
investigation; and there has been no corroborating evidence. In administrative proceedings, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.
Xxx It is sufficient that [herein petitioner] was implicated in the use of
illegal drugs and, more importantly, there is no counter-statement from [herein
petitioner] despite opportunities granted to him submit to an investigation.[30]
It was by petitioner’s own omission and inaction
that he was not able to present evidence to refute the charge against him.
Now we proceed to judge whether
the manner of petitioner’s dismissal was legal; stated otherwise, whether
petitioner was accorded procedural due process.
In Pastor
Austria v. National Labor Relations Commission,[31]
the Court underscored the significance of the two-notice rule in dismissing an
employee:
The first
notice, which may be considered as the proper charge, serves to apprise
the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought. The second notice on the other hand seeks to inform the
employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. This decision, however,
must come only after the employee is given a reasonable period from receipt of
the first notice within which to answer the charge and ample opportunity to be
heard and defend himself with the assistance of a representative if he so
desires. This is in consonance with the express provision of the law on the
protection to labor and the broader dictates of procedural due process. Non-compliance therewith is fatal
because these requirements are conditions sine qua non before dismissal may be
validly effected. (Emphases
supplied.)
While there is no dispute that
respondent fully complied with the first-notice requirement apprising
petitioner of the cause of his impending termination and giving him the
opportunity to explain his side, we find that it failed to satisfy the need for
a second notice informing petitioner that he was being dismissed from
employment.
We cannot give credence to respondent’s
allegation that the petitioner refused to receive the third letter dated
The law mandates that it is incumbent upon the employer to
prove the validity of the termination of employment.[32] Failure to discharge this evidentiary burden
would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore,
illegal.[33] Unsubstantiated claims as to alleged
compliance with the mandatory provisions of law cannot be favored by this
Court. In case of doubt, such cases
should be resolved in favor of labor, pursuant to the social justice policy of
our labor laws and Constitution.[34]
The burden
therefore is on respondent to present clear and unmistakable proof that
petitioner was duly served a copy of the notice of termination but he refused
receipt. Bare and vague allegations as
to the manner of service and the circumstances surrounding the same would not
suffice. A mere copy of the notice of
termination allegedly sent by respondent to petitioner, without proof of
receipt, or in the very least, actual service thereof upon petitioner, does not
constitute substantial evidence. It was
unilaterally prepared by the petitioner and, thus, evidently self-serving and
insufficient to convince even an unreasonable mind.
We cannot overemphasize the
importance of the requirement on the notice of termination, for we have ruled
in a number of cases[35]
that non-compliance therewith is tantamount to deprivation of the employee’s
right to due process.
This is not the first time that the Court
affirmed that there was just cause for dismissal, but held the employer liable
for non-compliance with the procedural due process. In Agabon v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[36]
we found that the dismissal of the employees therein was for valid and just
cause because their abandonment of their work was firmly established.
Nonetheless, the employer therein was held liable because it was proven that it
did not comply with the twin procedural requirements of notice and hearing for
a legal dismissal. However, in lieu of payment of backwages, we ordered
the employer to pay indemnity to the dismissed employees in the form of nominal
damages, thus:
The
violation of the petitioners’ right to statutory due process by the private
respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal
damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances…. We believe
this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of
the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it
provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the
latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.[37]
The above ruling was further clarified in Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot.[38]
In Jaka, the employees were terminated
because the corporation was financially distressed. However, the employer
failed to comply with Article 283 of the Labor Code which requires the employer
to serve a written notice upon the employees and the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) at least one month before the intended date of
termination. We first distinguished the case from Agabon, to wit:
The
difference between Agabon and the instant case is that in the former, the
dismissal was based on a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code while
in the present case, respondents were dismissed due to retrenchment, which is
one of the authorized causes under Article 283 of the same Code.
x x x x
A dismissal
for just cause under Article 282 implies that the employee concerned has
committed, or is guilty of, some violation against the employer, i.e., the employee has committed some
serious misconduct, is guilty of some fraud against the employer, or, as in
Agabon, he has neglected his duties. Thus, it can be said that the
employee himself initiated the dismissal process.
On another
breath, a dismissal for an authorized cause under Article 283 does not
necessarily imply delinquency or culpability on the part of the employee.
Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employer’s exercise of his
management prerogative, i.e., when
the employer opts to install labor saving devices, when he decides to cease
business operations or when, as in this case, he undertakes to implement a
retrenchment program.[39]
Then we elucidated on our ruling in Agabon
in this wise:
Accordingly,
it is wise to hold that: (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under
Article 282 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the
sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal
process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; and (2)
if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 but the
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be
stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise
of his management prerogative.[40]
The
Agabon doctrine enunciates the rule that if the dismissal was for just
cause but procedural due process was not observed, the dismissal should be
upheld. Where the dismissal is for just
cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not
nullify the dismissal or render it illegal or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the
employee for the violation of his right to procedural due process. The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer
to discourage the abhorrent practice of “dismiss now, pay later,” which we
sought to deter in the Serrano[41]
ruling. In Agabon[42] the nominal
damages awarded was P30,000.00.
Conformably, the award of backwages by the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC should be deleted and, instead, private respondent should
be indemnified in the amount of P30,000.00 as nominal damages.[43]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.
The Court of Appeals Decision dated P30,000.00 as nominal damages.
No costs.
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Per
Special Order No. 497, dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Vicente L.
[2] Rollo, p. 69-70.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Exceptions: a) the conclusion is a finding of fact grounded on speculations, surmises and conjectures; b) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; c) there is a grave abuse of discretion; d) there is misappreciation of facts; and e) the court, in arriving in its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admission of the parties or the evidence presented. (OSM Shipping Phil., Inc. v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 159146, 28 January 2005, 449 SCRA 525, 534).
[18] Cosep v. National Labor Relations Commission, 353 Phil. 148, 156 (1998).
[19] Abalos v. Philex Mining Corporation, 441 Phil. 386, 396 (2002).
[20] Vertudes v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 153166,
16 December 2005, 478 SCRA 210, 230.
[21] ART. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a)
Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work;
(b)
Gross and
habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c)
Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the
trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative;
(d)
Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representative; and
(e)
Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
[22] ART. 283. Closure of
establishment and reduction of personnel. -
The employer may
also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing
or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the
closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by
serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the
installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby
shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month
pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. In case of retrenchment to
prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at
least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. A fraction of at least six (6)
months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
ART. 284. Disease as ground for
termination. -
An employer may
terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any
disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial
to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he
is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to
one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a
fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
[23] Challenge Socks Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165268, 8 November 2005, 474 SCRA 356, 363-364.
[24] Vinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission, 381 Phil. 460, 482-483 (2000).
[25] JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, 99-100 (1996).
[26]
[27] Department of Labor Manual, Sec. 4343.01.
[28] Rollo, p. 120.
[29]
[30] Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[31] 371 Phil 340, 357 (1999).
[32] Times
Transportation Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos.
148500-01,
[33] Gabisay v. National Labor Relations Commission, 366 Phil. 593, 601 (1999).
[34] Mendoza v. National Labor Relations Commission, 369 Phil. 1113, 1131 (1999).
[35] Phil. Carpet Employees Association (PHILCEA) v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 168719, 22 February 2006, 483 SCRA 128, 140-141; Ariola v. Philex Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 147756, 9 August 2005, 466 SCRA 152, 171.
[36] G.R. No. 158693, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 573, as cited in DAP Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165811, 14 December 2005, 477 SCRA 792.
[37]
[38] G.R. No. 151378,
[39]
[40] DAP Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 36 at 799-800.
[41] Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission, 380 Phil. 416
(2000).
In Serrano, petitioner was employed by Isetann Department Store as a security checker but was eventually dismissed in view of employer’s cost-cutting measure without observance of the two-notice rule as mandated by the Labor Code. In this case, this court ruled that employer’s failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but mere failure to observe a procedure for termination of employment which makes the termination ineffectual.
[42] Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 36.
[43] Electro
System Industries Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 165282,